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PERIPHERY OR NOT?

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Editor: *Thomas Lundén*

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Abstract
This anthology collects papers read at the symposium "Sweden/Serbia and Europe – Periphery or Not?". It took place in Stockholm in November 2012 as part of a co-operation between the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. The theme "Periphery or Not?" refers to the spatial, cultural and political situation of the two countries in relation to what is often referred to as Central Europe, or with a slightly different definition and connotation, the Core Area of Europe. In many ways Serbia and Sweden represent very different cases of history, ethnic composition and neighbourly relations, but in some ways the two countries share problems of relating to the dominant centers of culture, economy and scholarship without losing their identity. A title used by one participant: "Sweden – the reluctant European" might well be used also for Serbia. The theme was addressed from a number of different disciplines within the humanities and social sciences.

Keywords:
Serbia, Sweden, Europe, centre-periphery, ethnicity, foreign policy, literature, political science

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Sven Gustavsson
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By *Thomas Lundén*

The symposium "Sweden/Serbia and Europe – Periphery or Not?" took place as a part of the co-operation between the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. This was the fifth meeting in a series which started in Stockholm in 1987 on the theme "Tradition and Modern Society", continuing in Belgrade and Kopaonik in 1990 with "Responsibility of Contemporary Science and Intelligentsia". The third symposium in Stockholm in 2004 dealt with the study of the respective capitals, "Stockholm–Belgrade", while another comparison between the cities, in Belgrade in 2008, focused on "Sustainable Development and the Role of Humanistic Disciplines".

The aim of all five symposia has been to gather Serbian and Swedish scholars to present papers related to the theme "Sweden/Serbia and Europe – Periphery or Not?" As can be seen from the present contributions, this theme was covered from very different angles, including history and historiography, art, economics, politics and geography. The papers in this volume only partially reflect the positive and intense discussions during the 2012 symposium and the events arranged during three gloomy November days in Stockholm. Unfortunately not all contributions could be included in this volume.

The sessions were devoted to the position of the two countries on the cultural and geopolitical scene of Europe before and after the creation of the European Union, focussing on their peripherality in relation to the Union and to the question of joining a Central European sphere of influence. In certain ways, both states can be termed "reluctant Europeans".

The initiator of the whole series of symposia, including this one, was Prof. Sven Gustavsson (together with, from the Serbian side, Prof. Predrag Palavestra who could not attend the Stockholm symposium). Despite poor health, Sven Gustavsson took an active part in the 2012 symposium and, as always, in arrangements around the sessions, including excursions, musical performances and cultural events. However, this meeting, so important to him, turned out to be his last academic appearance. He died on February 12, 2013. These proceedings are dedicated to his memory.

From European centrality to ambitious periphery

Sweden in the 17th–21st centuries

By *Rolf Torstendahl*

Sweden experienced a brief period of centrality in European affairs. The limelight that was cast upon Sweden at the Westphalian Peace Treaty and during the Seven Years' War in the North certainly delighted the Swedish King and his close associates, but it hardly made the people of Sweden happy. The most severe burden was not the money cost: subsidies, the spoils of war and extra taxes extracted from the areas where the wars were fought helped to ease the pecuniary burden for the Swedish peasantry. But they could not evade the constant recruitment of soldiers from among their farmhands and their sons. Parts of the country were in real danger of being laid waste, as very few of those who were recruited ever came back.[1]

The duration of Sweden's period of grandeur was limited to little more than ninety years – from the peace of Stolbovo in 1617, which provided an important take-off for Swedish power on the continent, to the Swedish defeat in the battle of Poltava in 1709 and the consequent capitulation of a great part of the Swedish army. Swedish influence on European politics reached its summit twice.

The first was the years 1656–58, when Karl X Gustav had fought his war and reached his goals against Poland-Lithuania, which was then in dissolution. The shores of the Baltic Sea were to a large extent under Swedish control, and, after a winter war against Denmark in 1658, still more coastline became Swedish. Sweden seemed to have attained the *dominium maris baltici*, which had been regarded as a pipe dream in earlier decades but was now a reality. As Peter Englund has noted, the successful Swedish warfare provoked some alarm even in England, and Sweden was at the centre of interest not only in Eastern Europe but also in Western Europe, where usually little attention was paid to news from the eastern part of the continent.[2] That moment was soon gone, and Karl X Gustav died in 1660.

The second moment of political centrality came in 1706–07, when Karl XII had

his main army quarters in Altranstädt in Saxonia. After forcing Augustus II the Strong to abdicate and selecting Stanislaw Leszczyński as the future king of Poland, Karl XII received emissaries from powers all over Europe, notably a diplomat from Louis XIV and a personal visit from the Duke of Marlborough, and thus played a role not only through his own warfare but as a potential ally in the ongoing war over the Spanish succession.[3]

No wonder that Swedish poets and literary men have sung about the heroic deeds of Swedish soldiers, officers and kings during these nine decades, and historians have painted beautiful word pictures of bravery and strategy. But it has rarely been stressed how short and limited this period of attention from other powers was, the period when the Swedish state really played a leading role on the European stage, becoming the object of flattering attention from France and other great powers.

Before Stolbovo in 1617 the situation was different. After the Viking Period and the gradual incorporation of Finland into the Swedish kingdom, Sweden was confined to a stable territory for centuries. At the time the realm included neither the southernmost counties of modern Sweden, which were Danish, nor part of the west of modern Sweden. On the other hand Finland was part of the country, which meant that people there had the same rights and duties as those in Sweden. During this period Sweden's centre of gravity was thus located a considerable distance to the east of what is now the case. The realm's moves eastward and westward from 1500 to 1905 are worth some contemplation.

Sweden had come out of the Middle Ages as a weak state. The founder of the Vasa dynasty, Gustav I, pursued a cautious foreign policy, for he knew that common men along the Danish border were much keener on trade with Denmark than on defending his newly won realm. His sons – three of whom became kings – had wider ambitions. In 1561 Estonia was acquired (by its own choice) as a province under the Swedish crown. By 1617 Sweden with Finland formed the core of a realm which included Estonia and Ingria, and had dynastic interests in Poland.

Against this backdrop, the rise of Sweden to a Great Power in Europe under the reigns of Gustav II Adolf (1611–32) and Karl X Gustav (1654–60) was the result of hazardous aggression and favourable circumstances. In 1630 Sweden intervened in the Thirty Years' War, which has led some historians to regard parts of Germany as a main object of Swedish policy. This is probably not true. Swedish interests in fact focused on Livonia, the Muscovite State and Poland (both Gustav II Adolf and Karl X Gustav began their reigns with wars against Poland), and only gradually did the economic interest in occupied ports and their custom duties make Sweden aspire to permanently possess German lands. (At the time the Muscovite State was slowly recovering from a condition of dissolution, called the Times of Troubles, *Smutnoe vremia*, that lasted from 1598 until the coronation of Mikhail Romanov as tsar in 1613.) The result of these

wars, and, in addition, repeated wars against Denmark, was to change the geographic position of the Swedish realm. With the Peace of Westphalia Sweden acquired certain provinces in northern Germany, and in other peace treaties Denmark had to cede permanently the rich regions at the southern end of the Scandinavian Peninsula. This moved Sweden westward.

Karl XII (1697–1718) was less lucky in his wars than his grandfather Karl X Gustav had been fifty years earlier. Karl XII won several battles and made brave forays deep into Russia, but he lost the war. One single defeat was decisive, at Poltava in 1709. Piotr I of Russia was quick to take advantage of the situation, when Swedes had suffered huge losses of men and a considerable part of their army had capitulated. The Russians grabbed the actual power in the Baltic region and started to build St Petersburg on what was still nominally Swedish soil. In the peace treaty of 1721 (the war ended in 1719) Piotr's power over these regions was legalised, and Sweden's era as a great power formally ended. Sweden had been a threat to Russia and Poland for a century, but after 1720 the position of Russia as the dominating power of Eastern Europe was undisputed. From then on Sweden was no longer at the centre of European politics, even though one or the other of the great powers would always be eager to make it an ally by means of bribes to leading Swedes.

It took a century for Sweden – and Swedish kings and politicians – to adapt to their country's diminished status. Several times – including the final vain effort of Karl XII to capture Norway from Denmark as a compensation for other losses – Swedish politics in the eighteenth century were based on overestimates of Swedish forces and power. The Swedish parliament, elected but not through democratic franchise, was the fundamental ruler of Sweden in 1720–72. Its leading politicians were tempted to show that Sweden still played a role in European affairs and thus pursued adventurous policies. Wars were started and lost, which meant that Sweden's remaining province on the Continent, a piece of Vorpommern, was reduced and finally lost entirely in 1814. A hazardous attack on Russia in the 1790s was surprisingly well conducted and did not lead to new losses, which was celebrated as a victory. However, during the Napoleonic wars the new Swedish king was strictly anti-Napoleonic. After Napoleon's treaty with Aleksandr I of Russia at Tilsit in 1807, Aleksandr seized the opportunity to take Finland. A humiliating new peace treaty of 1809 made Sweden even more peripheral than before. Having lost all former provinces plus the 'Eastern half of the Realm' as Finland was often called, Sweden was pushed still farther to the west, and any ambitions to establish Sweden as a major power in Eastern Europe had finally to be abandoned.

Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, a French marshal who became crown-prince in 1810 and king of Sweden in 1818, laid the foundations of a new policy. It was distinguished by diplomatic ambitions, military showiness and unobtrusiveness in a rare mix that has ever since been characteristic of Swedish foreign policy. Bernadotte came to an under-

standing with Aleksandr I and sent a Swedish army to participate in the final battle against Napoleon. But he also used it for an attack on Denmark in order to acquire Norway for his kingdom. Because of Norwegian ambitions for self-governance, manifested in a new constitution, the political solution had to be a union of two separate kingdoms with a common head of state. Thus Sweden's prestige grew only marginally, while the prestige of the monarch increased with a second country under his sovereignty. The union ended, after a long period of disputes, with its dissolution in 1905. It would seem that Sweden had thereby finally had come to accept its peripheral status.

It turned out to be more complicated than anticipated to maintain an unobtrusive position. During the First World War the Swedish (conservative) government wanted to avoid taking sides and immediately declared Sweden's neutrality, which was backed up by Hjalmar Branting, the leader of the Social Democratic Party.[4] The belligerent parties asked for special favours in negotiations on trade and, as war advanced, asked for supplies of specific goods (needed for military purposes) in exchange for provisions. Despite difficulties in feeding the Swedish population, the government began collaborating first with Nordic neighbours and then with other neutral states in order to maintain neutrality. Even the U.S. and President Wilson were approached in 1916 (i.e. before the U.S. had entered the war) and responded positively to a proposal for a conference of neutral states, where the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain and the Nordic states were other invited parties.[5]

Sweden managed to stay outside of any real fighting, but several Swedish merchant ships were sunk or attacked. This experience made the new Swedish Labour governments susceptible to the idea of a peace project for the world in the shape of the League of Nations. In 1920 Branting was a leading actor in the Swedish parliament in favour of participation in the League, while the Conservatives and Left-wing Socialists feared that membership would mean the end of neutrality. As a delegate for Sweden in 1921, Branting gave a speech to the League where he emphasised the interests of small states against the great powers. Thus Sweden for the first time articulated the right of minor states (peripheral states) and supported a political front-line of small states against the dominating powers.[6] When Branting formed his second government in 1924, Östen Undén became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Undén was an ardent advocate of the rights of small states, and he tried to gather other minor states for the same policy. His policy had an important impact on the solution of the Locarno crisis in 1925, and thus the active policy from the periphery paid off.[7]

Thus Sweden took up a task which has since been a recurring theme in the country's peripheral policy. Its main idea has been to join forces with other states on the periphery to protect common interests by peaceful means and mostly within organisations of international cooperation. A specific condition from the Swedish side has been that this cooperation should not come into conflict with the policy of neutrality

(non-alliance in peace and neutrality in war), which was agreed upon among Swedish political parties as a foundation of Swedish foreign policy. It is somewhat exaggerated to say that the political parties really agreed on this policy, for during the dominance of the Social Democrats in Swedish politics between 1932 and 1976, other parties, especially the Conservatives, often questioned various consequences that the Social Democrats claimed to follow from the policy of neutrality. However, during the Second World War a national coalition government was formed, where a diplomat, Christian Günther, was entrusted with the post as Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the war there was very little political discussion about the neutrality policy, and the government's line was broadly accepted.

Especially during the early war years some right-wing groups – small but vociferous – wanted Sweden to take the German side. Their opponents, on the other hand, criticising concessions to German requests, were silenced through constraints on the freedom of press. The confiscation of newspapers and journals that voiced anti-Nazi views was part of the balancing policy of neutrality. Nevertheless, the criticism of German politics was well known, which generated German protests, and this in turn helped to calm the conscience of advocates of the neutrality policy. In a few situations during the war the Swedish government satisfied German demands in a way that met with widespread criticism (especially after the war). These occasions showed that strict neutrality in war was a difficult position. The deviations from strict neutrality were defended with the argument that the Germans would have or might have assaulted Sweden otherwise, which critics denied, and it is difficult to determine who was right about the risks, given the information that was at hand at the time.

From the start in 1932 of Per Albin Hansson's first term as Prime Minister (with Undén at one of the less important posts in the ministry) the neutrality policy was combined with a cautious and unobtrusive position that contrasted with Branting's and Undén's active policy from the periphery. The war strengthened this isolationist position, and the new leader of the Social Democratic Party from 1946, Tage Erlander, showed as little interest in an active mobilisation of small states as did Hansson. Wartime experience showed that it was difficult to get warring states to respect neutrality, even when they had declared their willingness to do so in international treaties. Swedish politicians hoped that the United Nations, created after the war, would generate stronger protection for the rights of minor states, among them neutral ones, in times of war. Interestingly, Dag Hammarskjöld, the future Secretary General of the UN, made his career in the Swedish administration as a close collaborator and undersecretary to the Minister of Finance, Ernst Wigforss, who wanted to keep Sweden off the international scene, but later also to Östen Undén who had come back as Minister of Foreign Affairs after the war.[8]

Very soon it turned out that the post-war world was not primarily dominated by

internationalism in the form of the UN, but rather by alliances under the shields of the superpowers. At first these alliances focused on Europe, and European states rallied under the one banner or the otherness. A few stayed outside on principle, and Sweden was one of these. The criticism of this principled Swedish neutrality was rather strong in the years 1948–50, and even experts within the administration had strong objections to the government's position.[9] Undén's standpoint had not changed from the interwar period. He rejected participation in any military alliance and wanted neutrality, which he saw as the only morally defensible policy for a state that wanted no war and no participation in the machinery of war. However, his old idea of getting a strong lobby of minor states in the international organisation – once the League of Nations, now the United Nations – was clearly not viable. A comparison of his diary or notebook from these years with the interwar period shows a reorientation from foreign to domestic policy.[10]

At this stage Undén was slowly and quietly deserted by his fellow social democrats.[11] Prime Minister Erlander began to look for support in international social democracy instead of in the UN, and his prime advisor in these matters became Olof Palme, who was his assistant and secretary from 1953. Unlike the older generation of social democrats Palme had a genuine interest in making international contacts. The Socialist International was a perfect instrument for such contact-making. Palme's début there in 1954 was successful in Erlander's opinion: the former acted as the latter's right hand at a meeting in Sweden between Clement Attlee, Erich Ollenhauer and other leaders of the Socialist International about the future of Germany.[12] While Erlander was still careful not to engage Sweden in general European affairs, Palme soon widened his circle from social democrats to politicians in general around the world.[13] As prime minister 1969–76 and 1982–86 he had plenty of opportunity to create a network of contacts. Late in his career he was active in the formation of a group of nonaligned states with Indira Gandhi (Rajiv Gandhi after her), Julius Nyerere, Andreas Papandreou and others. This group wanted to form a counterweight to the two blocks of states allied to the superpowers.

It became a central object of Swedish foreign policy to promote all manner of initiatives independently of the power blocks of the cold war. Sweden also, under Palme's leadership, made several political demonstrations against the superpowers – both of them, but what got most attention in Sweden and in the West were demonstrations against U.S. policy. This is not to say that they were particularly effective, but they were certainly noted as a protest from the periphery of the divided world. A constant element was an effort to make close contacts with developing countries, another periphery. Among these activities were a persistent encouragement of the Palestinian community and an effort to strengthen its cause. Another case was Cuba, where Palme became a welcome guest, annoying the Americans by his clear standpoint against the

American blockade. A third case – chronologically the first one – was Palme's open criticism of the American side in the Vietnam War.

Palme was certainly the most visible Swedish politician in the late 1960s and the 1970s and after his comeback as prime minister in 1982 until he was assassinated in 1986. He is often presented as if he created something completely new and unprecedented. This is not quite true. Palme was walking in the footsteps of an earlier generation of social democrats in his principles, though not in his actions, for he was bold where they had been cautious. The principles that he tried to defend in regard to the small states of Europe and the world were similar to those of Undén in his early days: small states ought to cooperate in order to get their rights respected by the great powers. This was an active policy from the periphery.

Sweden lost part of its position and international prestige as spokesperson for small and independent states with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the blame for this fell hard on the country's Social Democrats. There was a lack of recognition from the Swedish foreign minister in regard to the liberation movements of the Baltic States, and Swedish policy was looked upon as a defence of the past, while the foreign minister saw only a balancing between the Soviet Union and its critics, such as Sweden had performed earlier. It took considerable time before Sweden could regain some of its credibility among minor states, and now it was hardly the Social Democrats who pushed. The active policies towards Palestine, Darfur, and recently the Arab countries in upheaval have been at least equally backed up by the conservatives and the liberals. Before the Arabs appeared on the agenda, the Swedish tradition of criticism of Israel and support for the Palestinians had temporarily changed under Prime Minister Göran Persson, whose international conferences in commemoration of the Holocaust gave Swedish social democracy a new image: this was a new activity from the periphery. This new orientation became a parenthesis, for policy returned to its old tracks when Persson resigned after the Conservative victory in the elections of 2006. Interestingly, Swedish policy in the Palestinian conflict with Israel has returned to the same general lines under the current non-socialist government as it had before Persson under the Social Democrats.

Another new feature of Swedish foreign policy is that Sweden has been involved in several activities led not by the United Nations but by NATO, which might throw doubt on the policy of no alliances. Those who have initiated and backed up this policy point to a tacit understanding from long ago that Sweden's sympathies lie with the West. But the Social Democrats have been unwilling to endorse policies on this ground, even though they have consented to Swedish engagement in some NATO-led activities. By enrolling in such military activities and in the economic collective of the EU, Sweden has reduced or forfeited the possibility of using the periphery as a basis for a standing as spokesperson for small states. For a period the initiative from the pe-

riphery shifted from Sweden to Norway, but it may just recently have passed on to other countries.

A note on references

A piece like this, intended as a paper for discussion of a development from centre to periphery, cannot be substantiated throughout by examples and footnotes, which would make it indigestible. In regard to examples I have restricted myself to giving some details here about the centrality of Swedish politics in the 17th to early 18th centuries and some others about the transition from unobtrusive isolation to ambitious networking under Social Democratic rule in the 20th century. These were chosen to show the points of my argument and should not be interpreted to be the only ones of their kind or to be of special importance for the train of events. Mostly I have avoided references for facts and events that are at hand in textbooks on Swedish history.

Endnotes

1 For the effects on wars on Sweden itself, see Jan Lindegren, *Utskrivning och utsugning: Produktion och reproduktion i Bygdeå 1620–1640*, Uppsala (Studia hist. Ups. 117), 1980.

2 Peter Englund, *Den oövervinnerlige. Om den svenska stormaktstiden och en man i dess mitt*, Stockholm (Atlantis), 2000, 314. His analysis of the situation in 1656 occupies several chapters, pp. 298–560.

3 Fredrik Ferdinand Carlson, *Sveriges historia under konungarne af Pfalziska huset*, vol. 8, 49–62 (this volume authored by Ernst Carlson).

4 Torsten Gihl, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia*, vol. IV (1914–1919), Stockholm (Norstedts), 30.

5 For this episode, see ibidem, 193–203. On Sweden's neutrality and the war, see ibidem, passim.

6 Erik Lönnroth, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, vol. V (1919–1939), Stockholm (Norstedts), 1959, 30–40.

7 On Sweden's standpoint and Undén's activities in the Locarno crisis, see Lönnroth, op. cit., 77–104. Undén's policy made Sweden seem to be a mouthpiece for Germany, while Undén saw the same actions as part of the neutrality policy.

8 Hammarskjöld's schooling into his future office is interesting and very competently clarified by Hans Landberg in the book *På väg ... Dag Hammarskjöld som svensk ämbetsman*, Stockholm (Atlantis), 2012.

9 See Karl Molin, *Omstridd neutralitet. Experternas kritik av svensk utrikespolitik 1948–1950*, Stockholm (Tiden), 1991 and Sten Ottosson, Den (o)moraliska neutraliteten, Stockholm (Santérus), 2000.

10 Östen Undén, *Anteckningar*, vol. 1: 1918–1952; vol.2: 1952–1966.

11 Undén had become a symbolic figure for Sweden's neutrality, while Erlander with Palme's sup-

port had outspoken ideas about economic integration in Europe versus the need of a European army. See Klaus Misgeld, *Sozialdemokratie und Aussenpolitik in Schweden. Sozialistische Internationale, Europapolitik und die Deutschlandsfrage 1945–1955*, Frankfurt/Main & New York (Campus), 1984, 448–50, qote 449.

12 Tage Erlander, [Memoirs] 1949–1954, Stockholm (Tiden), 1974, 353–357.

13 Two new biographies of Palme give abundant materials for his development as a politician. Kjell Östberg, *I takt med tiden. Olof Palme 1927–1969*, Stockholm (Leopard), 2008; Kjell Östberg, *När vinden vände. Olof Palme 1969–1986*, Stockholm (Leopard), 2009; Henrik Berggren, *Underbara dagar framför oss: En biografi över Olof Palme*, Stockholm (Norstedts), 2010.

Carl Larsson's Decorative Programme for the National Museum and its Controversial Ending

By *Hans Henrik Brummer*

Stockholm's National Museum was created in response to the need for somewhere to house the bulk of the royal collections. This national cultural heritage consisted of the Royal Library, the collections of the Academy of Antiquities, the Royal Armoury and the national collections of classical statues and works of art. In 1845 parliament voted by a slight majority to erect a building for the museum, which was to be located on Blasieholmen, the island facing the royal palace. The museum was completed in 1866.

The main commission for the architectural design was awarded to Friedrich August Stüler, a Berlin architect with a firmly established reputation for large-scale museums. Great expectations had been invested in the task that faced him. In his sketch for the staircase (fig. 3:1), the future museum's central hall, the architect provided a processional venue with undeniable symbolic value.

Stüler's proposed cross-section of the staircase projects a pattern of movement from a sunken ground floor to the first floor, from which a broad stairway rises to lead up to a monumental space with pillars, niches and a clerestory. The three-aisled ground floor with its low, shallow vaults has pictorial stained glass windows and historical attributes in the shape of equestrian statues, banners and other objects. The floor above it is empty, while the top floor takes the form of gallery with a coherent décor of classical sculptures against blue walls. A cast of part of the Parthenon frieze surmounts the lofty porch to bisect the vertical surface.

In this sketch two distinct collections are epitomised. The historical attributes on the ground floor encapsulate the collections of the Academy of Antiquities in what resembles an impressive memorial. On the top floor, the white marble classical statues denote the entrance to the national art collection.

Stüler's proposed segregation left the middle floor unfurnished. The question of whether the Royal Library and the Royal Armoury were to move here had not yet been

FIG. 3:1. *Friedrich August Stüler,* National Museum*, project for staircase 1848. After* Byggnadsstyrelsens jubileumsskrift*, Stockholm 1969, p. 130–131. Original in the National Archives, sub-archive Byggnadsstyrelsen, Sign. P. S. 132/19.*

settled. In the end the constantly expanding library was given its own building, and when the National Museum was inaugurated in 1866 the Royal Armoury took temporary possession of the middle floor. This arrangement lasted for twenty years, after which the Armoury moved out and its place was taken by the extensive collections of applied art which formed one section of the national art collection.

The National Museum was not originally planned as an art gallery. If that had been the case, it would have been called the National Gallery. Some considerable time was to elapse before the visual arts took over the entire building. The archaeological and historical collections of the Academy of Antiquities also expanded continually and had long been in need of larger premises before they were transferred in 1939 from the ground floor of the National Museum to the modern building that is today called the Swedish History Museum.

Stüler's sketch of the monumental stairwell, at any rate, indicates the main features of a situation that would last for 75 years. This coincided with a highly patriotic interval in Sweden's awareness of its own history: the period around the turn of the century when the national self-image was made up of shifting and often coinciding perspectives – local patriotism, folklore studies, ethnology, archaeology, aestheticism, nostalgia, national romanticism, patriotic fervour or plain chauvinism.

The original architectonical delineation of the stairwell was explicit enough. Stüler's loosely defined proposal was, in principle, implemented. Plaster casts of the Parthenon frieze, sketched by the architect, were installed on each side of the staircase leading up to the upper hall. And following Stüler's recommendations and prevailing museum practice, casts were procured that had been made from famous originals in Europe's great museums. But there was no coherent programme for the treatment of the walls – neither in the lower part of the stairwell with the entrance to the archaeological and historical collections nor in the upper hall with its allusions to the canonical European heritage symbolised by Greek and Roman statues. The final choice seemed inevitable. A national museum required national themes, which is what Stüler had already recommended.

When the programme of subjects that could suitably decorate the walls was discussed in connection with the various rounds of competitions, its focus was clear. The symbolic figures were to be taken from a romantically defined Swedish national image. This included Medieval figures such as Ansgar, "the Apostle of the North", and St Bridget. Three royal heroes were Gustav Vasa, Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII. Science was represented by Linnaeus, sculpture by Johan Tobias Sergel and poetry by Carl Michael Bellman.

The programme that was finally adopted for the lower hall took the form of a tribute to royal patronage of artistic culture in the past. In the summer of 1896 Carl Larsson was able, with the help of Italian assistants, to complete the monumental frescoes in the triptych framework imposed by the architecture of each wall.

The three panels in the north depict royal collectors and artists' studios. To the left the first panel offers informal encounters with art. Next to a magnificently framed painting by François Boucher, Carl Gustav Tessin seeks the favour of Queen Lovisa Ulrika by demonstrating a large work extracted from a portfolio of drawings. In the central panel Gustav III strikes an Apollonian attitude as he advances with raised hands to welcome a marble statue imported from Rome. To the right Sergel is depicted at work on his sculptural group *Amor and Psyche*, inspired by Bellman singing in the background.

The corresponding three panels in the south are primarily homages to the major project of Sweden's Great Power Era – the erection of the royal palace in Stockholm.

- The central panel depicts work on this extensive building. On scaffolding erected around the still unplastered façade, the royal architects are united in a handshake. After having made his round of inspection it is the grave Nicodemus Tessin Jr. who occupies the stage. Wearing a full-bottomed wig and a fur-lined cloak, he makes a dignified pause to receive the congratulations of his admiring fellow architect and successor, Carl Hårleman. On either side of this ceremony we are shown artistic creation in the service of the realm.
- On the left David Klöcker Ehrenstrahl is busy at a large canvas on which he is painting Karl XI who poses sitting on a blue blanket decorated with crowns for an equestrian portrait.
- The interior on the right depicts students in the Royal Drawing Academy, eagerly at work on sketches of a live model under the direction of Guillaume Thomas Taraval.

It was one thing to surround the entrance to archaeology and early history with themes taken from the Swedish kingdom's artistic heritage. This nationalist focus was enhanced, however, by Larsson's next commission.

In January 1908 he signed an oil painting on canvas to be attached to the upper hall of the museum over the entrance to the art collection. The scene he depicts is highly patriotic. As visitors mount the stairs their gaze is drawn to Gustav Vasa entering Stockholm on a white horse at midsummer in 1523 (fig. 3:2). Neither the critics nor the public viewed Larsson's Gustav Vasa as controversial – quite the opposite. Everything was in place: midsummer and joy that the realm had finally been liberated by its true ruler. The artist's earlier intention to continue with a motif from Gustavus Adolphus's reign on the empty western wall opposite was hardly likely to raise any eyebrows either.

But this was not to be. Larsson had another idea, which was rejected – even though the subject he chose did not lack relevance in a museum which housed prehistoric objects. The fundamental ideologies that sustain the world of art came into fierce and

FIG. 3:2. *Carl Larsson,* Gustav Vasa received in Stockholm 1523*, 1908. Photo © Nationalmuseum, Stockholm.*

indiscriminate conflict. His critics had, we must assume, arguments that were more or less sound. But did the infected debate that resulted in the artist's withdrawal conceal something we should know about? The decisive moment came when nationalism found other forms of expression than those that deploy the symbolic language of authority. Larsson was no longer extolling the conventional manner in which monarchy manifests itself. It was not without risk that he had turned to other sources.

A great deal was at stake: Larsson's reputation and standing as a monumental painter. "*Midwinter Sacrifice* was my ruination", he wrote in his autobiography. He had hoped to be able to fill the empty wall with a portrayal of an imagined sacrifice from prehistoric Sweden. After the negative decision by the committee, heavy-handed debate in the press and protracted negotiations, there was nothing more he could do but put into storage a multitude of sketches and a final version of the motif that was just over 13 metres long. His first inklings of the concept had taken shape around 1910, but in June 1916 it was all over as far as he was concerned. "I got sick of the whole thing and withdrew my *Midwinter Sacrifice*", was his disgruntled summary.

The artist had been granted a vision. Using Adam of Bremen and Snorri Sturluson as his meagre sources he had called upon his imagination to envisage the ancient temple of Old Uppsala. A ritual is being enacted in the frosty forecourt with its verdant trees. Maidens are dancing, men are blowing horns and warrior chieftains parading in their armour. A queen falls to the ground, overcome by sorrow. Her husband, Domal-

de, King of the Svear, stands ready to die to alleviate the famine that afflicts his realm. He is the sacrificial victim, and the altar will run red with his blood. Long before, Olof Dahlin had described how the king of the Svear was placed on a stone and then strangled rapidly so that his body could be drained of its blood with the sacrificial knife. In the simple medium offered by woodcuts, this imagined ritual was illustrated by the Norwegian artist Erik Werenskiold.

Suffering is a perennial theme in art. But at least for Larsson's influential main opponent, Ludvig Looström, Director and Keeper of the museum, this obvious fact was irrelevant. The sight of the sacrificial priest's dagger in ominous proximity to the naked skin of a male figure cancelled out his well-versed respect for the infinite variety of sacrificial scenes depicted in church interiors and art galleries. The disquieting idea of ritual murder took the upper hand. The artist Richard Bergh, who was to succeed Looström as director of the museum, also reacted, invoking rationality and finding that it would be enough to depict the midwinter celebrations of the Svear without bloodshed. Those responsible were faced with difficulties in justifying their decision when the conflict of interest was obvious to all. The nation's monumental painter had to accept being challenged. The resistance Larsson met with did not come primarily from "the assaults of modern artists". This is a view that has been constructed in retrospect. The fact that he had got the wrong end of the stick regarding current scholarship about prehistoric Sweden was perhaps embarrassing, but this was compensated for by the artistically justifiable selection of archaeological attributes. The support from his fellow artists Anders Zorn, Julius Kronberg, Bruno Liljefors and the manipulative Minister of Culture, Karl Gustaf Westman, was not enough. What mattered was that Larsson could not depend on support from either elderly conservatives or radicals of his own age with the power to approve or reject his plans. Covert motives and fierce opposition were what he had to take into account.

There is a great deal that obstructs any understanding of the work's basic concept. The artist's identification with the mysterious king of the Svear is, admittedly, not without relevance. But to what end? Was he dwelling on the myth of the self-sacrificing artist? Did he feel that he had been harmed by recent political interference in artistic policies? By life's contrariness? Was he letting off steam with outspoken allusions? The art historian Arne Danielsson has suggested that the figure in wolf skins extending strangler's hands towards the victim on the gilded sledge is a caricature of Ludvig Looström, that his companion in bear skin resembles the critic August Brunius and that the mourning figure glimpsed behind the priest's sacrificial dagger depicts Karl Gustaf Westman. The possibility is there, as the faces were not painted in until the final version of *Midwinter Sacrifice* was produced (fig. 3:3).

A distracting reinterpretation of the idea of sacrifice itself crossed the artist's mind at the time of a political manifestation, the so-called "Peasant Uprising", in 1914. "I can,

FIG. 3:3. *Carl Larsson,* Midvinterblot*, 1915. Photo © Nationalmuseum, Stockholm.*

however", he wrote to Westman, "hear the sound of knives being sharpened all over Sweden to sacrifice the country's present high-principled and fearless king". Larsson was asked to design posters for the event and thus contributed to this massive manifestation in support of the armed forces, which culminated in the assembly of 30,000 farmers from across Sweden in the courtyard of the royal palace in Stockholm to pay their respects to King Gustav V. The king's speech of thanks – incendiary in relation to the country's constitution – brought about the fall of the government and the dissolution of the Lower House of the parliament.

What has been disregarded and never really taken seriously concerns a stake in an exceedingly ambitious project. To Larsson's contemporaries this was something that did not really ring true. The apostle of happiness and bliss was not expected to explore more highly fraught regions, to break the established pattern. His idyll at Sundborn was one thing. Larsson's wish to represent a patriarchal cult of the earth of more majestic magnitude was something else. *Midwinter Sacrifice* had been preceded by ideas on a larger scale. In 1908 in the journal *Ord och Bild* Larsson suggested a project to honour the nation – a Pantheon-like temple to be built on one of the Late Iron Age burial mounds of Old Uppsala (fig: 3:4).

The Swedish realm has liberated itself and cast off the façade of the Evangelical-Lutheran kingdom. The boundary between paganism and Christianity has been eradicated. The cult of the nation reaches from an assumed glorious prehistory while at the same time offering faith in the future. "We Swedes will remain eternally young," the artist rejoices. The ancient temple described by Adam of Bremen is a prototypical mirage, the bells of the village church bestow reverence and a new temple with its processional passages stands outlined against the sky. In the temple's vestibule are three familiar marble statues by the royal sculptor Bengt Fogelberg. Oden and Thor embody wisdom and power, while Balder offers consolation through his redemptive clemency. A broad staircase leads the visitor down to the heroes' burial chamber with an image of Christ on the Cross to be seen behind Fogelberg's statue of Balder.



FIG. 3:4. *Carl Larsson,* Project for a temple to be built at Old Uppsala*, 1907. After* Ord & Bild *1908.*

Larsson was familiar with the belief that paganism contained presages of Christ's vicarious passion. He adopted the ideas about redemption that can be found in Esaias Tegnér's *Frithiof's Saga* and Viktor Rydberg's writings on the psychology of religion. The passage from Balder to Christ was made in the knowledge that the step from paganism to Christianity was easy to take. Different revelations, but in essence each the same.

In this range of subjects the artist found a motif that summed up the guiding principle of the envisaged temple. *Midwinter Sacrifice* depicts the idea of sacrifice to gua-

rantee the continued existence of the nation. One step has been taken towards a mythologised nationalism, one-sided and misleading in its self-image and its beliefs in continuity and distinctiveness.

But the project never achieved its intended effect. It is a relic of an installation envisaged for a symbolic setting that can no longer be seen. In Larsson's day, the lower section of the National Museum's staircase was dominated by Fogelberg's colossal marble gods, who flanked the entrance to the archaeological collections of the Academy of Antiquities. Balder, on the first floor, formed the apex of this group, visible from the upper hall as well. Here, at the end of the broad staircase, we face the largest gallery in the museum. Seen from here at the time, to the west stood the slender figure of Balder reflecting the light from the water outside. It was not until *Midwinter Sacrifice* was placed here experimentally in the inter-war years that the artist's intentions were realised. The sacrificial death of Domalde is enhanced by its association with the Christ-like figure of Balder. Both could now be viewed in spatial contact with each other. Ludvig Looström was right when he said that the "artistic concept had manifestly been conjured up by intellectual transfiguration of the Christian doctrine of redemption".

In his *Sleepwalking Nights* (1884) August Strindberg considered Oden, Thor and Balder as rejects. "You have been placed in the hallway among the overshoes and walking sticks, forbidden to enter the temple." Larsson was to weave his fantasies around the Old Norse divinities more assiduously. Strindberg and Larsson took different paths. Things came to a head when the author of *A New Blue Book* (1908) depicted the enviable patriarch of Sundborn as a "mendaciously invented character" and their friendship ended forever. Here the utopian opposed the enemy of dissembling.

For the utopian the price was high. The gods really have been rejected and the cult of the earth long since been discredited as obsolete nationalism. Was there any room for a programme with quasi-Christian substance in the national temple to art? Its clergy were reluctant and, when all was said and done, Larsson was left in isolation with his not entirely pellucid allusions to the conservative programme of the Peasant's Uprising. It had not been entirely without risk to create a nationalistic ideology around his own uneasy personality using features borrowed from Old Norse mythology and Christianity.

Even so there are good reasons for allowing *Midwinter Sacrifice* to occupy its intended place. With its frieze-like composition the work works well in its architectural setting. But our gaze is mainly stimulated by Larsson's familiar idiom. This endows the large surface with coherence, but ironically tends to live a life of its own in relation to the chosen content. Flowing lines and bright colours have reminded the artist's critics of printed posters. Karl Nordström remained steadfast in viewing the palette of *Midwinter Sacrifice* as far too garish and far too thin to make any impression of substantiality.

Was the bright tonal mood a deliberate choice or a fixed reflex? To Larsson himself his tried and tested idiom seemed the best possible in his ambition to depict patriarchs as the proud possessors of "magnificent garments and resplendent jewels". The kingly sacrifice demanded splendour and light if it was to offer edification. But the question remains whether a choice of style, adapted to the kind of life he aspired to, was able to sustain a concept that was more demanding and fraught with conflict. Is it at all possible to take the symbolism of the impending sacrifice seriously? This is doubtful. Larsson was working in a genre that aimed no further than ceremony and temple ritual. It is quite another matter that the subject inspires questions that go well beyond providing an art gallery with an imposing entrance.

Insofar as *Midwinter Sacrifice* can be viewed as a work of modern art, the modernity consists of the link with *fin de siècle* symbolism and its free use of original myths. Beliefs about religion and nationalism work together, disregarding chronological or geographical domains. The power of the conventional symbols of the Swedish realm pales before the concept of nation that emerges from *Midwinter Sacrifice*. It is distantly related instead to the legendary production of *The Rite of Spring*. Igor Stravinsky's music has gone down in history as a modernist masterpiece. But the original performance of the ballet in Paris in 1913 was in a setting produced by Nicholas Roerich, who was responsible with Stravinsky for the libretto. Roerich, a close associate of the ballet's impresario Sergei Diaghilev, was a remarkable mixture of ethnologist, archaeologist and artist, absorbed by dreams of the Stone Age: by dreams of a time when Russia's open meadows and the banks of her lakes and rivers were peopled by patriarchs allied to eastward Viking travellers.

The subtitle of the Ballet is *Scenes from Pagan Russia in Two Images.* The setting Roerich conjured up was a stylised burial ground with dancers in old-fashioned Slavic folk dress and bearskins. The first image depicts the tribe praying to the earth, the second the sacrificial dance of the chosen maiden, which culminates when the tribe's oldest member raises her corpse so that it cannot touch the ground. Her death is a necessity if life is to continue. Allied with the impact of Vaslav Nijinsky's choreography and Stravinsky's music with its cascades of diabolic rhythms, this pagan fertility rite was to strike its disoriented audience with all the force of a *succé de scandale*.

What has survived, for very good reasons, to become history is Stravinsky's music. The setting has been consigned to the archives and is therefore easily forgotten. Roerich sought a decorative symbolism that has certain points of contact with Larsson's art nouveau festoons and striking palette. But they were above all united in their cult of the earth and their preoccupation with an proto-historical past. That these conceptual worlds have taken different directions is one thing. *Blut und Boden* is one possibility, theosophy another. As modernist experimentation with form it is only really Stravinsky's music that turned out to have any staying power.

When *Midwinter Sacrifice* was hung experimentally in the National Museum in the late 1920s negative opinion still prevailed, unaltered. The work was removed and returned to the artist's heirs. Many of its advocates were convinced that that the rejection was politically motivated. Larsson's influential opponents, above all his fellow-artist and Director of the museum Richard Bergh, had close links with the emerging Social Democracy. Under the leadership of Hjalmar Branting they had assembled for a major demonstration to oppose the Peasant's Uprising in 1914.

It is possible to interpret the reasons underlying the rejection in this way, but motives based on aesthetic judgement and artistic considerations cannot be excluded either. Prince Eugen, who included both Bergh and Larsson in his circle of friends, rejected the idea that political antagonism had any decisive importance.

Unfortunately, political significance, although only marginal, was to be read into the removal of *Midwinter Sacrifice* by forces whose appreciation of art was exceeded by far by their enthusiasm for their Nordic origins. "For several years a wall in the National Museum has been embellished by Carl Larsson's hallowed creation *Midwinter Sacrifice*, a paean in colour to our proud, racially aware ancestors", declared the Nazi journal *Vår Kamp* on 15 January 1932. "This masterpiece has clearly provoked the Semitic gentlemen who now govern the *Swedish* National Museum, because its board recently gave orders for the painting to be *removed* and the wall it embellished 'restored to its original condition'. It is *shameful* that anything like this could take place in what is – albeit in name only – a *Swedish* museum. Here a major, *nationally* inspired work of art, created by the Swedish-minded Carl Larsson is to be evicted." This belated support cannot, of course, turn Larsson's painting into a Nazi creation. But that it could be annexed to unscrupulous ends is one of the familiar examples of the shady purposes for which history can be used.

With time the political implications faded. In 1942 *Midwinter Sacrifice* was deposited with the Archive for Decorative Art in Lund. Faced with the risk that the heirs would arrange a sale abroad, twenty years later a motion was submitted to parliament to enable the Lund archive to acquire the work. This motion was rejected and fears were confirmed by the sale of *Midwinter Sacrifice* to Japan in 1987 through Sotheby's. In the end however, Carl Larsson's dream did come true. His work was acquired by the National Museum in 1997. It was then given a permanent place in its intended position. The main argument for its return and display was that it makes it possible to keep the historical perspective open. And there has been no lack of questions.

Art, Nation and Society in Serbia

Contemporary Perspectives

By *Nenad Radić*

Writing about the complex relationship between modern art, nation and society in Serbia and giving it a contemporary perspective seems a daunting and complex. It is difficult, in the first place, because "at the heart of that two-century old practice of the modern self we call art, the science of which we call art history or museology, and the theory of which we call aesthetics, is a series of knots and conundrums, the *denial* of which we call the relationship between the subject and the objects" (Preziosi 2006, p. 15). Referring to the relationship between museums, art and phantasms of modernity, Preziosi's dilemma has double relevance in our case.

At present, two major art museums in Serbia, the National Museum and the Museum of Contemporary Art, have been closed for over a decade. Thus it is impossible to gain physical access to the display of Art. Established as a mirror of Modern Serbia in the nineteenth century, the National Museum's grand narrative of Art in Serbia and Serbian Art, from prehistory to the middle of the twentieth century, has thus become invisible. The closing of the Museum of Contemporary Art, modelled on Museum of Modern Art in New York, on the other hand, denied us the only live interaction with modern and contemporary art. Having opened in the sixties, the museum was at first instrumental in an ideological opening of Yugoslavia to the West, but later assumed a leading role in the promotion and appropriation of global trends in contemporary art in Serbia and *vice versa*. Closing the doors of the museums seemed inevitable if we take into account the appalling state of the museum buildings in the first place. However, on the second, more important level, this can be seen as symptom of an inability of both state and society to see the importance of art objects in reconstituting national identity through its origins and history. This is not to say that the state purposefully denied society its "rear view mirror", but to acknowledge the fact that, at present, facing so many challenges, Serbian society seems to be losing its direction and is caught

in perpetual purgatory, to borrow the Dantesque metaphor, between Heaven and Hell.

A brief history of modern art in Serbia

To facilitate this complex analysis, firstly we must put into perspective how, where and when Serbian modern art emerged. The traditional periodisation of modern art in Serbia begins at the turn of the 19th century, mostly because a comparison can be made between the centres of modern art and its peripheries; one artistic phenomenon replaces another, thus becoming the main one, and this is followed by a sort of reaction to it. The first centre of these new art movements was Paris, automatically becoming the centre to which, based on stylistic development, Serbian art, as peripheral, was constantly compared. That is, it is examined in terms of how quickly and successfully it was able to follow new movements. But the main problem here is in mapping Serbian art as periphery in terms of its geohistory, because Serbian art appears geographically at the periphery of the Austrian Empire. Finally emerging as an autonomous state in the first half of the 19th century, Serbia gave its art a space of its own, and a centre for development, with a cultural policy to create a cohesion of Serbian ethnic identity and a modern nation state. Therefore, the actual modernity of art, state and society began during that period, while, paradoxically, it still represented a periphery as a whole. The newly emerged civil society in Serbia demanded a new kind of artistic expression, but art was still closely intertwined with and influenced by its old, long-term art centre – the Byzantine Empire.

The great shift in centres occurred when Serbia turned for the first time towards Western Europe. Many Serbian artists started to seek further academic education at the Vienna Academy, where they could study classical anatomy, as well as take drawing classes, copying the old masters et cetera, and were thus able to rapidly compensate for lost time. During the second half of the 19th century, in the now fully separate nation of Serbia there appeared a desire to comprehend and represent the nation's history, turning the artists towards Munich, which was at the time renowned for historical painting. Many foreign artists, most of them from Central and Eastern Europe, studied and exchanged ideas there, which made Munich the first truly international centre for different art peripheries. Living in such a modern city, artists gained great artistic freedom, which finally led them away from the confines of the Academy and into the search for a more personal and modern expression. It was these new tendencies that established Paris as the new global centre, recognised for its modern art movements and a constant flow of artists from all parts of the world. For Serbian modern art, Paris, with its numerous studios and artistic possibilities, remained the most influential centre for over a century.

Imaginary Exhibition

As Ernst Gombrich (1950) put it, "There really is no such thing as Art. There are only artists." In order to give the history of this conundrum of relations, my approach will be somewhat unorthodox. Instead of telling the story of art, nation and society in Serbia and their interactions in a linear and thus chronological fashion, I will guide you through an imaginary exhibition. I have chosen five artworks: three easel paintings, one polyptych and one performance act, all done by female artists. I will swing the pendulum of time twice: the first swing from 1836 to 1975, the second from 1912 to 1992. In the end we will exit through the polyptych *Dark is the Forest* into the year 2012.

"Real exhibition: In the initiations into the Eleusinian mysteries, the hierophant, or exhibitor of the sacred things, would take certain objects from a basket and silently display them to the initiands in the midst of a great light: these may have included a golden ear of corn or a sheath of wheat, a snake, clay models of male and female genitals, and so on. Plato says that the chamber would fill with ghostly apparitions, and Pausanius records that someone who intruded upon the ceremony soon died, a story designed, of course, to keep intruders out. In the modernist exhibition the elite community of taste serves the same purpose: the artwork speaks only to the initiates, keeping their secrets safe from interlopers." (McEvilley 1989, p. 182).

The Room of the White & Black Swans

We see a beautiful young woman in a luxurious white silk dress, draped in a rose-coloured, transparent shawl, posing in front of us, with her right hand gently pressed at the level of her heart at the moment when she just put the paint brush aside. Katarina Ivanović (1811–82) painted her *Self-portrait* (fig. 4:1) in 1836, while studying painting at the department for women at the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna. Though born in the Habsburg Empire, she embraced her ethnic Serbian roots, and was noted in Serbian national memory as the nation's first female painter.

Ivanović's *Self-portrait* became a national icon, thus promoting her as the heroine of a new set of European values, away from the old patriarchal values of Serbia under Ottoman rule, and toward those of a young sovereign dukedom. Her status and this painting grew to iconic proportions through a dissemination of her biography as a uniquely talented painter, which was accompanied by the lithograph of this *Self-portrait*. I represent her here as the White swan, due to her desire to be recognised as an artist of historical painting, who, upon arriving in Belgrade, was recognised exclusively as a portrait painter. This role, which was pressed upon her by nationally aware intellectuals, essentially trapped her in this image of a beautiful young woman – the Ser-

FIG. 4:1. *Katarina Ivanović:* Self-portrait. © *National Museum Belgrade.*

bian Marianne. Ivanović, embittered and disappointed, left the Serbian capital and lead an isolated life, away from art and politics. Only near the end of her life did the Serbian Society of the Learned (the forerunner of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science) bring her back into the national consciousness. They approached her and suggested that she donate her artwork, and she graciously did: to the National Museum of Belgrade, the artist finally feeling embraced by the people with whom she identified.

The woman sits on a chair with her head tilted backward. Without stopping, she speaks the words that come to her mind: ...*groblje, spiritizam, duhovi, kretanje casom, boca, blagovest, baksis, bakalar, stremiti, beli luk, sitan seckan, sitroen, sunarodnik, narodnost, sovinizam, sakal, soko, rastrgnuti, kokoska, egipat, piramida, faraon, tristahiljadagodina*... When words no longer come to her mind, the performance ends. The artist is Marina Abramović (b. 1946), the year is 1975 and the place is Tübingen. In her performance, *Freeing of Memory*, the artist is attempting to empty herself of her national and ethnic identity, marking the beginning of a career that will catapult her to the pinnacle of the global art world. Paradoxically, an artist who attempted to free herself from national identity inadvertently became an icon of her former country. As Arthur Danto points out, her presence almost belongs to the discourse of icons of Orthodox Christianity, which speaks of the mystical presence of the saints within them (Biesenbach et al. 2010). Her last visit to Belgrade in September this year was marginalised by the cultural society of Serbia, which still does not recognize her as a globally acknowledged 'godmother of performance art'.

These two swans wanted the centre stage of Serbian cultural consciousness; however, society was not a willing audience.

The Silent Room

As we enter this secluded kingdom, a woman *Getting Dressed* in her private world, behind the screen, confronts us. She is caught in the meditatively melancholic gesture of putting on a silk stocking, while wearing only her undergarments, her loose hair falling freely down to her knees. The pink girdle, the silk stocking, the naked shoulder will stay hidden from the eyes of the public, as will the hair – symbol of female sexuality – once it is done into a bun, and thus, hidden. But, paradoxically, they can be seen in the painting. This painting from 1912, the year of the Balkan Wars, is the work of the almost forgotten Natalija Cvetković (1888–1928), a quiet woman who, by complying with the society's assigned gender role of that period, sealed her own fate as an unremarkable figure in the history of Serbian art. Though her paintings will never be ranked with the greatest pieces of art (Ćupić 2005), the unpretentiousness of her intimate record surpassed the limiting formal grading and points to the genuine value of her work as a discreet account of the potentials and limitations of the time in which she lived. The inherent double standards in Serbian society created the background and the limitations, which did not prevent her from leaving behind an authentic record of the realm of secluded women. Though imbued with a sense of escapism, this lethargy is transformed into an overwhelming artwork, subtle yet attractive, showing that her unpretentiousness becomes a virtue realised in paint.

From the gaze that peers, we go to the gaze that disappears into a large golden-

FIG. 4:2. *Marija Dragojlović:* Mirror in Golden Frame. *(With permission.)*

framed mirror. But it is no ordinary mirror. What is it then? Are we to see anything in this blue silvery surface other than perfect craftsmanship? Completed in 1992, Marija Dragojlović's (b. 1950) *Mirror in Golden Frame* (fig. 4:2) was created at the pinnacle of a society's turmoil – economic crises, war in Bosnia, war in Croatia, hyperinflation,

FIG. 4:3. *Biljana Djurdjević:* Dark Is The Forest. *(With permission.)*

complete collapse of the social and ethical values within society. All of this and more formed the particles that cloud the mirror's reflection, rendering it redundant, on the one hand. Conversely, this mirror can be seen as a refuge of sanity, a virtual mirror in which reality-effects disappear (Baudrillard 2003). If it is a mode of disappearance, this mirror is an – obscure but deliberate – choice on the part of the artist: the decision to lock herself into another universe.

The silence in these two works, 80 years apart, speaks of the same artistic defence mechanism. These works serve to subdue the aggressiveness of society, during two Balkan Wars; both the mirror and the dressing scene are places where the gaze is not returned, but where time stands still, where individuals can silently withdraw from society.

The Dark Room

Entering this last room, we find ourselves in front of the enormous polyptych *Dark Is The Forest* (fig. 4:3) by Biljana Djurdjević (b. 1973*).* The central panel depicts a dream-like forest, flanked on each side by two rotating panels, painted on both sides. Side panels that are closer to the central one alternate the images of coloured and black-and-

white forest, while the outer panels show, on the left, a male figure and, on the right, a female figure, both in an eerie dream state. The dark forest separates them, yet in a strange way connects them, seeing that both figures are laid flatly on the leaf-covered ground. If we were to rotate the male and female panels, we could read the double inscriptions; on his side, first we notice white star-like letters: *amor vincit omnia,* love conquers all, arranged in a nonlinear way. But if we looked closely, we would see that the dark background surface is entirely filled by one repeating sentence, *nulla in mundo pax sincere,* in this world there is no honest peace. The right-hand panel shows us a reverse situation, where the white noticeable letters are *nulla in mundo pax sincere*, but where also we see the repeating *amor vincit omnia*.

What kind of audience is supposed to understand this artwork? Only the one that is familiar with the literary source for this phantasmagoric spectacle – *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili / The Strife of Love in a Dream,* attributed to Francesco Colona, first published in Venice in 1499. This strange, erotic, allegorical romance tells of the Poliphilo's quest for his beloved Polia; however, what concerns us here the most is the very setting of this quest, where the action takes place in a dark forest that Poliphilo dreams. Like the book, the artistic value of the polyptych lies neither in "typography nor woodcuts separately, but in the overall composition of text and the image into a harmonious whole, which allows the eye to slip back and forth between textual description and corresponding visual representation with the greatest ease – a rarity even today" (Lefaivre 1997, p. 17). Now, if only the select few can fully understand the painted intertwined realms of dream and reality, then the polyptych is a visual Gordian knot, a symbol representing the current state of relationship of art, nation, and society, not only in Serbia, but also in the current state of world affairs – dark is the forest.

Exit

The main purpose of this imaginary exhibition has been to "initiate" through stages and modes of artistic strategies and poetics: beginning with the sacred image of an icon as the embodiment of Serbian national identity, continuing onto the capacity to persevere during dire situations by escaping into the phantasms of modernity, and finally reaching the eternal strife in a world where the relationship between subjects and art objects is actually a fallacy, because once we pass beyond the true and false, beyond good and evil, we are at the point where things lose their end. "From now on, we are in a kind of process of limitlessness in which the end can no longer be located" (Baudrillard 2003, p. 59).

This brings us closer to answering how contemporary Serbian art can contribute to the diversity of the global art world. Due to its contemporary traumatic political experiences, Serbia is a place where cultural, ethnic, and national identities are still

highly relevant and at issue, making it a place where those very notions are constantly alive, contemporary, and challenging.

If globalisation means losing one's cultural identity, Serbian art, with its burning personal issues, can offer the global contemporary art scene much-needed diversity. From its perpetual social limbo, Serbian art – being peripheral – has successfully developed and defended its values in one of the broadest global centres of contemporary art, New York.

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Sweden and European Literature

Reception and feedback, 17th – 21st centuries

By *Thure Stenström*

In the 17th century when Sweden was a great military power we had a well-known poet by the name of Georg Stiernhielm. He has been labelled the father of Swedish poetry, mainly on the strength of a single much-admired poem, *Hercules.* It is an exquisite masterpiece of linguistic wealth and subtle Renaissance philosophy where the poet advocates certain virtues as suitable for the Swedish aristocracy. *Hercules* is written in Swedish, in the vernacular. But it is noteworthy that Stiernhielm wrote in Swedish only during ten years of his long career as a learned professor, civil servant and diplomat in the service of the Swedish king. All his other works, and he was productive, are in Latin. It is a very significant fact that the father of Swedish poetry mainly wrote in Latin. And this is a general rule of our great power period.

Most learned men of this era, at and around the royal court or in and around the Lutheran church, were well versed in Latin and familiar with Greek mythology. What they knew, they had learned by reading in Latin. If you were an educated man of some stature – keeping in mind that the educated part of the population was small – you belonged more or less to an international Renaissance community which knew no national boundaries and was spread all over Europe. So! If you gave a speech or lecture at Uppsala University or if you negotiated with foreign diplomats abroad about boundaries or cessions of territory, you did it in Latin and with Cicero as a model. And even if you wrote in Swedish, as Stiernhielm did in *Hercules*, you were nevertheless so imbued with Latin and Greek learning that you – not for nothing – chose Hercules as a typical exponent of Swedish aristocratic virtues.[1]

Now! The situation was, after all, a bit more complicated and tricky than I have so far described it. If you want to sum up the main inspiring factors of our culture during the great power period you could do so by mentioning three key figures: Luther, Cic-

ero and Aristotle. And this trinity immediately gives us a clue to what is missing if we emphasise too much classical antiquity and ancient times. Cicero and Aristotle belong to this Graeco-Roman culture which forms the basis of all European humanism and the Renaissance. But Martin Luther does not belong. He, after all, wrote in German, and he was an icon and a central figure only for the Protestants of the north. And this reminds us that we must not underestimate the immense German influence on Swedish literature of the period. Luther's writings were almost as sacred as The Holy Scriptures to the clergymen of the Swedish State Church in the 17th century. The clergy read Luther in German, of course, if they did not already know him by heart. You can hear the echoes of Luther almost everywhere in the devotional literature of the time, not least in the famous Hymn Book of 1695, where Jesper Swedberg and Haquin Spegel brought Swedish spiritual poetry of the great power period to its last impressive culmination.[2]

And, if I may add a remarkable little detail about Stiernhielm before I let go of him. When he planned *Hercules* and decided to write in the vernacular – eager to bring about a national revival and something equivalent in Sweden to what Martin Opitz had done already in Germany – he was working as a legal expert for the Swedish Court of Appeal in Dorpat in Estonia. Estonia was a province which under the name of Livland belonged to Sweden at the time. Bernt Olsson, an outstanding scholar and expert on Swedish baroque literature, has suggested that Stiernhielm may well have come upon this brand new idea through his daily conversations with the German poet Paul Flemming, a pupil of Opitz, whom he had met in Estonia and who belonged to his circle of friends.[3] And so we cannot exclude the possibility that even the inspiration for *Hercules* – the most essentially Swedish poem of all – may to some extent have been... German! This is a reminder that the warp threads are intertwined and go criss-cross, to and fro, in the web of the era's literary history.

And so we may well stick to our leading idea that – counterbalancing the influence from the old Latin and Greek literature – it is the impact of German baroque poets (Gryphius, Opitz, Flemming, Gerhardt, Rist and others) that is more than anything else a characteristic feature of the period. Stockholm was more or less a bilingual city: many of its inhabitants spoke and wrote German and Swedish equally well. No less than 500 poets in Stockholm and Uppsala have been identified as writing German occasional poetry during the great power period.[4] It is no mere coincidence that for example Lars Lucidor, as did Stiernhielm himself for that matter, wrote fluent poetry not only in Latin but also in German and French. In fact, Lucidor wrote in seven languages. Likewise one could mention Sophia Elisabet Brenner who wrote in four.[5] It seems as if Sweden during our great power period was in many respects more international than it would be in later centuries. To a baroque poet such as Lars Lucidor, the choice of writing in Swedish or in German probably depended mainly on the intended audi-

ence. If he wanted or expected a vast circle of readers he chose German, if for the moment he was content with a small or less advanced audience he wrote in Swedish.[6]

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But then, in the 17th century, the literary and cultural map of Sweden changed considerably. When Charles XII died in 1718 and Sweden lost its great power stature there was also a change within the cultural life of the country. To put it simply and briefly, new strata of the population demanded more power, particularly a self-confident bourgeois class which took up competition with the old nobility and the clergy. It has often been argued that France and the Enlightenment movement gave the predominant impetus to this new literary atmosphere. There are even literary historians who sum up the whole period in Swedish literature between 1730 and 1790 as "the Enlightenment period". And it is true, of course, that Olof von Dalin – leading poet at the court and a prominent member of the royal academies – admired Voltaire. Very early in his so called Calot sermons and clergy satires he used wit and reason in questioning the life of the upper classes, much in the same way as did Voltaire. And no doubt Queen Lovisa Ulrika (founder in 1753 of this Academy of Letters where we are sitting today) was like her brother King Frederic the Great of Prussia a sincere adherent of the ideology of Voltaire, Diderot and d'Alembert. She even had d'Alembert elected as one of the first honorary members of our academy. But generally the Enlightenment movement did not gain real momentum in Sweden until the last decades of the century when Johan Henrik Kellgren, Nils von Rosenstein and to some extent Anna Maria Lenngren fought their famous battles against false authorities and mysticism.[7] First of all one has to remember that, as the great scholar Robert Darnton put it, "thinkers in Stockholm or Naples did not need to read Voltaire in order to learn about tolerance and natural law." Secondly the influence of the French Enlightenment in Sweden, if any, was limited to a minority of intellectuals and writers around the court of Gustavus III in Stockholm. He and his cousin in Saint Petersburg, Catherine the Great, were fond of Voltaire and Diderot and the other key figures of the Enlightenment. But the great majority of the Swedes were never affected by it. They stuck to the old Lutheran orthodoxy as they had always done.

Even Olof von Dalin was a religious believer and an old-fashioned nationalist who admired the heroic past of our ancestors far more than the progress of modern science. One must also keep in mind that there was a deep and widespread undercurrent of sentimentality and occultism, even romanticism, in Swedish intellectual life in the 18th century. The famous religious prophet and seer Emanuel Swedenborg is an example.[8] Much of the hymnal poetry was influenced by German pietism, and Hedvig Charlotta Nordenflycht's best lyrical poetry – of a very intimate and personal charac-

ter – is far more in the vein of Rousseau than that of Voltaire. When, finally, during the last decades of the century, such pre-Romantics as Tomas Thorild, Bengt Lidner and Frans Michael Franzén paved the way for more emotional poetry, they were mainly inspired by British poets such as Thomas Gray and Edward Young. The bard in *Ossian's Songs* was their ideal, not the belligerent satirist Voltaire.

To sum up: the Swedish literary landscape cannot be regarded simply as a French satellite state, reflecting the light from Paris and d'Alemberts *Encyclopaedia*. How closely connected Sweden remained particularly to Germany became evident when – in the early 19th century – Romanticism, on a wide front, invaded the two leading university cities, Uppsala and Lund. Atterbom, Hammarskjöld, Palmblad, Geijer and their Romantic contemporaries steered their grand tours to Berlin, Frankfurt and Weimar, admiring Goethe, Schiller, Schelling and Fichte. To mention just a few significant examples. Erik Gustav Geijer – an influential history professor, an outstanding poet and rector of Uppsala University – associated with Amalia von Helwig, born in Weimar and one of Goethe's and Schiller's best friends. And being more or less a universal genius himself, Geijer probably dreamed of becoming – and was even sometimes called – "the Swedish Goethe".[9] Schleiermacher and Jacob Grimm paid visits to the University of Lund, and when Esaias Tegnér took a recreational trip to Germany in the 1830s he was eager to visit his ultra-Romantic German collegues and fellow-writers.

For many Swedish writers the German language offered a gateway to international renown. It is no coincidence that the novels of such a pioneer in the women's movement as Fredrika Bremer (1801–65) became attractive to a German public with her Biedermeier novels, her Christian socialism and her books on travels in the United States and Europe, before she became known as a mouthpiece of human rights and religious freedom also in the English-speaking world.[10] In a similar way the pacifist and feminist Ellen Key (1849–1926), "the great-aunt of radical Europe", met with tremendous success on lecture tours in Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Hungary. Her charismatic performances and her new ideas concerning children's upbringing (in her famous book *The Century of the Child,* 1900) made her a world famous predecessor of a more modern lifestyle. But her career began in Germany.

This German supremacy can be noticed throughout the century and was strengthened by the education system. The German classic *Gymnasium* and Humboldt's Berlin university were for a long time prototypes and exemplary models to the Swedish schools which fostered our leading writers. Swedish secondary schools and universities were so to speak cast in the same mould as their German counterparts. And so Johan Ludvig Runeberg, Viktor Rydberg, August Strindberg, almost all of them received their first aesthetic impulses from German writers or German philosophy (Hegel, Solgers and others). Although exceptions to this rule are numerous, although the horizon widened considerably when Walter Scott and British realism became fashiona-

ble among Swedish novelists in the 1830s and 40s, and although Strindberg settled in Paris and wrote in French in order to "conquer the world", the German dominance by and large remained. In fact, it did until 1945.

But corporal Adolf Hitler changed all this! When Weimar was replaced by Buchenwald and Auschwitz, the whole German-Greek concept of παιδεία, of *Bildung und Wissenschaft*, broke down as a leading paradigm. Instead the Swedes oriented themselves towards the English-speaking world, not least to the United States. And so in the 20th and 21st centuries the influx from the outside world has become greater and greater, and the impulses are coming from all over the world. But very often – one must add in order not to exaggerate our international outlook – in English translations. Not all Swedish writers of the 20th century were, as Eyvind Johnson and Sven Delblanc, capable of reading French, English and German equally well. For the most part and especially nowadays linguistic competence is limited to English and to the Anglo-American approach to the world. Whether this means that we have become more international today is perhaps debatable.

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As a small country with a small national language Sweden has mainly been a recipient of literary impulses from abroad whereas the feedback from Sweden into world literature has been far less conspicuous. If I were to summarise in short what Sweden has meant to the literary world I would mention a few names: Emanuel Swedenborg, August Strindberg, Selma Lagerlöf, Astrid Lindgren, Ingmar Bergman and Stieg Larsson. This is what is left as more apparent and important Swedish footprints on the map of world literature. At least during the period that we have in mind at this symposium one could start with Swedenborg and end with Larsson.

Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) was a well-known scientist but became world famous first and foremost as a religious prophet and seer.[11] He often wrote in Latin, and his most famous works – *The Dream Book*, *De cultu et amore Dei*, *Diarium spirituale* and so forth – had a deep influence on the spiritism and occultism of the 18th and 19th centuries, on the mystic William Blake, on German romanticists such as Schelling, Novalis and Baader. And his doctrine of correspondences between the spiritual and the material world inspired Baudelaire as well as Strindberg and, to mention a modern example, the Polish poet and Nobel laureate Czesław Miłosz.

August Strindberg (1849–1912), of course, stands out as one of our most illustrious compatriots. His influence on modern drama has been deep-going and extremely important.[12] This holds whether you speak of naturalist theatre or of expressionist drama, the drama of the absurd or existentialist theatre. Samuel Beckett and Jean-Paul Sartre, Arthur Adamov and Jean Genet, Edward Albee and Harold Pinter, they all owe

a great deal to Strindberg as a playwright. And this is the case also of Ingmar Bergman, a spiritual son and a great admirer of Strindberg, our most famous director and film producer whose masterpieces such as *Through a Glass Darkly*, *Winter Light*, *The Silence, The Virgin Spring* or *Shame* are unthinkable without Strindberg.[13]

On the triumphs of Bergman's theatre and films I need not expatiate further. When I taught Scandinavian and Comparative Literature at Harvard in 1968–69, I was surprised to find Bergman's films and plays represented in the textbooks of my young students, linked with the plays of such literary giants as Shakespeare and Chekhov. In Sweden we would perhaps hesitate to put him on the same level as them. But Americans are less restrained. Another well-known Swede, Dag Hammarskjöld (1905–61), Secretary General of the United Nations and posthumously awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, wrote a diary, *Markings* which was published two years after his death. It soon became a devotional manual for innumerable readers all over the world and is today a minor classic not least in the United States.

I have already mentioned a few women. But there are further female celebrities to be taken into account. Selma Lagerlöf (1858–1940), one of our few Nobel laureates in literature, was a most popular writer in Germany and the German-speaking world in early 20th century.[14] Few books have contributed more to the image of Sweden abroad than her novel *The wonderful Adventures of Nils* (1906–07), which was read and appreciated particularly by children all over the world. Her fame and influence has lately been surpassed and exceeded by another great master of children's literature, Astrid Lindgren. No other Swedish writer has come anywhere near to Astrid Lindgren's success abroad: not Lagerlöf, not Strindberg or Bergman. She is the world's 18th most translated author and her books have sold roughly 145 million copies worldwide. If you want to single out what Verner von Heidenstam majestically called "the voice of our spirit in the world", you cannot bypass Pippi Longstocking, Karlsson-on-the-Roof and the Bullerby Children.

There they are, the Swedish books which have by far left the deepest marks on the world's mind. And so, although Stieg Larsson (1954–2004) has recently enjoyed great international success with his partly posthumously published crime novels *Men who hate women* and *The Girl who kicked the Hornets' Nest*, he has not yet reached the same pinnacles of glory as Astrid Lindgren. Larsson's success has no doubt been considerable, not only in the United States but also in France, England and Germany, perhaps because he is so well-informed about how the average Swede leads his life today and about the violence that may simmer under the pleasant surface of our modern welfare society.

There are, of course, also many other Swedish writers who have had notable success outside our borders. The prolific philosopher, poet and novelist Lars Gustafsson gained international recognition with literary awards such as the *Prix International*

Charles Veillon des Essais in 1983, the *Heinrich Steffens Preis* in 1986, *Una Vita per la Litteratura* in 1989, a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship for poetry in 1994, and several others.[15] Other outstanding modernists in poetry such as Gunnar Ekelöf and Harry Martinson should not be forgotten either among those who have been translated into foreign languages and appreciated abroad. But it is often a matter of chance and haphazard circumstances whether capable translators or critics willing to introduce a Swedish writer are available at the right time. For the Nobel laureate and poet Tomas Tranströmer it has meant a good deal that his friend Robert Bly has been so successful in publishing much-admired collections of Tranströmer's poetry.[16] The repercussions have been great. Tranströmer's direct language and powerful images have made him "the most widely translated Scandinavian poet in the English-speaking world in the later 20th century".[17] In a similar way Victor Vinde, an experienced translator and literary critic in Paris and a close friend of our Nobel laureate, the novelist Eyvind Johnson, guided Johnson's writings into the French language.[18] Perhaps Hans Magnus Enzensberger has acted as a similar intermediary to the poet Lars Gustafsson who is nowadays one of the most beloved Scandinavian poets in Germany.

But none of them is without rivals for European fame. One might dwell upon Lars Norén with his grim and pessimistic family plays much in the same vein as Strindberg, which describe the modern battle between the sexes and our Nordic loneliness, or Stig Dagerman, P. O. Enquist and Torgny Lindgren whose novels have been very much appreciated especially by the French and the Germans. Or take the boisterous leftist-political and communist writer Jan Myrdal, whose reports from China and travel notes from many other Asian countries and his campaign against Western colonialism and imperialism has excited interest and anger in many European countries outside Sweden.

When Scandinavia became in the last few decades part of a more global literary field, the whole question of center and periphery in Europe has changed considerably. Whether a Swedish writer is productive in a globally sought-after genre such as the detective novel or children's literature often decides their worldwide popularity far more than all inherent literary qualities. But – as can be seen in the case of crime novelist and playwright Henning Mankell (b. 1948), so far translated into more than 40 languages – to gain the upper hand on the book markets in London, Paris or Berlin very much facilitates, of course, worldwide success.

To sum up, I would argue that on the whole, we self-confident and conceited Swedes often overestimate our importance abroad, in literature as well as in politics. National fame and national glory are no longer important items of business for Swedish writers. Today we had perhaps better be more modest, trim our aspirations and humbly accept that the main voice of our Swedish spirit in the world is – and will for a long time remain – Astrid Lindgren's less flamboyant but charming works for chil-

dren, such as *Pippi Longstocking* and *Karlsson-on the roof*. There they are, the heroes of our time, playful, noisy children... Smiling, jumping, cheeky and rebellious kids. And perhaps more captivating national symbols than many others that we could think of.

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Identity and Mentality in Literary Studies

By *Slobodan Grubačić*

Two tendencies are in evidence today, the centrifugal and the centripetal, the globalist and the regional. The cultural policy of the European Union is striving to balance them. What will be the fate of national cultures on the periphery of Europe?

We have before us an example of the development of a universal, ecumenical state guided by the principle of the free flow of ideas, concerning which, what is always taken into consideration is economic profit. There is no doubt that in this process spirituality is replaced by informational content, which, over time, leads to a negation of national identities. Despite the positive influence of this on bringing peoples closer together, the utilitarian principle presages the end of individual cultures as integrated systems of knowledge, beliefs and conduct.

This is reminiscent of the old fear of cultural hegemony, pointed out by the Slavic scholar Dmitry S. Likhachov: "Comparative studies of various arts, primarily literature in its relations with other literatures, is of great importance for determining the essence of foreign influences, their changes, their being determined by specific social needs." (1966, p. 7). Further on, he says: "... these studies must not be limited to examining similarities, attention must be paid to carefully *allowing for* differences as well, which is obligatory."

That we are dealing with an old civilisational *Leitmotif* is evidenced by J.W. von Goethe's warning that one should beware of any facile adoption of foreign cultural models, of civilisational "shifting of coulisses" (*kulturelle Kulissenschieberei*). He was referring to theories according to which all people are the same, regardless of the colour of their skin, for that theory, too, can turn into a terrible form of violence against people, against ethnic and cultural differences that should be respected. It is the product of the erroneous assumption that all people like and want the same things. Let us recall Tacitus's observation that the Germans of his age found the Roman custom of

imprisoning their gods, that is, placing them within temples, abhorrent. The Germans, just like the Slavs, worshipped their gods in the open air.

What models do we have at our disposal, then?

Cultural models have been changing for centuries, whimsically and often following the dictates of so-called scientific truths. In our era, following the reign of terror of chemical formulas, scientific thought has come under the sway of a whole succession of new models (that are actually old ones). Of this, poetry has always had a melancholy image, and science feels the need to clarify its stance fully.

Today, for example, *anthropogeography* is fashionable again. Ever since the Berlin professor Carl Ritter explained the development of history as a result of geographical preconditions, the history of ideas has been interpreted as a result of geographical elements, climate and the soil. In J.G. von Herder's and G.W.F. Hegel's comparative history of culture, the geographical element determined ethnic development. This model has occasionally cropped up in the Balkans. Thus, at the beginning of the Second World War, Europe under Germany seemed to Miloš Crnjanski like an Asian peninsula that abruptly narrowed, turned solitary and rose dramatically in the Alps.

On account of its "position on the edge", in the south of the Balkans, under foreign cultural domination, Serbia has had a specific relationship with the centre of Europe during the course of its history. The so-called German ethnic bloc has been particularly intriguing as a continuous challenge.

Hence Milorad Pavić's pondering of the centre-periphery relationship has had a notable reception, his thoughts on the subject coinciding in many respects with the discourses of Roland Barthes. In his 1976–77 lectures entitled *How to Live Together?* (Barthes 2013), in the dynamic relationship between the individual and the community Barthes recognised the ancient Orthodox model of "idiorrhythmia". According to him, the notorious question *Comment vivre ensemble?* deserves an original answer. In a nutshell, that is the way of life of Mount Athos monks, *idiorrhythmics*. They possess a degree of independence in relation to the monastery community (in *coenobium*), without living like anchorites, eremites or stylites. Barthes saw the balance between isolation and living inside a community, that is, living according to "one's own rhythm", as a possible model of a desirable preservation of the autonomy of the individual.

It has to be pointed out, however, that the sociologist Georg Simmel, in his later years, issued two identification documents to the modern European. With a wavering hand, he entered in his new birth certificate "a disturbing piece of information": in his soul, he said, two tendencies, two kinds of individualism fought for supremacy – "individuality" and "uniqueness". The former was quantitative, the latter qualitative. One had its roots in the 18th century, the other was more recent, even though it was already in evidence in Herder and in Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* novels. In the former, the enlightenment-based enthusiasm of freedom comes to the fore; in the latter, it is the romantic dream of irreplaceability that does so.

Being the same while remaining different means being free like everybody else, but being, at the same time, different from everybody else. This can mean only one thing: that each subject should follow his own *rhythm*.

It is of interest now, however, to examine the fate of a literary text through an analogy with the life forms of an era. The path thus taken reveals that the new structures of literary works behave like the structures of life.

What strikes one is the way in which the notional pair of *solitariness* and *sociability* corresponds to the relationship between the individual work and the multitude of literary production. It is a relationship within which an original writer, more or less discreetly, avoids following the arrogant dictates of the "big world" – the dictates of fashion, a new discourse or style.

Finally, the ideal according to which each work follows *its own rhythm* is reflected on the level of content. According to Kristijan Olah (2012), in Pavić's 1984 novel *Dictionary of the Khazars* the author replaces his Byzantinism ("I am a Byzantine!") with an alternative position, with other sources of spirituality, shifting from the centre towards the periphery of his native Serbian culture.

This means that the problems and issues of an epoch always enforce the appearance of some new literary topic. They shape the notions of solitariness and sociability in a new way. Just as each subject follows his own rhythm, just as, within a small circle, more or less wisely, he composes his ritual of conduct in order to survive "socially", so literary texts point to the real nature of alterity as an essentially contradictory nostalgia for traditional images of identity, which possesses its depth and meaning.

Today, the classical sequence of the realist novel having been lost, authors must take a new path in order to create conditions for a new status of literary discourse. That is why it is so difficult to provide a new, topical variant of the well-known story about the dissociation of the individual from the collective, the rift that occurs as a result of a culturological gap created in the troublesome process of the disintegration of the patriarchal model of culture and the slow shaping of a new cultural system.

Among the favourite topics, in our country as well, are analyses dealing with the relationship between Ours and Foreign, mentality analysis, the postcolonial aspect (Turkish, Austrian), and the feminist aspect. The relationship between Ours and Foreign is among the more prominent ones. One can freely say that, during the course of the two millennia of the entire Judaeo-Christian civilisation, not every obstacle has been removed even when it comes to understanding one's own heritage, wherein each word has its own mythology, its symbolic inscenation and an entire repertory of roles ascribed to it by languages of the past *as* languages of different cultures and ways of thinking.

The cause of this should not be sought only in temporal distance, in racial and confessional differences, or in the unattainability of Truth in its final derivation. It is al-

ready contained in the significant fact that in Scripture *the same thing is said in different languages* – therefore, it was already contained in that symbolic moment when the apostles set off for all four corners of the world, when the tongues of flame descended upon their heads – the tongues they immediately started speaking in.

The ancient Greeks were aware that the Other represents the key to understanding ourselves, for we exist only in a dialogue, argument, opposition. To Herodotus, xenophobia was a disease of those who were afraid, who suffered from an inferior position, who were terrified of the possibility of seeing themselves in the mirror of the culture of Others.

And in some cases, they were unable to dissociate themselves from their native land to such an extent that, as Crnjanski saw it, they always painted one and the same thing: "Just as Camões created for himself a Mediterranean Sea and oceans that did not exist in reality, Tasso imagined and transposed all his Crusaders, all his princesses, all his loves to a Sorrento of his own". Goethe did the same when he spoke about our folk poetry. He disliked our epic barbarity, but he could see himself in the lyrical poetry of "Hasanaginica".

It is a banal fact that those who were raised within another cultural tradition see the world differently from those who belong to our own civilisational circle. "As a speaker of a national language, each man is condemned to a totalitarian folklore" – especially when the archetypal "nativeness" rebels in some foreign country. Or when, as in the case of "our" Italian Niccolò Tommaseo, one switches from defence to attack – against all foreign flags, in the name of a unique type of man, formed according to the unrepeatable combination of personal creative abilities, individual as well as national experience – "To Germans, the Slavic character is like a Latin book: even when they do understand it (which is not always the case), they spoil it with their pronunciation."

There is also, of course, an artificial emphasis on difference. We find it not only in the Germans' misunderstanding of Slavs, or in the analogous literary characters such as Marin Držić's Ugo Tudeško in Renaissance-era Dubrovnik (Držić 1551). For example, the view that there is something essentially barbaric in every Englishman, including Shakespeare, especially Shakespeare, is not a mere commonplace in the history of the Gallic spirit. It was maintained quite successfully in other countries as well, right until the time of Voltaire, when his friend King Frederick II of Prussia of was puzzled by the fact that the text of *Julius Caesar* did not contain even more irregularities, in view of the fact of "who wrote that play in the first place". Its author had no idea where Illyria was or that Bohemia has no seaside to speak of. To make the paradox even greater, Frederick, who (apocryphally) only used German to speak with horses and dogs, wrote a treatise on German literature in French (1780)! On the other hand, what enlightened representatives of other peoples think about the "civilised mincing" of the French is quite tellingly evidenced by entire libraries of ironic theatrical plays, a long tradition of ridicule and misunderstanding.

It has been wisely observed that the slogan *That is foreign to us!* is so readily offered in civilisational and political abstractions that it is heard even today in the form of falsetto-style empty sloganeering. All this presupposes at least two conclusions. The first is that the foreign world is a huge sea of stupidity and obscurantism, and that we ought to congratulate ourselves on not having been born there. The second convinces us of an even greater thing – that each foreigner is, in fact, laughable in the eyes of every other foreigner, and that life, as the interplay of these mutual prejudices, exquisitely reveals the opposite sides of various civilisations.

Naturally, even this humorously intoned xenophobia betrays the basic idea of a Herder and a Johann Georg Hamann. Thus the image of an exotic far-off land dating from the time of Friedrich Barbarossa's passage through Niš, with which the baroque era introduced a more recent history of variations on the theme of the Foreign, actually had a pedagogical function: it served to provide a foundation for the values of its own European cultural circle.

Journeys to distant lands served to increase the level of excitement: just as the Gothic novel and the Renaissance drama before it were located in the region of the Adriatic Sea, the intention being to enhance the power of the crimes and passions described through exotic surroundings, so the distance of Banat's waste lands, all the way to Zlatište in Romania, in the German Enlightenment era served as a costume which could conveniently be used to disguise a critique of its own views.

One could, on the other hand, take into consideration different views on the purpose of contrasting cultures. Namely those which overemphasise the awareness of the dialectic of ours and foreign – identity and alterity, Periphery and Centre – and so negate the Enlightenment-related stock phrases about building bridges between peoples, about bringing them closer to each other or even making them fraternise, worrying that small peoples will be marginalised in civilisational terms.

Objections could also be made from a theoretical perspective. The first one is well known from the polemic between René Wellek and Jean-Marie Carré, wherein Wellek warned of the danger of turning literary studies into "some kind of national psychology", into a mere comparison of mentalities, whose only positive outcome was described by one critic as a correction of the well-known "semiotics of directions or sides of the world", according to which northern peoples are rational, southern peoples are sensual, western peoples are extroverted, and eastern peoples are introverted.

A conflict between the regional and the universal perspective is also possible. With Goethe's idea of a *world literature* at the latest, and especially in the 20th century, each narrowly defined view in national terms came to be considered provincial. We are often reminded of Hellmuth Petriconi's excellent study on the *oppressed innocence* motif of the 18th century, wherein, after describing all the predecessors of Goethe's Gretchen in Richardson and Fielding, the author arrives at the ironic conclusion that what is typically German is actually "typically English".

The fear of losing one's specific characteristics is, of course, unfounded. It is neither empirically provable nor theoretically conceivable. We are born as individuals, and only a small number of us attain the level of true personality anyway. But individuality that would encompass all of society would be a contradiction in itself – not only under the new conditions imposed by the process of globalisation, but also in the most imaginative form of biotechnical and genetic revolution.

Therefore, the notorious question of what getting acquainted with foreign cultures leads to can still be answered in an equally notorious way: experiencing new models helps us attain new ways of understanding and to re-examine our image of the world. Here art is not understood as a mere illustration or ideological supplement of reality, but as the medium of a special critical and creative attitude to it, an exchange that recognises the identity of both sides. Culture only exists in the plural form.

Hence the above leads us even more forcefully to ponder the extent to which, for example, we can apply current methods of interpreting literature – the so-called studies of mentality, alterity, identity and postcolonial literature – to texts from the "periphery" (in view of the imperviousness of Serbian society, subjected to centuries-long "occupations", to outside influences). Finally, it leads us to ponder how this literary position can enrich the culture of Central Europe. There is a case study that can provide an answer to that question: the fate of the ballad of Kalenić monastery.

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The Debate on Religion

Swedish-Russian Relations in the 17th Century

By *Per-Arne Bodin*

I will be presenting and analysing how the Russian Orthodox Church (and the Orthodox Church in general) was described and evaluated in four seventeenth-century Swedish texts. As elsewhere in Europe during this period, there was an extensive body of published literature on Russia in Sweden.[1] As an emerging major power, the country was an important trading partner with Sweden, but above all it was an enemy.[2] What we might expect to find, therefore, is a thoroughly negative description of Russians, especially considering that in earlier periods they had often been regarded as heathens, a view that King Gustav I summarized when he referred to "The Russians, Turks, and other pagans"[3].

The descriptions I will be treating are written from the viewpoint of the outside traveller or observer—the gaze of the Other, as it is often called today. I will be examining the attitudes the texts express toward the Russian Church, and the reasons for these opinions, including the fact that all the texts were written in the same time period from an insider perspective within a Christian tradition that had not yet been influenced by the Enlightenment and the religious criticism of later centuries.

Petrus Petrejus

Petrus Petrejus is perhaps the most important of these seventeenth-century Swedish observers. He lived in Russia for several years for reasons unknown–he may have been sent there on official Swedish business, or perhaps he was a spy and an adventurer. Besides historical, geographical and social aspects of Russia, his book *Regni Muschovitici sciographia*, (fig. 7:1; published in 1615 in Swedish and in a German translation in 1620), also portrays the Russian character, often in sombre hues. He is an eyewitness, and as other researchers have shown, he made use of earlier descriptions of the


REGNI MUSCHOVI-
TICI SCIOGRAPHIA.
Thet är:
Een wiss och egen-
...
PETRO PETREIO
VPSALIENSI.

FIG. 7:1. *Petrus Petrejus. Title page of the Regni Muschovitici sciographia.*

country.[4] A recent article in the Russian journal *Pereformat*[5] accuses him of supporting the first False Dmitrij and of being the author of the Norman theory so disparaged by Russian nationalists. (The hypothesis is in fact mentioned in the book.) The article is a polemic against Petrejus, who is presented as a veritable seventeenth-century James Bond.

The final, sixth book of Petrejus' work deals with the Church. It is mostly devoted to a detailed description of baptisms, funerals, ecclesiastical garments, monasteries, and so on, but it also deals with theological issues such as the Trinity. Allow me to give a few brief concrete examples of his writing on these topics.

Petrejus' descriptions are rich in facts and details. One interesting question is how

he acquired this knowledge, since many travellers during this period report that they were not allowed to enter Russian churches.[6] His accounts are presumably based on his own impressions and on oral sources besides the written ones. On some occasions his judgements are rather positive, as when he describes prayer:

> Bisperna som munkar och präster äre efter deras sätt och ceremonier ganska flitige till att läsa och sjunga deras tider både dagar och nätter, och mena icke därmed till att tjäna församlingen, utan till att bevisa Gud därmed synnerlig tjänst och behag, och att de med sådant heligt leverne och goda gärningar skole för Gud helige och rättfärdige bliva, och därmed förvärva sig det eviga livet. (p. 26)

> Like the monks and priests, the bishops are in their own customs and ceremonies quite diligent at reading and singing their psalms both day and night, their intent thereby being not to serve the congregation but to render special service and pleasure unto God, and by such a holy life and good deeds to become holy and just in God's eyes and thereby achieve eternal life.

He mentions the ritualistic element in the Russian practice of religion, as in this passage on the necessity of reciting prayers in the prescribed way:

> Men råkar han något stappla uti sina böner och lexor förarga sig hans åhörare högeligen där uppå, så att han bliver priverat och satt ifrån sitt kall och ämbete, om det bliver sport och klagat. (p. 7)

> But should he happen to stumble in his prayers and verses, his listeners become mightily angry about it, so that if it is noticed and denounced, he is divested of and removed from his vocation and office.

Thus Petrejus underscores the significance of liturgical recitation in the Russian Church. He complains that the priests read various parts of the mass at the same time and very hastily. The same criticism was voiced by Russians as well during this period, and it is repeated by several of our travellers. For that matter, it is a practice that continues to the present day.

On several occasions Petrejus also notes the significance of holy images. People are not permitted to pray except before an icon or cross, and priests are not allowed to say mass without an assistant vicar, or *dyak*:

> Ingen präst må heller göra någon gudstjänst i kyrkan som är mässa, döpa, kristna barn, utdela sacramentet, jorda lik och annat sådant om han icke haver en cappelan hos sig tillstädes och må icke heller någon präst bedja och läsa i kyrkan eller annorstädes utan beläte, vilket och allom är förbjudet såväl andliga som världsliga höga som låga rika som fattiga bedja Gud antingen afton eller morgon utan han ser uppå ett beläte eller kors som står antingen i stugan eller i kyrkan. (p. 8)

> Nor may any priest conduct any divine service in the church – whether mass, baptism, christening of children, administering sacraments, burying the dead or anything else – unless he have an assistant present, nor may any priest pray and read in the church or elsewhere without an image; to everyone, both clergy and laymen, high and low, rich and poor it is forbidden to pray to God either evening or morning unless he gaze up at an image or cross either in the home or at church.

Petrejus also writes about life in the monasteries and convents, returning on several occasions to the ignorance of the monks and nuns. It should be noted that he is writing a couple of decades after Vadstena monastery, the last one in Sweden, was dissolved:

> ...om deras tro religion och orden: Utan säga att de kunna slätt ingen besked giva varken om en sak eller annan utan är alldeles menlösa och enfaldiga och kunna varken läsa eller skriva och dricka sig likväl fulla och druckna som andra svin och säga att patriarken metropoliterna och de andra deras höga andliga förmän skola för dem svara ty de göra allt efter vad som de dem bjuda och befalla det vare sig rätt eller orätt. (p. 5)

> ...about their faith, religion, and order: But they say that they are unable to give any information at all about one thing or another, but are utterly naïve and simple and can neither read nor write, and they drink until they are drunk just like other swine, and they say that the patriarch, the metropolitans and their other high priests will answer for them, for they do everything they are bidden and ordered by them, whether right or wrong.

What Petrejus says about the monks and nuns' lack of education and immoral life should be considered in light of the fact that the Protestant Church had a very unfavourable view of monasticism. It was not until 1977 that the ban on monasteries in Sweden was lifted and they could once again be freely established. This complaint regarding the morals of the Russian monks and nuns can also be encountered in other texts of the same character from this time.

Petrejus writes a great deal about the attitude of the Russian Church toward Protestantism. In his view, the Catholics were the common enemy of both Russians and Swedes, and he believed that the Russian religion should be incorporated as far as possible into the Protestant cultural sphere:

> De hålla mera utav den rena augsburgska läran än som utav den påveska eller någon annan religion och säga de att den lutherska kommer nästan överens med sanningen, och stode wäl till att lida där hon allenast ville angripa de papistiska lärare, och icke ville göra någon förändring uppå de ceremonier som uti kyrkan brukas. (p. 19)

> They like the pure doctrine of Augsburg more than the Papist one or any other religion, and they say that the Lutheran faith almost agrees with the truth, and could probably be tolerated if it would only attack the Papist teachers, and did not seek to make any changes to the ceremonies practiced in the Church.

The book concludes with a list of very specific rules formulated as questions and answers, otherwise usually found in priests' manuals for conducting divine service and for fasting during Lent and Easter. Here, the ritualistic aspect of Russian Orthodoxy is introduced in an unexpected and peculiar way into Petrejus' own text, in a passage that quotes specific rules of the Russian Church on fasting and on nights when it was prohibited for a priest to have intercourse with his wife. Part of it is translated from a theological treatise, *Voprosjanii Kirika*, which Petrejus does not cite directly but quotes from Sigismund von Herberstein's account of Russia in German. The Russian scholar Tatiana Oparina has shown that Petrejus also made changes in the work to bring the answers into conformity with actual ecclesiastical practices.[7]

What he otherwise attempts in his text is to include the Orthodox Church into the Christian community together with the Protestants while excluding the Catholics. The way in which Petrejus amasses detailed descriptions is typical of the age. As Catherine Peebles and Paul Zumthor note in a study of the development of the travelogue, the descriptive element becomes stronger in late sixteenth-century portrayals of foreign lands.[8] They refer to this tendency as myopia, a phenomenon that can be found in travel accounts in other periods as well. In certain respects Petrejus' book does suffer from such near-sightedness.

Johannes Botvidi

Another author who wrote about Russia at the time was the priest Johannes Botvidi, who in 1620 defended a thesis at Uppsala University entitled *Theses de questione utrum muscovitae sint Christiani?* (fig. 7:2). Botvidi was Gustav II Adolf's court preacher and confidant. The dissertation was in fact commissioned by the king.[9] Botvidi notes in his preface that he does not know Russian. He relies throughout on secondary sources such as the collection *Rerum Moscoviticarum auctores varii* (published in Frankfurt in 1600), but he does not seem to have consulted Petrus Petrejus. Botvidi declares that Christianity has indeed been introduced into Russia, and that the country has become Christian:

> Quae omnia conclusionem priorem evidenter comprobant Religionem scil, Christianam aliquando in Muschoviam fuisse introductam, Consequens est, ut ostendamus, eandem in hodiernum usque diem ibidem conservatam esse. (X)
>
> All this proves the earlier conclusion that the Christian religion was in fact once introduced into Muscovy, and what remains for us to show, is that it has been preserved unchanged to the present day.

THESES
DE QVÆSTIONE,
UTRUM
MUSCHOVITÆ
SINT CHRISTIANI?
Jussu S. R. M. Sveciæ etc. ad publicam disputationem in Academiâ Upsaliensi proposita,
à
IOHANNE BOTVIDI
GOTHO, S.S. Theol. D. & Regiæ Concionatore.
Respondente
M. ANDREA IOHANNIS PRYTZ.
Holmiæ, Typis Regnerianis.
ANNO M. DC. XX.

FIG. 7:2. *Johannes Botvidi. The title page of the* Theses de questione utrum muscovitae sint Christiani.

He criticizes the Russians for not having any sermons in their churches, which is of course crucial to him as a Protestant. He states that the Russian communion bread is leavened and not a wafer, but at the same time he points out approvingly that baptism is performed in the name of the Trinity, although the formula is in the passive rather than in the first person singular as in the Swedish ritual:

> Respondetur ad primum: Non multum interesse, sive quis dicat: Ego te paptizo in nomine Patris & Filii & Spiritus S. Sive: Baptizetur talis servus Christi Jesu in nomine P & F &Sp. Sancti, Sive: Baptizetur manibus meis talis in nomine P. & F. & S. Sancti, sed interim verum perficitur baptisma, quia tota Trinitas, a qua virtutem habet baptisimus, & efficaciam omnem secundum institutionem Christi sincere exprimitur. (XXIX)

> To the former (first) it is answered: Little differentiates saying: I baptize thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, or: He is baptized as a servant of Jesus Christ in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, or: He is baptized by my hands in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and the Baptism is really performed because the whole of Trinity from which the Baptism gets its force according to the commandment of Christ is sincerely pronounced..

Botvidi also notes that, like the Protestants, the Muscovites have a Bible and that the Holy Writ is held in great esteem. Even more than Petrejus, he seeks out similarities rather than differences between the two denominations:

> Deinde Sacram Scripturam maxima venerationen prosequuntur. (XXI)
>
> Holy Scripture is accorded the greatest veneration.

Both Botvidi and Petrejus observe that like divine service, the Bible is in the vernacular (*materno idiomate*). Botvidi calls the language both the mother tongue and the popular language (*vernacula*).

> Deinde sacra peragunt materno idiomate extra chorum. Epistolam et Evangelium populo astanti recitant post cantionem Seraphicam Symbolum Nicaenum decantant. Homilias quoque Ecclesiae Doctorum lingua vernacula publice legunt. (XLV)
>
> Subsequently sacred matters are conducted in the mother tongue. In the mass, besides the chorus, the epistles and gospel are recited with the congregation standing. After the seraphic hymn the Nicean Creed is sung. The preaching of the learned men of the Church is also read publicly in the popular language.

Botvidi maintains, however, that there are different Slavic dialects and refers to Slavic languages collectively as Illyrian. This was a common designation for all Slavonic languages at the time. Later it has denoted South Slavonic languages in particular, and the term has been widely used in language identity creation on the Balkans.[10]

> Illyricam voco lingvam, quae Slavis, Croatis, Bohemis, Dalmatis, Polonis, Lithuanis, Russis, Muscovitis aliisque populis est communis. (XII)
>
> Illyrian is the language which Slavs, Croats, Bohemians, Dalmatians, Poles, Lithuanians, Russians have in common.

Botvidi's emphasis on the use of the vernacular in the Orthodox Church is in accord with his attempt to bring Russian and Swedish religion closer together. He notes differences in religious customs but, surprisingly, views many of them as *adiafora*—insignificant side issues.

Botvidi's finding that the Muscovites were indeed Christian suited the Swedish king, who liked to see himself as the protector of the Orthodox in the area on the other side of the Baltic that had a Russian population. The Swedes wanted the Russians in this region to convert to Lutheranism, even issuing a catechism in Church Slavic. Still, there was some sympathy in Sweden for Orthodoxy, which was sometimes approvingly referred to as "the old Greek religion". This attitude is reflected in Botvidi's attempt to present the Russian religion as belonging to Christianity in general and being similar to Protestanism in particular.[11] The Catholic Church, on the other hand, does not figure in Botvidi's argument as it does in the work of Petrejus.

Johan Gabriel Sparwenfeld

Let us now move on to a view of the Russian Church written more than sixty years after Petrejus and Botvidi by Johan Gabriel Sparwenfeld, who kept a diary during a diplomatic mission to Russia in 1684–87.[12] As is apparent from the journal, Sparwenfeld was an enthusiastically interested, inquisitive observer of the Russian Church who described his many visits to monasteries and churches in his notes (fig. 7:3). His account is even more positive or neutral than that of Petrejus. As did his predecessor, he accurately portrays the structure of divine service and praises its "zeal". As shown by the following diary entry written early in his sojourn in Russia, he wants to know as much as possible and attempts to communicate as much detail as he can:

> Concerning the service I cannot say much as I did not understand it, but I did see that everything was performed with zeal and looked almost as if it were in the Catholic manner, with incense and vestments and three people serving by the altar – it could not be seen because of the screen – responded, and it resounded with the beautiful harmony of five or six parts.[13]

As a man of the world and diplomat writing long after the Thirty Years' War, Sparwenfeld was able to have a different and more positive view of the Catholic Church and to find similarities between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. He is eager to get to know and understand the Russian Church. He observes without judging. He asks permission to return to one of the monasteries he has visited to live there and study Russian. He views both icons and sacred music as aesthetically appealing. He describes the interior of a church, especially the rows of the iconostasis, in great detail:

> Then, at about 2 o'clock, they opened the church again. Then by mere chance and accident we were fortunate enough to get into the church all the way up to the doors of the sanctuary. And here the most noteworthy points are as follows. The church is divided inside like the Greek ones, one third for the sanctuary which is completely screened off by a wall, or by joinery work from the floor all the way up to the vault, and as in most churches, the screen consists of painted icons. But this one is much more sumptuous, because here there are two

FIG. 7:3. *Drawing by Sparwenfeld in his Diary.*

> rows of carved gilt wooden pillars, an upper and a lower row, and in between every second pillar there is at the top a prophet and in the bottom row an apostle, which means that in the two rows, the upper and the lower one, there are 20 painted icons and 42 pillars And right in front of each icon on the upper row a burning silver lamp ... looking out through the door, there is a large painted icon of Christ, the like of which in terms of delicacy and colours I have never seen, such is the tenderness of it.[14]

The age is different in comparison with the time of Petrejus and Botvidi, but above all so is the person. Sparwenfeld gives the impression of an aristocrat who can afford to be tolerant, understanding and benevolent. However, all three writers also have an

inside perspective in that they write from a pre-modern Christian vantage point about the pre-modern Christian phenomenon that was the Russian Church.

Laurentius Petri and the invented account

Now let us go back in time for a moment to consider a portrayal of a Swedish diplomatic mission that travelled to Moscow in 1557 to negotiate peace between the two countries. The delegates included Archbishop Laurentius Petri and the Bishop of Turku Mikael Agricola. This was during the reign of Gustav I, and the mission is mentioned in various diplomatic documents and in the King's registry. An account has been preserved of a meeting between the representatives of the Swedish and Russian Churches that supposedly took place after the conclusion of the official negotiations. The story is reported in Johan Göstaf Hallman's doctoral dissertation *Twenne Bröder och neriksboer, som then Evangeliske Läran Införde uti Nordlandet, then Äldre Mest Olaff Petri* ("Two brothers and inhabitants of Nericia who introduced the evangelical faith to the Nordic countries, mostly the older brother Olaus Petri") from 1726. The text describes a religious debate staged by Czar Ivan the Terrible regarding Lent and sacred images:

> Först osamdes them hwilketthera språket, the under disputationen skulle betiena sig utaf, Mäster Lars wille tala latin, utan något grækiska. Storfursten åter som samtalet afhöra skulle, förstod hwarken latin eller grækiska; begärade therföre thet the måtte tala på tyska, then Patriarken inte heller kunde; men Mäster Lars, som i sin ungdom studerade i Tyskland, war i thet språket fårdig, talar therföre Storfursten til på tyska, men som Storfurstens tal intet kom öfwerens med thet som Mäster Lars sade, kunde man någorlunda sluta, at Storfursten äfwen i tyskan hade en ringa kunskap. Omsider kommo the öfwerens at talas vid på grækiska, om fastan och beläternas tilbediande, men när Erkiebiskopen i sitt tal metaphysiske termer inspädde, förstod intet Patriarken hwart tredie ord och lemnade svaret ther efter. Storfurstens Tolk, som talet skulle uttolka, war under thetta samtalet stadd i tusende ångest, emedan han af alt som sades icke ett enda ord förstod, wiste ock, at om han sig skolat ursäckta, hade thet kostat hans lif, ty thenne Storfurste war en af the grymmaste Ryske Storfurstar. Hwarföre, när han skulle förklara hwad som sades, tog han til råda, och talade hwad som då i en hast kunde honom förekomma, som dock i intet mål med Erkiebiskopens och Patriarkens tal öfwerens kom. Michael Agricola, then äfwen war en af the Swenske sändebuden, förstod både grækiska, latin och Ryska, men hölt dock för särdeles orsaker skul lönliga, at han Ryskan förstod, han begynner öfwer thenna löjeliga handel at hierteliga le, hwilket, då Storfursten förmärckte, befalte han the både talande med disputationen uphöra, som war allom kärt; men i synnerhet Tolcken, hwilken thet ena swettbadet efter thet andra öfwergick.
>
> First they disagreed as to which language should be used in the discussion. Master Lars wanted to speak Latin without any Greek. The Grand Duke, who was to listen to the conversation, understood neither Latin nor Greek, and therefore demanded that they speak German, which the Patriarch did not know. But Master Lars, who in his youth had studied in Ger-

> many, was fluent in the language and therefore spoke to the Grand Duke in German. But when what the Grand Duke said did not agree with what Master Lars said, it became clear that the Grand Duke also knew very little German. Eventually they agreed to speak Greek about Lent and praying to images, but when the Archbishop mixed metaphysical terms into his speech, the Patriarch failed to understand every third word and answered accordingly. The Grand Duke's interpreter, who was to translate, was in great anxiety during this conversation, since he understood not one word that was said, and he knew that if he begged to be excused it would cost him his life, for this Grand Duke was one of the cruellest Russian Grand Dukes. Therefore, when he was to explain what had been said, he took his own counsel and said on the spur of the moment whatever occurred to him, which, however, in no way agreed with what the Archbishop and the Patriarch were saying. Mikael Agricola, who also was one of the Swedish ambassadors, understood Greek, Latin and Russian, but for various reasons concealed the fact that he knew Russian, he begins to laugh heartily at these ridiculous goings-on, and, when the Grand Duke noticed it, he ordered both of the speakers to end the debate, which relieved everyone; but especially the Interpreter, who went through one sweat bath after another.[15]

The Russians here, especially the Grand Duke, are made to represent tyranny, barbarism, and ignorance, whereas the Swedes appear to be educated, intelligent, cunning, and knowledgeable, particularly linguistically. Besides Swedish they are fluent in German and Russian and stand out especially for their competence in the classical languages, Latin and Greek. The other side is described as ignorant and without any foreign language skills at all. The Russians as presented here are in fact comical, and the interpreter who breaks into a sweat when he cannot manage his job could easily have been taken from the many jokes that once circulated about representatives of the Soviet regime. As a Slavist, of course, I sympathize with him.

Thus the text focuses on the great distance between Russia and the West. The Russians also seem a bit threatening and unpredictable. There is, however, a problem with this account. Hallman's dissertation fails to indicate the source of the report, nor is there any record of it in the Muscovy collection at the Swedish National Archives. The entire narrative is a forgery that was written at some time near the end of the seventeenth century and subsequently found its way into Swedish historiography as a genuine document. It belongs, of course, to the well-known genre of the religious debate, which may explain why many historians have been taken in. The text was composed so skilfully that even the Russian-American religious historian George Florovsky regarded it as genuine and characterized it as an early attempt at dialogue between Orthodoxy and Protestantism.[16] One suspicious detail is that the head of the Russian Church is referred to as the Patriarch, though this title did not arise until later, in 1589. The narrative style of the text also raises a question as to its authenticity. As historian Nils Ahnlund has noted, it was authored later – about the same time as Sparwenfeld's journal – by the notorious fabricator Nils Rabenius,[17] but its condescending and burlesque

manner sets it apart from genuine examples. The contrast we have noted in the text between Western learning and Russian ignorance is more typical of a later view of the relationship between Russia and the West that was influenced by the Enlightenment. It exemplifies the Enlightenment construction of Russia and Eastern Europe explored by Larry Wolff in his book *Inventing Eastern Europe*.[18] In addition to the learning/ignorance dichotomy, there is another element that fits the Enlightenment, namely the view of Eastern Europe as a burlesque. Thus the Russians behave in accordance with the rules of a simple comedy, while the West has the role of the audience. The account basically gives the impression of a travel anecdote.

Conclusion

Portrayals of the Orthodox Church during this earlier period are far from negative, despite our perhaps prejudiced expectations. These descriptions often display considerable knowledge, their tone is often neutral and the narrative objective, and they express curiosity as to the real state of affairs. The entirely negative depiction put forward by Hallman is a later fabrication written by Rabenius, who had never been to Russia and was mainly interested in telling anecdotes. There are many explanations for the otherwise multifaceted picture we see. The texts were written by men for whom the Christian worldview was self-evident. Petrejus and Botvidi viewed the Catholic world as a great threat to both Orthodoxy and Protestantism. Also, as a result of armed conquest Sweden acquired a considerable number of Orthodox believers within its new borders, so there was cause to regard their faith with a certain tolerance. In addition, Petrejus and Sparwenfeld exhibit a zeal for factual detail that in Petrejus' case perhaps reflects the era's typical approach to other countries and cultures. It consisted in a myopic amassing of detail in an attempt to guarantee authenticity. Florovsky, moreover, perceives an "ecumenical" interest in rapprochement and mutual understanding that was present elsewhere as well within both Orthodoxy and Protestantism. This is true, but his example from Hallman is a bad choice. In the rest of his article he proves this trend in the Protestantism of the time. What fails to be confirmed in these accounts is our expectation that seventeenth-century texts dealing with Russia would be exclusively negative or derisive.

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Endnotes

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4 Tarkiainen 1973, pp. 259–262.
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7 Oparina 2007.
8 Zumthor & Peebles 1994, pp. 809–824.
9 Mokroborodova 2004, pp. 67–76.
10 Iovine 1984, pp. 101–156. Thanks to Pontus Lindgren of Uppsala University for information on the Illyrian question.
11 Tarkianen 1971.
12 Sparwenfeld 2002.
13 Ibid., p. 103, 105.
14 Ibid., p. 111.
15 Op.cit., p. 120.
16 Florovsky 1974, p. 172: "In 1557 a special Swedish delegation visited Moscow. Two prominent Church leaders were among the delegates—Laurentius Petri, the first Lutheran Archbishop of Uppsala, and Michael Agricola, the Finnish Reformer. The delegates met with the Metropolitan of Moscow (Macarius), obviously on the initiative of the Tsar Ivan the Terrible. The main topics for discussion were the veneration of icons and fasting."
17 Ahnlund 1927.
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Sweden and Serbia

Two peripheries 1815–1914

By *Čedomir Antić*

Eric Hobsbawm gave an interview to the Belgrade weekly *NIN*[1] in 2010, in which he compared the positions of the Balkans and Scandinavia during the first half of the 20th century. Here he argued that Serbia had missed the opportunity to modernize and strengthen its economy in order to catch European trends and become part of contemporary European economic area. Hobsbawm stressed that Denmark on the other hand had managed to abandon its agrarian economy and focus on trade with the British Empire.

There are several common features between the Balkans and Scandinavia, especially during the 19th century's nation-building process. The two regions were peripheral; they remained politically disunited and under the influence of the Great Powers. However, there were numerous differences, as well. The Balkans were the only one of the four great European peninsulas (the Iberian, the Scandinavian, the Italian and the Balkans) that had never been politically united by the will of its peoples or the strength of one among them. The Balkans were inhabited by many very different ethnicities and saw the two most numerous Christian denominations intertwined with Islam. Finally, three out of six contemporary Great Powers (the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian Empires) were territorially attached and directly involved in the Balkans.

Demographic aspects of state development, nation building and the modernization process could probably be considered the most interesting part of a comparative presentation of Sweden and Serbia in the 19th century. Sweden was the first country in Europe with the administrative capacity to keep reliable records of its population; the first census was taken as early as 1750. At that time 1.8 million people lived within the borders of the Kingdom of Sweden. From 1800 to 1910 the Swedish population grew from 2.3 to 5.5 million.[2] The case of Serbia was quite different, although trends were the same. In the core of modern Serbian state – the Belgrade *pashalik* – some

400,000 Serbs lived in 1800. During the first decades of revolution and the autonomy-gaining process, despite grave losses, their number doubled. A century later about 2.5 million people lived in the Kingdom of Serbia; before the Balkan War of 1912 the population probably reached 3 million, and after the liberation and incorporation of Raska, Kosovo, Metohiya and Vardar Macedonia, the population reached 4 million. In 1960 the Republic of Serbia, with different borders and with an ethnically significantly altered population, for the first time surpassed the Kingdom of Sweden demographically. While the Socialist Republic of Serbia had some 8.7 million inhabitants in 1961, in Sweden in 1970 there were 7.5 million. That trend then stopped until the 1990s.

The issue of continuity probably presents the difference most vividly. During the long 19th century (1789–1914) both countries entered European politics as newcomers in crisis. Sweden however, after a relative decline following the reign of Carolus XII, just had to rearrange its statehood, while Serbia re-emerged after a 350-year hiatus under Ottoman overlordship. The first decade of the 19th century marked the end of a several-centuries-old Swedish rule over Finland, when this eastern territory was lost to the Russian Empire. In the 1813 war the new Swedish king Jean-Baptist Bernadotte changed sides, thus securing the prosperity of his kingdom and a personal union with Norway. This became the framework for Swedish modernization and industrialization in the 19th century. Serbia saw similar but more complex development, slower and burdened by wars and internal strife.

There are several differences and one common feature between Serbian and Swedish constitutionalism. First and most importantly, the Serbian constitution was "a barrier to personal rule" – *ustav* – while the Swedish constitution was the Instrument of Government (*Regeringsformen*). Swedish constitutionalism was a matter of continuity of reform and statehood, from the introduction of modern parliamentarianism through the bloodless revolution of 1772 when the king became the "constitutional autocrat". This peaceful evolution culminated in 1809 with the accession of a new dynasty, when separation of government was finally accomplished, but even then the monarch prevailed over other institutions. Only after 1917 did the King of Sweden adopt the principle of the cabinet being dependent only on the majority in the parliament. During the 19th century the Swedish parliament was composed of representatives of four estates.

In Serbia the process was discontinuous. The first constitutional law was adopted in 1808, during the Serbian revolution. The Constitutions of 1835 and 1869 came about as revolutionary acts, for Great Powers were not consulted on them. Serbia became a parliamentary state after the St. Andrew Assembly of 1858, but the 1835 Constitution and previous practice had introduced parliamentarianism as well. The common feature of the two states was the institution of monarchy. It was the main instrument of

constitutional transformation and the accession of a new dynasty in Sweden. It happened in the same era as the appearance and rivalry of two Serbian 19th century dynasties, the Karadjordjevićs and the Obrenovićs, who instigated and shaped the building of a constitution in Serbia.

One interesting phenomenon emerges from even a superficial overview and comparison of two countries' constitutional history. Despite the fact that Sweden was a much more advanced, independent and wealthy country with a far better-educated population and, for Balkan standards, unprecedented political stability: Serbia's unstable and dynamic constitutional history saw many constitutional solutions that were more liberal and more modern. This was caused by the egalitarian and austere basis of Serbian society and Serbia's uneasy position with internal political and social tensions, plus pressure from the autocratic Great Powers with their hostility towards any emancipation and modernisation of Serbia.

The modernization of the state and the economy was quite different in these two distant European countries. While Sweden was a well-established, old European estate monarchy with deeply rooted feudalism, Serbia was a country of egalitarian peasants who crushed feudal relations in uprisings and later abolished feudalism entirely after long negotiations with the Ottoman Porte. Hardly any Serbian industry existed before the Kragujevac cannon factory was established in the mid 19th century.[3] Later on, industrialisation faced severe obstacles imposed by politically dominant farming interests and a bureaucratic elite whose members were aware of the political and social consequences of western-style industrialisation. Nevertheless, in Serbia freedom of commerce was established in the 1830s, after the triumph of constitutionalism, whereas in Sweden the principle of free trade and commerce was established only in 1864.[4] Though many scholars take 1870 as the starting year for Swedish industrialisation, old crafts were very advanced, and significant industrial capacity already existed in Stockholm and Gothenburg. Having a highly developed and complexly stratified society, Sweden became able to successfully pursue one of the fundamental features of modern society – an advanced system of taxation. Between 1855 and 1869 the land-based property tax was abolished, and the barter economy was finally replaced by a money economy. In Serbia, taxation reform proceeded more slowly and has not reached the model of industrial states.

The state administration was far more advanced in Sweden than in Serbia. However, Sweden had problems similar to those of most Western and Northern European countries. The state administration was considered feudal until the process of its dearistocratisation started with the 1809 Constitution, and this was not complete until the 1850s. The process of industrialisation was rapid. The modernisation of the old universities of Lund and Uppsala had a significant impact on industrialisation.[5] Despite the fact that they did not provide sufficient knowledge for state administration

and were severely criticised at the time (as was the case with Oxford and Cambridge during the same period[6]), they provided a good foundation, and after necessary reforms became sources of personnel for a well-trained public administration.

The Principality of Serbia had several disadvantages. After the period of uprisings, a new kind of qualifications was needed for civil servants. The first generation of educated bureaucrats came from Serb-populated Southern Hungary. These new Serbian citizens were highly educated but very conservative, and the rural population was not well disposed towards them, despite the fact that Serbia had one of the smallest state administrative apparatuses in Europe. The next generation was composed of Serbian state scholarship recipients who were sent to European universities (mainly Vienna, Budapest, Munich, Paris and Berlin). There were fifty of them until 1860, but more than 1,200 in 1900. The Serbian elite was thus swiftly modernised. When Belgrade University was founded in 1905 only a tiny minority of its professors had received their education in Serbia. But, despite the fact that state primary schools were established more or less at the same time, in Serbia they were made compulsory at the end of the 19th century. About 69% of Serbian males were literate, while illiteracy was virtually eradicated in Sweden.[7]

Public education had, strangely enough, similar and contemporaneous beginnings in the two countries. There was no regulated state educational policy in Sweden before 1842 when Parliament decided that a public school was to be established in every parish, and made attendance compulsory for all children.[8]

Sweden and Serbia were clearly on Europe's periphery regarding the number of active theatres. According to the press of the time, among 1,584 theatres in Europe that were active at the end of 1866, Scandinavia had only 32 and the Balkans (including the Ottoman Empire) 12. Meanwhile, in France there were 337 theatres, in Great Britain and Austria 150, and in Russia including Poland 44. In Sweden plus Norway there were 18 and in Serbia only one theatre.[9]

The first contact between Sweden and Serbia in world athletics was made during the 1912 Summer Olympics. The Games of the Fifth Olympiad were held in Sweden, and it became the début for the Serbian Olympic team. Sadly, the first Serbian Olympic experience was not very stimulating. Firstly, of the five ethnic Serbs who took part in the Games, only two came from Serbia; the other three represented other nations. While the Austro-Hungarian representative allegedly poisoned the Serbian athlete Dusan Milosević, the Serbian marathon runner Dragutin Tomašević was assaulted by sports fans on a remote section of the road and immobilised until their favourites reached a secure advantage.[10]

Sweden and Serbia are geographically distant and have seen different historical developments. However, during the 19th century both countries were on the European periphery. Despite the fact that Sweden was a state with continuity, inhabited by

a population which was ethnically, religiously and culturally rather homogeneous and integrated both internally and with neighbouring states, it faced the problem of continuity during modernisation and had to re-evaluate its position in Europe. Serbia was rebuilt from its ashes during almost the entire 19th century; it appeared as a non-unified, rural, unenlightened political entity which was under the heavy-handed and malevolent influence of the Ottoman Empire and Austria. This brief overview has aspired to present mainly similarities between the two societies and to emphasise that Serbia in many respects underwent faster and more dynamic development (issuing its liberal constitutions, modest but progressive industrialisation and commercial legislation, even in protecting the rights of religious minorities). The Serbian advantages were, nevertheless, the consequence of its egalitarian society and the great, often quite megalomaniacal aspirations of its political and other elite. Serbian preconditions were poor, especially regarding the education level of its people and its heritage of Ottoman rule. The influence of the Great Powers had a devastating impact on Serbian affairs. Nevertheless, although the 19th–20th centuries put the countries on the road of constant growth – especially in the field of economy and culture – Sweden in the 19th century finally ceased to be even a regional power, and until the second half of the 20th century its population became smaller even than that of Serbia.

For the first time in history the two countries now also have the chance to become part of the same political union.

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Sweden: the Reluctant European

By *Lars Magnusson*

Sweden's relationship to the European Union has always seemed to be a reluctant one. This is clearly the case today regarding the Swedish position in discussions concerning the future of the EU as a consequence of the on-going budget crisis and economic recession. It has been a long time since the issue of whether Europe should take a step towards fuller integration, perhaps even including what has been described as a "fiscal union" – as a political counterpart to monetary integration – was as burning as it is today. Of course, Sweden is not a member of the inner core of the union defined as the members of the Eurozone. Nor do there seem to be any plans to seek membership in the monetary union, not even in the medium term. Moreover, the main line as this is being written is also to stay outside the suggested "bank union", arguing that this would imply a deepened and more politically entangled union than before. In fact, Sweden says no to most suggestions for overcoming the current budget crisis. The country does not want a deepening of economic cooperation; especially not solutions that could mean that Swedish tax money would be used to save other member countries from defaulting. For a fiscal union or European tax there is no – or very little – support from Swedish politicians. By and large, Sweden can be characterized at the moment as a bystander, reluctant to get involved in the heated debate concerning the future of the European project. What does Sweden want with Europe? Why is its position so reluctant?

To be able to answer such questions we must adopt both a short-term and a long-term view. The short-term answer is that Sweden has not – so far at least – been hit as hard by the crisis in the aftermath of the financial crash of 2008 as most other European countries. Sweden is proud to have learned its lesson from the severe economic crisis of the 1990s, having introduced harsh budget cuts and established strong macroeconomic fundamentals. Why should it pay for countries that have not taken respon-

sible precautions by cutting their external debts and establishing stricter budget discipline in time?

However, added to this short-term answer there are also more long-term historical explanations. The fact is that Sweden has always – both before it joined the European Union and as a member since then – been a reluctant European. In this there is nothing particularly novel today – even though the challenge from Europe to become more fully integrated has brought the issue to a head far more than previously. It is my aim here to suggest some explanations for why Sweden has been such a hesitant member of the European community.

In fact, Sweden was also a slow starter. It only joined the EU in 1995 after more than three decades of sometimes fierce discussion. Up until the end of the Cold War (in 1989–90) the official reason for Sweden to stay outside of the EU was its commitment to military neutrality; "... nonalignment during peace time in order to be neutral in a war situation", as stated in most official documents regarding Swedish foreign policy since the end of World War II. However, there is every reason to believe that although the principle of neutrality was important, it was not the only – or even perhaps not the principal – reason why Sweden was so late to join the EU. According to recent polls, after almost twenty years Sweden's membership now seems at last to be accepted by a majority of its citizens. But few argue in favour of a deepening of the union in terms of more economic, political and social integration. Almost no one in Sweden today argues for a more federalist structure of the EU. Hence the principle of inter-governmentalism is by far the most commonly held position both among Swedish voters and politicians. To hand over political decision-making from the national to the European level is virtually anathema in the Swedish discussion – but this is not only a current phenomenon: it has been the majority position since 1995.

The very long-term view

In my view, Sweden's position in the European project must be seen in relation to a broad range of historical factors, political as well as social and economic. Most certainly the early 18th century dethronement of Sweden as a great power in Northern Europe is an important factor. As a consequence Sweden turned into itself, reluctant to take part in European wars and power struggles, especially after the war with Russia in 1808, which stripped Sweden of its former Eastern provinces, Finland. The policy of neutrality that was formed in the subsequent period was of course a consequence of this dramatic event, which also entailed that Sweden was left outside the great wars of the first half of the 20th century.

However, there are two further important historical factors that play a major role in explaining such reluctance. Firstly, that Sweden has preserved up to the present a

quite egalitarian social structure within an ethnically rather homogenous population combined with inclusive democratic institutions for which there is a high degree of consensus. Here it is possible to point to the dominant peasant roots of present-day Sweden and the importance of a free peasantry for the development of democratic institutions as well as for economic development since the 18th century.

However, a second historical condition is also of major importance: the important role of the trade and labour movement together with other "popular" movements of the late 19th century – the temperance movement, the religious dissenter movement, and the cooperative movement. However, these two historical factors are clearly linked. Thus, the rise of the *folkrörelser*, "popular movements". and the influential role they have played is hardly imaginable without earlier Swedish history in general, and without the role of the peasantry in Swedish history in particular.

Hence, up until the 19th century, the Swedish economy was almost completely dominated by agriculture. Of course, there were also a few other sections of production, for example the mining industry, which was important especially in the 17th and 18th centuries, as well as state-subsidized manufactories in some major Swedish cities, especially Stockholm and Norrköping. It was often organized in the form of putting-out industry in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. But on the whole these sectors were of minor importance indeed compared to an agrarian sector that, up even to the mid-19th century, employed more than 80% of the country's workforce. Moreover, especially the mining industry was heavily dependent upon agrarian producers, as it was almost entirely located in rural areas. Further, it is clear that the Swedish industrial breakthrough of the 19th century was largely based on small-scale production rooted in agriculture, to a great extent relying on the independent small-scale producer as in the ideal image put forward by the Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th century. The famous big Swedish exporting firms (Ericson, Laval, SKF, AGA, Atlas Copco etc.) were not established until around about 1900 – at a time when this social structure was already in place. No doubt there were also large businesses involved in the iron and steel industry – but, as noted, there were strong agrarian roots connected with their establishment and growth over time.

In a general sense, the religious dissenter movement from the 1870s on, the teetotalling movement from the 1880s on and the labour movement from the 1890s on were all a consequence of the industrial breakthrough during the same period. They mainly attracted the lower-middle and the labouring classes – whose conditions had been very much transformed by the industrial revolution. Such a process of social change no doubt took place in many other countries besides Sweden during the same period. However, the specific shape it took in Sweden was original, at least up to a point.

First, as indicated, industrialisation in the Swedish context was a broad process in-

cluding various social strata and people of different origin and position. It included a broad foundation of small-scale production with a base in agriculture, local craft skills, etc. Up until the early 20th century – at least for most industries – it relied on many small firms in which the owner often took part in production activities as well as managing the firm. Thus in a relative sense, industrialisation in Sweden took a more "inclusive" form – in the recent words of Daron Acemoglo and James R. Robinson – than was perhaps common in many other countries. And the implications of this are not hard to understand: a willingness to compromise among small-scale owners of industry and workers was so to speak built into the system from the beginning. It was really, at its roots, an effect of the peculiar industrialisation process taking place in Sweden. It created a social system of production with gliding scales of positions; the peasant was never particularly far from the small-scale industrialist, nor the agricultural worker from the part-time industrial worker, nor were they far from the classic industrial proletarian. This loosely defined structure led to social flexibility – as well as to a mode of conflict resolution that has always been strongly emphasised in Swedish industrial relations. Further, it is clear that the popular movements from the late 19th century became permeated by such values – to the point where even the Swedish labour movement placed the emphasis on pragmatic compromise rather than on open class struggle.

However, it was not only in this economic or social sense that the early economic history of Sweden contributed to the rise and development of the popular movements in Sweden during the late 19th century. The first real trade unions appeared in the 1880s and early 1890s. The Swedish Social Democratic Party was founded in 1889 and served very much as a central organisation for the unions before the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen) was established in 1898. It has often been recognized that the early labour movement in Sweden to a great extent borrowed its organisational setup, its spirit as an organisation, from the earlier religious dissenter and tee-totalling movements. However, all of these popular movements also borrowed forms of organisation etc., from existing democratic or pre-democratic institutions on the local level; the rural *kommun* municipality, the village organisation etc. Thus, such institutions were to a great extent a nursery for the later voluntary popular organisations, where rules of fairness and agreement, a way to put forward proposals and to settle disagreements was taught and articulated. Its spirit of democratic values and of compromise was thus inherited by the popular movements – and this was probably an important factor behind the subsequent democratic development of Swedish society during the 20th century, in which the popular movements played a leading role.

The Swedish Model

These socio-economic developments apparently laid the groundwork for what has become known as the "Swedish model"; a Swedish *Sonderweg*; or as Marquis Childs famously called Sweden in the 1930s, "the third way" (between capitalism and socialism). This strong feeling of *Sonderheit,* "otherness", is also an important factor in understanding the present in Sweden's historical trajectory. It does not necessarily mean that Swedes feel superior to other Europeans. The sense of otherness can sometimes also imply a feeling of inferiority. But more importantly this figuration of self-reflexivity plays an important part when Sweden seeks its place among Europe's cooperating countries.

The kernel of this modern Swedish model – both in reality and as a form of self-reflexion – was made up by the organized collaboration between especially three parties: employers, organised labour and the state. However, popular movements as well as other interest groups, such as farmers, were also included in the matrix. The concept of the Swedish model can be used to denote several different things. In its broadest sense it has been used to characterise the collaborative framework that developed from the end of the 19th century and experienced its definite breakthrough during the 1930s. At this time Social Democracy rose to power and applied the so-called "horse-trading policy" (*kohandeln)* with the farmers' party in 1933. This laid the groundwork for the long period of Social Democrat governments in Sweden (1932–76, 1982–91 and 1994–2006) as well as the establishment of a Swedish welfare state.

However, the Swedish model can also be said to define the particular relations that evolved on the labour market after the mid-1930s. The trade unions were successful, especially in the interwar years, in reaching agreements with employers and their organisations, not only regarding wages and general work conditions, but also with regard to structural change, application of new technology, altered work organisation, etc. The general agreements in the 1930s and 1940s between the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), which organised a majority of Swedish workers in this period, and the powerful Swedish Association of Employers (SAF), has been regarded as especially important in this sense. Their cooperation in building an organizational structure through voluntary and binding collective agreements has also been identified as a core characteristic of the Swedish model.

Also, in a comparative perspective, Swedish employers were favourable to social legislation etc. long before the First World War. In fact there was a clear breakthrough for such a more active interest as early as the 1880s. Further, in Sweden this interest on the employers' part – as well as their direct campaigning for such ends in parliament during this period – seems to have been directly correlated to the rise of organised labour. Thus the development of independent trade unions and working-class political

organisations was clearly linked both to the development of social legislation and to the introduction of social welfare policies, but also more generally to the rise of "organised capitalism" in Sweden, characterized from the late 1800s on by quite close collaboration between employers and state.

A renegotiated mode

It seems clear that both the Swedish labour market and social model – the Swedish model in short – is currently facing great challenges from EU and its policies of economic, political, and social integration. For many years – from the early 1950s and well into the 1980s – Sweden was well known for its unusual system of formal industrial relations. However, as a consequence of slower economic growth and spiralling inflation – as well as influences from primarily Anglo-Saxon neo-Liberal discourse – this system collapsed in the late 1980s. Not only were general agreements between the great central organisations on the labour market – in particular the agreement between LO and SAF – replaced by collective agreements on the industry level. SAF also withdrew from any kind of collaboration on the central level with LO after a famous decision taken by SAF's board in 1992. Hence, during the 1990s and still today, employers are reluctant to negotiate openly with LO. This was made even more manifest in 2001 when SAF was dismantled and replaced by a new organisation, *Svenskt näringsliv*, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise. It was explicitly declared to have no bargaining functions at all, but rather to be a lobbying organisation.

However, at the same time, many argue that the Swedish model received a new impetus – was in fact strengthened – in the late 1990s because of the challenge from Europe, not least the introduction of the European Monetary Union. The general implications and effects of introducing the single currency and the European Central Bank are well known. With a single currency it is not possible for a member state to devalue its currency in order, for example, to defend its competitive position within a specific industry or the economy as a whole. Hence, the competition between member states will more directly involve national labour markets and how they function. For example, excessively high wage increases, above the level of the productivity increase in a certain country, will entail a loss of competitive edge for such a country or a particular industry there. Something like this has in fact occurred in Europe since the introduction of the euro. Hence Germany has strengthened its competitive position not least due to relatively low wage increases, while France, Spain and Greece have increased their wages relative to productivity. Partly, at least, this explains some of the problems within the Eurozone today, most particularly the extremely skewed balance of trade developments which has given Germany a large trade surplus while others countries have a negative balance.

Against the background of the challenge from Europe – and the decision in Maastricht in 1992 to establish a common European currency – the "Industrial Agreement" inaugurated in 1997 started a process of renewal in Swedish industrial relations. Once again, the importance of the export industry in setting the limits – the so-called "mark" – for wage bargaining in other sectors, and low inflation, made it possible to increase real wages without increasing the inflation rate. This agreement has certainly also been important for the recovery of Swedish industry, the low inflation rate since 1997 (despite the rather rapid recovery from the 1990s crisis), and the steady drop in unemployment. Thus it seems that the social partners in Sweden have learnt their lesson from the decades of high inflation, high nominal wages, but low or negative real wages. With the Industrial Agreement industry has also adapted to the new political-economy situation in Europe and the rules of the EMU, which are directly binding for those who have joined the "club", but indirectly also for those who remain outside.

With the inauguration of the Industrial Agreement in 1997 we have observed much less conflict on the labour market as well as a wage increase that has not threatened inflation and stability goals (basically the same as for members of the EMU) set up by governments, which aim to maintain Sweden's competitiveness without having to use the means of monetary policy (i.e. devaluation). From the perspective of wage earners a tiny inflation rate combined with some nominal wage increases have led to steady growth in real income over the last fifteen years.

So far Sweden – when it comes to wage policy and keeping up its competitive cost position – has been able to adapt to the EU and the common market. However, there have been other challenges that seems to strike closer to the heart of the Swedish model.

As noted, the core of this model concerns the relationship between organised labour and employers to freely form collective agreement concerning wages and other issues on the labour market. But something happened in 2004 that seems more than anything else so far to have threatened this "model". This was the famous Laval case.

Briefly, in 2004 the Swedish Construction Workers union blocked the Latvian Company Laval et Partneri from refurbishing and renovating a school in the municipality of Vaxholm near Stockholm. The reason was that the Latvian workers were offered lower wages than the Swedish collective agreement allowed. The case was brought before the Swedish Labour Court, which came to the conclusion that it was probably not against EU directives to block work at the Vaxholm site as the situation could very well be defined as wage dumping or social dumping, clearly against the EU's Posted Workers Directive. However, the court was not altogether sure, so when the employers (SI) and Laval et partneri appealed, the case went to the European Court of Justice. Its verdict was that the Swedish construction workers had used too much force in asserting their will, and the court decided in favour of Laval et Partneri.

The Swedish trade unions saw this as a major defeat. Their interpretation was that with this move the European Court of Justice had opened up for foreign employers to post workers in Sweden operating with collective agreements from their homelands – in fact opening for wage dumping. To what extent this is an accurate description can, and has been, fiercely debated in Sweden. However, more importantly in this context, it gave rise to much suspicion especially among the trade unions that the European Union – particularly through its Court – wanted to destroy the fundamentals of the Swedish model.

The social model after the euro

So far Sweden has chosen to stay out of the European Monetary Union. However, this does not mean that the European Central Bank (ECB) and its policies do not affect Sweden. As is well known, Sweden – together with other Nordic welfare states – have maintained an ambitious social welfare policy. Sweden's model has been recognised – using the categories developed by the social theorist Gösta Esping-Andersen – as an archetype of the general welfare state, providing welfare not on the basis of income but, as a token of citizenship, a positive right. Sweden has also been recognised as a high-tax state – certainly because of its high ambitions in the social field. One of the main fears shared by many is that the EMU and the further development of a common market in Europe will lead to future problems in funding the welfare sector because it is not possible, it is stated, for competitive reasons to increase taxes. Nor will it be possible to deflate the Krona if macro economic problems appear. This would of course be impossible with a membership in the Eurozone. Even if the use of such a measure is restricted for political reasons it could still be used in a crisis situation.

However, Sweden began to reform it welfare sector well before the stability pact could have made any impact – and, for that matter, before the rise of EMU institutions. This meant both lowering costs and making it more "employment friendly", to use the current Commission language. The main reason for this was a great unemployment crisis that hit Sweden in 1991–92, with unemployment figures (c. 11%) not seen in this country since the 1920s. As an effect of the rise of unemployment, social costs accelerated. This was because the Swedish state provides unemployment benefits and funds an ambitious labour-market policy with the aim of activating the unemployed (workfare instead of welfare!). As the Swedish social security system is built upon the principle of compensation for loss of income, high unemployment in the middle of the 1990s necessitated a search for lower overall social costs in order for the budget deficit not to get completely out of hand.

Therefore we saw a number of cuts and reforms in social security as early as the mid-1990s. The social security system during the 1990s was characterised by a large number

of changes (compared to other periods), and the changes made were mainly restrictive in character, i.e. they led to less generosity and range. The most significant changes concerned qualification rules and levels of compensation. The reforms of the 1990s downsized the Swedish welfare state in terms of generosity and income coverage. From 1991 to 1997 there were several restrictive reforms in sickness benefits and sick pay. In 1993 there was a restrictive reform of unemployment benefits, and in 1994–95 there were reforms in parental benefits and a reduction of the universal child allowance. Moreover, in 1994 a pension reform was launched, including new qualifying conditions and indexing rules, which were better funded but still less generous than the previous system. Moreover, just to give some more examples, in 1997 an income test for widows' pensions was introduced for those below the standard age of retirement. In the same year a national scale rate was introduced for guaranteed minimum income benefits. In 1998–99 stricter rules for the income testing of housing allowances and a reduction of allowances for wealthier recipients were carried through.

In the mid 1990s – at the peak of the economic crisis – the sickness benefit was lowered to 75% of the previous salary while in 1998 it was readjusted to its earlier level, 80%. In 1997 a parliamentary committee on sickness/occupational injury benefits was established. Closer co-ordination of the two benefits and the option of privatising the occupational accident component of the occupational-injury insurance was recommended. There was also a debate about the possibility of transferring the whole occupational injuries/sickness cash benefit to the social parties, but this option was rejected. In 1996–98 changes were made to the arrangements for social support in order to improve co-ordination between national and local authorities and ensure that everyone in need receives a minimum level of income. Thus to some extent Sweden, in the aftermath of the 1990s crisis, made substantial cuts to its welfare system in order to tighten its budget – which at least during last year ran a high surplus – and make it compatible with the demands of the ECB and the stability pact. Also, the general tax burden was lowered, and consequently the public sector's share of the Swedish GDP shrank between 1990 and 2012. For a time, from 2002 to 2008, the prospects looked quite favourable, but after this date many fear that the general economic crisis in Western Europe (and on a global scale), leading to lower growth rates, will force renewed cuts to the welfare sector. With rising unemployment and a lack of demand for products, a positive budget balance may soon turn into a negative one (a clear lesson from the early 1990s).

Of special concern to Swedes these days is also that the monetary union, in combination with the budget crisis, may necessitate initiatives to develop a more federalist policy for Europe. This fear is most clearly seen with regard to taxes. There are at least two aspects to this. Firstly, as is well known, the EU – in its Lisbon and EU 2020 strategies – suggests that member states must lower their taxes, especially on low paid wag-

es, in order to increase wage and labour market flexibility as well as to increase employment. All Swedish governments have protested against this since 2000. As early as in the Swedish action plan for 2000 it was stated (and this has since then been an official Swedish standpoint): "The primary purpose of taxes is to fund the welfare system and thereby contribute to social security and justice". This is stated in the Swedish Action plan for employment 2000. It is certainly true that the Swedish welfare state as we know it is seriously challenged by the EU recommendation that we should lower income taxes and labour costs. Therefore, lowering income taxes by about one per cent causes a lot of controversy.

Secondly, there has been strong resistance to all previous suggestions – which are much more topical today against the backdrop of the current European crisis and the calls for introducing more binding economic institutions and ties on the European level in order to prevent banks and states from defaulting – to introduce European taxes, creating a so-called fiscal union. As already noted, this seems to be a highly unpopular move among Swedish voters. Not only would it mean that more tax-payer money were spent in Europe, siphoning off means which could otherwise have gone, for example, to funding the Swedish social model, but also – and foremost – that such steps would imply an even closer integration in Europe, threatening both the social and labour-market model.

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To conclude, a main reason that Sweden has remained a reluctant or skeptical European is that the country still feels a strong commitment to the "Swedish model". However, as we have seen, integration policies originating from Brussels are not the only source of pressure to change and adapt that the Swedish model has experienced over the last decade or so. Perhaps much more important was the great slump of the early 1990s and what must be understood as the consequences of global economic competition. However, in this case continued European integration is regarded as a definite threat that would further dismantle the Swedish model. In a historical perspective this is in all likelihood the main reason why Sweden has remained a reluctant European. The shared belief that the model deserves defending is an example of a force that social scientists call path dependency.

Economic benefits and costs of Serbian accession to the EU

Is there an alternative?

By *Boris Begović*

Taking into account that Serbia is one of the least developed countries in Europe (measured by the *per capita* income level), the economic benefits and costs of its EU membership should be considered in terms of their impact on the country's long-term economic growth. The following analysis is based on the assumptions that only some features of EU membership will lead to economic benefits and speed up economic growth.

The hypothesis of this paper is that the major economic benefit of EU membership for Serbia is increased growth resulting in increased income *per capita*. The EU can be considered a great "convergence machine" (Gill & Raiser 2012). It has provided three rounds of convergence:

1) From 1950 to 1972 Western Europe converges on the *per capita* income level of the US
2) From 1973 to 1993 Southern Europe converges on the *per capita* income level of Western Europe
3) From 1994 to 2010 Central and Eastern Europe converge to the *per capita* income level of Western Europe

Taking this into account, it is evident that EU membership could be beneficial in terms of economic growth for new member states. Testing this hypothesis will require several steps. First, the mechanism of convergence will be theoretically explained and evaluated, based on the findings of contemporary economic growth theory. Then the drivers of convergence within the EU will be identified and explored. Also, some of the costs, i.e. consequences of EU membership that can slow down economic growth, will be identified. For the case of Serbia, an alternative EU accession scheme will be

suggested, which can provide for *per capita* income convergence, based on the findings of previous analyses and existing political constraints.

Convergence: basic theoretical issues

Since the advent of the modern growth theory, with the neoclassical model of exogenous economic growth (Solow 1956; Swan 1956), the issue of convergence has been in the limelight of the economic growth debate.[1] It is *per capita* income convergence or σ convergence that is crucial for understanding EU as a convergence machine and the benefits for its member states or accession counties. The main finding is that in the long run, a stable state of all countries that have the same technology, the same saving rates, the same population growth rates, and the same depreciation rate, will ge nerate the same *per capita* income level and the same long-term growth rate for that income, determined only by the rate of technological progress. Because the conditions for convergence are specified, this approach is called "conditional convergence".[2]

The main cause of *per capita* income convergence is diminishing returns of the production factors, more specifically diminishing marginal productivity of physical capital. The increase in income *per capita* generates more investments *per capita* (assuming that the savings rate is constant) increasing the capital-to-labour ratio, which increases labour productivity and income *per capita*. Nonetheless, though the marginal productivity of capital is positive, it also diminishes due to the law of diminishing returns. Accordingly, the growth rate for rich countries is *ceteris paribus* inevitably lower than the growth rate of poor ones – physical capital being more productive in the latter.[3] This is the reason why poor countries can expect higher growth rates than rich ones and eventually, due to the closing gap between the two, the *per capita* income level in all countries will be the same without any decline of *per capita* income in rich countries. This is the basic mechanism of *per capita* income convergence.

The mechanism that creates this growth advantage of poor countries is not sustainable. As their economies grow, their *per capita* income becomes higher, the capital-to-labour ratio increases, and due to the law of diminishing returns, the growth rate eventually declines. It converges on the steady-state growth rate that depends only on the rate of technological growth. This convergence of transitional growth rates of various economies towards a steady-state growth rate is called β convergence. This type of convergence has only secondary importance in this analysis.

The mechanism of *per capita* income convergence is uncontroversial. The crucial question is instead whether the conditions for convergence are met. Such an inquiry provides an answer to the important empirical question, why do nations differ so much in respect to their income *per capita*?[4] These differences can be explained by whether or not the conditions for achieving income *per capita* convergence are met. The first

condition is the same technology being shared by all the nations involved. The problem is that in reality different nations possess different technologies. Some countries, due to ample investment of production factors in research and development, together with efficient diffusion of technology within the country, are close to the technological frontier (cutting-edge technology), while other countries are far from this frontier. The farther a country is from that frontier, the lower the expected total factor productivity (TFP), hence lower income *per capita*. Obviously, there are substantial barriers for international technology diffusion, and so countries with inferior technology are trapped at lower-level income *per capita*. Accordingly, convergence is conditional on an elimination of barriers for international technology transfer. This condition is the most important one because it affects the transitional growth rate, but also the steady-state growth rate (depending only on the rate of technological progress) and the corresponding *per capita* income level.[5] The causes of the barriers for international transfer of technology must be explored. This is the only way that these barriers can be understood and hopefully eliminated.

The other condition for convergence is equal saving rates. Although the saving rate influences only the transitional growth rate, not the steady-state growth rate, it determines the steady-state *per capita* income level. The higher the saving rate, the higher the steady-state *per capita* income level. Although the seminal growth model is based on the assumption of a closed economy, it is evident that, theoretically speaking, a low domestic saving rate can be augmented by capital import, i.e. international transfer of savings, leading to a higher effective domestic saving rate.[6] The smaller the obstacles to the free flow of capital, the greater the expected convergence between economies. Taking into account the diminishing returns on capital, it is expected that capital should flow from rich to poor countries in search of higher returns. Nonetheless, in reality this is not always the case. Tornell & Velasco (1992) demonstrated that there is an inverse flow of capital from poor countries to the rich, which is counterintuitive taking into account high returns in the poor countries (ample business opportunities) and low returns in rich countries.[7] Again, the reasons for the inverse capital flow should be explored, as the same effective saving rate is a precondition for convergence.

Another feature of the neoclassical growth model, on which convergence theory is based, is the implicit assumption that maximum efficiency is always achieved, and that the total factor productivity (TFP) depends only on technology, i.e. TFP growth depends on the rate of technological progress. Not only is this picture idealized, since inefficiency exists in the real world, a greater problem is that different countries have significantly varying levels of inefficiency. If the "efficiency frontier" concept is devised as an analogue to the concept of technology frontier (Begović 2011), the distance from this frontier differs greatly from country to country, and the greater the distance to the efficiency frontier, the lower the TFP level and TFP growth; hence less convergence can be expected.

The crucial question is this: what is the source of the three observed convergence obstacles? The answer is rather straightforward: inappropriate economic institutions, i.e. the institutional framework within which business decisions are made. As economic institutions create incentives for economic agents' decisions, they are crucial for economic growth and convergence.[8] This can be demonstrated for all three observed obstacles.

Institutions that protect private property rights, particularly intellectual property rights, are crucial for research and development, which create technology innovation, and for the diffusion of these innovations. If the higher returns from technological innovation cannot be internalized, there is no incentive for research and development, and no innovations will be created. Furthermore, without protection of intellectual property rights the owner of the innovation has no incentive to diffuse it, i.e. to transfer it to economic agents in another country, though part of the innovation no doubt has the character of a public good and its transfer does not depend on the protection of private intellectual property rights.

Nonetheless, the protection of intellectual property rights is not the only prerequisite for technology transfer. Another is the country's absorption capacity, including the spillover effects, which are very important for profound diffusion of technology. The most important absorption capacity factor is the human capital available in the given country. Human capital is not exogenous, but it depends on the investment in human capital, particularly education. If the property rights of the owners of human capital are not protected from violations by various predators, including excessive taxation of labour, then there is no incentive for individuals to invest in their own human capital.[9]

Hence it is demonstrated that strong institutions that protect private property rights are essential for efficient technology transfer. The better and more comprehensive the protection of private property rights and contractual rights, the smaller the expected obstacles to technology transfer and convergence.

Furthermore, institutions that protect private property and contractual rights[10] are crucial for international movements of capital, i.e. for channelling savings flow from countries with high saving rates and low returns on investment to countries with low saving rates and high returns. Without such protection there is no flow of this kind, i.e. there is no international financial intermediation, whatever the specific mechanism of this intermediation. In the case of borrowing, creditor rights must be protected in order for capital to be lent. For direct foreign investments (FDI), the property rights of the investor must be protected for investment to become materialized. Furthermore, FDIs are a suitable vehicle for technology transfer; hence improved protection of private property rights provides an interaction between the transfer of international savings and technology transfer, speeding up convergence.

Institutions that protect private property rights are also crucial for efficiency, since in case of poor protection of private property rights, some of the available production factors remain unallocated, some are allocated to inferior business endeavours, some are allocated and utilized in an inefficient manner, and some are even allocated abroad (reverse flow of capital). Better protection of private property rights leads to the reallocation of production factors to the most productive business endeavours, as well as improvement of the production efficiency of the previously allocated production factors. This improves efficiency and speeds up economic growth, leading to convergence. In this sense, institutional inferiority, demonstrated by poor protection of property rights, provides an opportunity for the given country: institutional reform results in improved efficiency, speeding up economic growth (though it is a rather one-off event, speeding up transitional economic growth and increasing the steady-state *per capita* income level) and convergence.[11]

Better protection of contractual rights (as part of protection of private property rights) leads to decreased transaction costs, bringing about more exchange, division of labour, specialization of producers, and economies of scale (lower average costs), thus providing greater production efficiency. Although there are decreasing returns at the macroeconomic level, many individual projects are characterized by increasing returns, and in that case the size of the market is crucial for the achievement of economies of scale, as demonstrated by Stigler (1951). Furthermore, greater exchange means more competition, i.e. pressure from the competitors, and this pressure is the crucial incentive for production efficiency (Stigler 1987). Economic institutions that provide economic freedom, particularly free entry of new competitors, are crucial for creating and maintaining strong competition, which is a prerequisite for efficiency.

It is evident that income convergence is conditional on institutional convergence, as similar economic institutions enable technology transfer and capital flow and equalize efficiency – basically all the parameters of the growth model that brings about the same steady-state *per capita* income level. Accordingly, the concept of *club convergence* emerged – income convergence of the countries that belong to the same club (Aghion & Howitt 2009).

Having gone through the basic mechanisms and conditions for convergence, we can now identify which features of EU membership are crucial for conditional convergence of the nations that belong to this convergence club. Let us explore the drivers of the EU convergence machine.

Drivers of the EU convergence machine

We have seen that institutional convergence is the main driver of the EU convergence machine, as is the case with any convergence club. The question is: which segments of institutional convergence are relevant for income convergence?

The first segment is related to institutional convergence regarding the protection of private property and contractual rights. This is basically convergence related to an entrepreneur-friendly business environment, which provides incentives for investments in production factors, their efficient allocation and utilization, and especially innovations that lead to economic growth. The first round of convergence (between Western Europe and the USA) was only partly based on institutional convergence related to the business environment, as there were many similarities between these two institutional frameworks even before convergence began. Somewhat more intensive institutional convergence related to the business environment, predominantly protection of private property and contractual rights, has been recorded in the second round of convergence of Europe's North and South, although some differences remain to this day.[12] Nonetheless, the most intensive and comprehensive institutional convergence has been seen in the case of the CEE countries and the process of their accession to the EU. With the CEE countries the institutional framework of the EU member states was the institutional frontier, even a formally set goal of institutional reform; hence the convergence of the business environment was swift and comprehensive. This was a vivid example of the move from an administrative to a market-driven economy.[13] The third round of convergence proved the most intensive, as was the *per capita* income convergence. The causality between institutional convergence and income convergence, i.e. higher growth rates in the CEE countries than in incumbent member states, is confirmed by the fact that the main source of growth in CEE countries was an increase in total factor productivity, and it was much higher than the accumulation of production factors (capital and labour).[14]

The other significant factor of the convergence within the EU, both Southern Europe and CEE integration, has been the single EU market. The free flow of goods (and to a lesser degree services) within the EU, along with minimized transaction costs, has created strong competitive pressure and viable incentives for undertakings to improve both allocative and production efficiency. Accordingly, newcomers to the EU club increase their efficiency more than the incumbents (as the inefficiency of the newcomers prior to membership was greater), and their TFP growth rate is higher; hence the rate of their growth is higher, resulting in income convergence. Furthermore, the larger size of the market provides more opportunities for specialization and economies of scale, for improved total factor productivity, as well as the greater attractiveness of the country for FDIs, which are the main mechanism for technology and savings transfer. The other convergence mechanism is based on the EU being a customs union and on its rather liberal foreign trade policy, i.e. low protection of domestic producers. By entering the EU as a customs union, domestic producers become more exposed to international non-EU competition, increasing efficiency incentives.[15] Although a single market is established for goods, there is still no single EU market for services as there are

many obstacles to trade in services. The consequence is that service industries in the EU are less efficient than the manufacturing industries (Gill & Raiser 2012). This demonstrates the competition component of efficiency.

Finally, a very important segment of institutional convergence is the financial institutions that provide a free flow of capital from countries with high saving rates and low rates of return to countries with low saving rates and high rates of return. The process basically represents financial integration within the EU, enabling efficient international financial intermediation. A specific feature of this financial integration has been huge FDIs by banks from Central, Western and Northern Europe in the CEE, enabling the flow of borrowed capital and transfer of savings in that manner. The financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent events, including the ongoing sovereign debt crises, demonstrated that though banks in the CEE have high returns, they have had better prudential control than the banks in the countries of origin.

Since these three segments of the institutional reform are crucial for the institutional and *per capita* income convergence, the pertinent issue is whether EU membership is a necessary condition for institutional and *per capita* income convergence. It is definitely not, though membership has been beneficial in some cases. As to the first claim, there are countries that are compatible with the EU regarding the three institutional segments, although they are not members of the EU (Norway, Turkey and, up to a point, Switzerland). As to the second, the 2004 "big push" EU enlargement demonstrated that there was some synergy between political and economic integration with the EU in the case of the CEE countries and their transition from administrative to market economies.

Formalized institutional convergence, which is inevitably brought about by EU membership, has both benefits and costs for the development of economic institutions, since it generates a compulsory model of economic institutions with very little freedom regarding institutional design. On the one hand, adopting environmental protection standards and EU-style labour legislation generates some costs to long-term economic growth, due to increasing production costs and decreased labour-market flexibility. On the other hand, EU membership creates strong incentives for, even requires, judicial reform, which improves the protection of private property rights and introduces the rule of law. This is beneficial for long-term economic growth.

Convergence without full integration: the EEA scenario

From the analysis in the previous two sections of the paper it should be evident that EU membership is not a necessary condition for *per capita* income convergence. Although membership can prove beneficial in some cases (such as the 2004 "big push" accession project), it turned out to be counterproductive in terms of institutional re-

forms in the 2007 enlargement round, and can be linked to substantial political costs, particularly in the case of Western Balkans candidate countries, such as Serbia.

The alternative integration framework could be the arrangement known as the European Economic Area. This arrangement is based on the same "four freedoms" as the EU: the free movement of goods, services, capital and people, though the latter one should not be confused with labour, as it is not necessarily the same. There are three crucial components of this arrangement:

- Integration into a single market (including a customs union);
- Compulsory institutional convergence in areas related to the single market;
- Free flow of people across the borders with the Schengen club states.[16]

These components provide the institutional convergence that was described in the previous sections, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for income convergence to occur.

In the area of single-product markets, the effects of EEA membership are the same as in the case of full EU membership. The same finding applies to the issue of financial integration, allowing for efficient financial intermediation. As to the institutions relevant to the general business environment, predominantly those protecting private property and contractual rights, the process of institutional reform/building is virtually neutral to integration in the EEA. A nation has its own choice whether private property and contractual rights are to be comprehensively protected or not. There is no obligation, and this gives substantial freedom to a nation regarding institutional design, maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of building EU-like economic institutions. In this way, a nation can create an institutional framework that is more suitable for the protection of private property rights and maintaining economic freedom, which are prerequisites for long-term economic growth.[17] EAA states are obliged to harmonize their institutional framework with the EU only in certain specific areas, mainly linked to the issue of the single market. Since EEA members are not represented in any way in the EU's institutions, there is no way for these countries to influence the institutional framework that they are obliged to accept and enforce (Hetland 2012). The criticism of this discrepancy and the lack of democratic influence ("fax democracy") should be viewed from the perspective of the effective channels that small nations in the EU can use for the articulation of their own national interests, influencing the decision-making processes in the EU and the design of its economic institutions. The difference between none and next to none is not that significant.

The EEA type of integration is quite dissimilar from EU membership; nevertheless it provides all the prerequisites for income convergence.[18]

Concluding remarks: the way forward for Serbia

Due to "enlargement fatigue" and prolonged political crises, the EU's enlargement has effectively stalled. It seems that Croatia will become an EU member state in 2013 [it did on 1 July 2013], but it is evident that there will be great uncertainty regarding the timing and pattern of further EU enlargement.

The strong "off the record" message broadcast from Brussels is that the EU will not tolerate another Cyprus, referring to countries with unsettled borders and unsolved fundamental constitutional issues. Serbia, with the unsettled issue of Kosovo (Kosovo & Metohija; Косово и Метохија), resembles Cyprus. Serbia claims that Kosovo is an integral part of the country, while Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence is recognized by most EU member states, though not by the majority of countries worldwide. Taking this issue into account, senior EU officials and officials from the most important EU member states are trying to provide incentives for Serbian officials to push for a long-term status solution along the lines of the informal recognition of Kosovo's independence, for the time being. Little progress has been made on this front. These incentives are based on EU membership/accession, but taking into account the sheer magnitude of the political problem for Serbia, as well as the uncertainty regarding the feasibility of Serbian membership and the structure of the EU when the time for Serbia's membership eventually comes, it is not surprising that the incentives have not been effective.

A reasonable way out of this deadlock for Serbia would be a change of direction, from full EU membership, i.e. political integration, towards the EEA option, i.e. economic integration only. In due course, when the EEA provides some convergence results, further political decisions could be made. By that time a new sustainable structure of the EU will certainly emerge, however it may turn out.

The EEA route would deny the EU institutions and its member states the clout of political conditionalities regarding Serbia. This could be beneficial to the country because instead of political pressure exercised against the "Bad Boys of the Balkans", and the obtained concessions, incentives could be created for the nation to behave more maturely. In such a situation everything would depend on the nation and its elite – no one else could be blamed.

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Endnotes

1 For a comprehensive treatment of the convergence issue see: Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992). The best textbook treatments are Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2005); Aghion & Howitt (2009).

2 Contrary to this, "absolute convergence" does not refer to any conditions. It simply assumes that poor countries have a higher growth rate than rich ones and in due course the *per capita* income level of all the countries will be the same. Empirical testing of the absolute convergence hypothesis provided grounds for its refutation (Baumol 1986).

3 This refers to transitional economic growth, i.e. growth that moves an economy towards its steady state. When steady state is achieved, the growth rate depends only on the rate of technological progress. See Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2005.

4 In a seminal empirical paper about these differences Hall & Jones (1999) demonstrated that the *per capita* income level is proportional to labor productivity and they specified the factors that determine that productivity.

5 The depreciation rate is predominantly determined by the technology; hence technology convergence also means convergence of the depreciation rate.

6 Kaldor's (1957) hypothesis on increasing marginal propensity to save implies that saving rates in poor countries are lower than in rich countries, not only in absolute, but also in relative terms (relative to income). Nonetheless, the empirical findings described as the Feldstein-Horioka paradox (Feldstein & Horioka 1980) demonstrate that the scope for free international flow of savings is rather limited. The explanation of the paradox came somewhat later (Yasutomi & Horioka 2011) with the introduction of economic institutions into the analysis.

7 Savings deposits in Swiss banks, one of the most popular repositories of capital owned by rich people in poor African countries, generate rather low returns, perhaps the lowest ones in the world.

8 According to North (1990), institutions are considered as "rules of the game in society, or more formally, [they] are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction". A review of the role of institutions, as a fundamental explanation of economic growth, can be found in: Acemoglu *et al.* (2005) and, within the historical context, Acemoglu & Robinson (2012).

9 Following Djankov *et al.* (2003) it is assumed that private property rights can be violated by predators from both the private and the public sector, and that this violation can be both in accordance with the law (e.g. excessive, i.e. predatory taxation) and illegal (e.g. theft).

10 Hereafter, it is assumed throughout that the protection of private property rights includes protection of contractual rights. Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) separate the two, but this approach seems not to be productive, at least not for the purpose of this analysis.

11 Demographic conditions for convergence are not the focus of this analysis as they are not institutionally dependent.

12 The most notable example is Greece, whose business environment lags significantly in terms of the costs of doing business and economic freedom, compared with the countries of Western and especially Northern Europe.

13 As has been demonstrated (EIU 2003), substantial convergence of the CEE countries took place during the accession process, prior to full EU membership.

14 According to the growth accounting exercise (Iridian 2007; Borys *et al.* 2008), TFP growth was by far the main source of growth among the CEE states c. 1995–2005. The problem is that since it was due to elimination of major inefficiencies, this TFP growth is not sustainable, but was rather a one-off event. Future growth must be based on the accumulation of production factors and technological progress, rather than on improved efficiency through reallocation of incumbent resources.

15 This did not occur in some cases (e.g. in Estonia) where countries entered the EU after having already had a *more* liberal foreign trade regime prior to accession, meaning that they were obliged to introduce new foreign trade barriers in order to comply with the policy of the customs union. This demonstrates that EU membership may bring about some costs in the terms of less efficient economic institutions, i.e. a departure from the most efficient free market institutions.

16 Technically speaking, the free flow of people across borders is not regulated by the EEA agreement, but rather by the Schengen agreement. All three full members of the EEA (Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland) are also parties to the Schengen Agreement. So is Switzerland, which implements some elements of the EEA even though it is not a member. Turkey is a candidate country and has a customs union arrangement with the EU, but is not a party to the Schengen Agreement, as is the case with some of the EU member states (willingly or unwillingly). Andorra is a member of the customs union; it is not a party to the Schengen Agreement, and it is not committed to future EU membership.

17 In this sense the business environment in Norway and Switzerland is much more entrepreneur-friendly, measured by the costs of doing business and economic freedom, than in many EU countries.

18 The *per capita* income convergence of the candidate countries in the Western Balkans, including Serbia, has demonstrated that EEA integration is sufficient for *per capita* income convergence. Even though it was based on an effectively voluntary institutional convergence, without all the institutional components of the EEA. EU membership is not imperative.

Regional Cooperation and Europe

The Case of the Nordic and Baltic Sea Regions

By *Lars Rydén*

Regional contacts across the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic have a long history, at least back to the Iron Age. When the Viking ships made sea journeys easier, a period of sometimes violent sometimes peaceful contacts became possible in the region, and far beyond it. In the westward direction we should particularly remember the establishment of settlements on Iceland and later southern Greenland by colonists from present-day Norway. In the eastward direction we may recall that the vast realm of Novgorod had close contacts with present-day Sweden and Finland. Kings and queens sometimes controlled very large areas also in the High Middle Ages. In 1397 Queen Margaret of Denmark became ruler of a Nordic "commonwealth", the Nordic Union, including present-day Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway.

The Hanseatic League, centred on Lübeck in present-day Germany, was a trading league operating mainly along the shores of the Baltic Sea but also with important footholds on the North Sea. Again the construction of a new type of ship, the cog, made the shipping of large cargoes possible and trade very lucrative. The *Hansa* was essentially a trade monopoly and was not appreciated by all. Some cities became immensely rich, such as Visby on the island of Gotland in the Baltic, as well as the coastal cities of Reval/Tallinn, Riga, Danzig/Gdańsk, Hamburg, Bremen and others. In all of these cities rich historic architecture and milieus can still be seen.

The political history of the Baltic Sea region is a long tale of conquests and the formation and fall of empires. During Sweden's period as a Great Power, about 1560 to 1720, the Baltic Sea was at times almost surrounded by Swedish-ruled land. Efforts to create a union between Sweden-Finland and Poland-Lithuania essentially failed, even though such a union did exist on paper from 1592 to 1599 (Lundén 2010). It survives only as a monogram in the floor of the Jagiellonian chapel in Uppsala Cathedral.

The break-up of the Medieval political landscape started with the division of Po-

land, completed in 1795, followed by the 1809 Swedish-Russian war which made Finland a Grand Duchy in the Russian Tsarist Empire. Three empires – the Russian, the Austrian-Hungarian, and the Prussian German – dominated the 19th century. The formation of the modern state has its origin in the national awakenings during this period. Thus the German Reich was formed in 1871. The border between Norway and Sweden, delineated in 1751, became an international border in 1905 with the break-up of the union between the two states created in 1814. Finland became independent in 1917 after the October Revolution in Russia, and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland became independent in 1918 after the end of the First World War. The events included a peaceful agreement over the border between Denmark and Germany as well as the creation of an autonomous Åland Islands as part of the Finnish state (Gerner 2003).

Nordic cooperation today

Modern Nordic cooperation started in the aftermath of the First World War, very much as an outgrowth of the peace movement, which had been active before the war but sadly incapable of preventing it. The longing for peace fostered alternatives, the most important being internationalism and international cooperation. *Föreningen Norden* (the Nordic Association) was formed in 1929 as a voluntary association to support Nordic cooperation and the Nordic spirit. Of course the Second World War was a setback, but the neighbours continued to have contacts even then. Voluntary support for Finland during the 1939–40 Winter War was considerable, and thousands joined the Finnish forces. After the German occupation of Denmark and Norway in 1940 much of the resistance was organised in non-allied Sweden, not the least using the vast northern wastes for contacts and to escape Nazi troops.

Nordic cooperation continued after the war and became a state concern. In 1951 *Nordiska Rådet* (the Nordic Council) was formed by the parliaments of the Nordic countries. The Council consists of 87 members from the parliaments in the five Nordic countries and the autonomous areas of Greenland, Faroe Islands and Åland. As early as the 1950s the Council established a Nordic passport union and common labour market. The focus, however, is on cooperation in culture and education. Several foundations support exchange, projects and cultural events. There are Nordic prizes for literature, poetry, film and music. A strong tradition of the *folkhögskola,* "rural college", is supported, with several Nordic schools. Also, research and higher education are part of the cooperation. For instance, students could transfer university credits between Nordic institutions of higher education years before the EU established its ECTS (European Credit Transfer System).

Only in 1972 was *Nordiska Ministerrådet* (the Nordic Council of Ministers) esta-

blished as a cooperation between governments. The council of ministers works as a meeting place and coordination arena for the various ministers, similar to how the EU works. The Council offers not least an opportunity to coordinate Nordic policy within the European Union, and it provides a platform for the non-member states Norway and Iceland to have a say.

A strong part of Nordic cooperation is the twinning of towns between the countries (Jakobsson 2005). It opens up for local authorities to be active in the Nordic arena. Many opportunities for travel and visits between the towns are available under this scheme. The model of town twinning has later been adopted on a much larger European scale. It was (and is) a strong part of cooperation between the Nordic countries and the newly independent states after the end of the Cold War, supported not least by a considerable population of former refugees from the three Baltic States.

The end of the Cold War saw a dramatic increase in regional cooperation

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union opened a new era in regional cooperation. The extremely sparse contacts between East and West during the period after the Second World War now picked up dramatically. After 50 years with the Iron Curtain, intensive cooperation began, especially between the three Baltic States and Poland and Western Europe. Conditions for cooperation were good: the Western partners had money, the Eastern partners the capacity to accept support. In Western Europe many Baltic exiles contributed.

As early as 1989 the Swedish state invested in environmental cooperation with Poland. In the following years an estimated one billion Swedish crowns (c. 100 million Euros) were made available annually for projects with eastern Baltic Sea countries. The support came from all kinds of stakeholders but most importantly the Swedish state. Denmark, Norway and Finland also supported cooperation with similar amounts. Meanwhile, Germany supported the development of the former GDR in the new unified Germany with even larger sums.

These developments re-created a Baltic Sea region (fig. 1) that had been divided for 50 years by the Iron Curtain. Before that, in the inter-war era, contacts had been quite lively, from vacation trips to the sand beaches on the eastern side of the Baltic Sea, to trade exchange and economic cooperation. During the Cold War period, in spite of efforts, only one major project had been successfully concluded. It was the establishment of the Convention for the Protection of the Baltic Sea in 1974. This had been negotiated by Finland from 1972, after the Stockholm UN Conference on the Global Environment, and was finally ratified in 1980. It was administered by the Helsinki Commission, HELCOM, with a Secretariat in Helsinki. Although not a strong convention, it did serve to uphold contacts between states on the eastern and western

FIG. 1. *Map of the Baltic Sea region, defined as the drainage basin of the Baltic Sea and Kattegat to the west of Sweden. This is the original definition of the BSR as first established in the Baltic Sea convention from 1974 and is the most often used one. The drainage basin has a population of 86 million. Later, several different definitions of BSR have been used for example in various schemes funded by the European Commission. The basin includes (parts of) 14 countries of which 9 are coastal and 5 in the hinterland. This map illustrates the concern for the environment of the Baltic Sea on the part of Coalition Clean Baltic, one of the several NGOs in the region working for a cleaner Baltic Sea. Image from* Coalition Clean Baltic.

coasts of the Baltic Sea, and also to gather data on the status of the sea from the whole region during the Cold War. The convention was rewritten and much enlarged in 1992; this time signatories included those from the newly independent coastal states. It was ratified by all parties in 2000.

In 1991–92 many cooperative schemes started in the Baltic Sea region (table 1). The three Baltic States and Poland were invited to join a number of schemes already functioning in the Nordic countries. According to the 5+3 formula (5 Nordic and 3 Baltic States) the new countries were invited to join Nordic Council meetings from 1992. The Council of the Baltic Sea States, CBSS – with all Nordic and BSR countries plus the EU Commission – was formed in 1992. The Union of Baltic Cities, UBC (105 members today) was also formed in 1992 and the BSSSC, the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation between Counties, in 1993. In 1992 the Swedish and Polish governments formed a common planning organisation, VASAB 2010 (Visions And Strategies Around the Baltic Sea) to coordinate infrastructure planning. A common organisation for energy cooperation, BASREG, and a common scheme for sustainable development, the Baltic21, was formed in 1996.

An upsurge in voluntary associations were formed by all kinds of interest groups – farmers and artists, businesses and banks, schools and universities, etc. Gunnar Lassinanti (2012) estimates that there are 200–300 networks in areas such as finance, environment, energy, communications, business, innovations, universities, research, local authorities etc. in the region. In the academic field a number of research cooperations formed, most notably Baltex, a cooperative organisation to study the Baltic Sea itself, coordinated from Warnemünde in Germany. The Baltic University Programme, by far the largest of several university networks, formed in 1991. It covered universities or other higher education institutions in all the 14 countries wholly or partly in the Baltic Sea drainage basin (nine coastal states and five in the "hinterland"). Today more than 220 universities of all kinds are listed in the network (fig. 2). The emphasis is on education, and a total of some 350 course groups and close to 10,000 students register for courses yearly. There are several funding schemes for common education or research projects, such as the Visby Programme from the Swedish State, which supports exchange and common projects from the undergraduate to the PhD level.

Why is this regional cooperation supported by the states and the societies at large? Below I will discuss four issues where international cooperation is obviously of interest and which several stakeholders have expressly stated to be central reasons for their efforts to develop regional cooperation.

FIG. 2. *On this map of the Baltic Sea region the emphasised spots mark places where one or several universities or other institutions of higher education and research take part in the Baltic University Programme network. In 2013 a total of 226 institutions were involved in this cooperation.* Image from Baltic University Programme, Uppsala University.

International security

International security was (and is) a primary reason for the strong support of democratic development in the newly independent countries. The Western democracies did not want to see a return to the Cold War! During the Cold War period Central Europe had the largest concentration of armaments ever amassed in human history. In the early 1980s the situation became critical. The Cold War temperature sank below the freezing point when both NATO and the Soviet Union deployed medium distance nuclear missiles close to the Iron Curtain border. Pershing missiles in the NATO countries and SS20 in the Warsaw Pact countries could reach the opposite side six minutes after launch. Any mistake would lead to disaster. No wonder civil protests in Western Europe were extensive. The situation changed dramatically when U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty in 1986 at the Reykjavik summit. In a few years it eliminated the entire category of short- and medium-range nuclear missiles on both sides.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that the Red Army left the former Warsaw Pact countries, and in particular the former Soviet Republics, most importantly for our purposes here the three Baltic States, although not until August 1994. In the early 1990s after the end of the Cold War several disarmament treaties were signed and entered into practice. The Paris treaty on conventional weapons in 1991 led to a reduction and withdrawal of armaments from the Baltic Sea region. The START (STrategic Arms Reduction Treaty) on nuclear weapons led to a reduction of the insanely large nuclear arsenals on both sides. Later, support for nuclear disarmament weakened, but the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the removal of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet republics, all now being deployed in the Russian Federation. Sadly, the same did not happen on the NATO side. There are still about 200 US nuclear missiles in NATO countries outside the UK and France, and thousands of nuclear weapons on alert on both sides. It should be mentioned, however, that a New START treaty was signed in Prague by U.S. President Obama and Russian President Medvedev on 26 January 2011.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union also led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. NATO, on the other hand, did the opposite – it expanded. In 1990 United Germany joined and in 1999 Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined (after disregarding the so-called 4+2 talks from 1990 regarding Germany) followed by the Baltic states, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania in 2004. The NATO enlargement was seen by the newly independent states as a necessary security step considering their recent liberation from the Soviet Union. Still by some it was called "the biggest mistake in the post-Cold War period" and seen as increasing the distrust between US and

Russia. This criticism was muted, however, by the Partnership for Peace Programme that was introduced in 1994 aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union. 22 states are PPP members.

The expansion of the European Union was also considered a security guarantee by the newly independent states. The EU added Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 and expanded most dramatically in 2004 when ten new countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic Sea region, entered the Union.

Lately the much-discussed Nordic cooperation on defence matters has come to concrete steps. The Nordic ministers of foreign affairs reached agreement on a *Nordic Declaration of Solidarity* in the area of foreign and security policy between the Nordic countries during a meeting in Helsinki in April 2011. For crisis management the Nordic Battle Group was formed by Finland, Sweden and Norway along with Estonia and Ireland with allegiance to the EU. Thorvald Stoltenberg, former Norwegian minister for both defence and foreign affairs, presented the report *Nordic co-operation on foreign and security policy* in 2009, a document which recommends even more concrete steps in defence. Recently Sweden reached an agreement with Iceland to surveil its air space.

Environmental protection

Also in environmental matters regional and international cooperation seems necessary. After all, if a pollutant reaches the Baltic Sea off the Baltic States coast, with the prevailing currents it will reach the Stockholm archipelago five days later. Protection of the Baltic Sea is impossible except as a common undertaking around the drainage basin. Although environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea region has a long history, the Baltic Sea is still one of the most polluted large bodies of water in the world. The 1992 revised Helsinki convention is good but insufficient. Thus in 2007 the coastal countries agreed on the so-called Baltic Sea Action Plan. In this new framework a number of actions were agreed on, most importantly to reduce the load of nutrients emitted into the sea considerably, where each country has set and agreed commitments. This will make improved waste water treatment necessary, but even more importantly, changed agricultural practices to reduce runoff. The implementation of the Baltic Sea action plan should start no later than 2016 and has to be completed by 2021. It includes a number of actions in addition to reduced nutrient loads, among them measures to reduce the risk of tanker accidents, very much needed considering the enormous increase in Russian tanker traffic on the Baltic Sea. A wrecked oil tanker would be a disaster for the sea's sensitive ecosystem. The crucial issue of the regulation of fisheries is not included; this is a task for the European Commission.

The ultimate goal of improved environmental cooperation is to move towards sustainable development for the region. A number of steps have been taken. In 1996 the

Swedish and Polish prime ministers invited all relevant countries to Visby on Gotland to sign an Agenda 21 for the region, called Baltic21. It was the first regional Agenda 21 in the world. The Baltic21, which is today a project under the CBSS, has not been very effective, but a number of other initiatives have been successful. Thus the Nordic Investment Bank has funded environmental investments, e.g. the building of waste water treatment facilities, especially in Russia. The energy cooperation BASREG has led to the building of a region-wide electricity grid.

The Baltic Sea region has good potential to be a leader in sustainable development. The development of renewable energy in the EU is led by BSR countries. Sweden (49% renewable), Finland (38%), Latvia (40%) and Denmark (30%) are among the top countries, while the Russian Federation and Poland are still heavily dependent on fossil fuels. Denmark plays a key role in EU climate policy and is a wind power forerunner, while Germany is increasing its share of renewable energy rapidly after the decision to phase out nuclear power, and is becoming a forerunner in solar electricity and biogas as part of the so-called *Energiewende*.

Democratisation

Supporting democratic development in the newly independent states was one of the main reasons expressed for the major economic support given to cooperation in the Baltic Sea region in the early 1990s. It was preceded by a dramatic development in the decade up to 1991. Poland led the fight for democracy. The strike in Gdańsk's Lenin shipyard in 1980 became a starting point. The strike led to the formation of the trade union *Solidarność* (Solidarity), but with the introduction of martial law the union was forbidden the following year. Developments resumed again, obviously as a consequence of the new regime in the Soviet Union, in 1988. Negotiations between the opposition and the government opened in February 1989, the so-called round-table discussions, and the first partly free elections took place in June of that year. At the same time the Baltic States were struggling for independence, supported by Western Europe. For example, in central Stockholm public rallies to support Baltic independence were organised each Monday for more than year. Independence finally became a reality in August 1991.

Democracy in the independent states started with much enthusiasm. More than 100 parties competed in Estonia's first parliamentary elections in 1991, and similar situations were seen in Latvia and Lithuania.

Support for the new democratic movement in the independent states took many forms. The change was difficult from a centralist political system to one where decisions were to be made in a much more distributed way. The municipal level saw an enormous boost in activity where a large number of municipalities in Western Europe, especially Sweden, had contacts with a few municipalities in the newly independent states to help and support the development of institutions, authority routines, etc. Po-

land, again a forerunner, had a minister for local democracy in its first independent government.

At the time of writing, democracy in Central and Eastern Europe has followed disparate trajectories. In the 2012 elections the governments of Estonia, Lithuania and Poland stayed in power for the first time, a sign of some stability. In the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index from 2011 Estonia and Poland ranked highest in their groups. On the other hand Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are retreating in these rankings. For example the corruption index in Russia has grown worse every year since 1996. In Belarus we see increased control by the president and a concomitant decline in the economy. In Ukraine developments after the Orange Revolution of 2004 have been very damaging to democracy. Today, in both Ukraine and Belarus opposition candidates are in jail.

Economic development

A fourth strong reason for the support of cooperation in the BSR for the countries in Western Europe was the economy. The expected economic development would create new markets for their own industries and thus good economic growth at home. But it started out quite differently. The dissolution of the Soviet Union with all its social institutions led to a collapse in the three Baltic States. They lost about a third of their economy, and a sizeable part of the population was close to starvation. In 1992, the most difficult year, the inflation rate was about 1000%. Thereafter reorganisation of the society slowly gained pace and after a period of recovery economic growth rose steeply to reach c. 10% annually. The Polish situation was not quite as bad, even though Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz wanted to make a radical switch to a market economy.

The first Western companies to establish themselves in the CEE were in the service sector. These included banks, the IT sector, airlines, hotels, etc. Although investments were mostly made in Poland and the Baltic States, some establishment also took place in the Russian Federation. The collapse of the Russian rouble in 1998 and the continuously worsening corruption made progress much slower here than elsewhere. The 2004 expansion of the EU made the differences even more pronounced. The four freedoms (for goods, capital, services and persons) were introduced in the new member states under EU's Copenhagen rules.

For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania patterns in trade changed, increasing with the European Union countries, especially Germany, and decreasing with Russia, which had been virtually the only trading partner before the change. Also, trade within the Baltic Sea region developed significantly, e.g. Estonia with Finland and Sweden, and Lithuania with Poland. Economic integration has continued, with Finland and Esto-

nia joining the Euro zone, while Denmark, Sweden and Poland remain outside. The recession after the 2008 financial crisis has been difficult in the three Baltic states, while Poland came through with much less damage and today has one of the more successful EU economies.

What about Europe?

Above a number of reasons for promoting regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea region have been listed. Is there a corresponding list of reasons for pan-European cooperation within the EU? Yes, at least in practice.

The European Union was formed as the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 to safeguard peace on a continent devastated by two world wars. The means to do this, economic cooperation, has later been perceived by many as the ultimate goal. Economic cooperation has been adopted as an essential vision on the European agenda. Still, the goal of a peaceful continent remains in place. Today no disagreement between EU member states is expected to escalate into violent confrontation. The European Union has successfully created a *security community*, a meta-region in which conflicts are managed by peaceful means. It consists of 28 member states and three affiliates (the former EFTA countries, today the European Economic Area, EEA: Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein). The Baltic Sea region, excluding Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, has successfully been incorporated into this community.

In addition to peace-keeping there are at least two new roles for the EU. Economic cooperation has been mentioned. The second equally crucial role of the Union is to protect the environment. As already stressed environmental impact does not stop at national borders, and international cooperation is needed to deal with it. It took many years before the EEC initiated an environmental policy. With the enlargement of the Union in 1972 (Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined then) environmental policy was on the agenda for the first time, and in 1973 the first Environmental Action Programme was adopted. The EU's environmental legislation has grown dramatically since. Systematic and comprehensive work has been done to develop environmental protection. Environmental law and regulations are considerable. When ten states in Central and Eastern Europe joined the Union in 2004, this led to a rapid development towards improvement in environmental matters in these states.

While peace-keeping, economic development and environmental protection are seen as best pursued on a broad European scale, the importance of regional strategies is also recognized. This is in line with the policy that each matter should be dealt with on the most appropriate level, so-called *subsidiarity*. To execute this policy the Commission has installed several regulatory and financial schemes on the regional level, the most important being Interreg, supporting cooperation in seven EU regions, includ-

ing the Baltic Sea region. The current Interreg IV covers the period 2007–13, funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) with a budget of 7.8 billion euro (2006 prices). It has three parts: cross-border cooperation, transnational cooperation and interregional cooperation.

The full step towards a Union-wide regional policy was taken with the initiative to develop regional strategies to overcome environmental problems and promote competitiveness and prosperity. The first one was the Baltic Sea Region strategy. This strategy was decided on in December 2007, and its implementation began in 2009 during the Swedish presidency. The Baltic Sea Region Strategy has three main objectives: to save the sea, to improve connections among the region's countries, and to increase prosperity. To this end the Commission has developed an Action Plan with 15 Priority Areas and about 80 different Flagship Projects presently running. The Baltic University Programme is one of them. The next regional strategy – for the Danube basin – is now entering implementation.

Regional cooperation as a general strategy

Regions may refer to different entities. Here we have been concerned with meta-regions, that is, consisting of several states. In general, meta-regions may be defined from several perspectives. Natural regions, the classical study objects of geographers, are defined by natural boundaries, often mountains or water. One may also start from ecology and look at natural regions, e.g. a desert or a tropical forest. A political region is e.g. the European Union, while a social or cultural region has common cultures, languages or religions. (For a general discussion of regions including the Baltic Sea region, see Rydén 2002).

Regions are often discussed in connection with identities. Do the inhabitants of the Baltic Sea region perceive themselves as belonging to the region? This certainly varies a great deal and self-perceived identity in the region remains an empirical question deserving some research. Certainly not many in the region are aware that they live in a particular drainage basin and that everything they throw into their little sinks at home will eventually end up in our common large sink, the Baltic Sea. However, from the point of view of travel and language, it may be more obvious that they belong to a Baltic Sea region or a Nordic region. Although Nordic students most often travel westwards, to the USA, UK or Australia for vacation and studies, some changes are being seen. For example Berlin is becoming popular to visit, and tourist trips to Eastern Europe are rapidly increasing.

One may also argue that the classical concept of regional belonging is becoming irrelevant. Firstly, the rapidly increasing use of the Internet makes social contact independent of geography, and forms an ever more important part of the lives of the com-

ing generation. Secondly, rapidly increasing immigration to the region from many countries across the world has its consequences. In Sweden about 20% of the population is of foreign origin or have parents born outside the country. Similar figures are valid for Denmark and Norway, but are slightly lower for Finland. For these newcomers, their identities probably still largely rest with their countries of origin and perhaps where they live as well, but rarely with the region in spite of a policy of integration.

Are these thoughts important for future development? I think so. To build a successful future we need identity to protect our society and, even more so, to protect and safeguard our environment and everything that nature provides us with. If it is not in a sense "ours" or part of "us", it will be seen as less valuable and be more threatened by misuse or even destruction. It should be added that a major UN-led international study called the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment from 2005 identified meta-regional strategies as the most promising future vision, precisely for their capacity to protect the environment and the long-term ability of Nature to serve our fundamental needs (Cork et al. 2006). It seems that regional coherence and cooperation are needed for protecting all of the dimensions mentioned above – security, the environment, the economy and democracy. It is a policy which has been successful in the Baltic Sea region for close to a century and should be worth working for in all corners of the world.

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TABLE 1. *Cooperation in the Baltic Sea and Nordic region. The list includes significant examples of different organisations and other schemes for cooperation in the Baltic Sea and Nordic region. Name, abbreviation, brief description and year of origin are given. A web directory for many is kept by the library at Södertörn University College. See www.reference.com/Dir/Regional/Europe/Regions/Baltic_Sea*

Intergovernmental cooperation		
Helcom, Helsinki Commission	HELCOM is the governing body of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. Secretariat in Helsinki, Finland.	1974/1992
CBSS, Council of the Baltic Sea and Nordic states	An overall political forum for regional intergovernmental cooperation between the eleven states of the Baltic Sea and Nordic region as well as the European Commission. Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Secretariat in Stockholm, Sweden.	1992
Baltic 21	A regional Agenda 21 with the eleven Baltic Sea and Nordic states and the European Commission to advance sustainable development in the Baltic Sea and Nordic region. Under CBSS. Ministers of the Environment.	1996
BASREC, Baltic Sea and Nordic region Energy Cooperation	Supports a competitive, efficient and well-functioning energy market with energy efficiency and renewable energy measures. Under CBSS. Ministers of Energy.	1998
VASAB 2010 Visions and Strategies around the Baltic Sea	Works with spatial planning and development in the eleven Baltic Sea and Nordic region countries. Ministers of Planning. Secretariat in Gdansk, Poland.	1992
Baltic Sea Heritage Co-operation	A cultural heritage co-operation among the Baltic Sea and Nordic states, initiated by the Ministers of Culture.	1998

Regional and local authorities cooperation		
BSSSC, Baltic Sea and Nordic states Subregional Cooperation.	A political network for decentralised authorities (subregions) in the Baltic Sea and Nordic region's Baltic Sea littoral states.	1993
CPMR – Baltic Sea Commission	The Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR) to support sustainable development of the sea. Secretariat in Rennes, France.	
Euroregion Baltic ERB	A political cooperation in the south-east of the Baltic Sea and Nordic region, consisting of eight regions in Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden.	1998
UBC, Union of the Baltic Cities	A proactive network mobilizing over 100 member cities for democratic, economic, social, cultural and environmentally sustainable development of the Baltic Sea and Nordic region.	1992
BaltMet, Baltic Metropoles Network	A forum for capitals and large metropolitan cities around the Baltic Sea to promote innovation and competitiveness in the Baltic Sea and Nordic region.	2002
B7 Baltic Islands Network	A co-operation between the seven largest islands in the Baltic Sea to exchange experience and work together on common projects.	2002
Political and financial organisations		
Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference	Conferences which gather both national parliamentarians and representatives of sub-national assemblies from the Faroe Islands, the Åland Islands and Greenland. The Conference meets once a year.	1991
The Baltic Sea and Nordic region INTERREG III B Neighborhood Programme	A European Community initiative that funds transnational projects working together for balanced and sustainable development of the Baltic Sea and Nordic region.	

The Visby Program	The Swedish Institute's Baltic Sea and Nordic region Exchange Programme funding mobility and academic projects in the Baltic Sea and Nordic region.	
Non-governmental, academic and educational networks		
Coalition Clean Baltic, CCB	CCB unites 27 member organizations to promote the protection and improvement of the Baltic Sea environment and natural resources. Secretariat in Uppsala, Sweden.	1990
BUP, the Baltic University Programme	A network of some 225 universities and other institutes of higher learning in the Baltic Sea and Nordic region focusing on sustainable development, environmental protection, and democracy through education, research and applied projects. Secretariat at Uppsala University, Sweden.	1991
BALTEX, the Baltic Sea Experiment	A Regional Hydroclimate Project within the Global Energy and Water Exchanges Project of the World Climate Research Programme. Coordinated in Warnemünde, Germany.	1992
ScanBalt BioRegion	An organisation for the Baltic Sea or the Nordic-Baltic Region's Health and Bio Economy community for research institutions and biotech companies. Secretariat in Copenhagen, Denmark.	2001
Stockholm International Water Institute, SIWI	A policy institute that generates knowledge and informs decision-making towards wise water policy and sustainable development. Active in the Baltic Sea and Nordic region. Secretariat in Stockholm, Sweden.	1991

Baltic Sea Project, BSP	An UNESCO Associated Schools Project to awaken young people's interest in environmental issues, protection and sense of responsibility. Some 200 secondary schools from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden take part. Secretariat circulating, presently in Lithuania.	1990
Business cooperation		
Baltic Development Forum, BDF	For decision makers to discuss strategies for the development of the Baltic Sea and Nordic region, which gathers not only politicians, but also business, academia and media. Secretariat in Copenhagen, Denmark.	1998
Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce Association, BCCA	Unites Chambers of Commerce of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden to promote trade and business relationships across the Baltic Sea and Nordic region.	
Baltic Sea Tourism Commission	An international organization for market-oriented companies and tourist organizations in the Baltic Sea and Nordic region.	
Baltic Sea Trade Union Network	A network of 22 trade union confederations around the Baltic Sea linked to the European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC.	1999
Culture and arts networks		
Baltic Sea Festival	A classical music festival coordinated by Esa-Pekka Salonen, conductor and composer, Finland, and Valery Gergiev, conductor and director of the Mariinsky Theatre in St. Petersburg, performing at Berwaldhallen in Stockholm in August each year. Cooperating with WWF for improving the environment of the Baltic Sea.	2003
Ars Baltica	A cultural think tank which advocates arts and culture on the political level and promotes cultural life around the Baltic Sea outside the own core region.	

Rescuing democratic capitalism in Europe after 2008

By *Sverker Gustavsson*

My contribution does not deal with the specificities of our different national positions within and towards the European Union. Instead, I will dwell upon the unification problem as such, shared by all current and potential member states. As I see it, there are basically three questions to be answered, namely

- What structural characteristics are crucial?
- What options were there before 2008?
- What options are there after 2008?

Why is 2008 important? It is because the banking bailouts that year triggered an acceleration of a negative development in terms of sovereign debts and, as a consequence of that, a vicious spiral of diminishing mutual trust among member states.

The reader will require no detailed description of what happened during the following four years. It is all there in the media and on the lips of everyone these days. Nor need I call attention to the obvious risk of a total breakdown – not just of the monetary union, but of the common market as well. My task here is rather to focus upon the *options* before and after this historical watershed. What does it mean that the established informal pact of confidence has lost its political impetus? And, given the current post-2008 context, by what means can the necessary mutual trust be resurrected?

But first a few words about the title I have chosen for my contribution. What does the expression "rescuing democratic capitalism" (Streeck 2011) refer to? Let me first give a rough idea of that concept before going into more detail.

Inside each democratic member state, I assume, there is an in-built *horizontal* conflict between left and right. Both sides trust that the other side will not use its majority position in order to change the constitution, despite the fact that there is a consi-

derable conflict over ideas and interests. Thus issues can be politicized despite a comparatively high degree of consensus as to the rules of the game.

By contrast, and due to the informal character of the *vertical* relationship, the suprastate and the member state can easily destroy each other. There, the political equilibrium is sustained by what might be called an informal pact of mutual confidence or even a constitutional balance of terror (Gustavsson 2009:37 ff; 2013:2 ff). In this context, the terms "pact" and "balance of terror" refer to the observation that vertical member state loyalty is being bought at the price of the suprastate, taking the sustainability of basic political freedoms, legitimate opposition and universal suffrage in the member states into consideration. Those opposite notions are relevant when applying the general clause of free movement and the doctrine of fiscal oversight.

What structural characteristics are crucial?

Basically, two fundamental facts are crucial when it comes to resurrecting the informal pact of mutual confidence after 2008. One is the fact of monetary union *without* fiscal union. The other is the fact that the EU is neither a unitary state nor a federation.

The meaning of a monetary union without fiscal union is best understood in the light of what I would like to call the European integration staircase – a theoretical model pointing to the political dynamics of the different stages of integration (Balassa 1961:5 ff).

1. Country by country
2. Free trade area
3. Customs union
4. Common market
5. Monetary union
6. Fiscal union

A free trade area means no tariffs between countries. A customs union means a common external tariff wall. A common market means that non-tariff trade barriers, in terms of environment and different security and public procurement aspects, are integrated as well.

However, most relevant in a post-2008 perspective are the fifth and second levels in the staircase model. Let us remind ourselves of how things were seen twenty-five years ago, immediately before the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany. Then the EU had reached the stage of a common market, and nothing more was either expected or wished for. Conventional wisdom at that time was that a monetary union could not be achieved without a fiscal union, i.e. also integrating the

tax bases. At that point in time such a further movement upwards in the staircase model seemed impossible. Citizens of the member states could not be expected to let the European parliament tax European citizens in order to establish a large-scale system of revenue-sharing across borders.

In the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, all of a sudden things started to happen which no one had either expected or actively wished for. As part of political compromising around German unification, the dominant European politicians at that time, Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand, agreed upon the idea of a monetary union *without* a fiscal union. That solution was supplemented with what was later called the stability pact, which prescribed that deficits in the member state public budgets should never exceed 3 per cent of their GNP and their sovereign debts should never exceed 60 per cent of their GNP. If these norms were followed, no European taxation rights, no European revenue-sharing and no transnational bailouts were supposed to be needed. You could say that it was a sort of negative solidarity. The member states promised each other to behave in such a way that they would never have to ask for fiscal help across the borders in order to run their national economies without a currency of their own.

In 2008 member states had to bail out national banks to such an extent that the stability pact broke down entirely. This showed that certain economists and political scientists had been right in 1991, when they advised against taking the fifth step on the staircase before the member states were ripe for taking the sixth step as well.

Let me then focus upon the second crucial characteristic. The political meaning of the fact that the EU is neither a unitary state nor a federation is better understood with the help of a simplification similar to the staircase model. I suggest that we highlight three cases in order to clarify in what respect and to what extent the EU is something constitutionally special, i.e. in terms of how the dialectics between *legitimization* and *compliance* is being conceived and organized in multilevel political systems (fig. 1; Zürn 2012: 738; Scharpf 2012: 17).

In a unitary state, legitimization and compliance take the form of two distinct arrows running symmetrically all the way from top to bottom and vice versa. Govern-



FIG. 1. *Compliance and legitimization in multilevel political systems. Upward arrows: legitimization; downward arrows: compliance.*

ments, parliaments, courts, parties, media and interest groups are working in such a way that citizens consider them *directly* legitimate. That makes citizens relatively non-reluctant when it comes to complying with legislation and revenue-sharing decided upon by their governments and parliaments.

In a federation, there are two parallel dialectics at work. One is a national system of politics and law working in the same way as in a unitary state. The other is a specific state system of politics and law. That second part runs like a miniature nation-state inside the federation. Comprehensively, a true federation is a two-tier system. Both parts are basically of the same kind and similar to each other – as we can see in the United States.

By contrast, the EU is neither a unitary state nor a federation. It is a treaty-based collectivity of states in which national political structures *mediate* between the Union on the one hand and citizens on the other. What is important in the present crisis is that the union has no legitimacy of its own. It is based on pooled sovereignties and pooled legitimacy mediated through the member states' political systems. The EU differs from an ordinary state – whether the latter is a unitary state or a federal one – in that there is no direct relationship of compliance and legitimization between the (European) top level and the (national) bottom level. Compliance and legitimacy within the European Union are mediated via national courts, national bureaucracies, national governments, national parliaments, national political parties, national interest groups, and national media. In theory, union law enjoys precedence and has direct effect. In practice, it does not. Unless national political structures actively choose to comply with it, the writ of the Union does not prevail in national politics, national administration, or national judicature.

After 2008, legitimacy intermediation is becoming increasingly difficult. That is so because union issues are becoming increasingly redistributive and hence more visible in the eyes of the public. More than before, national politicians, administrators and judges need to provide good motivations for why citizens should comply with decisions taken without their electoral consent by people living in other countries.

What normative options were there before 2008?

Before this latest phase of vacillation on fundamental questions, there were basically three schools of thought on the normative issue. The focus of all three schools was on a problem that the British historian Alan Milward described in a great 1992 book on rescuing – rather than dissolving – the nation state, looking back on the interwar years and how states were conceived after 1945. In his vocabulary, "rescue" meant how to overcome the systematic deficiencies of democratic governance in the nation state – deficiencies which once called the stark challenges of fascism and communism into

being. Each of the three schools offered its own answer to this question. The challenge to rescue democratic capitalism today, to be sure, is of a different kind. Nevertheless, the recommendations of the respective schools are worth outlining. I shall thus ask: do these recommendations have any relevance for the political predicament we confront today, four years after the onset of the crisis?

Up to 2008, then, three basic arguments ruled the roost. They were as follows.

Firstly, according to Giandomenco Majone (2005) and Andrew Moravcsik (2008), Europe's leaders had created something truly admirable and there was nothing to be worried about. The tensions built into the Union project did not cause these *end-of-history* theorists any loss of sleep. On the contrary, they considered the design of the Union to be a real hit, historically and globally speaking. In the course of one hundred years, they argued, Europe had produced two political innovations of great historical importance. The first was the mixed economy, in the horizontal dimension; the second was the mixed polity, in the vertical dimension. The mixed economy enabled subsequent generations to avoid totalitarianism, and the mixed polity made it possible to combine a truly free market with democratic arrangements in respect of social legislation and fiscal redistribution within each Member State. The horizontally mixed economy worked best when it was paired with a vertically mixed polity. Protections afforded the free market by the Union offered a much better solution than did the risky business of running a mixed economy within each separate country – too close to public opinion and election campaigns.

Secondly, in the view of the German social philosopher Jürgen Habermas (2011), the founding fathers of the Union left us with something potentially explosive. The actual Union is dangerously distant from a normal democratic federation. Through *a great leap forward*, therefore, social and fiscal policies should be made suprastatist, in the same way that markets and the currency already have been. In other words, the European Parliament should be given the same status as the German *Bundestag*. Democratic accountability and actual decision-making must be located on the same constitutional tier: they must take place – both of them – at either the national level or the federal level. Not only was there a strong theoretical argument for taking the definitive step from monetary union *without* fiscal union to monetary union *with* fiscal union, the time was also ripe from a practical point of view for a definitive break with the idea of sovereignty being delegated rather than surrendered. We could not wait for the emergence of a European *demos*. Instead, a suprastatist demos would emerge from the process itself, as the old states yielded to a new state at the Union level with a sovereignty of its own.

Thirdly, the Italian and German political scientists Stefano Bartolini (2005; 2010) and Fritz W. Scharpf (2010, 2012) agreed strongly with Habermas that the Union's founding fathers left us with something potentially explosive. However, their response

to that historical mistake was neither to embrace political enthusiasm nor to seek to centralize power as much as possible. Instead they called for *extreme caution*. Such an approach was necessary, they believed, if devastating outbreaks of large-scale populism were to be avoided. Unlike Habermas, they did not see politicization as the best way to go. Citing the historical background of fascism and populism, they underlined the urgency of avoiding a situation in which identities supplant socioeconomic interests as the fundamental political cleavage. On the other hand, while they defended the living constitution (Gustavsson 2008) of legitimacy intermediation in a multilevel European polity, their analysis was very much opposed to Moravcsik's. To be sure, the combination in question – double asymmetry, monetary union without fiscal union, and a constitutional balance of terror (the Union and the Member States can each destroy the legitimacy of each other) – did not fill their hearts with joy. But they saw no workable alternative to this unstable constitutional equilibrium. No available constitutional policy option was better or even equally good. The two authors argued in a manner well known from environmental policy. That is, they urged that a precautionary principle be followed in these matters. The vertical division of powers in a transnational living constitution must be handled accordingly. We cannot think just in terms of marginal costs and benefits, Bartolini and Scharpf argued. We must also keep a worst-case scenario in mind.

What I have described as the informal pact of confidence and a constitutional balance of terror was – according to this third basic argument – the solution to the problem of how to live with a fundamental uncertainty as to whether Union or national law applies.

What normative options are there after 2008?

The question to be answered under this last point is *whether* and *how* the informal pact of confidence can be sustained under post-2008 circumstances and given the crucial characteristics I described initially. Is extreme caution still the best approach to take? Or ought we instead cast it aside, in view of what has happened over these last few years? If that last answer is the right one, then we are in real trouble. In my view, the first and second schools of thought – Moravcsik's "more of the same" and Habermas' "great leap forward" – seem even less attractive today than they did before 2008.

It is imperative, I think, to take the key concepts of constitutionalism and legitimacy seriously, as Bartolini suggested in his 2010 book chapter criticizing the discussions that led up to the Lisbon Treaty.

In 1993, the German Constitutional Court cleared the way for a *stability* union. The criteria for accepting the Maastricht treaty (Gustavsson 1998) were provisionality (sovereignty was delegated but not surrendered), marginality (more remained for de-

mocracy within each Member State than was delegated), and revocability (if stability was not achieved, Germany could retrieve the prerogatives in question). The alternative theory at the time was that a monetary union could only work if combined with a *transfer* union, achieved through a great leap in the constitutional character of the EU. The Union would have to have its own power to tax, authorized by a sovereignty of its own. The Court implicitly held, however, that a transfer union would violate the terms of the Treaty. As Christopher Lord (2012) has pointed out, today's monetary union without fiscal union is neither a stability union nor a transfer union; rather, it is a *risk* union. What has been collectivized over these last few years is a breath-taking amount of instability and unpredictability.

In light of developments over these last few years, I would say that the Union can be viewed most fruitfully as being in a constitutional state of emergency. Contrary to the terms of the Treaty, the European Central Bank now lacks any real independence, and it has been made the lender of last resort. Contrary to the Treaty, not just private banks have been bailed out but Member States too. Contrary to the Treaty, Member States have broken the terms of the Stability Pact regarding deficit and debt levels. Constitutionalism should mean predictability. Legitimacy ought to mean that Member States comply voluntarily with the treaties. If we understand these two key concepts in this way, we cannot avoid a most worrying observation: namely, that the Europeans and their member states are now caught in a vicious spiral of declining mutual trust, while the long-term prospects of both constitutionalism and legitimacy are being undermined.

In an ordinary system of government, a state of emergency is a declaration suspending normal operation of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers. It alerts citizens to change their normal behaviour. It orders government agencies to implement emergency measures planned beforehand. It can also be used as a rationale for suspending rights and freedoms otherwise guaranteed under the constitution. A state of emergency may be declared under conditions of civil unrest, or when a man-made or natural disaster has hit, or in a situation marked by international armed conflict.

In this particular context, however, a state of emergency is something else. It does not imply exceptional executive, legislative, or judicial decrees carried out from top to bottom, as it would in an ordinary state. Due to the current constitutional predicament in Europe, the decisions of the central Union authorities are mediated through the system of government prevailing within each Member State. Which decisions get implemented – and how – depends decisively on how the government of each Member State reacts.

This is so because the European Union is a treaty-based collectivity of states in which national political structures mediate between the Union on the one hand and citizens on the other (Bickerton 2012). In other words: it is the absence of a *unified*

sovereign that distinguishes the post-2008 European predicament from an ordinary state of emergency. After all, a sovereign is able – all at once and with a big bang – to make a new constitutional beginning. The Union is now losing both its legitimacy and its ability to make its Member States comply. The challenge devolves upon the *multiple* masters of the treaties: i.e., the Member States. Every one of the 27 Member States must agree if new powers are to be conferred on the central Union authorities. In practice as well as in theory, those who take constitutionalism and legitimacy seriously must acknowledge these fundamental elements. Otherwise, they will be unable to keep rescuing democratic capitalism from authoritarian technocracy as well as from populism, which is the flip side of the technocratic coin.

The implications of the post-2008 predicament, as I see them, are as follows. If we mean to resurrect a European constitutional culture of mutual trust and confidence among citizens in all 27 Member States, I think we should focus on two key sets of values, which are relevant inside the national intermediaries and electorates.

The first set of crucial common values relates to the concept of *democracy*. It has three basic components:

- Universal suffrage and legitimate opposition
- A capacity to solve social and economic problems, above all in connection with unemployment
- The rule of law, a professional and non-discretionary administration, and an absence of corruption.

In practice, and due to the way in which the Union is organized, these criteria are to be applied within each Member State. Indeed, as things now stand in the aftermath of 2008 – assuming we follow the advice of neither Moravcsik nor Habermas – the Member States will likely become even more important, due to the crucial role they play as intermediaries between the Union on the one hand and citizens on the other. Citizens will not trust their governments, legislatures, administrations, or judicatures unless politicians, judges, and professionals within each Member State interpret the compliance problem in light of their own system for legitimate opposition, their own capacity for solving problems, and their own mechanisms for minimizing administrative discretion.

The second set of crucial values relates to non-discrimination between various actors and to non-restriction in connection with the flow of capital, labour, goods, and services across borders. How is the line to be drawn between *non-discrimination* on the one hand, and a Member State's *legitimate protection* of its own form of social organization on the other? Can we find an electorally relevant lowest common denominator here?

Yes, I think we can. The German political scientists Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer (2010) argue that the Union has developed from a regime aimed at the non-discrimination of foreign capital, labour, goods, and services into a regime intent on standardizing social organization and democratic capitalism throughout the Union as a whole:

> Originally, the removal of trade barriers and *de facto* discriminatory practices intensified competition between national production and welfare regimes. This competition did not exert transformative pressure on national labour law, industrial relations, company law, take-over regulation or supervisory board codetermination as long as firms in highly regulated or organised economies remained economically successful. In the current phase of European integration this no longer holds true. Now, in order to deepen European integration, the Court and the Commission apply the principles of mutual recognition and non-restriction to services, capital markets and free establishment. They thereby directly affect member states' institutions and push them towards the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. In a post-Ricardian setting, the Commission and the European Court of Justice interpret institutional differences *as such* as restrictions on the four freedoms. (Höpner & Schäfer 2010:361 f.)

From such an observation, it seems even more important than it did four years ago to consider the political relevance of the fact that the broad category of democratic capitalism contains many different *varieties* of democratic capitalism. The development from interpreting free movement as non-discrimination to interpreting it as standardizing social organization has to be reversed. Otherwise, I think we will be heading for some sort of a technocratic authoritarianism or (as the flip side of that coin) populism of an authoritarian kind.

In other words: if our aim is to resurrect the informal pact of confidence, we should have something to say about the national choice of social model. Democracy in the Member States will not become self-reinforcing unless voters realize that they live in a system based on legitimate opposition and political liberalism. If we are to avoid potent populism as the antidote to full-scale technocracy, political majorities within the Member States cannot delegate *all* fundamental choices to the Commission or the European Court of Justice. *Some* of them must be kept open for the electorates to decide.

In sum, this means that the informal pact of confidence is the straw that we still have to grasp at. During these last four years that theory has become much more difficult to apply. This is because European issues are not "below the threshold of political visibility" (Scharpf 1999:23) any longer. Now, they have become more redistributive and hence much more socially relevant, and because of that much more visible to the general public.

In theory, it would be a good thing to revise the Maastricht Treaty in order to formalize the borderline between national self-determination on the one hand and Un-

ion law on the other. In practice, it would be hard to achieve the necessary unanimous vote among all 27 member states for such a change. Given these rules of the game, *formal* change is hard to imagine. Even more than before 2008 we will need a minimum common understanding of the *informal* aspect of the informal pact of confidence doctrine. That remains crucial for the positive development of the Union project – provided that we want to avoid the risks of populist outbursts coming from excessively hard technocratic rule as well as from a big bang operation of the kind that Jürgen Habermas suggests.

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PROGRAMME

Symposium 22–23 November 2012

Sweden/Serbia and Europe – Periphery or Not

at The Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities, Stockholm
in cooperation with *The Serbian Academy of Science and Arts*
Organizers: Sven Gustavsson and Jelena Spasenic

Thursday 22 November

The first day is led by Lars-Gunnar Larsson, Professor of Finno-Ugric languages, Uppsala University, Member of the Academy.

09.30 – 09.55	Welcome and Opening remarks *Gunnel Engwall*, the President of the Academy and *Slobodan Grubačić, SASA* Some words on the topic of the symposium by *Sven Gustavsson*
10.00 – 10.35	From European centrality to ambitious periphery: Sweden 17th-21st century. *Rolf Torstendahl*
11.00 – 11.35	Carl Larsson's Decorative Programme in the National Museum and its Controversial Ending. *Hans Henrik Brummer*
11.35 – 12.10	Art, Nation and Society in Serbia – Contemporary Perspectives. *Nenad Radić*
14.00 – 14.35	Sweden and European Literature. Reception and Feedback 17th-21st century. *Thure Stenström*
14.35 – 15.10	The Center and the Periphery: The Forming of a Mentality at the Margins of Europe. *Slobodan Grubačić*
15.40 – 16.15	The Place, Role and Importance of Literature in Serbia and Europe at the Beginning of the 21st century, or How to be Square in the Global World of Literature. *Aleksandar Jerkov* (Serbian literature)

16.15 – 16.50	The Dispute on Religion. Swedish-Russian Relations in the 16th and 17th Centuries. *Per-Arne Bodin*
16.50 – 17.20	Concluding remarks
17.30 – 18.15	Reception in the premises of the Academy
18.15 – 21.00	Conference dinner at the Academy

Friday 23 November
This day is led by *Thomas Lundén*, Prof. em. of Human Geography, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University.

09.15 – 10.00	Sweden and Serbia – Two Peripheries 1815-1914 (Similarities and Differences). *Čedomir Antić*
10.00 – 10.45	Sweden's Membership in the European Union. The Reluctant European. *Lars Magnusson*
11.00 – 11.45	Economic Benefits and Costs of Serbian Accession to the EU: Is There an Alternative? *Boris Begović*
11.45 – 12.30	Regional Cooperation and Europe. The Case of the Nordic and Baltic Sea regions. *Lars Rydén*
13.45 – 14.30	The Informal Pact of Confidence and its Alternatives. *Sverker Gustavsson*
14.50 – 15.45	Serbia's Road to EU-membership. Obstacles, Risks, Prospects. *Milica Delević*
15.45 – 16.15	Closing of the symposium
19.00	Dinner at restaurant Jakthornet hosted by H.E. Dr. Dušan Crnogorčević, Ambassador of Serbia in Stockholm

Saturday 24 November (Optional programme for participants)

10.00	Guided tour of Stockholm with prof. Thomas Lundén
11.00	Visit to Prince Eugen's Waldemarsudde Art Museum
16:00	Guided tour of the Royal Palace

Authors

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