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HERITAGE AND BORDERS

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Heritage and Borders

EDITOR:

Anna Källén

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ABSTRACT

Borders now seem to be everywhere, just like it is often said in heritage studies that the past is everywhere. In this edited volume a multidisciplinary group of scholars explore what happens, philosophically and in practice, when these two concepts and phenomena, heritage and borders, are combined. The findings show that heritage, as well as borders, exist just as much in the mind as on the ground. Heritage and borders can be understood both in terms of roots and routes. They are matters of administration, but they are also matters of consideration, matters of competition, and matters of contention. They are defended in the name of security and protection, longing for belonging, and good will. And they are contested in the name of philosophical critique, or political and artistic activism. In six articles and a joint conversation, the volume addresses key issues and entangled complexities in discussions on heritage and borders that take place in and across academic disciplines today.

Keywords: Heritage, border, in-between, roots, routes, law, time, memory, buffer zone, conflict

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Heritage and borders

An introduction

Heritage and borders are inextricably connected. Ever since the passing of the first national heritage laws in the 17th century, and the establishment of museums for the collection of artefacts and public communication of national history in the 19th century, heritage has been defined by national borders – legally and in common sense. Over the last decades, alternatives to the traditional understanding of borders, as enclosing and defining stable national identities, have been developed by critical theorists like Homi K. Bhabha and Trinh T. Minh-ha. In their writings,[1] the border is a productive zone where identities are articulated, meanings negotiated, and the border itself is upheld by means of cultural practice.

We see now, in many parts of the world, an intense political interest in borders. Border controls are intensified. There are calls for increased protection of borders and new walls to be built. At the same time, there are political, capitalist, and academic movements talking of global connections in terms of networks and transnational flows that ought to make political borders redundant. On closer inspection, however, such emphasis on flows and connectedness seem to have created a new interest in borders, rather than having erased them. Just as David Lowenthal once opened our eyes to that "the past is everywhere", borders are everywhere.[2] Both heritage and borders are now highly visible phenomena and objects of heavy political investment. And just like the border, the concept of heritage both demands and defies definition. It is at once rigid and slippery.[3] So what happens, philosophically and in practice, when two such slippery yet rigid phenomena are combined?

1 E.g. Bhabha 2004, Trinh 2011.

2 Lowenthal 1985, xv.

3 Péter Balogh in the Conversation, this volume.

This volume is a result of the two-day *Heritage and Borders* symposium in Stockholm, held on 21–22 September 2017. The articles in the first part of the volume represent papers presented on the first open day of the symposium,[4] which was hosted by the Department of Culture and Aesthetics at Stockholm University. The second part – the Conversation – is a transcribed version of a round-table conversation hosted by the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities on the second day of the symposium.

In the six articles and the following Conversation, borders are discussed in the concrete forms of walls and buffer zones, and in the more abstract sense of boundaries or demarcations. There are material remains of former political borders that have become heritage objects, such as the Berlin Wall, Hadrian's Wall, and the Great Wall of China. There is the heritage dimension of existing borders, in Jerusalem, on the island of Märket, and between North and South Korea, where material and narrative manifestations and the formalization of body movements all depend on the history of that particular border, at the same time as they are heritage in the making. Ida Hughes Tidlund writes that the "categorization of land and understandings of the past become conjoined through borders. When borders define land as 'ours', it also outlines a certain past as 'our history'".[5] On a related note, there is much value invested in heritage across borders – relating to "our history", but "over there" – often as a result of migration and other forms of displacement. We have many well-known examples of diaspora communities and descendants of migrants who, sometimes centuries after the first migration took place, maintain and create anew heritage which relates to the assumed place of origin.[6]

There is also an important conceptual relation between heritage and borders. In the discussions in this volume it is maintained that heritage is essentially about constructing borders.[7] The concept of heritage creates material, mental, and monumental borders – and must do so – between past and present, between us and them, between what is worth preserving and what is not. If it did not come with such boundaries, it would not be heritage. Borders, in turn – political, physical, and conceptual – will influence the understanding and creation of heritage. Demarcations around heritage sites define what is heritage protected by law and what is not – sometimes two apparently identical pieces of turf a metre apart.[8] And borders define categorizations of

4 With the later addition of articles by Mikael Baaz & Mona Lilja, and Ida Hughes Tidlund.
5 Hughes Tidlund, this volume.
6 Siri Schwabe in the Conversation, this volume.
7 Balogh, this volume, and Fredrik Krohn Andersson in the Conversation, this volume.
8 Niklasson, this volume; Ian Lilley in the Conversation, this volume.

heritage on national, regional, and local level. Is the Preah Vihear Temple a Thai or a Cambodian World Heritage Site? That question has led to serious political conflict on national, regional, and local level over the past decades.[9]

On a very basic level, heritage and borders are both means by which modern society is organized.[10] Both concern space and time, and can be regarded as attempts to control and command, by means of definition, people's possibilities to engage in space and time. The potential is essentially Janus-faced. Both heritage and borders can be restricting and subordinating, needing activist interventions. And they can also be soothing and comforting, satisfying a longing for belonging that appears to be a symptom of our time – like a skin protecting our integrity.[11] To be in-between, of heritage and at a border, is a profoundly difficult experience.[12]

Essentially, both heritage and borders define and demarcate an identity, culture, or experience against an Other. As such they must be regarded as active creations that need maintenance, that need to be recreated again and again, in order to continue to exist. Yet, once created, they become involved in new discourses and cultural experiences, by which they gain resilience and eventually appear to be normal and real. As discussed in several of the articles and in the Conversation, the tradition of mending a wall, or the annual check of national borders, soon becomes a form of heritage in itself.[13] And it is somewhere here, in the tension between rigid reality and the need for constant recreation, that we find the articles and discussions of this volume. From them we learn that heritage, as well as borders, exist in the mind just as much as on the ground. They can be understood both in terms of roots and routes. They are matters of administration, but they are also matters of consideration, matters of competition, and matters of contention.[14] They are defended in the name of security and protection, longing for belonging, and good will. They are contested in the name of philosophical critique, or political and artistic activism.

These are profoundly complicated issues, and the purpose of this volume is not to simplify, or come up with solid new definitions of heritage and borders. Rather, it is an attempt to catch some of the entangled complexities of the discussions on heritage and borders that take place in and across academic disciplines today. There are overlaps in concepts used, and possibilities to borrow or learn from empirical data

9 Baaz & Lilja, this volume.
10 Mattias Frihammar in the Conversation, this volume.
11 Cecilia Parsberg in the Conversation, this volume.
12 Trinh T. Minh-ha in the Conversation, this volume.
13 Hughes Tidlund and Viejo-Rose, this volume.
14 Elisabeth Niklasson in the Conversation, this volume.

and analyses of academic fields other than one's own. But there are also significant differences in the practical approach to both heritage and borders, for instance between common-law and civil-law countries,[15] as well as between academic discourses. Both similarities and differences are worth noticing, for the development of a richer and more nuanced understanding of these two concepts that are of monumental importance in culture and politics in the 21st century.

*

The first section of the volume is introduced with the article *The revival of cultural heritage and borders* by Péter Balogh. It is a literature overview featuring the cross-fertilization between research in Heritage Studies and Border Studies from the 1990s onwards, and includes a discussion of key concepts and definitions, and examples that illustrate common areas of interest in the two research fields. Focus is here on questions of power, territory, ownership, and diversity.

In the second article, *Heritage ecotones*, Dacia Viejo-Rose sets out to explore heritage borders as physical entities, rhetorical tropes, and practices. With concrete examples, such as the Mostar Bridge and the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, and ecosystem concepts such as ecotones and edge effects, she focuses on the in-between spaces and interdependencies created by such heritage borders, and investigates what happens in these "zones of encounter".

In the article *Märket: The makings and meanings of a border in the Baltic Sea*, Ida Hughes Tidlund writes about the border between Finland-Åland and Sweden, on a small island in the Baltic Sea. From her own ethnographic observations and archive research, she writes the winding biography of that small but important piece of border, and demonstrates how it is literally formed by, at the same time as it profoundly informs, the activities and movements of people living with and around it.

Mikael Baaz and Mona Lilja write in their article *Borders in the mind and on the ground* about the Preah Vihear Temple on the border between Cambodia and Thailand. The temple, which was listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2008, has been a site of conflict and contestation for decades. They show how various aspects of international law have been at play at Preah Vihear, and how they appear to have fuelled rather than solved the conflicts. With an alternative discursive–materialistic

15 Ian Lilley in the Conversation, this volume.

approach, they call for attention to the peace-building potential of initiatives and organizations in local civil society.

Elisabeth Niklasson's article *Borders of belonging in the European Heritage Label* departs from the examples of two heritage sites: the Sagres Fortress in Portugal, and the Krapina Neanderthal Museum in Croatia. With a threefold analytical focus – inward on the EU heritage bureaucracy in Brussels, backward on the historical times represented by such heritage sites, and outward beyond the European continent – she investigates the symbolic, historical, and cultural boundaries of the EU's new European Heritage Label.

Cecilia Parsberg's article *We are losers and you have to learn from us*, begins in a conversation with the Palestinian poet Kefah Fanni on the West Bank in 2005, and moves to Sweden, where she a decade later set up an artwork in the form of a chorus dialogue: *The Chorus of Begging and The Chorus of Giving*.[16] Featuring the conversations with Kefah, and the work with the chorus dialogue, she explores through artistic practice the social potential of engaging in the actual border space between losers and winners in contemporary society.

The six articles are followed by the Conversation. Compared with the articles, the Conversation has more of a raw and unfinished character. As such, it invites a wider circle of readers to a situation where different academic perspectives and research experiences meet and are negotiated. This situation is mundane in university research seminars, but rarely reaches a wider audience. The intention is to catch some of the dialogical, situated character of the conversations – moments where positions are not fully assumed and knowledge is ambivalent, hence still productive. Speaking with Homi Bhabha: "If you seek simply the sententious or the exegetical, you will not grasp the hybrid moment outside the sentence – not quite experience, not yet concept; part dream, part analysis; neither signifier nor signified".[17] To help structure the reading, some key themes or strands that run through the conversations and connect them with the articles have been highlighted in the margin. The themes are: law – whose law? – conflict – creation – destruction – scales – negotiation – cleansing – the in-between – buffer zones – inside/outside – difference – security – practice – nationalism – roots/routes – flow – essentialization – walking – strategy – memory – the spiral – and, time. But the themes and strands are open at both ends, emerg-

16 Parts of Cecilia Parsberg's work *The Chorus of Begging and The Chorus of Giving* was featured as a film projection with a commentary at the *Heritage and Borders* symposium, in the Metro station at Stockholm University on 21 September 2017. It can be viewed in its entirety at http://beggingandgiving.se

17 Bhabha 2004, 260.

ing and disappearing, connecting and disconnecting with other strands and themes without sentential (or sententious) ambition. The combined subject of heritage and borders is, and must be, complicated and ambiguous. Hence the Conversation is intended to allow for the complexity and ambivalence to stay complex and ambivalent, forming a productive space to inspire new forms of knowledge around these two related concepts.

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Lowenthal, David 1985. *The past is a foreign country*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Péter Balogh

The revival of cultural heritage and borders

A literature review with some explanatory remarks

Introduction*

This contribution aims to provide a (critical) literature overview of the cross-fertilization of two large research themes: that of "cultural heritage" and that of "borders". It is acknowledged that both fields have enjoyed growing recognition and concomitant institutionalization over the past years: both Heritage Studies and Border Studies are now considered as established academic fields, with their respective journals, conferences, educational programmes, and a more recent and still-emerging "critical" school of each. Yet despite the rapid growth of both fields especially over the last two decades, few seem thus far explicitly to have reflected upon what appears to be a growing evidence of cross-fertilization[1] between them. Hence, in the form of a literature review, this paper maps the milestones and fruits of that process, complemented by some – in places critical – reflections. The argument is that borders are neatly tied to heritage, and do not and will not disappear but rather transform.

* The author would like to thank Anna Källén and Tim Winter for their fruitful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The participation of the author at the *Heritage and Borders* symposium and the subsequent workshop (21–22 September 2017) in Stockholm was fully financed by the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities. Research for this contribution was made possible from two Hungarian projects in which the author is involved: National Research, Development and Innovation Office – NKFIH grant #NN 114468 (Change and Continuity in Hungarian Spatial Imaginaries: Nationality, Territoriality, Development and the Politics of Borders) and #PD 124543 (Svejkian ferry countries? Geopolitical identities in East Central Europe).

1 A few years ago, a whole theme issue of the *Journal of Borderlands Studies* was devoted to the cultural production and negotiation of borders, not least through heritage. See Schimanski & Wolfe 2010; Amante 2010.

The chapter is structured as follows. This very short introduction is followed by a brief presentation of some of the key concepts in Heritage Studies and Border Studies, also touching upon potential common fields of investigation. Subsequently, a section introduces some of the first instances of cross-fertilization, which mostly took place in the 1990s. The longest section then tries to continue the journey chronologically, focusing on the complex (power) relations between communities on different territorial scales when it comes to defining "their" heritage. The last section before the concluding one carries on with the literature review but here the guiding question is whether heritage is imaginable without any sorts of boundaries at all. The chapter ends with a brief summary, some concluding thoughts as well as future outlook.

Theory, definitions, and delimitations

In spite of the above-mentioned blossoming of heritage-related literature, few papers actually seem to offer (shorter) definitions of the term. This may be more understandable considering that most authors – in accordance with the post-positivist, or constructivist paradigm – are interested in what their research subjects value as heritage, rather than following their own presumptions. A few examples of definitions are nevertheless in place here. On a more abstract level cultural heritage can be seen as "a way to manage the past for the future".[2] Brian Graham and others for instance refer by heritage to "that part of the past which [groups, individuals, and institutions] select in the present for contemporary purposes, be they economic, cultural, political, or social".[3] Consequently, according to Elizabeth Greenspan "sites of heritage are those spaces at which groups, individuals, and institutions negotiate how to use aspects of the past in the present, often by manipulating the space of the site itself".[4] In general, then, this literature review uses the definitions of (cultural) heritage which the cited authors themselves have adopted. Applying a broad approach will of course include tangible and intangible heritage alike. There is in any case one important delimitation to be mentioned. While more cross-fertilization would surely be fruitful (and has to some extent already started taking place), I – as many other social scientists – do not deal with Heritage Science, i.e. the technically-oriented study of heritage conservation. I find that fields such as Memory Studies, History, Human Geography, Cultural Studies, etc. are closer to the discussions in which most scholars of Heritage Studies as well as Border Studies are engaged.

2 Eskilsson & Högdahl 2009, p. 78.
3 Graham *et al*. 2000, p. 17.
4 Greenspan 2005, p. 372.

Similarly, then – and again in line with the general trend – the concepts of border and boundary are used here in a broad sense. A conventional distinction between the two has been for the border to refer to the line in the sand, i.e. the physical barrier, whereas a boundary could refer to any aspect of social demarcation. Such a distinction has, however, become increasingly blurred.[5] On precisely this note, one of the contributions of Border Studies has been to show how borders in the minds have created physical separation barriers on the ground – a process that works just as efficiently the other way around; i.e. the creation and maintenance of territorial borders also influence, if not fully define, group belongings.[6] Border Studies as we know it emerged in the late 1990s as a counter-narrative to notions of a borderless and deterritorialized world that accompanied the enthusiasm and optimism of many commentators at the end of the Cold War along with forecasts of an ever-more unfolding globalization.[7] The overall picture has become more nuanced by the recognition of the border as a meeting point or contact zone between different actors – for good/legal[8] and bad/illegal or semi-legal[9] purposes.

Not only new cultures (see below), but also path-breaking research often emerge through meetings at the borders of already established or emerging academic disciplines.[10] Increased interactions between the fields of Heritage Studies and Border Studies seem particularly fruitful, and should be regarded as fertile ground for advances in research, since borders are often seen as the finites of one territory and the beginning of the next, and can as such be strongly linked to definitions of cultural heritage. As Sara McDowell explains:

> The concept of, or acts of, territoriality are bound up in notions of a demarcated geographic space (a territory) which usually contains some kind of homogeneous, collectivized community sharing a collective identity or heritage. Territoriality is needed to stabilize and mobilize groups or individuals and their resources inside demarcated boundaries. Within societies then, various groups insert symbols into the cultural landscapes which resonate with their sense of heritage and identity, and which simultaneously incite remembering and mark territory. For territoriality to work, the group

5 For a longer paragraph on the gradual transformation of this distinction see Balogh 2014, p. 22.
6 For a longer account on the background and development of Border Studies see e.g. Balogh 2014, pp. 35–52.
7 Newman 2006; Paasi 2009.
8 Löfgren 2008.
9 Byrska-Szklarczyk 2012.
10 Källén & Sanner 2013, p. 9.

> often places visual warning symbols around the agreed territory further to deny others access into the home area [...] Flags, for example [...][11]

Some of the early signs of cross-fertilization

One of the first papers to deal with the connection between cultural heritage and boundaries is Leo Ou-fan Lee's account of Chinese literature produced in peripheral areas of the country, in exile, or by diaspora members.[12] The author takes note of a number of writers who saw themselves deprived of their cultural heritage through their remote physical distance from the geographic centres of Chinese cultural life, thus hindering them from producing valuable literature. However, Lee argues, it is exactly at the intersection of different cultures – often coming about by crossing regional or national boundaries – where new value is created, in the form of new cultures in general, and in this case in the form of new and inspiring types of literary work in particular.

In a similar vein, art teacher and scholar Elizabeth Garber notes that "[i]n border studies, the meeting of two cultures and countries is studied".[13] She is inspired by the concept of a border consciousness that "necessarily implies the knowledge of two sets of reference codes operating simultaneously. The challenge is to fully assume this biculturalism, develop it, and promote it".[14] Garber's empirical focus is on Chicanos, a label that "refers to Mexican-Americans who identify themselves as part of a political and social movement to establish self-respect and respect for the customs and heritages of Mexican-Americans".[15]

One of the early boundary scholars to mention cultural heritage is anthropologist Fredrik Barth. In an added preface to his reprinted anthology *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, Barth and his co-authors explain the wide adoption of their work as follows:

> It is true that the word "ethnic" is used to refer to groups of people who are considered to have a shared identity, a common history, and a traditional cultural heritage. But these features may not in themselves provide the best bases for analysing and understanding ethnic phenomena. The breakthrough we were striving for during our

11 McDowell 2008, pp. 47–48.

12 Lee 1991.

13 Garber 1995, p. 223. It can be added though that Border Studies have been interested in (the reasons for) a lack of cross-boundary contacts nearly as much as in their presence.

14 Cf. Garber 1995, p. 223.

15 Garber 1995, p. 224.

> symposium in 1967 was to identify the particular processes whereby ethnic groups are formed and made relevant in social life. To do so, we were looking for something like mechanisms, not for descriptions of manifest forms.[16]

The authors exemplify: "in analysing indigenous people's political activism, we discussed the shift to seeing such groups as engaged in a social struggle for meaningful change, not the revitalization of an unchanging heritage of aboriginal cultural traits".[17]

Indigenous movements are also a departure point in anthropologist Simon Harrison's short but important contribution. Quoting a crucial insight by Brigit Meyer and Peter Geschiere that "people's awareness of being involved in open-ended global flows seems to trigger a search for fixed orientation points and action frames, as well as determined efforts to affirm old and construct new boundaries",[18] Harrison notes "an increasing resistance by many indigenous communities to what they perceive as appropriations of their cultures by outsiders, perceptions which to some degree involve the reification of their cultural heritage as a form of property".[19] Thus "[i]ncreasingly, indigenous peoples and their supporters seek to protect [...] commercially valuable aspects of their cultural heritage with intellectual property".[20] One of Harrison's examples is the Notting Hill Carnival, which contributed to strengthening West Indian identity in Britain at the same time as it was seen by many of its organizers to have been misappropriated by outsiders and adulterated by white British culture. Hence "[t]he West Indians had tended to reify the concept of carnival, that is to treat it as if it were a material object, and to regard it as being exclusively their own".[21] Harrison's other case is the heritage of classical antiquity, which in many Greeks' eyes needed to be purified from its Turkish accretions in order to be reassembled as Greek culture. The author draws the important lessons that point to the perpetual nature of boundaries:[22]

16 Barth 1998 [1969], p. 5.
17 Barth 1998 [1969], p. 7.
18 Cf. Harrison 1999, p. 10.
19 Harrison 1999, p. 11.
20 Harrison 1999, p. 11.
21 Cf. Harrison 1999, p. 12.
22 Not so much their exact drawing between various groups or territories of course, but their very existence.

> The folk rhetorics of identity which I have tried to outline thus certainly allow groups to represent themselves as more or less outward-looking, more or less amenable to various sorts of mutually enriching cultural give-and-take – so long as their cultural boundaries are not erased altogether and all distinction lost between inside and outside. For according to these discourses of identity [...] the distinction between the cultural Self and Other depends irreducibly on stopping at least some transmission of culture between them [...][23]

But while all group identities depend on bordering – i.e. in some way defining the Self and/or the Other[24] – some of them can perhaps be more easily mobilized at times. Changes in the physical delimitation of (state) boundaries and often-concomitant population exchanges provide illustrative cases of both persistent and shifting collective identities. Paasi for instance described how Finland's post-WWII loss of Eastern Karelia to the USSR created a community of expellees whose ideological interests, coupled with the economic interests of local authorities and the emerging heritage industry all combined to give rise to a kind of "reconstructed Karelia" in the border areas of Eastern Finland:

> War memorials, houses built in the Karelian style, the symbols of Orthodox religion, and events exploiting the Karelian heritage mushroomed in this part of the country and created a symbolic space that provided the Karelians with cultural representations that perhaps partly compensated mentally for their lost territory, while at the same time stimulating tourism.[25]

Such expellee associations have typically been engaged in maintaining local forms of identity and heritage, as well as organizing visits to their members' former native homelands on the other side of the border. Yet the number of such nostalgic trips have decreased as they realized the "Utopian land" they were looking for no longer exists, with the differences between the commemorated past and contemporary realities being particularly exacerbated by the diverging historical trajectories that the two sides of the once-coherent region have experienced since the split.[26]

23 Harrison 1999, p. 13.

24 The related concepts of bordering, ordering, and othering are discussed in a large corpus of literature on Border Studies, see e.g. Scott 2009; van Houtum 2010, pp. 959–960; Balogh 2013, pp. 192–193; Scott 2015.

25 Cf. Paasi 1999, p. 672. For the German-Polish context see e.g. Balogh 2014, pp. 24–25.

26 Cf. Paasi 1999, pp. 677–678.

Complex relations between different territorial scales

Connecting the fields of cultural heritage and borders will inevitably raise issues of territorial scale. As the designation "World Heritage" gained momentum due to UNESCO and other organizations, scholars began discussing – and often questioning – the idea and practice of global heritage. Anthropologists, archaeologists, geographers,[27] and others have engaged in a critical debate of heritage sites designated as "global" by organizations such as UNESCO and the World Heritage Fund. The most resonant critique questions the salience of the category of "global heritage" itself. Archaeologist Lynn Meskell argued that such a category suggests a universal agreement about what constitutes globally valuable sites of heritage and assumes that individuals or communities from different regions of the world value "global heritage" to begin with.[28]

In an illuminating case study of Cyprus, Julie Scott analyses the conflictual implications of "world heritage" as intended by UNESCO versus "on the ground" on the divided island. In the Greek-Cypriot south, three sites have received World Heritage status between 1980 and 1998.[29] At the same time, despite there being more known heritage sites in the north, due to its status as disputed territory the (so-called) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus could not nominate any of them for World Heritage status. Thus as "Greek and Turkish Cypriots are differentially positioned in relation to the authoritative resources of the island's past, for which World Heritage inscription has become the ultimate brand",[30] the "current stalemate works to deepen existing imbalances, and further entrench the exclusion of Turkish Cypriots from a sense of ownership of Cyprus's heritage".[31] The author therefore concludes that the UNESCO philosophy of world heritage for a world citizenry is perhaps only possible in cyberspace.[32]

Scott points out a fundamental dilemma, which is that "[t]he dominance of the nation-state model of political self-determination has encouraged a view of heritage

27 See e.g. Graham *et al*. 2000.

28 Meskell 2002.

29 Scott 2002, p. 101. It is nevertheless noteworthy that no Cypriot site has been added to the World Heritage List for two decades now, despite there remaining unrecognized cultural heritage sites on the Greek side as well. While this particular question is beyond the scope of the present paper, we might speculate that the exclusion of the Turkish side has been hindering the recognition of any further sites on the Greek side as well.

30 Scott 2002, p. 112.

31 Scott 2002, p. 113.

32 See e.g. https://whc.unesco.org/en/convention/

as the cultural property of specific ethno-national groups".[33] As potential panacea she is turning to two concepts: one of them is patrimony, which – unlike heritage – is future oriented: "[i]f one is talking of heritage or of an heir, the genealogy goes back from the son to the father ... If one is talking of patrimony, one's attention is directed towards the future, towards the son."[34] The other concept is stewardship, which "directly confronts traditional and entrenched notions of property and its associated rights, with an alternative model of duties and obligations [...] and which substitutes universal values for particularistic interests and identities".[35] Hence, the author laments the explicit exclusion of active forms of stewardship from UNESCO's remit in relation to World Heritage Sites.

While remaining contested, "global heritage" is explicitly defended by for instance urban anthropologist Elizabeth Greenspan.[36] She argues that the latter must not be constructed top-down by large bureaucratic organizations but can also be conceived by for instance tourists and local residents. Based on a case study of the World Trade Center (WTC) memorial site during the year following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, she claims visitors from around the world as well as locals were actively co-creating the site and turning it into global heritage. According to the author this was manifested for instance by people leaving notes such as "The world supports you" or "We love America" on plywood walls and memorial posters. Greenspan also conducted on-site interviews with visitors, one of whom she quoted saying: "Even if we don't belong to the same culture, I'm Filipino, there are many nationalities here. But we can ... be together".[37]

Some critique is in place here regarding the way Greenspan treats the concept of globalness. Although not framed as self-critique, she does mention some of the term's ambiguities:

> [G]roups and individuals are constructing globalness at heritage sites in multiple, perhaps contradictory, ways. At the WTC site, visitors were not a random sample of individuals from around the world; they had the desire and means to visit the USA, New York City, and the WTC site – quite a selective group. Interviews with visitors

33 Scott 2002, p. 112.

34 Scott explains this idea in somewhat more detail (Scott 2002, p. 114). Others, such as Sundberg and Kaserman (2007, p. 731), have also critically approached the notion of heritage itself, which often refers to "something transmitted by or acquired from a predecessor" as well as "something possessed as a result of one's natural situation or birth."

35 Scott 2002, pp. 114–115.

36 Greenspan 2005.

37 Greenspan 2005, p. 380.

> revealed that many had friends and/or family who live or have lived in or near NYC, or elsewhere in the USA. As a result, their ideas about what kind of place the WTC site is, and how it may, or may not, be a global heritage site, are shaped by these factors. While many who visited the WTC site said it feels international or global, others may visit and experience it as intensely Western and/or American.[38]

Thus, while there are few things or identities in the world that can be described as genuinely global (with New York City still widely regarded as an iconic example), the geographies of visitors even at such an international site as the WTC memorial will be selective. Relatedly, there is a risk of conceptual inflation where Greenspan conflates such terms as "non-national" and global: "this paper uses the word 'global' to refer to representations that situate phenomena or groups ... beyond the boundaries of any one nation-state; the phenomena, though rooted geographically in a precise locale, are represented as 'non-national'".[39] The empirical evidence of manifestations of globalness remains vague, or at least questionable:

> Flags hanging on walls from Japan, Italy, France, Canada, and Britain, and comments on plywood written in Czech, Hebrew and Hindi collectively worked to situate processes of heritage making as a project originating from more than one nation-state. Visitors did not always see or engage in such an international collective during their visit, but by reading walls, adding their own comments, and photographing memorials, visitors participated, perhaps indirectly, in such a collective marked materially at the site. Constructions of globalness were marked primarily in the collection of flags and signatures from many countries on walls and fences surrounding the site. Such a collection presented a coming together of many distinct nations, an "imagined community of nations".[40]

Referring to her interviewees, Greenspan writes that "[m]any said that the memorials expressed to them support for New Yorkers and/or Americans. Even without mentioning the world or globe, such comments imply the presence of a scale beyond the national, one that is able to provide support to local and/or national collectives".[41] My point is that "beyond the national" is not necessarily global. Some of the alterna-

38 Greenspan 2005, p. 382.
39 Greenspan 2005, p. 374.
40 Greenspan 2005, p. 380.
41 Greenspan 2005.

tive concepts the author could have used include transnational[42] or translocal,[43] perhaps even binational cultural heritage[44] could have been more suitable in a number of cases. Common to these terms is that they do emphasize the transboundary nature of a phenomenon or an individual, but do not claim to represent the global. Greenspan does use the terms "international" and "multinational", but her aim throughout the whole article is to defend "global heritage", a notion that – despite Greenspan's well-intended efforts to prove its constructive potential – does not become much less fuzzy.

It is crucial to add at this point that the fuzziness of "global heritage" does of course not mean that national heritage would be much easier to define, something Tomas Germundsson's study well attests. He shows how the continued significance of mainstream notions of the Swedish national landscape, often rooted in historical romanticism, serve to exclude some regions such as Scania.[45] That area has both a distinctive physical landscape and a historical record of belonging to Denmark. Of course, Scania is not the only part of Sweden where the country's borders have shifted historically. However, although Scania has been under Swedish rule since 1658, its "landscape heritage runs the risk of being alienated when it is valued from a national criterion [...] a critical questioning of official heritage practice is therefore needed".[46] In the meantime, regional actors in Scania are not just waiting for that to happen. Instead, in the age of a "Europe of regions" they have actively been mobilizing Scania's contemporary heritage, including the potentials of a new bridge to the Danish capital Copenhagen,[47] as well as the relative proximity (as compared to other Swedish regions) to continental Europe. In this case – as along many other intra-European borders – a cross-border region (Öresund) has gradually been institutionalized, also supported by a mobilization of past and recent heritage.

Another case study from southern Sweden emphasizes the need to maintain the multiplicity of readings and practices of cultural heritage in a historical borderland.[48]

42 Conceptualizations of transnationalism have boomed since the early 1990s (see e.g. Vertovec 2009 for a comprehensive account) but have only started infusing Heritage Studies more recently (cf. Jørgensen 2014). This might be related to that the UNESCO Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage "contains no guidelines for dealing with transnational cultural heritage or mobile, migrating cultures" (Leimgruber 2010, p. 176).

43 Kiiskinen 2008.

44 George & George 2016.

45 Germundsson 2005.

46 Germundsson 2005, p. 21.

47 Germundsson 2005, p. 33.

48 Eskilsson & Högdahl 2009.

The "Snapphanes" were a 17th-century pro-Danish guerrilla organization that fought against the Swedes in the Second Northern Wars in Scania, and were consequently arrested and killed by Swedish authorities during and following the ousting of the Danes from the region in the 1670s. Their story could be constructed in "classic" nationalistic frames, i.e. as an example of the enemies of the nation "rightly" being punished for their lack of loyalty. While that version is not excluded, the story is "in many ways the little man's struggle against an oppressing superior force" and can thus be "regarded as a practice of history valid in our age".[49] Moreover, under the current realities of an ever-more integrated Danish-Swedish cross-border region, local Snapphane stories can also be mobilized as a shared heritage connecting the two nations, evidenced for instance by the presence of both Swedish and Danish flags at the annually held "Snapphane Days".[50] The challenge to such multiplicity and hybridization is thus not so much an animosity between Swedes and Danes, which is nowadays virtually non-existent, but rather the ever-more influential needs of (place) branding, which require competitive and simplified messages. The authors' final thought regarding the future of the Snapphane Days is a challenge most likely shared by other similar events across the world:

> [T]he "professionalization" of the event probably will raise claims for a "cleaner" and more homogenous storytelling, as well as more stylized settings. We will claim that one possibility to keep this multiplicity is an on-going ambition to leave space for the "bottom-up" where new local actors will continue the discussion on the history of the Snapphanes and prevent it from becoming another tourist attraction: easy to trace and understand but without the nerve that emanates from the negotiation that actually *makes it meaningful*.[51]

A diversification of commemorative practices at local level is also the main concern in a paper by Ewa Ochman that focuses on south-western Poland.[52] The key argument here is that Polish administrative-territorial reforms in the 1990s have triggered a process whereby local governments are now much more in charge of commemorative practices that were previously handled by the national government, resulting in much more fragmented and diversified heritage narratives.[53] Local identity-building is seen

49 Eskilsson & Högdahl 2009, p. 77.
50 https://www.hembygd.se/osby/kulturarrangemang/snapphanedagar-2010-och-2011-11/
51 Eskilsson & Högdahl 2009, p. 79 (emphasis in original).
52 Ochman 2009.
53 In a positive sense (i.e. in terms of multiplicity).

as particularly necessary in this post-socialist context, given the former regime's neglect and even denial of (local) diversity, with all past-related narratives subordinated to the ideology of the central state and class-struggle master narrative.[54] Accordingly, local actors, especially in the historical border town of Gliwice, have worked hard – reportedly successfully – to redefine local heritage to emphasize their community's past multicultural character. Moreover, given that different municipalities conduct divergent politics of memory, Ochman concludes that such an intense diversification "has the most potential to challenge a coherent and nationalizing version of the historical past propagated by the state".[55]

Whereas Ochman's enthusiasm and appreciation of such trends is both understandable and welcome (from a normative standpoint), the need emerges to nuance the picture with two – perhaps less optimistic – aspects. The first targets the idea that a post-socialist context and politico-economic decentralization would guarantee a rich diversity of heritage accounts. As Eskilsson and Högdahl show in their above-discussed article, multiplicity can be threatened by fundamental marketing strategies and branding activities, in particular the tendency to create short, simple, and saleable messages and communications rather than more complex and nuanced ones with a multifaceted character with which most heritage would deserve to be treated. This suggests that economic liberalization as well as political decentralization do not *per se* guarantee that heritage does not get "corrupted". The second and strongly related critique cautiously raises a warning finger towards the main sources of current diversity-embracement, which often include European Union (EU) funding. Ochman accounts for projects like Gliwice's Minority, which "allows us to show the heritage of the region through traditions and culture of multi-ethnical and multi-cultural local society" and has so far presented exhibitions on Armenian and Jewish minorities. The museum also holds annual Gliwice Heritage Days as part of the European Heritage Days.[56] In the author's own words:

> Rethinking the image of the city as a historic border town and a present-day cultural, linguistic, and economic contact zone has concrete ramifications. Primarily, it helps to increase prospects for receiving EU subsidies and encourages national and foreign

54 Ochman 2009, p. 405.

55 Ochman 2009, p. 393.

56 Ochman 2009, p. 404. The author just mentions this in parenthesis. I think it is important that the local heritage days are connected to the European Heritage Days, with the latter thus most likely having an impact on the former.

investment. This is particularly important in the context of the decline of mining and metallurgy industries in Upper Silesia.[57]

Firstly, although museum curators and others engaged in such exhibitions and events are almost certainly open-minded persons with noble intentions, it remains difficult not to think of the present near-total absence of ethnic minorities (such as Armenians and Jews) whose heritage they commemorate. It is of utmost importance to note here that "boasting" of one's own tolerance by proudly displaying currently nearly non-existent domestic minority-cultures is far from a uniquely Polish phenomenon. The point is, therefore, to take note of the contradictions involved in such a process; since contemporary, genuinely multicultural societies are not rarely infected with ethno-national or -linguistic, or religious conflicts (or a combination of these). Secondly and relatedly, Ochman refers more than once (see e.g. the quotation above) to the peripheral character of her study area, which is a rather disadvantaged city in a region known for struggling with its more recent heritage based on mining and heavy industry. Yet she does not really discuss the consequences and potential risks that such structural challenges and a concomitant subordinated position – including dependence on financial transfers from domestic and European core regions – imply. Given that the discourses and financial means of diversity-embracement partly stem from outside (e.g. Brussels),[58] a failure of the European project and citizens' related unfulfilled expectations could turn into some sort of a "revenge" of the periphery, including a rejection of most – even noble – ideas stemming from the core. That we have already been witnessing over the past few years, not least in countries like Poland and Hungary.

Ochman's point that heritage is particularly contested in post-socialist contexts is nevertheless valid. In the following quote Sara McDowell describes an example from the Baltic states, but similar practices can be found not just in post-socialist but also in post-colonial contexts.[59]

57 Ochman 2009, p. 405.

58 Although loaded with contradictions and increasingly challenged, these discourses can perhaps still be considered as hegemonic in the context of the EU.

59 Turkmenistan for instance has a colonial (pre-1917) as well as a Soviet state socialist (until 1991) historical record. Given that for over a century local authors and intelligentsia published almost exclusively in Russian, the country has found it particularly difficult to rediscover its national heritage. See briefly about some attempts in Balogh 2007.

> In Latvia, for example, the annual commemoration of the Barricade Days [...] which marks the restoration of the country's independence, has become increasingly popular, while a significant number of memorials in Riga, the capital, remember the sacrifices made by the hundreds of thousands of Latvians killed throughout the country's history of occupation [...] These practices are an integral part of the construction of a new identity and a separate heritage for many Latvians. By dismantling sites of heritage synonymous with Soviet occupation (which were constructed in the first instance to reinforce Soviet control of Latvian territory) and replacing them with expressions and narratives of Latvian identity, the local population can validate their new-found independence. Similar processes have taken place in neighbouring Estonia [...][60]

Yet relatively recent examples of "heritageization" and "re-heritageization" from Estonia in particular again reflect the challenges of creating coherent national narratives. Around a quarter of the population (still) identify themselves as ethnic Russians, and the country has experienced a war of monuments[61] that peaked in 2007 upon the relocation of a bronze statue of an anonymous Soviet soldier, from a central place to a less-frequented site within Tallinn. At the same time, in the northeastern border-town of Narva, with over 90% Russian speakers, the restoration in 2000 of a Swedish Lion monument to mark the tercentenary of Sweden's victory over Russia at the first Battle of Narva was perhaps compensated by subsequent commemorations of the Russian conquest of the city in 1704. But then again, a proposal a few years later to erect a statue of Peter the Great in Narva briefly threatened to open a new front in Estonia's monument war.[62]

In a related paper David Smith and Stuart Burch explore how social categories are articulated through place-making, with a particular focus on the meanings ascribed to public monuments and other heritage sites by "everyday" residents of the EU's eastern border city of Narva. A restorationist discourse harking back to "authentic", Old Narva prevails among ethnic Estonians (in Tartu and Narva) and dismisses the city's current modernist Soviet architecture as abhorrent and ugly, and moreover emblematic of the damage inflicted on the "real" western Estonia by 50 years of Soviet occupation.[63] For the vast majority of informants the researchers encountered in Narva, however, the Soviet architecture has real value: in many instances they or their forebears had an actual hand in its construction, as part of Estonia's post-war devel-

60 McDowell 2008, p. 49.
61 Burch & Smith 2007.
62 Burch & Smith 2007.
63 Smith & Burch 2012, p. 414.

opment scheme.[64] The authors conclude that these sometimes conflicting narratives in turn convey something of the complexity of identity in this borderland setting, a complexity which is still insufficiently acknowledged not just in political but also in academic discourse around the interface between the EU and Russia.[65]

Cultural heritage without borders?

As previously alluded to, heritage is not just contested in relatively newly independent states but also in places across Western Europe (see *Fig. 1*) or North America. Juanita Sundberg and Bonnie Kaserman for instance find that recent strategies to enforce the United States boundary with Mexico have shifted undocumented immigrants into remote lands federally designated as protected areas, such as national parks or wildlife refuges.[66] The US Government and media represent such entries as a threat to nature and wildlife. Repeatedly defining that which is threatened as American, such discourses work to draw and reinforce boundaries around the nation, creating categories of inclusion and exclusion by means of narration. According to the authors, discourses about border-protected areas create images of nature as the embodiment of the "American" nation and its national heritage. The notion of heritage thus "serves to delimit the body politic as Anglo-American and cements this community's claims to territory".[67] The dominant images represent Southwestern border-protected areas as threatened by wounding and contamination by undocumented immigrants who are consequently held responsible for this damage. The resulting association between them and the traces they leave behind – refuse and human waste – works to preclude them from inclusion in the body politic as rights-claiming individuals.[68]

It can be added that (illegal) migration is increasingly contested in many parts of the world. An article by Ashworth and Bruce focuses on historical town walls and tourism,[69] therefore a comparison with state border walls that we see again rising across the world may seem far-fetched at first sight. And yet their insight that these historical "town walls can be seen as the grim barriers between contested identities or as the emblems of the peaceful security of the town within",[70] can arguably just as well

64 Smith & Burch 2012, p. 415.
65 Smith & Burch 2012, p. 422.
66 Sundberg & Kaserman 2007, p. 727.
67 Sundberg & Kaserman 2007, p. 729.
68 Sundberg & Kaserman 2007.
69 Ashworth & Bruce 2009.
70 Ashworth & Bruce 2009, p. 299.

Fig. 1. Perhaps also due to its relatively fragile structure (as a federal state divided by ethno-linguistic, cultural, and administrative borders), the shape of Belgium's territory is commemorated on souvenirs such as this coin (indirectly contributing to the maintenance of the political order and state borders of that country). Photograph by author.

be linked to the contemporary border protection mania, a result of massive fear by many citizens that has been successfully mobilized by some – irrespective of whether or not on justified grounds.

Some critical scholars such as Mary Taylor understand the revival of not just cultural heritage but culture more generally as a product of late capitalism.[71] Building on influential scholars such as Nancy Fraser, George Yúdice, anthropologists Arturo Escobar and Jane Cowan, as well as geographers Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, the main argument in this approach is that the recent emphasis on cultural rights is neatly tied to identity politics and, most importantly, has replaced social rights as the key force of political mass mobilization. While this is an important observation, in a way we should have seen it coming. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama predicted that

> [i]n the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed. Such nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-historical world for some time to come.[72]

Accordingly, roots tourism – i.e. travel for the purpose of seeking roots – has been emerging in particular among "descendants of a diaspora living in contemporary multicultural societies and travelling to ancestral homelands in search of identity and belongingness"[73] (see also *Fig. 2*). While such activities certainly create links between established territorial states, to some extent they also question these entities – or

71 Taylor 2009, p. 54.
72 Fukuyama 1989, p. 18.
73 Higginbotham 2012, p. 189.

at least their fixed nature – by emphasizing ethnic/genealogical and cultural bonds stretching beyond them.[74]

At the heyday of the globalization debate – i.e. around the turn of millennium – influential writers such as Marc Augé and Zygmunt Bauman have conceptualized globalized, uniformalized places such as international airports as non-places, being "nowhereseville". Yet more recent heritage studies have pointed to the growing presence of national and local cultural heritage at exactly these sites; not just in commercial forms but also through exhibitions, performances etc.[75] Paasi for instance has described this contradiction as follows:



Fig. 2. The nowadays-popular search for ethnic roots may to some extent question administrative borders by emphasizing other types of belonging that reach beyond the confines of (current) political entities. Photograph by author.

74 Higginbotham 2012, pp. 196–198.
75 van Ulzen 2011; Silverman 2017.

> [B]orders are challenged by postnational and denational processes, mobility, and at times by ethnic upsurges, [yet] studies on (banal) nationalism display how much emotional bordering, fear, and loyalty are mobilized through nationalized and memorialized material landscapes like military cemeteries and monuments, or through national performances such as flag/independence days, parades, and other elements related to national heritage, "purity", and symbolism.[76]

If nothing else, borders are maintained as they can serve as a resource to local communities and beyond.[77] In Europe cross-border co-operation initiatives can receive funding for maintaining different elements of cultural heritage from the EU,[78] but the advantages go far beyond this. In many places, such as along the Polish-Ukrainian border, cities like Przemyśl as well as its surroundings have consciously built up the tourism industry around the region's frontier culture, including walks to historical demarcation lines (for a similar example see *Fig. 3*), promotion of border fortresses, exhibitions on the lives of local borderlanders, etc.[79] Interestingly enough, the narratives produced here (as in the Estonian cases above) also have some difficulties balancing between a focus on the historical multicultural heritage and current realities of ethnic homogeneity.[80] Along many borderlands, such sites and places of remembrance now often host various events of cultural exchange, high-level political encounters etc. In less fortunate situations, however, these (sometimes very same) sites see a clash of memories, or worse, of physical bodies. Whether a peaceful or a hostile meeting point, the symbolic and practical role of the border is indisputable for the production of past, present, and future cultural heritage.

In lieu of conclusions

As above examples of cross-fertilization between Heritage Studies and Border Studies have hopefully demonstrated, the meta-theoretical approach of the two fields has by and large been in line with the prevailing paradigms of the past decades, with a particular focus on diversity. A dilemma of diversity, not least in an era of globalization, is that its very existence depends on the presence of distinguishable units (i.e.

76 Paasi 2012, p. 2305.

77 In fact, conceiving of the border not just as a barrier but rather also as a resource has been one of the key shifts in Border Studies, among policy practitioners, and others. For a discussion on this see Balogh 2014, pp. 44–48.

78 See e.g. Ocokoljic 2013.

79 Barthel 2016.

80 Barthel 2016, pp. 60–61.

Fig. 3. The large bunker complex pictured here and forming part of the Árpád Line (an extensive historical border corridor) has peacefully been visited by Ukrainians, Hungarians, and others for years. Yet a nearby historical landmark at Verecke Pass, which commemorates the (assumed) entry point of the ancient Hungarians into the Carpathian Basin in the 9th century, has multiple times been vandalized by Ukrainian radicals. Photograph by author.

territories, groups) and boundaries between them. At the same time, diversity is arguably of limited value if it cannot be experienced – an action that itself necessitates the crossing of borders, physical and mental.

As Border Studies have shown, the world has not become a borderless space, as some well-intentioned but naïve commentators expected in the 1990s. The important thing then is how we deal with borders, for instance when presenting cultural heritage. In a number of countries in Africa and Asia for instance, "heritage resources have found themselves embroiled and endangered by militarised conflict and political turmoil, and simultaneously acting as a source of ethnic or religious tension".[81] In some regions with similar but temporally more remote records of ethnic conflicts, such as the German-Polish borderland, local and regional cultural heritage is actively promoted and crafted into a suitable form by avoiding certain contested historical periods, such as the mid-20th century.[82] But even in regions with a more peaceful re-

81 Winter 2013, p. 534.
82 Nilsson *et al*. 2010, p. 165.

cent history such as Scandinavia, cultural heritage can be hijacked and manipulated by such forces as the political far right.[83]

There are good examples, too, of course. On the international level, despite relevant criticism of organizations as UNESCO playing into the hands of old-established national structures,[84] its World Heritage List now recognizes 37 so-called Transboundary Properties.[85] The EU supports a good number of cross-national initiatives such as Europeana, a huge online digital archive accessible to all.[86] Cross-border heritage routes and itineraries have been around for some time and noted for their capacity to bring about dialogue and interaction.[87] And on the local but transnational level, in his study of a bilingual school in Haparanda at the Swedish-Finnish border, geographer Thomas Lundén found in the local curriculum that

> the pupils shall gain knowledge about and understanding for our native environment, our shared culture and history, thereby being able to push forward, preserve, and pass down the cultural heritage of Tornedalen. They shall learn to take responsibility for our neighbourhood and to consciously co-operate long-term for an ideal global environment; to develop an international perspective that enables understanding and respect for other cultures, and facilitates collaboration, friendship, and peace.[88]

In the end, the question is not whether any heritage will remain to be claimed by community A or B, or in some cases a newly forming group – for instance at the intersection of A and B. The question is how such claims by spatially or culturally bounded communities are handled.

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83 Niklasson & Hølleland 2018.
84 Scott 2002; Taylor 2009.
85 http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/
86 https://www.europeana.eu/portal/en
87 Moulin & Boniface 2001.
88 Lundén 2011, p. 90.

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Dacia Viejo-Rose

The ecotones and edge effects of heritage borders

Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.[1]

Heritage is at its most fragile and, ironically, its most powerful when it is used to uphold singular narratives of history and belonging: interpretative accounts that firmly root a heritage site to a specific and rigidly demarcated group of people, a moment in time, a specific meaning, and set of values. The fragility derives in part from the vulnerability of singularity to inevitably multiple alternative interpretations. This singularity also makes heritage stand out as a prime target for both deliberate destruction and neglect when the singled-out interpretation falls out of favour or ceases to be "usable". The power lies in, as successful propagandists know, the attractiveness of black-and-white narratives that leave no room for the messy ambiguity of the in-between. Instrumental to the construction of such singular narratives are heritage borders that clearly delineate communities, moments in time, meanings, and values. These borders can be useful and at times inescapable, but by thinking through them to alternative models they can be made more porous and malleable and their more damaging effects identified.

The negotiation of such borders is one of the aspects that most distinctively differentiates how natural heritage and cultural heritage are managed. While with nature conservation a mesh of relationships and interdependencies is seen to be at the core of safeguarding strategies, cultural heritage has tended to be protected by isolating sites, and in the process neglecting its entanglements. This itemization of cultural heritage has been reinforced in recent decades as a result of inventorying becoming the first port of call for protection measures. Today, with ICOMOS and IUCN initiating ever-tighter collaboration in their professional standard setting, is an opportune moment to explore the benefits of bringing these approaches together. With a particular aim of offering countermeasures to the singularizing effects of heritage

1 Frost 1915.

borders, this paper proposes to borrow from environmental conservation to argue for a "heritage ecosystems approach".

Such an approach is especially important because heritage is used to produce and reproduce power relationships[2] and in the process an endless set of boundaries can be drawn. Borders and heritage come together in numerous ways (see *Table 1*) depending on how the relationship is articulated: heritage of/as/at borders. In this paper the emphasis is on exploring how heritage borders exist as physical entities, rhetorical tropes, and practices, in order to focus on interdependencies and the in-between spaces that borders create. This approach borrows from a recent shift in how human geographers understand borders: away from seeing them as static objects fixed in space toward, as Kaiser argues, "more dynamic explorations of the ways in which bordering discourses and practices shape and reconfigure our understandings of the places and/or social communities with which they identify/differentiate one another."[3] The shift to *bordering* as a process of meaning making has clear echoes in recent developments in heritage studies where, however, it has been argued that the emphasis on process should not lead to denying the existence, and energy, of things.[4] Therefore in order to examine how borders and heritage come together I will be drawing both on the work of geographers who have focused extensively on borders,[5] and of archaeologists and anthropologists working on material culture in terms of its entanglements and its political ecology.[6] By combining these insights this paper suggests ways of dismantling the singularity of heritage and proposes strategies for seeing its borders as productive spaces. This is a way of acknowledging the processual nature of heritage borders and placing the emphasis on their interconnectedness while taking on board Doreen Massey's call:

> There never was place that was a bounded container, nor indeed an identity of place that was not contested. [...] On the other hand, neither is there a non-striated smooth space. What we have to do is take responsibility for the striations that are inevitably made; take responsibility for the inevitable boundaries, the definitions, the categorisations, in the sense of politicising the terms of their construction.[7]

2 See Graham *et al*. 2000 for an extensive discussion.

3 Kaiser 2012, p. 522.

4 Massey 2012; Coole & Frost 2010; DeMarrais *et al*. 2004.

5 E.g. Massey 2012; Reeves 2014; Kaiser 2012.

6 Bennett 2010; Thomas 1991; and Hodder 2016 on the entanglements of things and Herzfeld 2006 on uses of space, Morehart *et al*. 2018 on how political ecology and archaeology inform one another, Basu 2017 on the 'inbetweenness' of things.

7 Massey 2012, p. 256.

This paper is organized in two parts. First, the more salient heritage borders and their effects are presented with a focus on five broad categories: territorial, protective, communal, temporal, and conceptual borders. Second, an argument is made for the usefulness of borrowing from ecosystems approaches in order to think differently about heritage, more specifically through the notions of ecotones, the zone of encounter between two ecological systems, and edge effects. The ecotone in particular will be used to examine what happens in the zones of encounter and argue for the productivity of these spaces and their importance for the future of heritage thinking and, indeed, protection. The edge effect in turn is will be used to explore the impact of buffer zones and corridors as a conservation tool. The paper builds on the work of archaeologists in particular to bring context back into the equation and aims to suggest more comprehensive mechanisms for assessing heritage than the current indexing impulse offers. The goal here is to contribute to recent work on the relatedness of heritage by inviting reflection on the possible fruitfulness of applying ecosystems thinking to it.

For illustrative examples I draw on my own fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Spain, and brief observations of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the Korean peninsula as well as that of others from a variety of regions. While my research has focused particularly on war and its aftermath, here I also draw on my observations of heritage practice at local, national, and international levels more generally. This is necessarily a partial exercise and is intended as a prolegomenon to more sustained research on movement in/of heritage through its dislocation and relocation, of which an understanding of borders forms an important part.

Borders of/as/at heritage

In recent decades our understanding of heritage has undergone a paradigm shift traceable in the work of organizations such as UNESCO and ICOMOS but also in the emergence of critical heritage studies. At the heart of this shift is an appreciation of heritage being not just, or even primarily, about physical "things", be these monuments or artefacts, but rather about the *significance* of things and non-things for people. This paradigm shift is about more than acknowledging intangible manifestations and transmitters of heritage: it is also about a shift in focus from protection to interpretation, from historic value to symbolic value. As a result, cultural heritage has broken free from sites; no longer anchored down, its sitedness is today understood to result from an entanglement of relations between things – including people, objects, symbols, and places – rather than only from its physical location in a landscape.[8]

8 Hodder 2016.

Yet despite the increased appreciation of the networks and entanglements intrinsic to heritage valuation, borders of many kinds still loom large in heritage practice and theory. In this section five types of heritage borders will be examined: protective borders around sites; communal/ownership borders that distinguish between bounded collectives; territorial borders; temporal borders that segment notions of past, present, and future; and ontological binaries that conceptualize borders within heritage discourse.

Protective borders

Protective borders are, it would seem, ubiquitous to (Western) heritage practice. The barriers and spatial distance that they create are regarded as essential protective measures for the delicate treasures they enclose. In museums, these borders come in the shape of bell jars, glass cases, cordons, and alarms, all instruments that institutions create in order to protect objects from a physical encounter with people. In the heritage sphere there are fences, pay barriers, barbed wire, swaths of neatly cropped grass, and increasingly buffer zones. Recognizing the importance of context for appreciating, and indeed preserving, the significance of heritage sites political (e.g. UNESCO) and professional (e.g. ICOMOS) bodies alike have increasingly worked buffer zones into the management toolkits and requirements of site management plans. Buffer zones first made it into UNESCO's Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention as early as 1977, and from 1998 they became integral to application dossiers and management strategies; they are now strongly recommended and defined as follows: "a buffer zone is an area surrounding the nominated property which has complementary legal and/or customary restrictions placed on its use and development to give an added layer of protection to the property."[9]

In both museum theory and practice there has been a wealth of critical thinking on how to erode this protective divide and truncate the distance that it creates. The new museology of the late 1990s criticized museums for fetishizing culture.[10] Since then curatorial practices countering this approach[11] have, for instance, developed ways of facilitating contemporary communities' hands-on engagement with collec-

9 UNESCO 2017, p. 30. See also ICOMOS-UK 2001.
10 Merriman 1991; Karp & Lavine 1991.
11 Thomas 1991.

tions[12] by working with artists an representatives of source communities and using 3D printing to allow visitors to handle objects or virtual reality to create an immersive experience of the contexts for which objects were made.[13] And alternative curatorial strategies do exist; they were introduced with the development of the ecomuseum model[14] in the 1970s that sought to place social and community development at the core of the functions of conserving, exhibiting, researching and educating about cultural heritage, continued today by the International Institute for the Inclusive Museum, and have further been developed in particular with regards to community museum initiatives such as Kenya's Community Peace Museums.[15]

Outside the realm of the museum, as the intangible dimensions of heritage have come to the fore – emphasizing the social and symbolic nature of heritage – protective borders have also increasingly come into question. And yet, this appreciation has not stemmed the spread of protective strategies that involve "cleansing" of heritage sites,[16] essentializing and reifying them, and cordoning them off. As Byrne comments with respect to his observations in the Philippines and Thailand: "In some ways it [the UNESCO convention on intangible heritage] would marginalise it even further, at best resulting in the compilation of inventories of the beliefs and practices of popular religion, the labeling of them as heritage being a sure way of consigning them conceptually to the past."[17] The phenomenon of spatially "cleansing"[18] sites has been particularly critiqued in response to the effect that the official designation heritage status on sites in cities and towns in Thailand, India, Cambodia, Laos, and South East Asia more broadly is having of expelling communities from the sites, often temples, with which they live and for whom they are particularly significant.[19] An example

12 See, for instance, the work of curators at the Cambridge University Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology (MAA) in recent exhibitions *Chiefs and governors: Art and power in Fiji* (2013–2014) and *Another India* (2017–2018).

13 Galeazzi & Di Giuseppantonio Di Franco 2017.

14 The ecomuseum model was introduced in 1971 by Georges Henri Rivière and Hugues de Varine. See Georges Henri Rivière's many publications and public lectures on the topic – e.g. Rivière 1992 [1973].

15 See the website of the International Institute for the Inclusive Museum: www.inclusivemuseum.org for development here and Walters *et al*. 2017 for examples of community peace-building museums.

16 Herzfeld 2006.

17 Byrne 2014, p. 21.

18 Herzfeld 2006.

19 Herzfeld 2006 on Thailand; Daly & Winter 2012 and Gillespie 2011 on Angkor in particular and Cambodia more generally; Karlström 2009 on Laos; Byrne 2014 on the Philippines and Thailand.

would be central areas of Bangkok where in the name of the "beautification" of the dynastic districts attempts have been made to remove the extant populations to the periphery– a move that was resisted by some communities for 18 years.[20] In India too, of the 25 cultural properties currently inscribed into the World Heritage List, most sites are strongly integrated with the lives of local communities who continue to associate with and use the sites in a variety of ways. Yet over the last few decades many communities have been either expelled from these sites or asked to adjust their ways of living, and often their aspirations, as management and conservation measures effectively distance people from heritage sites. Similar cases can be found around the world with well-researched examples including in Jordan, Mali, and Peru.[21]

Concern with these boundaries as they are applied not only to World Heritage sites but to heritage more broadly is that they facilitate that what Laurajane Smith (2006) has termed the Authorized Heritage Discourse becomes the central element determining value, where it is this "thing" behind the protective barrier or indeed the very term "heritage" that is declared to be of universal value because experts say so and in the name of protection, cordon it off from the very people for whom it has most significance. Instead of allowing people to continue to live with, going about their daily routines that incorporate these sites into a mundane use and regular ritual activities, it is their exceptionality that is emphasized. As a result, the border or the glass case makes them rarefied, and turns them into objects to be admired from a distance because the voice of authority says that they are outstanding, not mundane. Protective borders can have many detrimental consequences, two of which are particularly effecting. The first is to distance, or in some cases directly expel and subsequently exclude, local communities from their heritage sites in the name of standardized, often international, professional, and thus authorized "best practice".[22] The second is that the heritagescape is carved up, with each site cut off from the rest of the world inside its protective buffer zone. The result is fragmentation and a neglect of the entangled nature of heritage sites.

Furthermore, the fact that the international regulation of cultural heritage, despite numerous NGOs dedicated to the topic, is dominated by UNESCO – an organization made up of member states, means that it is very difficult to overcome national geo-political boundaries in practice. Nation states have a tendency to put

20 Herzfeld 2006; Esposito & Gaulis 2010.

21 See for instance Bille 2011 on Petra; Joy 2016 on Mali; Silverman 2002 and 2011, Robinson & Silverman 2015 on Peru, among many other examples.

22 Smith 2006.

heritage into glass boxes and cordon them off with proprietary sensibilities that have clear implications for territorial claims and collective identities.

Bounded collectivities and territorial borders

The most effecting type of border in the heritage landscape to date is a result of the late 19th-century "rise" of heritage:[23] the nation state. National borders are particularly instrumental in the proclivity for singular interpretations that neatly fit into the authoritative narrative of one group's mythical history. These boundaries of "us" and "them" are not only intended for those on the other side of the state borders but also, and especially, for a national audience. The territorial boundaries of the state are both outward and inward-looking.[24] The same applies when heritage is located at or used as a border. Two examples of this would be the Preah Vihear Temple and kimchi.

When heritage located in a border zone (see *Table 1*) and divisions between nations are contested over a long period, tensions of ownership and delineation of territory can become particularly violent. The case that has been most extensively studied in the heritage field is that of the Preah Vihear Temple, which is situated on what has been a shifting border between Cambodia and Thailand, and where tensions escalated as the temple's World Heritage status was being negotiated.[25] An example of a common heritage site divided by a border, this time from UNESCO's representative list of intangible heritage, is that of kimchi, listed in 2013 as "Kimjang, making and sharing kimchi in the Republic of Korea" (South Korea), and in 2015 as the "Tradition of kimchi-making in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (North Korea), despite their obvious similarities and the irony that descriptions of both emphasize that kimchi-making boosts co-operation and social cohesion. A common heritage is not enough of a bridging element to overcome a political divide.

Wars offer prime examples of heritage border-making and their long-term consequences. The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and its aftermath demonstrate that the damage goes well beyond the physical destruction of given sites. It begins with the propaganda campaigns that draw lines between those who are "with us or against us" with no room for the in-between grey areas, continues with a division of the country's heritage along those lines, and is reinforced by reconstruction and memorial policies that reflect one version of the country's past.[26] Wars also have the effect of essential-

23 Swenson 2013.

24 Reeves 2014.

25 Meskell 2015; Silverman 2011; see also Baaz & Lilja, this volume.

26 Viejo-Rose 2011.

Borders as heritage	When a border itself becomes an object of heritage (e.g. Berlin Wall) this includes the edges of Empire (e.g. Roman Limes) as well as the paraphernalia and material culture of borders such as check-points and passports.*
Borders of heritage	The edges of heritage, the buffers, boundaries, and auras that are drawn around heritage sites in attempts to protect sites. These borders are increasingly being questioned and seen at most as highly diffuse.
Heritage of borders	The heritage that emanates from the fact of borders and the act of bordering, the inherited borders, or borders that form a part of our habitus.
Heritage at borders	Heritage sites can occur at contested borders as is the case of the Preah Vihear temple complex at the border between Thailand and Cambodia.
Heritage divided by a border	Borders that fragment what is otherwise a shared heritage, e.g. kimchi being inscribed on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity separately by North Korea and South Korea.
Border crossing as heritage	Routes of trade, transportation, movement of people, objects, and ideas. E.g. the Rhaetian Railway World Heritage site in Switzerland, the Silk Road, the Trans-Siberian railway line, and the Andean Route.

Table 1. Borders of/and/as heritage. * Reeves 2014; ** Bourdieu 1977.

izing differences. In the case of Cyprus, the boundaries that were created by warring parties turned heritage – religious buildings, archaeological sites, historic sites, as well as family homes and land – into an instrument of border construction beyond the Green Line, and marginalizing any group that did not fall neatly on either side of the binary divide.[27] The boundaries that are created by warring parties essentialize cultural differences, eliminating the messiness of reality and the in-between – an in-between space that is essential for heritage as it is here that encounters and re-evaluations make heritage resilient and ensure that it remains pertinent rather than ossifies. Memorial processes can reinforce rather than dilute these boundaries, and commemorative landscapes are often deeply divided by different communities of memory with their particular interpretation of events appropriating different sites of memory.[28]

Borders between people can be physical and territorial, political, legal, social, and cultural. They are not only determined by nation states or their breakdown, but occur wherever collective identities do. Heritage is used as a territorial marker, a dis-

27 E.g. The Jewish and Maronite communities of Cyprus. See Demetriou *et al*. 2012; Demetriou 2017; Navaro-Yashin 2012.

28 Sørensen *et al*. forthcoming 2019.

cursive common ground, and an emotional trigger with the effect to delineate collective belonging and shape its representation. In a context in which identity politics is an increasingly important factor in the world today, the capacity for border making between people appears to be infinite. Heritage borders are often used to designate minorities, to exclude, alienate, and disown groups from hegemonic imaginaries of belonging – "this is *our* heritage, *the* heritage of the dominant *us"*, and anything else falls in the margins. At times this delineation has also been used, notably in the 1980s and 1990s, by minorities to strengthen their claims, leveraging their difference to gain political traction in resisting oppressive hegemonic majorities. For every heritage border drawn to strengthen a group's identity, others are marginalized, and yet the lines are also constantly shifting, as Trinh Minh-ha writes:

> The boundaries of identity are continually repositioned in relation to varying points of reference. The meanings of here and there, home and abroad, third and first, margin and centre keep on being displaced according to how one positions oneself.[29]

Other ways in which heritage borders are used to create bounded collectives and their representation include that between centre and periphery, and between the global and the local. As more groups vie for representation through the recognition of their heritage, as more sites are designated and protective boundaries set up around them, the resulting fragmentation creates ever more margins and peripheries. Heritage can be used to rally people together around a shared narrative but it is inherently contentious as assertions of ownership exclude and foster competing claims. In creating World Heritage status the first of these dimensions was highlighted and the second ignored; too often this has resulted in, or at best failed to stem, violence that is direct, structural, and normative.

The highly ideological universalizing discourse of heritage "of humanity" is often pitted against what is portrayed as the particularist attachment of local communities.[30] Integral to heritage is the potential for it to speak to, inspire, and mean things to many different people, thus acting as a common ground, yet ironically its management in the name of universal values often results in fragmentation. Speaking from his experience in South East Asia, Byrne similarly concludes that "[t]he spatial programs of the modern state seem inimical to the kind of local placemaking and place

29 Trinh 1994.
30 Meskell 2015.

attachment that we think of heritage practice as championing. And yet sadly we find that heritage practice has been complicit in those programs."[31]

Temporal borders

The critical turn in heritage studies understands heritage as a process and this has emphasized its presentist nature: that it is primarily a resource used to satisfy the needs of the present (even if that present is understood to be evolving).[32] Heritage is now seen as a process of construction that uses the past as a resource to be exploited in pursuit of present needs and aspirations. The heritage borders discussed above are about demarcating space and belonging, but time is also an essential ingredient and it too tends to be broken down into bounded moments and events. This is especially salient in debates about authenticity, where it is the moment in time when a particular site is seen to have been in its authentic state that is contested.

Officially designating a site as heritage moves it into a heterotopia[33] grouping it with other heritage sites while widening the gap with its local context. As Byrne writes in *Counterheritage*, "[h]eritage practice exemplifies the 'buffered' relationship with old things, a relationship that puts them in their place, a place that is external to and subservient to us."[34] In the heritage heterotopia all sites, despite their differences and accumulated meanings, end up being valued according to a common set of values – the heterotopia becoming instead a homotopia of sorts.[35] Foucault discusses heterotopias as "linked to slices in time [...] heterochronies" and uses the example of museums as places where "time never stops building up".[36] While heritage sites can be understood as heterochronies in their accumulation of pasts, there is nonetheless the tendency to talk in terms of "then" and "now"; this is particularly so when heritage management practices are informed by nostalgic longings for a very particular moment of "the past". But the temporal binary is also there in portrayals of restorations depicting before and after images, and in post-war situations when the sense of marked divides between past, present, and future are particularly salient.

Temporal borders bind heritage to moments, isolating them from prior or sub-

31 Byrne 2014, p. 57.

32 This is a pervasive notion in heritage studies today. For an early argument to this effect see Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1995.

33 Foucault 1984/1986. Heritage would comply with his second and fourth principles of heterotopias for which he uses examples if cemeteries and museums respectively.

34 Byrne 2014, p. 39.

35 Anna Källén when commenting on a draft of this piece helpfully signalled this last point.

36 Foucault 1984/1986, p. 7.

sequent developments. This is a useful manoeuvre if they are to be used for political purposes to rally a particular meaning; a typical strategy of the uses of heritage to construct singularity as indicated at the start of this piece. Examples of this abound at sites that, through their layered nature, result in occasionally violent confrontations over which slice of time is the most authentic and valued: al-Ḥaram ash-Sharīf with the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh also claimed by some to be Ram Janmabhoomi,[37] the mosque of Cordoba transformed into a cathedral, and the once Greek Orthodox Christian patriarchal basilica and later imperial mosque of Hagia Sofia in Istanbul, are a few. These examples also help to illustrate that intrinsic connectedness in heritage of temporal and spatial relationships; to use Mikhail Bakhtin's term, which he developed to analyse literary constructions, a *chronotope*.[38] Bahktin writes: "In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history."[39] Using the concept of chronotope can help to dilute somewhat the spatio-temporal borders of heritage and turn them instead into ecotone-like spaces for it suggests how different temporalities and stories can be written into a collective place.

Heritage research is increasingly diachronic, analysing how changes to specific sites or heritagescapes occur over time, and this is undoing some of the temporal borders. The biographical lens has been posited as a mechanism for teasing out the stories and accumulated meanings as well as what has been forgotten or gone untold throughout the existence of a site from the moment of its inception.[40] While useful, the biographical lens also has limitations as it suggests a kind of boundedness to a linear narrative, a life history; whereas, as the use of a chronotope suggests, a site can have many different "lives" simultaneously. What the biographical approach and the chronotopic one have in common is that they emphasize the importance of stories for heritage.

Conceptual borders and binaries

Stuart Hall wrote in 1999 that "[w]e should think of heritage as a discursive practice", that it is one of the ways in which collectives – be they a nation or a family – are built "'storying' the various random incidents and contingent turning points of their

37 See Ratnagar 2004.
38 Bakhtin 1981.
39 Bakhtin 1981, p. 84.
40 Sørensen & Viejo-Rose 2015.

lives into a single, coherent, narrative".[41] Language has a powerful bordering effect in at least two ways. First, the very act of heritagization creates all sorts of borders introducing protection measures, "expert" interventions, and designating "ownership" through identifying who the stakeholders and "local community" is. Second, the heritage ontology is riddled with conceptual binaries – e.g. material/immaterial, natural/cultural, local/universal, movable/immovable, extraordinary/mundane, local/universal, symbolic/real – the list goes on. And while these have been amply debated and there is a consensus within academia that heritage is necessarily a combination of these, they nonetheless continue to effect policy and practice.

The dichotomies so often used to discuss, analyse, and above all categorize heritage suggest a border between two poles and so in practice there is this sense that a compromise must be reached between one and the other. The reality is of course that all sites are a messy mix of all of these categories. Boundaries have chronotopic and corporeal qualities as well as semiotic ones and they can act as barriers or bridges, as containers or conduits, and they are not impermeable but porous. An ecosystems approach might provide some of the conceptual tools to explore that messy in-betweenness when boundaries are rendered porous by endless entanglements.

An ecosystems approach to heritage borders

Some conceptual tools of ecosystems modelling are borrowed here, to explore the in-between spaces and effects of borders, with the aim of unpacking heritage borders. What I see as the main advantage of that is precisely the dynamism of those models that suggest some sort of cycle, structure, and pattern within the flexibility. An ecosystems approach brings a sense of interdependence to the conversation: when one point in the system changes, it has ripple effects on the others, and both the strength and distance of relationships are affected. Another productive dimension is that it suggests the possibility of developing models or mapping tools that will enable us to look for patterns of relation and response, cause and effect. This in turn could allow for comparability and, possibly, predictability in terms of understanding the dynamics of heritage.

Is this borrowing from ecosystems theory *just* metaphorical? We speak in metaphors, think in metaphors, and encounter the world metaphorically. Certainly there could be a cross-over form of ecosystems approach that, more than a critical exercise, might allow us to develop practical heritage ecosystems mapping tools that could be used to model how heritage functions. By identifying not only the entanglements

41 Hall 1999, p. 5.

but the dynamics of these – how and why they work, how and why they change, and how they are related – it would be possible to test for patterns or elements of predictability.

The reconstruction of the Mostar Bridge is a prime example of what happens when the whole heritage "ecosystem" is not taken into account. In Mostar, the focus on a flagship reconstruction project on the part of the international community, while keenly aware of the *chaîne-opératoire* of heritage sites and the dedication to restoring their material authenticity, nonetheless failed to take into account its entanglements[42] in the symbolic and affective post-war landscape. Thus when rebuilding the bridge at Mostar in the 1990s and early 2000s and in so doing prioritizing, for instance, sourcing stone from the original quarries used by the Ottomans, the violence that its symbolic and semiotic fabric had been subjected to were not sufficiently considered, overlooking what Thomas refers to as "the mutability of things in recontextualisation".[43] As a result the reconstruction of the bridge did not ignite, as was hoped, a domino effect and process of repairing the communal rifts and grievances caused by the war. The lesson to be drawn from here in light of heritage is that if the "heritage ecology" of a site is not rebuilt, then its linking ability, to act as a social glue of sorts, can be lost.

To explore how ecosystems modalities might help to address and move beyond heritage borders, three concepts in particular are being borrowed here: ecotones, edge effects, and corridors.

Ecotones, edge effects, and corridors

The Ecological Society of America defines an ecotone as: "[...] a border zone, where ecological systems meet and mingle, sometimes forming a new and different community of species [...]" The term refers to the transition from one ecosystem to another, as well the stress inherent in a population at the limit of its tolerance for specific environmental conditions.[44]

A beach is a prime example of an ecotone; a unique region between two divergent ecological zones, of water and land that shares some characteristics of both yet has its own distinct nature. Central to the ecotone is the idea that certain species or phenomena only occur at the boundary area between two distinct zones, for instance some species of birds only live on seashores – not in the water, not on land,

42 Thomas 1991; Hodder 2016.

43 Thomas 1991, p. 28.

44 Ecological Society of America 2017.

but strictly in the zone between the two biomes.[45] The buffer zones used in heritage management, intended as they are to create further areas of protection and distancing from encroaching development, ultimately become a type of ecotone. This sense of the inhabited in-between has its equivalents in the spaces and communities at the margins of nation states and of hegemonic narratives of collective belonging.[46] Examples of such communities abound around the world at the margins of empires and expansive hegemonies; they result in creolization and can be found in those groups that deliberately defy nation-state boundaries – the Sea Gypsies and pastoral nomads of the world as well as all regular boundary crossers.[47]

There is a certain productivity that occurs at the margins, as anthropologist Anna Tsing writes: "[...] borders are a particular kind of margin; they have an imagined other side. The image of the border turns attention to the creative projects of self-definition of those at the margins".[48] The imagined other side can be reflective of one's own fears and insecurities, or be sites of fantastical creations of "here be monsters" at the other edge of the known, mapped, territory. But the *finis terrae or land's-end is a productive space, not only one of endings but also of beginnings.* James C. Scott refers to the "shatter zone" as the peripheries of a state, to where people who are deliberately and reactively stateless gravitate in order to avoid its reach. "The diagnostic characteristics of shatter zones", Scott writes, "are their relative geographical inaccessibility and the enormous diversity of tongues and cultures".[49] Scott's shatter zones are also sites of hybridity and encounter for heritage, heritage ecotones of sorts as different expressions find themselves in close quarters. Perhaps the shatter zones of heritage however, are there where the authorized discourse does not reach and where heritage binaries have little consequence – such as refugee camps.

Within nature conservation the increased reduction in size and fragmentation of ecosystems has long been an area of concern. When activities such as road construction, farming, pulping, drilling, or damming divide large ecosystems such as tropical rain forests, these become fragmented. Each fragment consists of an inner core that maintains the original ecosystem of species and interconnections, a buffer zone, and an edge. As the ecosystem is further divided each of the resulting fragments has an ever-smaller inner core area of the biome, and the ratio between core and periphery gradually increases so that there is ever more edge but less core. This edge in turn,

45 Benjamin A. Morris, pers. comm. 24 July 2017.
46 Sturgeon 2005.
47 Sturgeon 2005.
48 Tsing 1993, p. 21.
49 Scott 2009, p. 8.

Fig. 1. Nicosia's Green Line and its Buffer Zone in November 2010: the start of the United Nations Buffer Zone, replete with rusting razor wire. Photograph by the author during fieldwork for the CRIC Project (Cultural Heritage and the Re-construction of Identities After Conflict).

by increasing exposure to light and other species, or by cutting off the movement of species from the core, creates a buffer of sorts around the core. Protecting an ecosystem by breaking it down into bits that are fenced off transforms it and dramatically reduces its reach.[50] This edge effect is thus an important aspect in considering the impact of fragmentation. We might moreover consider that for each new fragmentation, new marginalities are created. Learning from this experience the application for heritage management would be to encourage valuing the relatedness of sites with their contexts and with other sites. In heritage terms the edge effects created by fences and barriers animate ontologies of difference, on the "other side", and enforce a sense of exclusion. When the edge is itself a space, a no-go area or no-man's-land buffer however, certain things can begin to happen here, as in an ecotone. (See *Figs. 1–3* for illustrative examples from Cyprus.)

Protected Areas have been a principal strategy of transnational nature conserva-

50 A possible interpretation of this is that if translated directly to culture the result is an alarming one that encourages that walls be built to keep some pure inner core safe from being invaded by other species.

Fig. 2. A map displayed on a wall situated at the end of the Buffer Zone after crossing into Northern Cyprus. The North is detailed and the South left empty as though the edge effect was to wipe the other side of the border into a blank slate – presumably to better project imaginings of the "other". Photograph by the author during fieldwork for the CRIC Project (Cultural Heritage and the Re-construction of Identities After Conflict).

tion; of these, the equivalent of the bell-jar approach to protection is known as "fortress conservation" which Mark Dowie describes as "[...] areas designated for conservation protection are bordered and guarded to keep wildlife in and unwanted humans out".[51] This fetishization of the wilderness resembles the process of heritagization that similarly essentializes and attempts to "cleanse" that which is being protected. Buffer zones are a common tool for managing ecosystems that attempt to soften the hard border of the fortress approach. And they are increasingly being developed around heritage sites as well.[52] A concern however, is that rather than becoming genuine areas of interaction between different "ecosystems", these are just acting as wider barriers that limit rather than expand the zone of contact. Concern with the direction in which buffer zones are headed (based on the operational guidelines of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention) is that they are seen as forms of glass cases, protective

51 Dowie 2009, p. xvi.

52 See for instance the European Union & Council of Europe 2012. *Guidelines on cultural heritage. Technical tools for heritage conservation and management*.

Fig. 3. In the actual no-man's-land of the Buffer Zone a project was set up to transform the Buffer into a "zone" or "home" of cooperation and thus to "revitalise the 'Dead Zone'". This image illustrates that some initiatives can only happen in the in-between zones. Photograph by the author during fieldwork for the CRIC Project (Cultural Heritage and the Re-construction of Identities After Conflict.)

barriers keeping out anything that might harm or somehow pollute the "core" to be protected – when the perceived threat is urban development or indeed people.

A measure created to mitigate the fragmentation, resulting from "fortress conservation" measures for wildlife protection, is corridors re-linking segments. These corridors aim to prevent core areas from shrinking dramatically and to link them up to allow for the movement of species along longer expanses – crucial for animals that are wide-ranging but only within core biomes. Attempts to reintegrate sites otherwise fragmented by protective borders in the field of cultural heritage bear a resemblance to these nature corridors. In international cultural heritage management practices, the corridors of ecology have their equivalent in corridors such as the one developed in the Austrian city of Graz as part of the nomination to extend the World Heritage site from the historic centre to Schloss Eggenberg: each site had its own buffer zone as well as a corridor linking the two.[53] Applying the idea of these corridors to the semiotics of heritage would im-

53 World Heritage Committee 2010; UNESCO 2008.

Fig. 4. Prayer ribbons and flags on the "Freedom Bridge" at Imjingak DMZ in Paju, South Korea. This bridge was the site of a prisoner exchange following the Armistice Agreement of 1953: as the estimated 13,000 prisoners crossed over they are said to have shouted "Hurrah Freedom". Once they crossed, the bridge was cut off. On the other side of Freedom Bridge is another bridge, that of the new train line running up to North Korea built during the Sunshine Policy years (roughly 1998–2008), with the final destination Pyongyang. Beneath Freedom Bridge there is a, currently somewhat unused but still maintained, outdoor adventure park replete with bathing pools. This site thus illustrates a palimpsest of narratives that so often come together in and around border areas that harken to and memorialize the past while at the same time representing aspirations and hopes for the future. Photograph by author, December 2011.

ply re-linking the referential connectedness of heritage that the castle is connected with the historic centre as much as it is with the surrounding landscape, meanings and values, the rituals and ceremonies, the related myths and stories, and above all the people who live with it.

One of the most interesting binaries in the heritage ontology is that between heritage as *roots* versus heritage as *routes*. The roots perspective takes heritage to be an anchor both spatially as a territorial marker and symbolically as a fixed set of meanings that can always be returned to. In contrast, understanding heritage as routes essentially sees it as movements of people and things through time and space that are held together by stories, series of events, and exchanges. From the late 1980s there be-

gan a series of initiatives dedicated to emphasizing heritage routes as a mechanism for crossing national borders and strengthening transnational and regional heritage narratives.[54] UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and the European Union all launched projects of this kind, and despite a lag in the early 2000s, these have come back in prolific fashion with the Council of Europe alone boasting 31 cultural routes and a new cultural routes programme "Routes4U". These are but another type of heritage corridor. Unfortunately, the heritagization of routes often comes with the construction of the usual heritage borders outlined above.

An evocative illustration of what a heritage edge effect might look like is the DMZ dividing the Korean peninsula. Not only is it a border representing a violent divide of people, it is a space abounding with memorial and symbolic markers, and a safe-haven for numerous plant and animal species. One striking aspect of this border is that it is used as a platform to communicate and send messages across the divide. At Pamunjeon there are numerous sites including a bell and a shrine used to send prayers and respects to ancestors on the other side, and many border fences at strategic points, e.g. bridges, are filled with prayer ribbons (see *Fig. 4*). The materiality of culture along the DMZ represents the whole gamut of relations between the two Koreas, ranging from hopeful optimism in the form of new railway connections, to materializations of aggression in the form of lookout towers and razor wire. What is clear is that this barrier as wide and high as it may be (a buffer zone four kilometres wide and 250 kilometres long) has done nothing to hinder the intensity of mutual observation. Both sides have their gazes attentively focused on the other and regularly project music, speeches, and flag waving at each other. The DMZ also speaks directly to the ecosystems approach in that it has been proposed by South Korea as a Biosphere Reserve,[55] because of the unique species and migrating birds that have found a safe haven here due to the relative absence of people and development. This "hard" barrier is thus also a productive space: things happen here that cannot happen elsewhere.

Dismantling singularity in heritage

Since the end of the Cold War, many once-messy liquid borders and "specially controlled zones" have been tidied up and bureaucratized, with paved roads, fences, checkpoints, and duty-free shops going up around the world.[56] Yet heritage borders

54 The Council of Europe launched its first Cultural Route in 1987, and UNESCO held a meeting of experts on "Routes as part of our cultural heritage" in 1994.

55 Republic of Korea 2011.

56 Myrivili 2004; Green 2012, pp. 573–574.

remain stubbornly porous and ever shifting. This piece set out to identify the most pervasive heritage borders and to explore what applying an ecosystems approach to them might do in terms of suggesting ways of modelling the relationality of heritage. This approach is not only about accounting for assemblages and entanglements but also the productivity of the edges, of marginality, and of the in-between.

Above a deconstruction of the different forms of borders, boundaries, and binaries in heritage was proposed, with the main critique being that they result in fragments and alienation. An ecosystems approach is suggested as a way of countering the fragmentation and reintegrating the resulting "bits". An advantage of applying the tools of ecosystems mapping to heritage and its borders is that it offers the opportunity to critically examine the binary thinking that so permeates the field. The paper began with a rejection of singularity in heritage: the ways in which protection is carried out, and claims of ownership to heritage are made by anchoring *a* given heritage site uniquely on to *a* particular narrative, and *a* particular place. For this singular narrative, often about values and belonging, is the one that animates impermeable borders that essentialize difference. In the context of a socio-political climate where crisis seems to be prevalent and Ulrich Beck's resulting "risk society"[57] seems more pertinent than ever, this singularity is further encouraged: risk and responses to risk accentuate a one-sided appreciation by focusing on one aspect of vulnerability, usually physical. To counter this tendency I would suggest a two-pronged approach, one that applies a heritage ecosystem form of mapping and valuing heritage, and another that focuses on a detailed exploration of heritage ecotones where there is a "premium on the adaptability of identities" where people have "[...] multiple histories they can deploy singly or in combination depending on circumstances".[58]

A heritage ecosystem approach would apply a form of *chaîne opératoire* analysis that would reintegrate its various dimensions, breaking with the current binary structures, and emphasize the relatedness of sites. This approach has been used for developing management plans for Biospheres of Man where the delicate balance of species is carefully assessed; designing a similar approach to heritage could also be instrumental for integrating heritage sites with aspirations for sustainable development. The heritage ecosystem idea adapts the ecomuseum one, introduced in 1971 by Georges Henri Rivière and Hugues de Varine[59] as a holistic approach to cultural heritage interpretation, taking it into a broader domain. Some protective boundaries for heritage are

57 Beck 1992.

58 Scott 2009, p. 329.

59 See Georges Henri Rivière's many publications and public lectures on the topic – e.g. Rivière 1992 [1973].

inescapable; shifting the focus from bordering strategies to heritage ecotones as the zones of encounter generated by those boundaries however, could be a step towards both developing more creative and inclusive protective measures and beginning to value those dimensions of heritage that are about hybridity and change. For that to happen a degree of porosity in those borders is important. As social groups continually aim to define and redefine the relations between social and physical space, ideas about heritage borders are particularly important. A heritage ecosystems approach would expand the scope of attention to include boundary producing practices and the narratives of inclusion and exclusion that they uphold and communicate.

In Robert Frost's poem 'Mending Wall',[60] the speaker questions his neighbour's inherited wisdom that proclaims a fondness for walls and, not without a hint of mischief, challenges it. The ambiguity that runs through the poem is one that runs throughout heritage borders as well, whether in the form of malleability and porosity, buffers and boundaries, edges and ecotones or indeed ecosystems. This paper has argued that rather than accept them as habitus we can focus instead on the interconnectivity of heritage and on an approach that emphasizes the productivity of the spaces effected by borders.

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60 Frost 1915.

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Ida Hughes Tidlund

Märket

The makings and meanings of a border in the Baltic Sea

The border of Märket rock

Märket, a tiny skerry in the middle of the Baltic Sea, consists of only bare rock and a few lighthouse buildings. Isolated, at a far distance from the Swedish coast to the west and at an equal distance from the nearest Finnish island to the east, the horizon is all around. Approaching Märket by boat, its buildings first appear as a ship on the horizon – an oddly solid ship painted in red and white stripes, somehow resembling a colossal, square lollipop (*Fig. 1*). When coming closer one can see bare rock beneath the few buildings, flat and just above the sea surface. Scattered over the rocks are a dozen painted white circles, surrounded by the letters "F" and "S", demonstrating that the little island is divided between the nation states of Finland and Sweden. This state border of Finland also coincides with the border of the autonomous and demilitarized province of Åland, within Finnish sovereignty, making Märket the only shared land between the state and the minority.[1] Further enhancing its peculiarity, the border here twists across the island in several sharp turns (*Fig. 2*) while the rest of

1 The name Märket means "the mark". Åland is an autonomous, demilitarized and neutralized archipelago province which has been under Finland's sovereignty since 1921, when the League of Nations decided on the so-called Åland Solution to preserve peace in the Baltic Sea region, after a serious dispute over the Åland islands between Finland and Sweden that jeopardized the peace after the First World War. The special status of the province entails a far-reaching autonomy including the right to pass laws in areas relating to internal affairs of the region, to exercise its own budgetary power, and having certain exceptions in those areas falling under Finnish sovereignty. The islands are also unilingual Swedish by law, in comparison to bilingual Finland (Finnish 87 % and Swedish 5 % by 2017). In combination with the autonomy, there is also a Guarantee Law protecting the minority rights of the region since 1922, coinciding with the borders of autonomy, while the borders defining the demilitarized territory differ slightly. The special status of the islands is of great symbolic importance for the population.

Fig. 1. Märket seen from the sea. Photograph by the author.

the state border runs perfectly straight mile after mile north- and southwards.[2] The eccentric border enhances the attractiveness of this otherwise inhospitable skerry and turns it into a tourist destination, bringing issues of heritage negotiation between Åland and Finland to the fore as the ownership of a border is intertwined with interpretations of whose past it is to represent.[3]

Despite its isolated location, Märket is buzzing with activity from spring to autumn. The lighthouse buildings – the beacon tower, a tool and firewood shed, a machine hall, and a little privy – were left to deteriorate from 1976 when the lighthouse was automated, until the Finnish Lighthouse Society leased the island in 2007 to restore the buildings. The aim is to preserve the buildings through volunteer work

2 The island is also positioned on the border separating two time zones, making the eastern part of the island one hour ahead of the west. The Swedish part of the island is furthermore divided by the two counties of Stockholm and Uppsala, as well as the two municipalities of Östhammar and Norrtälje.

3 The land is here referred to as "Åland" and the state as "Finland", which are the terms used also in everyday speech in Åland.

as with other lighthouses around the Finnish coast. The first volunteers arrive when the ice has let go of its grip and the groups stay one week at a time until the last group leaves when the autumn storms become too fierce. All the restoration work is done with diligent care and respect for the history of the buildings, although the interpretation of whose past they preserve is contested. This is partly due to the circumstance that a crucial part of their work is dependent on the border crossing the island. The Society is not only restoring the buildings but also amplifying the multifaceted border to attract tourists who visit for a few hours when the weather allows. The volunteers manage the annual border work, such as repainting the border marks every summer after they have been weathered off in the winter by ice and sea water.

This short border section, measuring only a hundred metres or so, has re-emerged in topicality and meaning in the last decades and can illuminate how bordering, in the meaning of the making of borders, is processual. A border is not a static phenomenon but rather to be seen as an active entity;[4] not finalized once demarcated, but rather shaped by incessant interactions, and with a meaning in flux. As a part of an ongoing dissertation project aimed at examining how borders around the maritime, autonomous, and demilitarized region of Åland interfere with the everyday life of the local population, this specific section of the border has been investigated through archival research, participant observation, and interviews.[5] The purpose of such a close examination of the border is to see it from as many sides as possible, to appreciate its polysemic and complex cultural and political character. Concomitantly, the examination

4 van Houtum 2011, p. 51.

5 The participant observation took place in Märket for seven consecutive nights and days in the summer of 2017, and interviews were made there as well as in other places. Putting the border (and human interactions with it) in focus, instead of the individuals themselves, means that the border itself provides a sampling of participants. Throughout the archival research, observations, and interviews, the border functions as a directing device. Participants are hence chosen based on their presence near to or active engagement with the border in Märket. As the border topic is sensitive on the Åland islands, involving issues about the at-times tense relationship between the minority and the state, all participants in the dissertation project are made anonymous. The material used for the article coincides with the dissertation's, and the same precautionary measures are applied here. There is therefore an intentional vagueness in referring to interviewees and field notes from participant observation, as too much detail such as specific dates, age, and mother tongue, or a possibility to connect different quotes with one another under pseudonyms, could reveal participants' identities. Some characteristics serving as identifiable traits, such as gender, have been blurred. A code key is kept at the Department of Ethnology (ERG), Stockholm University. Also, all translations from documents, interviews, and field notes are made by the author. The mentioned guest books and the manuscript for the celebrative speech are kept in the attic/museum room of the lighthouse.

is intended to cast light upon the ways that borders enter the lives of individuals by having effects on their everyday lives, as an ambiguous phenomenon, as an obstacle requiring active handling, or as an amusing spectacle.

Border biography

The border that divides Märket rock into two halves stems from a border agreement signed in 1810 when the borders in the Baltic Sea were redrawn due to the incorporation of Finland in the Russian Empire. The topographical description of the demarcation says that the border between Sweden and former Russia went "through the middle of the Sea of Åland, where it divides the reef of Märket straight through".[6]

The lighthouse was built on the skerry in 1885 to address shipwreck problems. The strait nearby is known for its treacherous waters while at the same time being the main passageway for ships travelling the Baltic Sea. Finland, at the time a grand duchy in the Russian empire, built the lighthouse on a Russian initiative during a short and intensive construction period, and the light shone for the first time in November 1885. Building the lighthouse was a testing task as the island is so small and barely rises above the surface of the sea.[7] The beacon tower was simply built on the only possible spot, that is, the highest and flattest. This happened to be on the Swedish side of the island, and this is the reason behind the later peculiar, oddly shaped border.

In the beginning of the 1980s, almost a century after the lighthouse had been built, it was time for Finland's and Sweden's regular border inspection (which means that the state border between the two countries is inspected and if necessary adjusted every 25 years). The previous border inspections had taken place without any major adjustments but with the regular service that a border requires; restoring border points, measuring depths, putting up new border signs on bridges that have been built across rivers that define the states' outlines.[8] Although borders are built for eternity and not for short term,[9] they need active management to stay put, a condition illuminated by the floating character of maritime borders. And now Finland raised concern about the border on *Märket*; it was declared inappropriate to have a Finnish lighthouse on Swedish land. The assigned border commissions quickly realized that, since the buildings could not be moved, the nationality of the surrounding rocks had to be changed.

6 Ekman 2000, p. 13; Gustafsson 1995, p. 192.

7 Andersson 2015; Gustafsson 1995, p. 193.

8 SE/RA/420093, vol. 1: Riksarkivet, Swedish National Archives, Border inspection 1981, vols 1–11. Hereafter, the following abbreviation is used: RA/420093:vol. number.

9 Green 2012, p. 576; van Houtum 2011, p. 51.

Hence the two commissions were assigned the special task to demarcate the rocks anew. Two secretaries belonging to the Finnish and the Swedish commission respectively were given an assignment to suggest solutions to the problem.[10]

There were several circumstances to consider for the two secretaries. Despite its isolated location and diminutive length, the border on Märket is of great importance for the involved states and therefore a concern for international relations in the Baltic Sea region. The Swedish border commission demanded that the Swedish part of the island should remain equal to the Finnish in size.[11] As the demarcation of a maritime territory is based on the furthermost positioned land border,[12] this stretch of border running over rock, no matter how short, determined a large part of the Swedish national waters.

Also, as Märket island is located within Åland territory, the initial supranational border demarcation was given a special importance. Due to Åland's demilitarized and neutralized status as defined in multilateral treaties, adjusting the border in Märket became an issue that extended outside the powers of the nations of Finland and Sweden. No alterations can be made to the status or the borders without all states being consulted.[13] Keeping the border to the middle point of the island was considered to be in agreement with the Åland Convention, and so this became an essential criterion in the border adjustment. If the agreement was not breached, other involved states would simply have to be informed and not conferred.

The first task was therefore to demarcate the former border in order to transform it. The documents from 1809 did not closely specify were the border ran, apart from that it went through the middle point of the island. The two secretaries thus proceeded from what was known; that the island was divided in two halves through its middle point.[14] The commissions decided that the middle point was to be regarded as equal to the highest point of the island, as the land elevation since 1810 had not changed its outlines. The accurate position of the middle, that is, highest, point then had to be determined. This was accomplished partly by handiwork. The secretaries made models of the island in paper – the Finnish secretary made one, and the Swedish secretary his own, and then they turned them upside down to find the skerry's most protuber-

10 RA/420093:1.

11 RA/420093:2.

12 Schofield 2011, pp. 675f.

13 Convention on the demilitarization of the Åland Islands (1856), Convention relating to the non-fortification and neutralization of the Åland Islands (1921). Signatory states: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Denmark, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, and Sweden. Russia signed equivalent treaties in 1940 and 1947.

14 RA/420093:1.

Fig. 2. Detail of a plaque on the beacon tower wall, showing the border. The plaque was put up by the Finnish Lighthouse society in 2010. Photograph by the author.

ant and presumably middle point. The co-ordinates of this middle point could thus be reported to the commissions.[15]

After having dismissed a few proposed solutions, the commission decided that Märket would be divided in equal halves through a complex border, ensuring that both nations received an equal share of the island.[16] The land around the lighthouse became Finnish while Sweden was given a portion of the previously Finnish half, resulting in the zigzag line akin to two butterfly wings extending from the middle point (*Fig. 2*).

When an agreement had been met, the secretaries were given the final task of marking the border. They travelled together to Märket to drill and chisel marks in the rocks at specific points. On site, though, they realized that the planned demarcation was not entirely feasible due to the nature of the rocks. They reported back to the commissions that "it appeared as necessary to make a few adjustments as some of the points in the proposed border line were placed in crevices or on other, from a

15 RA/420093:1.
16 RA/420093:2.

border marking perspective, unsuitable places".[17] The secretaries decided, however, that these adjustments were to be considered as insignificant and the border marking could be finalized without formal conduct.[18] The border was after this considered to be completed in 1985.[19]

Dual place, contested past

When the border was adjusted, the lighthouse had been unmanned for a few years and the island rarely visited, and the demarcation was mainly an administrative matter meant to be viewed on maps. But since then, Märket has become a heritage site and a tourist attraction where the border plays a crucial role, and it has continued to develop outside the control of the border-making institutions. As literary scientist Saija Kaskinen writes, a border runs through people as much as through a landscape, and seen as an ontological phenomenon, the border is shaped by lived experience as much as by political contracts. By examining the names that people give borders one can reveal their meanings.[20] Indeed, the short section of the border on Märket has been given different names; it has been associated with tango dance moves drawn on a floor,[21] and also been nicknamed "a bow border of white balls".[22] The nicknames indicate the conscientious efforts of making a border adjustment in a friendly spirit. In the demarcation of Märket, Finland and Sweden together danced a tango across the skerry or tied a ribbon in a decorative bow shape. As is commonly stated, it takes two to tango. In this case, the third possible dance partner, which was Åland, had been left out of the picture. The Åland Convention was not trespassed, but Åland had no say in the matter that altered the border of its territory, and the site has since been a matter of contestation.

As mentioned above, Märket is the only shared border and shared land between the minority and the state. Unlike other parts of Åland, Märket hence falls under dual ownership, making it a contested site. The double-sidedness of the border opens a gate through which the state can cross the otherwise shielded Åland territory. Border control falls under state sovereignty and the constantly scanning border control

17 RA/420093:2.
18 RA/420093:2.
19 Gustafsson 1995, p. 193.
20 Kaskinen 2014, p. 1187.
21 Andersson 2015, p. 263; Gustafsson 1995, p. 193.
22 *Nya Åland* (newspaper), 13 July 2007.

cameras on top of the wood shed clearly defines the island as a place of national concern.

At the edges, territories can chafe on one another, especially if there are unsettled issues regarding the control, ownership, or meaning of a borderline. The shared-ness of the border between Finland and Åland, rather than the dividedness of the border between the well-defined states, makes the site a sensitive issue. Half the island is a grey-zoned borderland in itself, and ambiguity increases the risk of chafing. Borders are definitions and as such are not aided by being blurry;[23] they define what is our land and what is yours, and such a definition also includes an aspect of time. Borders are heritage, in the meaning of an interpretation of place passed on from previous generations, intended to stretch into the future. As philosopher Paul Ricœur puts it, geographical space and historical time are intertwined.[24] Geometry stabilizes landscapes while at the same time adding to the quasi-immobility of the long time span,[25] meaning that categorization of land and understandings of the past become conjoined through borders. When borders define land as "ours", it also outlines a certain past as "our history". And when a border ownership is ambiguous, so becomes the interpretation of the past. So whose past is then retold by the dually claimed border in Märket?

Some 30 years after the secretaries drilled holes into the rocks, the holes were reinforced with white painted circles, and the letters "F" and "S" were added. This was done by the Finnish Lighthouse Society at the beginning of their project to restore the lighthouse. The idea to paint the border was in an interview explained by one of the initiators as a desire to show that "a proper border ran there". When asked whether they contacted any border authorities before engaging with the work, the initiator said that they "asked no one, no no, when we are there we ask no one about anything". They bought asphalt paint and set out to find the correctly shaped drilled marks made by the secretaries, but as the island is an old construction site, there are plenty of holes: "we found twelve, but really there should be eleven", a fact they "have tried to forget".[26] While the aim was to highlight a proper border, they felt they had free hands at figuring out where it ran, how it should be marked, and whose it was. Borders being ambiguous phenomena means that there is not one sole understanding of what they are. When encountering a border, what one sees depends on who

23 Cf. Newman 2006a, p. 181.
24 Ricœur 2004, p. 146.
25 Ricœur 2004, p. 152.
26 Interview, 2017.

Fig. 3. Border point number 6. Photograph by the author.

one is; one sees what one has learnt to see.[27] Possibly, the initiators from Finland did not even consider the fact that the border is also an Åland border, or perhaps the unfixed character of the relation between state and minority was not seen as a feature enhancing the properness they wished to emphasize. But when marking the border, their interpretation became visible for others. This painting of the border fortified its state-ness, while at the same time omitting the Ålandic part by making it invisible. One of my volunteer tasks during the time I did participant observation on Märket was the annual restoration of the white circles representing the border. It dawned on me while I crawled around the rocks with a paintbrush that the border marks were painted from a Finnish perspective. Whenever I knelt down to scrape the old paint off and position the templates on the worn circles from the previous year, I had the "F" just in front of me and the "S" on the opposite side. Standing in Sweden, one had to read the letters upside down (see *Fig. 3*). The border was thus painted from

27 Green 2012, p. 581; see also Newman 2006b, p. 143; Rumford 2011, p. 68.

the perspective of someone standing in Finland, looking across the border into Sweden. Walking around the island this is not immediately apparent, but down on my knees in close contact with the border I had plenty of time for reflection.

The border reinforcement was hence a result of the interpretation of a few active individuals taking an initiative, an action in which accuracy might have been secondary. But this interpretation of the border also came to dominate the understanding of whose place Märket is, and whose past it represents. When the Lighthouse Society members interpret the border as the state's, they also emphasize the site as a heritage for a national maritime past. In the celebratory speech for Märket lighthouse's 130-year anniversary, the Society chairman announced the restoration as aiming to "save Märket as a living example of the harsh history of seafaring".[28] The management of the lighthouse fell under Finnish maritime administration, while the keepers were local Ålanders.[29] Visiting Ålanders seem to view it as a place of personal history. One day during my week on Märket a man came to visit, who used to spend his summers on Märket as a boy with his lighthouse-keeping father. As he walked around, he recollected the place as his own. "This is where we slept", he said in the room where my bunk bed stood. "This is where we made porridge", he said in the next room.[30] The island was for this man not a place representing the history of lighthouses or seafaring in general, but his own childhood and family history. There are also guest books notes of the same nature: "Hi grandpa, I have checked out your old workplace!" says a note from July 2013, and another one from July 1986 records: "The nicest day of the summer, warm and sunny, and we came here to see grandfather's lighthouse".

Such Ålandic relatives do not join the hard-working volunteers in the same numbers as the ones who have travelled further. A vast majority of volunteers have come from mainland Finland despite the island's relative proximity to Åland.[31] A Society manager ponders over the fact that lighthouse descendants do not volunteer: "One reason is probably that this is a symbol of the power of Finland there. It could be that every [Åland] person has a political person inside",[32] implying that political reasons lay behind an unwillingness to volunteer. The state-ness of the border becomes, he posits, a symbol of state power, making it into an undesirable place to engage with for Ålanders:

28 Speech manuscript, September 2010, kept in the lighthouse.
29 Andersson 2015, p. 296.
30 Field notes, Märket, summer 2017.
31 *Nya Åland*, 14 September 2010.
32 Interview, 2017.

> "Märket is also their [Ålanders'] history, but you can also think that it has always been… a state symbol… that they do not love. First it was the Russians, then it became Finland's lighthouse. It is… Finland's lighthouse on their land. It is no dream, our relation."[33]

When the lighthouse was manned, it was an Ålandic site, run by Ålandic men, although employed and instructed by the Finnish ministry. When the Finnish Lighthouse Society leased the island, the border was emphasized as a state border and the site became Finnish, telling a national maritime past. When asked, a Society member describes the history here told as being about lighthouses in general, and the Society in particular. Märket is the flagship of the Society, and so represents also the Society's past. When asked to whom Märket belongs, she replies that it belongs to both Åland and Finland, but that "the Society has leased it. To keep. For ten years".[34] After that period, there is a risk that "it goes back, to Åland", as if the island's territorial belonging is on lease, too.[35] The dual belonging of the island makes it switch back and forth, which becomes clear on the arrival day of the volunteer group that I have joined. As I carry jerry cans of drinking water across the rocks, a volunteer calls out a question, standing on a rock with the phone in hand, directed towards the Åland flag on the flag post just outside the buildings.

> "Have you taken enough photos of the flag yet?"
> "No?" I stop and answer, with a questioning tone.
> "As we mustn't keep it."
> "Why?"
> The volunteer continues in a slower manner, as if explaining something apparent:
> "Because we are not Ålanders."
> Silence occurs, presumably so that I can give a sign that the issue has been clarified and I have understood. When I say nothing, the volunteer talks again, this time slower still:
> "We're *Finns* [pause]. And one Swede. We mustn't have it."[36]

The previous volunteer group had put the Åland flag up as one volunteer was from Åland, but now when no one could claim to be Ålandic, the flag was taken down. A

33 Interview, 2017.
34 The lease was confirmed annually until 2009, when the long lease was agreed. It runs out in November 2019 (interview, 2017).
35 Interview, 2017.
36 Field notes, Märket, summer 2017.

Fig. 4. Found Åland flag. Photograph by the author.

few days later, I spotted a tiny Åland flag made of paper, attached to a toothpick stuck in a crevice in the rocks behind the lighthouse. Its colours were faded (*Fig. 4*). This little flag was one of few visual reminders that we were in Åland territory. One exception was the flickering between network providers on my mobile phone as I climbed across the rocks; the phone guided me, seemingly arbitrarily, on whether I was in Sweden, Finland, or Åland. And Swedish reminders were also few. "It's raining in Sweden", said one volunteer. This was a cue for us to close windows and doors as the rain would soon be upon us. However, the approaching rain was still far out over the

sea and the coast that we could not see but knew was on the other side of the waters. Sweden was here seen as "over there", far away behind the horizon behind the nearby buildings which is Swedish territory in juridical terms. The border was never used in the opposite way as a direction device, as in "look towards Finland". We seemed to be in Finland, looking towards Sweden and also towards Åland at a distance. A hand waving east answered my question about where the firewood was taken from: "They brought it from Åland", as if Åland was "somewhere over there".[37]

Border as obstacle

The entire demarcation process as performed by the Finnish and Swedish authorities in the border inspection illuminates the border as an artificial phenomenon. But artificiality does not decrease the power of borders. Borders that were initially drawn on maps acquire realness through the actions of the state, and the citizens who act in accordance with (or against) the border.[38] Following border researcher Henk van Houtum, bordering is collaborative work and we are all taking part in an ongoing production and interpretation of borders.[39] Collaborating with the border can be understood partly as complying with the laws to which the borders are related, that is, national law. This becomes acutely apparent in the direct proximity of borders when one's exact location determines one's lawfulness. One day on Märket I joined an official whose task it was to ensure that passing ships followed Finnish fuel regulations by placing his boat behind the sterns of the ships to measure exhausts. I asked the official once if we were in Finland or in Sweden. "I don't know", he replied, looking around over the sea slightly confused for a second as if the surrounding water could give him a hint. "Does it matter?", I asked. He explained that it could, as he had had a drink with his lunch and was unsure of the legal alcohol level for boat driving in Sweden.[40] Hence, when he was out chasing ships to ensure that they followed one national law, he was at the same time possibly breaking the law of another nation. Border crossing transforms the legality of an activity, which is why the proximity to the border makes the relation betweeen law and border so evident. A similar experience was told to me

37 Field notes, Märket, summer 2017.
38 Green 2012, p. 580; Grimson 2012, p. 206.
39 van Houtum 2011, p. 60.
40 Field notes, Märket, summer 2017.

in an interview with a retired lighthouse keeper who worked at the lighthouse before it was automated in 1976:

> "Then, there were no borders. // In Sweden, the seal became protected... three or four years before Finland. And during those years we hunted seals everywhere, also in *Swedish* territory. We *did*. And we didn't think about it. Until now, later // I realized, what the heck!"[41]

While the lighthouse keeper and his colleagues regularly broke the law by crossing the border, it was nothing they paid attention to. By stating that there "were no borders", he did not claim that the borders were not drawn, but that they had no juridical consequences. They were simply lines on a map that the lighthouse keepers had not seen and did not need to consider. Of course, the lighthouse keepers knew about the border. They even had a piece of tape running through the kitchen to show, however incorrectly, where the border ran.[42] But in the decades before the 1980s adjustment, the vagueness of exactly where the border ran made it open for interpretation.

Today, said the retired lighthouse keeper, the border matters more. He continued to tell a story of a time when he visited the island in the company of a photographer equipped with a drone. The camera was on the drone and the ambition was to take a photograph of the island from above with the lighthouse keeper standing below. Every time the drone was sent up, however, it flew for a while before it suddenly stopped. "It couldn't fly", explained the lighthouse keeper.

> "It was registered in Finland so it couldn't fly over to the western side. It could only fly up to the border, and then it stood, still. It got a new start, hit against and stopped again."[43]

The border interfered with electronical equipment though the built-in map that the drone operated with, which made the drone dive every time it came outside the boundaries of that map.

Borders, seen as walls or as law, interfere with everyday life in various ways. Even on an uninhabited island like Märket there were occasions when the legal implications of the border became clear. Intermittently, the border raised an impenetrable wall. The CCTV cameras belonging to the Finnish border control on the island oc-

41 Interview, 2017.
42 Andersson 2015, p. 264.
43 Interview, 2017.

cur as a result of the border as law and the border as a state concern. Living and working here entails being under the ever-scanning, surveying gaze of the Finnish state at all times. Mostly, the cameras were subject for jokes but in some instances, stricter terms to the island's position on the very border appeared. During the arrival day's security training, the manager pointed to a walled-off corner of the wood shed, belonging to the border control, and gave us strict orders to stay away from it. The appearance of the corner with doors barred with heavy padlocks and yellow signs with big black writing in several languages gave no room for the cheerful jokes that usually characterized the interaction in the group.[44] This aspect of the border was not open for interpretation.

There are also other situations which the border as law raises in the island while at the same time being subject for interpretation, such as when border-related authorities arrive on the island:

> "When the [Finnish] border control comes here to check their equipment. If the wind is that way so they can't come onto the eastern part… They are not allowed on the western part, because that's Sweden. They *can* go there, but they mustn't moor. One person must stay in the boat with the engine running. They can jump ashore, but not moor."[45]

Mooring on Märket is a highly weather-dependent enterprise as the winds and waves can put both vessels and people in danger. There is no harbour but a few rocks jutting out where the sea is deep and boats have to approach with care and caution. If an official boat arrives on border-related business, according to the statement above, its passengers have not merely the weather but also the law to consider. However, the border inspection of 1981 explicitly pointed out that the border would connote no such restrictions. It is instead highlighted that exceptions must be made because of the perilous conditions: "All citizens *and even authorities* will be allowed to enter the island as is most suitable", state the official agreements.[46] This implies that authorities should not at all be restricted in their mooring. Still, I heard volunteers describe lengthy interrogations and juridical penalties as results when boats had moored the

44 Field notes, Märket, summer 2017.
45 Interview, 2017.
46 Added emphasis, RA/420093:1, 2.

island from the "wrong" side.[47] This demonstrates the fluid interpretations also of legal implications of borders.

In isolated Märket, times were intermingled. The old slippers of the lighthouse keeper stood under the hanging Gore-Tex jackets in the entrance. The enamel mugs with rusty patches were next to our plastic jerry cans of drinking water. As the border between timezones coincides with the state border, we stepped between now and then, past and present, when dealing with our daily chores. Also, one always kept an eye on the weather and safety precautions were paramount. In a setting that so well enhanced the temporary and vulnerable existence of humans, the border's white brightness appeared as more than a decoration. The painted border and its implicated restrictions stand in stark contrast to the ancient, permanent character of the rocks and the uncompromising forces of nature. What, then, gives a line such authority? Borders are faith, Henk van Houtum writes: the territorial border is believed-in ideology and successful as long as those who are subject to the border have an interest in believing.[48] But once a border has been made, anthropologist Sarah Green adds, it gains thing-like qualities, taking place both in the sensuous world and in people's minds. Borders are, writes Green, "epistemologies made real".[49] While the being of a border starts off as knowledge (I know there is a border somewhere here), it ends up as something existing and possible to experience with our senses (I'll paint it white so others can see it). Ontologically speaking, a border without consequences is no border as it is not known and sensed (I can remain unaware of a border until it somehow comes to matter to me). Although a border starts off as belief, it seeps into human lives, where it becomes a lived matter to consider through its legal or cultural effects.

A volunteer explained to me that when civilian boats arrive, in contrast to official ones, they do not need to take the border into consideration because they "are no institution". When approaching a border the necessary precautions differ due to one's relation to it. A similar theme is brought up during a conversation with another volunteer on the island. All volunteers have different tasks during the week and one is to restore the remains of the wallpaper. The volunteer doing this is employed by a Finnish state heritage institution and I ask whether she is there in that professional role, whereupon she replies:

47 Field notes, Märket, summer 2017; interview, 2017.
48 van Houtum 2011, pp. 51, 56.
49 Green 2012, p. 580.

> "No no *no*, not on duty. That would be as if I'm checking up and being *nosy*. You know, Åland is *independent* [when it comes to heritage conservation]."[50]

To be in Åland on duty could signal an intrusion and she is therefore on holiday during the volunteer week. By being officially off duty, the volunteer can work without risk of upsetting the border of autonomy.

When encountering a border, one has to conform to a certain degree to the rules and conditions of it. One cannot claim to not believe in it and expect to be let through. Borders are thus not merely belief: they have direct effects on everyday life that do not ask for degree of belief to make a difference. They are law as well as interpretation, lines as well as meanings, and they come with appendages of effects that have bearings in all these spheres. And yet, the border as law does not necessarily result in activities coming to a full stop. The border here on isolated Märket is of little importance for most people, compared to the walled and controlled borders that exist elsewhere. But also in this case, the outcome of the encounter with the border differs depending on the person and the situation of the encounter. Finnish border control boats keep the engine running to avoid mooring on the Swedish side, and a Finnish official cannot be on duty while working with her professional tasks on the Ålandic part of the island. The border can cause stumbling, reorientation and strategizing, but there are ways of getting around the border and slipping through the imaginary or real wall, if one learns to navigate it.

Border as spectacle

During a break in my assigned task of cleaning and painting the marks, I asked the manager for whose sake the border was repainted every year. So far out in the sea with nothing but horizon in every direction, I wondered who would benefit from being able to see perfectly painted border marks. The manager replied:

> "For the tourists, yes, and for the volunteers, and for those who come here. Tourists come from abroad you know and they want to *see*, *where* is the border, *where* is it? Border guards don't need to see it, they *know* it."[51]

50 Field notes, Märket, summer 2017.

51 Interview, 2017.

Visitors often mention the border in the guest books of Märket. One visitor left the following note in the summer of 2016: "Now visited 310 meeting points. The most exciting border I've seen! And I know what I'm talking about!". It seems obvious that some visitors come to Märket because of the border and it is of importance that they have *seen* or *sensed* the border. If the white marks were not explained, they could easily be mistaken for something else than a national border. Hence the border is a crucial ingredient in the marketing of the island for tourism as it adds attractiveness to the island as a destination. But that relies on both visibility and explanation. One could say that the border here is a spectacle, both in a literal sense where the white marks dot the rocks, and in how one speaks about the island in tourism promotion. A spectacle is something that one can see, from *spectare* which means "to see", and is thereby also something that is supposed to be watched. This character of the border on Märket makes it quite different from the law-binding walled borders that control and restrain. As such, it offers a different understanding of what borders can do and how they can be seen as resources.[52] But the juridical side of the border can also enhance its attractiveness. A member of the Lighthouse Society told a newspaper: "A few weeks ago, a couple were married here. The bride stood in Sweden and the groom in Finland, and the registrar had to stand in Finland or the wedding would not have been officially valid."[53] Apparently, the marriage was authorized by Finland, which is why the registrar had to stand on the Finnish part of the rock. Such amusing narratives add to the attraction of the border and a similar story was told to me by the captain of the fishing boat that transports volunteers to Märket. It seems to be a story retold to narrate the peculiarity of borders in general, and this border in particular.

Tourists arrive to Märket during volunteer season on days when the weather allows the one-hour boat trip from western Åland. Some arrive in smaller groups on organized trips from Åland to watch seals, birds and the lighthouse. Some stop by with their own boats when going across the Baltic Sea. When I arrived, two persons were packing up their tent to continue to the Åland archipelago with their canoes. They had spent the night on Märket, waiting for a calmer sea. When tourists arrive, a volunteer puts on a crew t-shirt with a map of the island on the back and offers the visitors a guided tour for a fee. As one can walk around the entire island in ten minutes and the beacon tower looms in the middle, a map is not necessary. But the t-shirt map has the border clearly marked, traversing the island in sharp turns. One of the first stops on the guided tour is the white circle in the middle of the island, showing the central point that was so important in the negotiations of the border adjustment.

52 Balogh 2014.

53 *Nya Åland*, 14 September 2010.

Fig. 5. Tourist straddling the border. Photograph by the author.

At this point, the volunteer also turns their back to the group to show how the border twists and turns. A similar t-shirt can also be bought in the little souvenir shop in the beacon building, adding to the bric-a-brac feel of the border as spectacle. In the guest books, there are many comments that allude to the peculiarity of the border. "We had a swim in Sweden and a barbecue in Finland, cool!" states one typical comment from 2007, and another one from 2013 says: "The Ålanders took one boat, and the people from [a Swedish town] another, and then we met on Märket so that everyone would feel at home." In this context, these decorative features of the border are more important than the juridical status. It is a border that overthrows the general spatial imaginary of the region as Finland is suddenly west of Sweden. "Such an amazing feeling that from Finnish/Ålandic territory view eastwards to Sweden! Märket has put its mark on us forever", writes a group of visiting governors from Sweden in the guest book in 2011. The border here is of a spectacular kind and it has also been actively transformed into a spectacle. This was also the aim when the border was first

painted. The person who participated in the first painting explained that they added some white lines in between the points "so that the tourists could jump across".[54]

A group of tourists arrived as I knelt to paint one of these lines in my volunteer assignment. The large group was divided in smaller groups and they landed on Märket with the island's rowing boat. I sat painting within their sight as they climbed onto the island and they immediately came walking towards the freshly painted border line. One woman took a big step over the line and burst out: "Now I'm home! What a long journey it was!". Another woman came up and straddled the line with one foot on either side, causing comments, on which she replied: "This is how I am. Double sided." As I sat just nearby, she turned to me and explained that she was born in Stockholm but lived in Åland for many years.[55] Once the whole group had arrived, they gathered around the border mark and divided themselves in smaller groups according to which side they felt they belonged to. Comments were made about where they thought the others should be placed; did they belong on this side of the border, or the other? The woman who had straddled the border took the same position again and they were all photographed in this arrangement (*Fig. 5*). Listening to their chatting and comments, it occurred to me that this group interpreted the border as a matter of Sweden and Åland only. Finland was not once mentioned during their arrangements around the border. For them, this was the border dividing Sweden and Åland. The meaning of this border as a lived experience was open for interpretation, regardless of the institutional border-making and the guiding letters of "S" and "F" around the border marks.

The sides to a border

The interpretation of a borderline can seem obvious at first glance – it divides something from something else. But when examined closely, various features of a border unravel. The border in Märket, although appearing peculiar, illustrates the processual character of all borders; while they begin as institutional negotiation objects and result in lines on a map, they thereafter continue to develop and acquire rather different meanings and appearances though human interactions with them. The border of Märket brings out how there are more than two sides to a border when it comes to meaning and heritage. The border is here turned into a spectacle, a playground, but it is a play with lingering issues of domination and contestation as the border raises

54 Interview, 2017.
55 Field notes, Märket, summer 2017.

questions of whose story is to be told by the play, and who is to set the rules when the toy belongs to both sides.

The vernacular effects of a border are another side of it. Some legal or direct implications can be handled – one can refrain from drinking alcohol, add letters of one's liking to the border points, or buy another GPS map for one's drone – while one simply has to comply with other. The interpretation of borders is not entirely open. The Finnish Lighthouse Society had to stick to certain criteria in their visualization of the border. One cannot choose to interpret the border as a mere decoration and act accordingly. And that points out the complexity of borders; they are more than belief, in that they become lived through their effects and appendages.

The Märket border may appear to be an unusually complex border, but when understood as human matter, close examinations of borders can reveal the many more sides to them than the two sides appearing when seen as lines on a map. If one wants to understand everyday life in border regions and grasp the meanings of borders in terms of culture and heritage, one needs to approach borders as complex phenomena. Borders are not simple lines in the landscape, nor cultural perceptions about belonging and inclusion/exclusion, but both and still more.

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Mikael Baaz and Mona Lilja

Borders in the mind and on the ground

(Re)categorization as "peace-building resistance" in the Preah Vihear Temple conflict

Introduction*

The Preah Vihear Temple is situated on the top of a steep cliff in the Dangrek Mountain range on the border between Cambodia and Thailand. The ancient temple, which was built during the first half of the Angkor or Khmer Empire (from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries), has been at the core of difficult and a prolonged border conflict between the two neighbouring countries for more than a century.[1]

On 8 July 2008, despite the delicate nature of the matter as well as strong protests from Thailand, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) decided to list the Preah Vihear Temple as a World Heritage Site. Following this decision, new disturbances broke out and both countries sent troop reinforcements to the area. This time, Thailand claimed that the "demarcation" had not yet been completed for the vicinity next to the temple, which had been adjudged to belong to Cambodia by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1962 (henceforth, "ICJ Judgment 1962").[2] By mid-July 2008, the total number of troops had increased to over 1,000, including a large contingent of Thai soldiers "occupying" the Keo Sikha Kiri Svara pagoda located some 300 metres from the Preah Vihear Temple. Thailand denied that these soldiers were inside Cambodian territory. A few months later, in October 2008, Cambodian and Thai soldiers opened fire on one an-

* We would like to thank Katrina Gaber and Niclas Lantz for providing valuable input to the original article. An earlier version of this chapter has previously been published under the title '(Re)categorization as resistance: Civil society mobilizations around the Preah Vihear Temple' in *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 30:3 (2017), pp. 295–310.

1 Kasetsiri *et al*. 2013, p. 23.

2 Case concerning the *Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)*, Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, ICJ Reports 1962.

other and it was not until May 2011 that a ceasefire was finally agreed upon. Prior to the ceasefire, on 28 April 2008, Cambodia had submitted a request to the ICJ for interpretation of its 1962 Judgment. In the Judgment, delivered on 11 November 2013, the ICJ observed that the Preah Vihear Temple is:

> ... a site of religious and cultural significance for the peoples of the region and is now listed by UNESCO as a world heritage site [...] In this respect [...] under Article 6 of the World Heritage Convention, to which both States are parties, Cambodia and Thailand must co-operate between themselves and with the international community in the protection of the site as a world heritage. In addition, each State is under an obligation not to "take any deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly" such heritage.[3]

Rather than suggesting a solution to the conflict, the Court ordered the parties to take their responsibility and to seek to resolve the ongoing conflict by inter-governmental co-operation.

Today, however, the Preah Vihear Temple conflict not only engages two governments where politicians, diplomats, and military troops are involved, but it also involves other actors such as various supranational organizations, including the ICJ and UNESCO. Moreover, as we will see further below, various local civil society actors who act very heterogeneously as both supporters of the conflict, as well as peace builders. These non-state actors (international as well as national) have contributed to change the context and content of the conflict. Put somewhat differently, the Preah Vihear Temple conflict is inherently political and the scale and complexity of these politics is intensifying. Lynn Meskell writes:

> Globalization and world-making projects, like the UNESCO World Heritage projects, have changed the stakes for particular heritage sites through processes of greater independence and connectivity, transforming them into transnational commodities with exchange values that transcend their historical and material characteristics and that can be wrested from those contexts to serve other international interests ... [H]eritage is also always political, too, in domestic arrangements, particularly when governments intervene in the material lives of their citizens, local peoples, and other connected communities.[4]

3 Request for interpretation of the judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the *Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)*. Overview of the case. ICJ 2013.

4 Meskell 2016, p. 72.

In this chapter, which is based mainly on various official documents, a number of semi-structured interviews made by the authors in Cambodia with Cambodians between 2012 and 2017, scholarly writings, media reports, and op-eds, we will highlight "resistance" that promotes peace and reconciliation – what we would like to call "peace-building resistance" (PBR) – rather than conflict and extreme nationalistic discourses. This is so far a rather neglected area of research within the social sciences, humanities, and law. Many civil society actors try to promote and establish less "dangerous" truths regarding the temple that challenge various mainstream views. Put somewhat differently, the chapter deals mainly with civil society mobilizations and resistance in relation to the Preah Vihear Temple from a historical and discursive–materialistic perspective. The different PBR activities on the ground are, however, performed in relation to as well as by using various official judgments, decisions, and statements (issued by international organizations). These "documents" are also taken into consideration below. By this, the chapter also briefly touches upon another somewhat neglected research area, namely the "usage" of international law and world heritage.

There has recently been an increased interest in "matter" within the social sciences and humanities. The research produced so far that departs from this (new) "material turn", however, has not explicitly embraced relations of power and resistance. Resistance studies have also not been inspired or informed by the material turn; instead, resistance studies have been preoccupied with entities such as texts, signs, symbols, identity, and language.[5] In theoretical terms, this chapter seeks to fill this gap in research by displaying how matter makes resistance possible, thus entangling power, resistance, and materiality. The question in focus is as follows: how is performed resistance articulated in relation to matter, current discourses, and the construction of history? In particular, we focus on "resistance" in terms of (re)categorizations that are performed in the historical, legal, and discursive–material nexus of the Preah Vihear Temple. By this, we bring in physical and material entities in order to display the ways in which matter is of importance in discursive production and for resistance. Thereby, the chapter seeks to contribute to, mainly theoretically but also empirically, our knowledge of PBR in general and the practice of it in relation to the Preah Vihear Temple conflict in particular. In addition, it also seeks to move beyond existing studies of world heritage from a legal perspective *stricto senso* – which mainly focus on various international treaties on heritage (such as the Convention concerning the

5 Törnberg 2013.

Protection of World Cultural Heritage and Natural Heritage, 1972) and issued judgments (for example, the ICJ Judgment of 1962), their content and how they should be interpreted – by focusing on the practical outcomes of such treaties, judgments, decisions, and agreements (rather than the "legality" of different interpretations) as well as how these have been and are "used" on the ground by different actors, for various political objectives and reasons.

When speaking about "resistance" in this chapter, we have in mind resistance that manifests in the negotiations of what people experience as generally held "truths". When discussing this kind of "subtle" resistance, we depart from the works of Paul Ricœur who argues that there is more meaning assigned to a symbol than the literal signification.[6] This inspires us to argue that (re)categorization can occur while the real is represented in a more literal way that abandons "contextual readings" in relation to different nationalistic discourses. The practices of (re)categorization can be seen as a deconstructing strategy that challenges power-loaded nationalistic discourses and the cultural order – in this case, in both Cambodia and Thailand.

A short historical background to the Preah Vihear Temple conflict

Historically, the Preah Vihear Temple has been used in different ways as a means of underpinning and affirming the unity of the states and the construction of a national collective identity in both Cambodia and Thailand. The conflict between the two countries over the Preah Vihear Temple reveals how monumental architecture continues to be associated with and is used to legitimize national conflicts. It also displays how history, or perhaps more correctly, the usage and construction of history, is vital. Overall, the temple conflict shows that there are strong bonds between matter (stones, building, and land) and (the constructions of) history, identity politics, and nationalism. The temple itself, as an artefact and representation, does not have a single or fixed meaning; the temple emerges in the material–discursive nexus in which the symbolic and matter entangle.

The modern Thai and Cambodian border conflict around the Preah Vihear Temple has its origin in a number of boundary agreements between France and Siam that were signed between 1904 and 1908. These agreements are, in turn, a response to the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1893, which concluded a violent conflict between France and Siam in the same year. Together, the treaties established the boundaries of what eventually became Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. By departing from the Franco-

6 Ricœur 1976.

Siamese Boundary Treaty of 23 March 1907, the frontier regions were then mapped by the French military. The final maps showed that the Preah Vihear Temple was on Cambodian soil and this was communicated to the Siamese Government in 1908. The Siamese Government, at that time, did not protest officially against the drawn boundary lines.[7]

When France withdrew from Cambodia in 1953, Thailand established a police post just north of the Preah Vihear Temple and hoisted the Thai flag over the ruin in 1954. In due course, this led to the new and independent Cambodian government turning to the ICJ in 1959 to ask for assistance in solving the temple conflict with Thailand. In June 1962, as indicated above, the ICJ presented its judgment and ruled that the Preah Vihear Temple belonged to Cambodia. The judgment was split (9–2) and Thailand reluctantly accepted it.[8]

In 2008, UNESCO, as we also now know, decided to list the Preah Vihear Temple as a World Heritage Site, which provoked new conflict patterns. This time, the Thai protests did not focus on the temple per se, but rather on the still-disputed 4.6 km^2 of land surrounding the Preah Vihear Temple.[9] Periodic eruptions of deadly violence followed and in 2011, Cambodia once again turned to the ICJ to ask for assistance in interpreting the 1962 judgment. The 2013 ICJ decision affirmed the 1962 judgment that gave sovereignty of the temple to Cambodia as well as making some clarifications regarding the extent to which this sovereignty extended over the land surrounding the Preah Vihear Temple. The 2013 decision refines the expression "vicinity" that was used in the 1962 judgment by defining it as the whole promontory in which the temple is located. However, the promontory is just a small part of the 4.6 km^2 of land that is still contested. By this, the ICJ has ultimately not ruled on the entire disputed area but has left it to the two countries to jointly resolve the border issue over the remaining land.[10] Both governments welcomed the decision and suggested talks to solve outstanding issues once and for all.[11]

Even though this can change in the future (not least considering the nationalist rhetoric characterizing the election campaign in Cambodia in 2018), there is currently little interest in Cambodia for further confrontation over the land bordering the Preah Vihear Temple. The political atmosphere in Thailand, however, has changed dramatically over the recent years and today it is very different from that of Cambo-

7 ICJ Judgment 1962; Strate 2013; Lilja & Baaz 2016, p. 5.
8 ICJ Judgment 1962; Silverman 2010; St John 1994; Lilja & Baaz 2016, p. 5.
9 Silverman 2010, pp. 4–5.
10 ICJ 2013; Lilja & Baaz 2016, p. 6; Ciorciari 2014.
11 CNN 2013.

dia. Following several political crises since 2008, which were on an overall level characterized by violent struggles between the so-called Red Shirts (put simply, a political movement supporting then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra), and the Yellow Shirts (put simply, a political movement opposing Thaksin) the Thai Army carried out a military coup in the country in May 2014. The opposition in Thailand prior to the coup, primarily the nationalist Yellow Shirts (or more formally: The People's Alliance for Democracy; PAD), strongly rejected the Cambodian sovereignty claims of the Preah Vihear Temple and stated that the issue was unresolved and they have been using the Preah Vihear Temple to undermine the Thai government since 2008.[12] The military leaders in Bangkok, who were supported by the Yellow Shirts, after the coup, accused Cambodia of secretly supporting the Red Shirts. The Thai military has also recently erected barbed wire in the vicinity of the Preah Vihear Temple. This time, at least so far, the Cambodian response has been only to carry out peaceful protests.[13] To conclude, the Preah Vihear Temple still holds political force and one cannot rule out a new outbreak of violence in the future.[14] One could also conclude that the climate for co-operation between the two countries (as suggested by the ICJ in 2013) could have been better.

Over the years, the long history of Siamese imperialism in the region has been used by Cambodian leaders to create a narrative in regard to Thai claims to the Preah Vihear Temple. According to Shane Strate, Thailand is described as the wolf and Cambodia is the lamb. In Thailand, however, the narrative is different.[15] Here, the country is described as the lamb, while France is described as the wolf. The Preah Vihear Temple is portrayed as a fine that was paid to the colonial powers in order to remain a sovereign state. Or in other words, Thailand's leaders "sacrificed a finger to save a hand".[16] In Thailand, the Preah Vihear Temple is associated with the legacy of western imperialism and, in particular, the territory that was "lost" to the French imperialists.

The contradictory, mainstream narratives of Cambodia and Thailand described above could be understood, at least partly, with reference to the fact that Thailand has displayed characteristics of both colonizing and colonized power. Strate writes that "The image of lost territories serves as a reminder of Western imperialism and also masks Thai neo-imperialist ambitions in Cambodia and Laos, presenting military ag-

12 Chachavalpongpun 2013; Lilja & Baaz 2016, pp. 6–7.
13 Thearith 2014.
14 Lilja & Baaz 2016, p. 7.
15 Strate 2013, pp. 41–43.
16 Strate 2013, pp. 41–43; Lilja & Baaz 2016, p. 6.

gression as an attempt to recover what was lost.".[17] According to Alexander Hinton, a dominating discourse on Thailand in Cambodia is that of "Thai thieves", who are always ready to "rob" Cambodia.[18] One of our respondents said:

> Cambodians look upon Thailand as a rapacious Thailand, always claiming territory from Cambodia. And historically, always claiming Preah Vihear Temple and other Angkorian temples and look upon themselves as ancestors of the ancient Khmer culture. They have always laid claims to that, for hundreds of years. They have controlled the area for hundreds of years as well.[19]

In the interviews, nationalism was often mention as a cause of the conflict. In 2012 a respondent said: "The cause [of the temple conflict], the main cause is two things: the one is the political incongruences, and second is extreme nationalism."[20] Another respondent argued: "the Cambodian society [see the temple] as part of their heritage, cultural heritage, an intrinsic part of their identity. And you know because it has been contested it has become much more sensitive and more important, even more important than Angkor Wat. Because it is contested."[21]

Strong nationalism thus underlies the temple conflict in both Cambodia and Thailand. But, as put forward by Hinton, there are also people calling for peace and understanding.[22] Such discourses also surfaced in 2012, when several of our interviews contain alternative stories, which we interpret as resistance against more nationalistic discourses that fuel the temple conflict. Among other things, new understandings of the artefact that the temple constitutes, as well as the conflict parts, were promoted by our respondents in relation to the border conflict. We understand this as a resisting practice, the practice of (re)categorizing current mainstream narratives.

Resistance and civil society from a discursive-material perspective

The "material turn" often departs from and adds to the "linguistic turn". In this, it is important to acknowledge different strands of "post-structural" theory. Michel

17 Strate 2013, pp. 44–46.
18 Hinton 2006.
19 Interview, writer, Phnom Penh 2012.
20 Interview, civil society representative, Phnom Penh 2012.
21 Interview, writer, Phnom Penh 2012; Lilja & Baaz 2016, p. 6.
22 Hinton 2006, p. 468; Lilja & Baaz 2016, p. 7.

Foucault, for example, who is often labelled as a "post-structuralist", embraces the importance of language while still emphasizing the role of matter and material space in the shaping of subjects. Among other things, matter predominates in Foucault's discussion of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon as an architectural configuration. While Foucault stressed the linguistic without "throwing out" matter, there are also some "extreme" strands of the linguistic turn. Power, in this view, is regarded as discursive regimes and what is sayable at all.[23] From this perspective, we are raised into a language that limits what we can think or say. As Kathy Ferguson argues "The power that linguistic feminism attributes to language resides not only in what gets said or who gets to talk, but in what is sayable at all".[24]

Many followers of the "material turn" are sceptical of this extreme position of "post-structural" theory. Still, as argued by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman,[25] the linguistic turn should not be rejected, but departed from and built upon. In line with this, we embrace both language and material when analysing civil society-based PBR against the Preah Vihear Temple conflict. We hereby acknowledge that the material is more than a passive social construction, but instead stands out as an "agentic" force that interacts with and changes discourse.[26] Put in a different way, exploring the existence of a materiality can actually contribute to our understanding of the discursive production; this is due to the fact that various aspects of materiality can contribute to the development and transformation of discourses.[27] Karen Barad argues that the nature/material prevails within post-structuralism as a passive being, which is defined in relation to an active culture.[28] She, however, argues that nature also affects discourses and has political consequences. Thus, matter, in some senses, might be assigned agency, while it informs and shapes practices and current discursive truths.

Of particular interest to us are civil society-resistance practices. Various practices, which negotiate norms and discursive boundaries, are taking place in-between the subject and the material context. We would like to argue that there is no clear border between the subject and matter in a moment of resistance. The differences between the matter, practice, and subject are not "fixed, absolute or inherent".[29] Consider, for example, Tahrir Square, in Cairo, Egypt, which is a well-known symbol of the "Arab

23 Ferguson 1993, p. 124.
24 Ferguson 1993, p. 124.
25 Alaimo & Hekman 2008.
26 Alaimo & Hekman, 2008, pp. 4–7.
27 Colebrook 2000; Grosz 1994.
28 Barad 2008.
29 Lenz 2011.

Spring". The square and the protesters were actively doing something to each other simultaneously. The material conditions of the square, its location, openness, and grandness, all affected the interrelations that emerged in-between the protesters and the square. The protesters' bodies were adjusted to a range of material conditions – the square's generous surface area, its flatness, its structure, and the central location of the square. The traffic circle at the centre of Tahrir Square and its closeness to important buildings – such as the Egyptian Museum, the building of the National Democratic Party headquarters, the Mogamma government building, and the Headquarters of the Arab League building – most likely contributed to why and how people moved on the square. In addition, the square is easily accessible and is serviced by the Sadat Station of the Cairo Metro system. The material forces of the area's architecture, infrastructure, and cityscape interact with the bodies and minds of the protesters and provide them with what that they have to either work with or against.[30] The demonstrations on Tahrir Square can be viewed as events or phenomena, which in Barad's terminology, emerge through different "intra-actions".[31]

The above implies that we should abandon the constructed separateness between not only discourse and matter, but also between human resistance and the material conditions of this resistance.[32] How civil society is constructed depends on, by extension, how certain borders or boundaries are established while we interpret the doings of civil society actors in the nexus between human practices and matter. In regard to the Preah Vihear Temple, stones, land, architecture, legal documents, and various texts published on the internet are important material aspects for analysing resistance. Bodies materialize as Thai or Cambodian, who act and interact in processes that entangle movements, spaces, things, and language.

Overall, what we understand as, for example, the Arab uprising is created and recreated in the assemblage of encounters and interrelations.[33] Rather than considering the Egyptian, Cambodian, Thai, or any other civil society in a taken-for-granted manner, we should think of civil society (or a part of it) as emergences in the interaction between the subjects, practices, matter, and various understandings of these interactions. If we do so, civil society becomes the result of our interpretations of multiple encounters, practices, materialities, and interrelations that are performed over time. Because, as Kate Weston points out, there can be no space without time. Put in a dif-

30 Lenz 2011.
31 Barad 2008.
32 Lenz 2011.
33 Barad 2008.

ferent way, every configuration of resistance is always simultaneously spatial and temporal – our interpretations of the world are always shaped in "spacetime".[34]

Theoretical framework: Resistance, the surplus, and two levels of signification

In this chapter we focus on subtle forms of resistance, which often turn out to be "invisible" practices that take place behind the stage of public rebellions.[35] Such disguised "everyday practices of resistance" are, however, to be considered as central since they often focus on the construction of meaning. As Roland Bleiker argues, symbolism, poetic language, and storytelling can be highly relevant in terms of resistance and "... the most powerful practices of dissent ... work in discursive ways, that is, by engendering a slow transformation of values".[36] In line with this, resistance studies have mainly been preoccupied with immaterial cultural processes and intersubjective meaning systems. The field has been characterized by generally "less than tangible" entities such as texts, signs, symbols, identity, and language.[37] However, as stated above, we should also take into consideration the physical and material entities and their potential "agency"; that is, the ways in which matter is of importance in discursive production. We should thus highlight the central role of the material in the processes where discourses (of resistance) are constructed. Primarily, we are inspired by the idea that the material is more than a passive social construction, but instead stands out as an "agentic" force that interacts with and changes discourses. Thus, we explore how the existence of materiality that entangles with resistance practices can actually contribute to the development and transformation of discourses.[38]

In what follows, we will look into one form of PBR in relation to the Preah Vihear Temple conflict, namely: "(re)categorization". Here, resistance manifests in the negotiations of what people experience as generally held "truths" by "(re)categorizing" the discourses. (Re)categorization denotes resistance that is played out as different stakeholders try to negotiate mainstream views on the temple conflict, which they regard as violent or repressive. Every interval of repetition of the discourse offers a place where, what seem to be experienced as, power-loaded truths regarding the temple could be challenged and/or changed. Overall, we understand resistance as a response

34 Weston 2002.
35 Scott 1985.
36 Bleiker 2000, p. 276.
37 Törnberg 2013.
38 Colebrook 2000; Grosz 1994.

to power (in this case, in the form of dominant, nationalistic discourses) practised by people who either fight for themselves or for others who could be targeted in, or affected by, the temple conflict. The (re)categorization displayed in the analytical section below, is made possible in the nexus between the material and the discursive.

Before moving on to the analysis, we would like to introduce some theoretical perspectives that contribute to our understanding of the practice of (re)categorization as a deconstructing strategy of resistance. To understand (re)categorization, we must understand categorization and its relationship with matter. Post-structuralist scholars, among them Stuart Hall, agree that people generally understand the world by classifying and organizing it into various symbolic orders. Food, for example, is separated and organized into "raw" and "cooked", "vegetables", "fruit", etc.; these are categories that are often considered to be natural to us. From this perspective, different foods are assigned different positions within a classificatory system.[39] This reasoning is further added to by Barad who views the world from a discursive–material perspective and embraces categories as a part of a different phenomenon that is constructed but still informed by an objectively existing reality.[40]

We take a slightly different approach than Barad. Foremost, we argue that embracing materiality is important when trying to understand the negotiations of different classificatory systems. By this, we display how matter is important for resistance by standing out as an "agentic" force, which opens up space for various discursive strategies. Moreover, by including matter into our analytical scheme, we also explore the overlaps and gaps that prevail in the meeting between discourses and matter. Often there is a gap or a surplus between the category and the real. Consider, for example, the concept "women". It has a certain meaning assigned to it and when we interpret the world, we tend to understand women from our understandings of a "woman". However, the world is more complex and richer than the concept or name "woman" (the stereotype), which leaves us with remnants of reality that lie outside our conceptualizations of the real. There is a non-symbolized real that we fail to capture.[41] Overall, the relationship between the "naming" and reality is a complex one, where the real does not fit neatly into the symbolic space, which produces an effect of a non-symbolizable surplus.[42]

Thus, there is often, not to say always, a gap between the meaning assigned to a name (for example, the descriptive features ascribed to a "woman") and the object

39 Hall 1997.
40 Barad 2008.
41 Lilja 2016.
42 Edkins 1999.

that has been named (the real woman). This "surplus" or "gap" might lead to the (re)categorization of the cultural order and its lived categories. For example, one of our respondents – a Cambodian woman – blamed the fact that she was not married on the gap between her view of herself and the image of a "Cambodian woman". She said "I am too intelligent to be a Cambodian woman; I cannot be a Cambodian woman.".[43] By not recognizing herself along the Cambodian discourses of femininity, the women located herself in a new category; neither as a "man" nor a "woman". As an "in-between" representation, she (re)categorized the cultural order. Thus, matter might contribute to resistance, when things fail to fit into any category. This last observation is of great interest for our analysis.

The relationship between matter and the symbolic could be even more nuanced by engaging with Paul Ricœur's sketches of the material world.[44] Even though Ricœur, with his phenomenological hermeneutics, approaches reality from a slightly different angle than the above, we are still inspired by some of his notions of the real. Ricœur, who differentiates between different levels of meaning making, argues that there is a literal signification of a phenomenon. However, often, this literal meaning is transgressed; there is an extension of meaning that is operative in every symbol.[45] Ricœur argues that the symbol functions as a "surplus of signification" as there is more meaning assigned to the symbol than the literal signification. Or in other words, a poem about a sunrise describes more than a meteorological phenomenon. The poem, it can be argued, expresses an excess of signification that surpasses the literal connotation. Ricœur explains the interpretation in the following way:

> Only for an interpretation are there two levels of signification since it is the recognition of the literal meaning that allows us to see that a symbol still contains more meaning. This surplus of meaning is the residue of the literal interpretation. Yet for the one who participates in the symbolic signification there are really not two significations, one literal and the other symbolic, but rather a single movement, which transfers him from one level to the other and which assimilates him to the second signification by means of, or through the literal one.[46]

Ricœur argues that we do not separate the two levels of signification. For the participants in the communication, there are not really two significations – one literal

43 Interview, politician, Phnom Penh 2012.
44 Ricœur 1976.
45 Ricœur 1976.
46 Ricœur 1976, p. 55.

and the other symbolic – but rather the reader is assimilating the latter signification by means of, or through, the former. Or in other words, there is always a literal significance (i.e. a close reading of the material facts, which entangle with our symbolic goods). Thus, as argued above, we must abandon the constructed separateness between discourse and matter. Categories and boundaries are established while we interpret, for example, resistance in the nexus between the symbolic "order" and matter. Still, the possibility to move between Ricœur's levels of significations creates the opportunity to resist certain "truths", which fuel various conflict patterns. The material reality gives people the means and allows them to (re)categorize certain notions – in this case, various discursive goods that are assigned to the temple.[47]

(Re)categorization as peace building resistance

Several of the civil society actors that we interviewed tried to frame the discourses regarding the Preah Vihear Temple conflict in new and alternative ways. One respondent, for example, implied that the conflict is in some senses not a conflict, but just a result of current domestic politics in Thailand. She said:

> If you ask me the problem is related to the political crises, especially in Thailand (...) Because the Thai side tried to politicize it. The pro-Thaksin government actually backed the Cambodian government in the process, but later on it changed. He couldn't stay any longer in the government.[48]

The quote could be interpreted as an attempt to (re)categorize the Preah Vihear Temple conflict from an "international" to a domestic (Thai) issue. Other attempts to redefine the conflict also appeared in our interviews. One (Cambodian) respondent, for example, said "I want to clarify that Thailand is not demanding the temple, but the land around the temple".[49] This is an interesting statement, since several other respondents did not distinguish between the land and the temple when discussing the temple conflict. For example, one respondent said:

> The conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over Preah Vihear is actually not a new matter. [...] For me [the temple] is a symbol of this country, the Khmer empire. That is

47 Ricœur 1976, p. 55.
48 Interview, civil society representative, Phnom Penh 2012.
49 Interview, civil society representative, Phnom Penh 2012.

> why it has become a symbol for the Cambodian so called 'prosperity period'. In other words, you can say that it symbolizes the Cambodian identity.[50]

In general, the respondents addressed the Thai–Cambodian conflict by putting up the temple as a node around which other discourses, in regard to the conflict, were organized.[51] Thus, the temple prevails as a privileged sign around which other words get their meanings. This is interesting, given that the ICJ awarded Cambodia sovereignty over the Preah Vihear Temple more than 50 years ago. The judgment did not, as we know now, rule over the land immediately around the temple. Hence, what has been at stake in the latest stage of the Preah Vihear Temple conflict has not been the temple per se, but rather a discussion about a related piece of land.

Taking into consideration the strong discourses around the Preah Vihear Temple, the attempt to remove the temple from the conflict becomes interesting ("Thailand is not demanding the temple, but the land around the temple."). Even though the above respondent her/ himself probably not address her/his statement as resistance, we interpreted the statement as PBR, since the respondent seemingly negotiates nationalistic discursive constructions around the temple (by removing the temple from the conflict). The removal of the temple from the conflict displays a gap between the real object of the conflict (the land) and the discourses surrounding it. Put differently, a closer look into the issue would suggest that there is a gap between the matter – a piece of land – and the discourses that reinforce the conflict/temple pairing. In this, the move between the material and the discursive becomes compelling. The respondent above, in some senses, tries to use the surplus that emerges between the descriptive features of the conflict and the object of the conflict (the land) in order to deconstruct or "solve" the current conflict. By emphasizing the land instead of the temple, the (re)categorization of the discourses about the Preah Vihear Temple hereby holds a deconstructing potential. And, as argued above, it could also be seen as resistance as the (re)categorization appears as a response to power (i.e. dominant, nationalistic discourses in regard to the temple conflict).

Further attempts to separate matter from discourses – which reinforce the conflict/temple pairing – were seen in the interviews. One respondent, for example, suggested that one should distinguish between the people and the problem; or in other

50 Interview, research fellow, Phnom Penh 2012

51 Winther Jörgensen & Phillips 1999.

words, between the bodies and the meaning making. The civil society representative said as follows:

> There is formalization between civil society in Cambodia and Thailand. We can contact each other immediately when there is a need, to address a problem. We have the freedom to communicate, to work together (...) Well, everyone believes that no problem can be solved by violence. And violent resolutions create suffering, so therefore we have to avoid that (...) The root cause of the problem is that we fight people, but we have to fight the problem.[52]

The respondent is discussing peaceful strategies to solve the temple conflict. These strategies take place within a discursive–material context that is formed by the material artefact (that the temple constitutes) and the discourses that surround it. In the above quote, resistance is carried out by the respondent when (s)he chooses to make a distinction between the people and the problem. Again, it is resistance in the form of (re)categorizing, as it deconstructs previous interpretations about the Preah Vihear Temple conflict. The new categorization challenges previous interpretations by offering new categories to depart from. The "problem" is separated and disconnected from different bodies/actors ("We fight people, but we have to fight the problem."). Thus, solving the "problem" does not involve a conflict with other people as they are removed from the "problem".

In order to further shed some light on the argument above, let us be inspired by what Stuart Hall calls different "systems of representation"; the "things in the world" are, he argues, interpreted by us.[53] Thereafter, we map our interpretations with a set of concepts or categories. Or in other words, we use our concepts, or categories, and interpret the objects we see in the world; that is people, events, etc. We then have the discursive categories (or what might be called mental representations or concepts), which prevail as "true" categories, as well as the things in the world – the people, objects or events – and through constructing a set of correspondences between these "things in the world" and our conceptual maps, we give the objects meaning. People tend to map what they hear/see/experience and make matches between a more abstract mental representation and the factual artefact, movement, practice, and so on. Thus, the concepts – which might be about easily graspable things, such as chairs and

52 Interview, civil society representative, Phnom Penh 2012.

53 Hall 1997.

plates, but also about war, love, or friendship – make us interpret the world according to certain discursive categories/"truths".

However, in the case of the Preah Vihear Temple conflict, some civil society actors seem to resist the dominating concepts, or conceptual maps, and seek to interpret the temple, the conflict, and its actors in new and alternative ways. Hall calls the expected interpretations and categorizations "preferred meanings". The writer of meaning often intends it to be interpreted in a certain way. The majority will also read the message in a very similar way to this "preferred meaning". However, there are those who resist and make different interpretations other than the preferred meanings.[54] This is the case in relation to the Preah Vihear Temple conflict, where one strategy is to (re)categorize different concepts, reinterpret the material conditions, and pinpoint the difference between the "things in the world" and the prevailing conceptual maps. The physical and material entities of the temple then emerge as matter that matters in the discursive production. The material becomes an "agentic" force that interacts with and changes discourses.

This kind of resistance of (re)categorization of civil society actors was, for example, expressed in a column in the *Bangkok Post*. The columnist tried to shake the cultural order by reorganizing different layers of meaning. He argued:

> I'm not a pacifist. There are reasons to fight. But 4.6 square kilometres of dirt is not one of them (...) If we give up the temple the dispute is over ... Is not trade and commerce more important? Preah Vihear is just a pile of stones.[55]

The above-proposed discursive–materialistic approach provides us with a possibility to understand the kind of resistance that is being harboured in this (re)interpretation of the conflict.

It is resistance through challenging nationalistic discourses by arguing that the 4.6 km^2 surrounding the temple is not a lost body part of the Thai nation's body, but it is just "4.6 square kilometres of dirt". This quote displays resistance by (re)categorization. The Preah Vihear Temple is no longer interpreted and mapped as a holy, ancient artefact, but simply as a "pile of stones". Likewise, the land surrounding it, which is commonly associated with national identity, is now nothing but "dirt". We would like to propose that this (re)categorization is made possible because the columnist departs from matter and tries to make a close(r) "empirical reading" of the Preah Vihear Temple conflict. He is abandoning a more "contextual reading" that involves various

54 Lilja 2016; Skelton 2000.

55 Voranai Vanijaka quoted in Strate 2013, p. 42.

nationalistic ideas for a more "literal meaning". We do not know if the columnist actually visited the area and has seen the "dirt" and the "pile of stones" that he speaks of, but he still tries to depict the material facts of the temple without bringing in various symbolic goods, which might underpin the conflict.

To understand the above empirical close (and resisting) reading of the temple area, we should return to Ricœur's different levels of meaning making.[56] Ricœur argues that there are two levels of signification – one literal and the other symbolic. The columnist, quoted above, seems to separate the literal connotation from the symbolic "surplus", thereby, resisting the latter. This resistance is made possible as the material can be interpreted and (re)interpreted. In the quote above, the boundaries constituted through discursive–material practices are then (re)categorized through a literal reading of the land and temple. New norms are then created and imprinted into matter. Here, the stones of the Preah Vihear Temple turn out to be "agentic", as they contribute to how the temple is discussed and represented. The discourses around the temple are deconstructed while simultaneously being embraced as a symbolic surplus that exceeds the material fact of a "pile of stone".[57] This (re)categorization might be threatening to some civil society actors who strive hard to politicize the temple issue. Mary Douglas claims that people tend to protect the distinctive categories that they (we) arrange the world according to.[58]

In the above quote, the columnist compares his literal interpretation with the general view of the temple conflict in order to deconstruct the latter. This can be understood through the concept of "concretism",[59] which denotes how certain representations are experienced as more concrete; that is, as more applicable, understandable, detailed, or practical. These more concrete representations then make us experience the discourses as more graspable and comprehendible than before.

Among its impacts, concretism strengthens discourses by exemplifying and/or repeating a more abstract discourse/notion with concrete representations. The ability of concretism to make complex matters more understandable/concrete can be illustrated by the way in which maps reduce countries, states, and infrastructure into well-arranged images, thereby visualizing nationalistic discourses and reinforcing them.[60] Maps, thereby, stand out as more concrete representations, which make the

56 Ricœur 1976.
57 Barad 2008.
58 Douglas 1966, pp. 33–41.
59 Lilja 2016.
60 Lilja 2016; Trenter 2000.

discourses about nations, states, and countries more graspable, and thereby, strengthen these discourses.

The above implies that discourses might be strengthened by more concrete representations. However, in the above quote about the Preah Vihear Temple, the opposite happens. Instead of strengthening the nationalistic discourses around the Preah Vihear Temple, the columnist uses the very concrete representation of a "pile of stone" to oppose and deconstruct the general "truths" about the temple. The columnist makes a close, empirical reading of what we would see if watching the temple. Moreover, this reading contradicts the more general discourses that circulate around the temple. This usage of a literal reading of the temple – and the very concrete representation this reading suggests – must be seen as resistance against power-loaded and nationalistic discourses. The resistance is made possible by the ability to approach matter without bringing in various discursive constructions that surround it. Agency is then made possible, as there are different levels of interpretations in the nexus between the material and the discursive.

The "new" concept, which is created in the attempts to (re)categorize the prevailing cultural order, also needs to be critically examined. Consider, for example, the columnist who is quoted above. His concept of "dirt" is probably a very narrow reading of the landscape of the Preah Vihear Temple, which consists of plants, stones, shades, trees, and soil. This reductiveness is probably made to emphasize the main points that are argued by the columnist in regard to the temple, thus, being informed by the respondents' attempt to resist.

Conclusion

The aims of international law are vast and include not only to maintain order, but also to fulfil other goals such as the advancement of peace and co-operation, the protection of natural and cultural heritage, and the peaceful solution of international disputes in the international society. In terms of these goals, it is difficult to claim that either the ICJ or UNESCO have been particularly successful in preventing and/or solving the Preah Vihear Temple conflict by using international law. In fact, the ICJ and UNESCO, at least occasionally, have contributed to fuelling the conflict rather than quelling it. This is, among other reasons, a result of the inbuilt bluntness of the institution of international law, too much of legal formalism in its application, ignorance, incomplete, ambiguous and "difficult"-to-interpret judgments and decisions, as well as bad timing and various local nationalist and, by extension, disloyal understandings and usage of these judgments and decisions. International law and international decisions are no more effective on the ground than different local actors

allow them to become. In order to be effective, international law and international decisions must be carried loyally by local actors. This has not been the case in the Preah Vihear Temple conflict. But, as has been displayed above, this is only part of the (hi)story. Other, more peace-promoting initiatives have also been carried out by different local civil society actors, performing, among other things, PBR activities.

The field of resistance studies does not often explicitly embrace the material. In this chapter, we seek to respond to this challenge by discussing practices of resistance in a discursive–material context. Departing from this discursive–materialistic approach contributes to our understanding of the resistance that is played out in relation to the Preah Vihear Temple conflict. Resistance of various civil society actors is taking place in-between the subject and the material context. There is no clear border between the subject and matter in a moment of resistance; different material circumstances interact with the bodies and minds of the subjects, which provide them with the conditions that they have to either work with or against. The material and various discursive categories interact and shape different forms of resistance (i.e. practices used to negotiate what people experience as generally held "truths").

In the analysis, we show how (re)categorizations can be interpreted as resistance practices in regard to the temple. Overall, we display how the characteristics of the discursive–material nexus make resistance, in the form of (re)categorization, possible. Among other things, there is (often) a gap or a surplus between the category and the real. This "surplus" or "gap" might provide actors with the possibility to resist and (re)categorize the cultural order by bringing in, or displaying, aspects of the real other than those accepted/included in the current categorization. Thus, matter might contribute to resistance when things fail to fit into any category. Or in the case of the Preah Vihear Temple, different civil society actors choose to interpret the temple (the real) in an empirically close, or literal, way that abandons a more "contextual reading", which involves different nationalistic discourses. In this, some of the above practices of (re)categorization can be seen as deconstructing moves that draw upon the surplus between meaning and matter.

Overall, the analysis of (re)categorization as resistance implies that in order to understand how resistance occurs due to material aspects, we must embrace that the material is more than a passive social construction, but instead stands out as an "agentic" force that interacts with and changes discourses. Various aspects of materiality contribute to the development and transformation of discourses. Or in other words, the matter of the temple contributes to the discourses of the "temple".

To conclude, international law can, but does not, by no means, automatically contribute to solve difficult border conflicts. In fact, in intervening in local settings, such as listing cultural artefacts as "World Heritage" sites, international law and other in-

struments could in unfortunate cases fuel conflicts rather than contributing to solving them. In order to achieve success, international actors need the co-operation of local actors. Sometimes this is very difficult to achieve. To reach such co-operation or move beyond different obstacles, creative PBR, such as (re)categorizations could provide the path forward. This is clearly illustrated by the Preah Vihear Temple case.

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Elisabeth Niklasson

Borders of belonging in the European Heritage Label

Europe starts here!

On a bare promontory at the south-westernmost corner of Europe stands Sagres Fortress, one of the most famous and visited heritage sites in the Algarve region of Portugal (*Fig. 1*). Once the residence of Prince Henry the Navigator and, according to legend, the place of his 15th-century school of navigation, the site has come to signify early European overseas exploration. About 2,300 kilometres to the east, wedged in between two hillsides so as to resemble a prehistoric cave, lies Krapina Neanderthal Museum. Located next to the famous Croatian site of Hušnjakovo Hill, where the largest find of Neanderthal fossil bones in Central Europe was uncovered in 1899, the museum is dedicated to the culture, environment, and evolution of early humans. In 2015, these temporally and culturally remote sites were connected as they received the European Heritage Label (EHL).

Adopted by the EU in 2011,[1] the EHL is a recognition awarded to heritage sites on the merits of their "symbolic European value" and "role in the history and culture of Europe and/or the building of the Union".[2] Upon being listed, sites are designated as places where Europe starts, henceforth bound to Europeanize their exhibitions and activities in order to strengthen European citizens' sense of belonging to the EU.[3]

Using the sites in Sagres and Krapina as starting points, this chapter asks: what borders of belonging does heritage make and break in the name of Europe? In my investigation I first move *inward* to the centre of EU bureaucracy in Brussels, where an intentional lack of precision regarding the nature of Europe has created a bor-

1 The EHL was first founded as an intergovernmental initiative in 2006 (Lähdesmäki 2014). When the EU took over in 2011, no previously labelled sites were transferred to the new scheme.

2 EU 2015.

3 EU 2018; EU 2011.

Fig. 1. Sagres Promontory. Photograph courtesy of Duarte Fernandes Pinto.

derland in EU cultural policy, vacillating between the parallel ideas of Europe as a unique civilization and Europe as a political community. This ambiguity, I propose, has produced a positively charged image of Europe in EU heritage actions. Moving *backwards* to the times presented as European at the EHL sites, I argue that this image resonates with the EHL's adherence to a certain canon of European civilization and tends to disassociate the EU from dark and uncomfortable pasts. Finally, moving *outward* to the periphery and beyond the European continent, I use one feature at Sagres Fortress to illustrate how the border-transcending and civilization-confirming aspects of the EHL are linked to the parallel political project of externalizing the EU's border regime. I also highlight how the latter empowers the European radical right – a political family which likewise relies on the canonized idea of European civilization.

Where do you belong?

Heritage and *borders* are not, borrowing the words of Ian Hacking, "obedient to our minds".[4] They are classes for which our ideas and that which they represent develop in symbiosis. No natural similarities can be found among, say, sites on the World

4 Hacking 2002, pp. 106–107.

Heritage List, or national borders, aside from the manifestations created as a result of our classification: plaques and visitor centres, maps and barbed wired fences. Heritage and borders therefore demand constant reaffirmation and physical demarcation to continue to be recognized as such (see Hughes-Tidlund, this volume).

This understanding of heritage, as something we "do" rather than something that just exists, is now commonplace in Heritage Studies.[5] It also resonates with approaches to borders in the field of Border Studies. As argued by Henk van Houtum,[6] a border is a verb, and "[m]aking a border, demarcating a line in space is a collaborative act". Adopting such a stance is to recognize that, rather than mirrors to the past or natural divisions of space, heritage and borders are world-making acts leaving their own imprint on reality. It also means that, as researchers and citizens, we always, in some capacity, participate in the production of heritage and borders. The next step would then be, as suggested by Tim Winter in relation to the future of Heritage Studies, to begin "focusing on the critical issues that face the world today, the larger issues that bear upon and extend outwards from heritage".[7] One such issue, in which heritage and borders converge, is the configuration of the conditions for belonging in present-day Europe.[8]

A border is a question, van Houtum writes.[9] The same is true for heritage. In their instrumentalized forms, they ask and answer one of the most dangerous questions of our time: Where do you belong? Depending on who is asking, what answer is given, and which arguments are used – passport, physical appearance, religious affiliation, cultural heritage – it can affect the trajectories of human lives. The power asymmetry embedded in this question, of who has the right to ask and the interpretative privilege to sanction certain responses over others, is what makes the EU's search for a European identity embodied in heritage on the one hand, and hardening external borders on the other, so volatile. In what follows, I explore the intersection of European heritage and borders by drawing on insights gained through ethnographic fieldwork at EHL sites, participant observation in the European Commission, document analysis, and interviews.[10]

5 Smith 2006.

6 van Houtum 2011, p. 60.

7 Winter 2013, p. 533.

8 I use the notion of belonging not as an individual assertion, but as something shaped through (and prescribed by) the interaction between politics and society, with bearing on collective identity formation and citizenship rights (for a discussion on uses of "belonging", see Lähdesmäki *et al*. 2016).

9 van Houtum 2011, p. 60.

10 See also Niklasson 2016.

Extending inwards: Borderlands of EU cultural policy

In late August 2017, at a bustling café in Zagreb, Croatia, I met with two persons involved in the promotion and nomination of EHL sites at national level. They were translators in a sense, recruited to locate suitable sites, such as Krapina Neanderthal Museum, and to explain the EU initiative to aspiring applicants. This is not an easy task, I was told, partly because there is no money to be gained by being awarded the label, just prestige, but also because the European Commission criteria were difficult to understand. They all sounded very similar and vague, asking for the site's "European symbolic value", "pan-European nature", significance for European integration and history, how it endorses "common values", and the "European dimension" of site activities.[11] Having just joined the EU in 2013, the same year as the first EHL sites were awarded, the Croatian representatives had limited experience interpreting such identity-political EU expressions.

The Croatian representatives were not alone in their confusion. In each report presented by the "EHL expert panel" – the jury of specialists nominated by the EU to make the final assessment – it is stated that many applicants misunderstand the intentions of the EHL: that their narratives are not European enough, their explanations of the European dimension not intricate enough (or too anachronistic), and their links to European values not specific enough.[12] These concerns echo issues raised in older EU heritage actions. The European Community's first heritage scheme, offering partial financial support for monuments and sites of "European renown" (from 1983 to the mid-1990s), attracted many applications that, according to the Commission, "failed to satisfy the terms and conditions of the scheme".[13] It also resonates with my experiences working for the EU agency in charge of the funding programme *Culture 2007–2013*, where I processed hundreds of applications and helped monitor the expert panels. When it came to heritage, the first evaluation criterion, "European [cultural] added value", was interpreted differently both between experts and applicants, with meanings ranging from Christianity to geographical location.[14]

The root of this uncertainty, I argue, lies not in the EU's definition of heritage (which follows those of UNESCO and Council of Europe) or poor application guidelines, but in its vague approach to "Europe" as a signifier. What should

11 EU 2015.
12 EHL 2013; 2014; 2015; 2017.
13 EU 1992a, p. 6 annex.
14 Niklasson 2016.

be achieved by the EU (integration and economic prosperity), and based on what principles (democracy, freedom, human rights), has been clear from the outset, but *Europe* and what it means to be *European* remains obscure. As highlighted by Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, this avoidance is not so much an outcome of neglect as a strategy.[15] In the *Schuman Declaration* (1950), the first proposal for a European coal and steel community, Europe was used as a moral concept and almost magical formula. Only by conflating geographical and cultural Europe with the new co-operation was a wider integration project made possible. This especially visible in documents relating to EU enlargement:

> The term European has not been officially defined. It combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity ... The Commission believes that it is neither possible nor opportune to establish now the frontiers of the European Union.[16]

This ambiguity has shaped EU cultural policy, tasked with developing a European cultural area and "bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore".[17] Most of all the interchangeable use of *Europe* and *the EU* has stimulated a celebratory view of European heritage. Wrapped up in the name of the political project, "Europe" was preordained to become a positive signifier, and heritage, a nostalgic project of late modernity, already implying something good – something worth saving.[18] Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire figure frequently as reference points for democracy, citizenship, and the rule of law in EU rhetoric, and are thus symbolically tied to the EU institutions. When it comes to "negative" or "dark" heritage,[19] such as the Holocaust and communist repression, these ties are severed. While vital to the self-narrative of the EU, and supported through many EU actions, sites from these periods are not used to tell a story of the contemporary Europe of the EU, but *the ashes from which it arose*. By presenting the Union as the saviour of a continent gone astray and promoting dark heritage as places of remembrance – brutal violence, racism, and tyranny become the stuff of moral tales, not internalized as part of what it means to be European.[20]

15 Puntscher Riekmann 1997, p. 64.
16 EU 1992b, p. 11.
17 EU 1992c.
18 Lowenthal 1998.
19 Meskell 2009.
20 Karlsson 2010; Niklasson 2016.

This tendency to disentangle the Europe of the EU from uncomfortable pasts is reflected in the European Commission's tentative division of EHL sites into four positive themes. Listed under the banner of "*freedom and democracy*", the themes are: "struggle for peace", "path to unity", "quest for knowledge", and "vanguards of progress".[21] Sites are then placed under one of these themes. In this exercise, the Roman archaeological military site of Carnuntum in Austria is placed under "vanguards of progress", whereas Camp Westerbork, a Nazi transit camp in the Netherlands, is placed under "struggle for peace". For Carnuntum, the EHL panel report refers to the Roman Empire as a "predecessor of Europe", while it links the Nazi camp to values such as "reconciliation" and "European memories".[22] Perhaps the unwillingness to recognize negative heritage as symbolically linked to present-day Europe is why the staff at Camp Westerbork felt so uneasy when they received the standardized promotional EHL postcards, featuring the slogan "Europe starts here!" with the barracks where Jews were detained in the background.[23] But is it really that far-fetched, historically speaking, to present Europe as starting with genocide?

The strategy of vagueness, whereby the frame of Europe is decided but not its content, has produced a conceptual borderland in EU cultural politics that stretches from 19th-century tropes of a unique European civilization, to present-day notions of cultural solidarity.[24] The former view dominated the EU's first heritage actions. Tacitly grounded in Greco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian heritage, it saw monuments and sites as silent witnesses of European history, and European identity as reflected in Western archaeological features and architectural styles. After the EU expanded eastwards in the 2000s, this view became less viable.[25] Focus shifted from "European roots" to "European values" and from a European past embodied in things to a Europe embodied in people.[26] Accordingly, the EU's method for supporting heritage projects shifted from a target-oriented to a form-oriented approach. Instead of contributing to the restoration and conservation of flagship sites like the Athenian Acropolis, funding was increasingly directed towards cultural co-operation and European professional networks.[27]

21 EU 2017.
22 EHL 2013, p. 8.
23 EHL 2016, p. 37.
24 Calligaro 2013; Niklasson 2016; Shore 2000.
25 Delanty 2013.
26 Niklasson 2017.
27 Innocenti 2015.

In the EHL, both approaches meet. The EHL scheme is target-oriented, with sites envisioned as "mirrors and ambassadors of European significance",[28] but also form-oriented, intended to link heritage professionals and sites together. It seeks to reveal European narratives already resting in sites, *and* to forge a shared European narrative through the very act of labelling. Such ambitious cultural political undertakings require collaboration, and this is where vagueness becomes of essence. To make the action meaningful, independent experts and heritage professionals must be recruited and encouraged to *think EUrope*, to interpret concepts like "European significance" and fill them with content.[29] According to Cris Shore and Susan Wright, it is by applying such soft pressure that cultural policies can "influence people's indigenous norms of conduct so that they themselves contribute, not necessarily consciously, to a government's model of social order".[30]

Returning to the café in Zagreb, the difficulty experienced by the Croatian representatives can be viewed as a response to this strategy of vagueness. They had been asked to think EUrope: to consider what kind of "Europe" it was that the EU wanted them to want.

Extending backwards: Borders in time

When presented by the European Commission or the EHL panel, the 38 heritage sites that have been awarded the EHL so far are usually listed chronologically, to "convey a sense of history".[31] Based on the order in which they appear, 13 sites predate the modern era (before 1789), 16 sites date from that time until the end of WWII, and eight sites to the contemporary era (post 1945). The heavy focus on the last centuries, and the leaps in time further back, could be perceived as a natural outcome of the teleological perspective of the label, to mark "milestones in the creation of today's Europe".[32] Then, the only conundrum would be why there are only six sites that directly relate to the political history of the EU (e.g. the European District of Strasbourg, the village of Schengen, and the Maastricht Treaty). However, based on statements made by members of the EHL expert panel and my conversations with EU officials, there is an underlying ambition to create an unbiased and representative

28 EHL 2017, p. 8.
29 Cf. Morin 1987.
30 Shore & Wright 1997, p. 6.
31 EHL 2017, p. 5.
32 EU 2018.

timeline of European history – a hope that "the gaps will be filled gradually".[33] This nurturing of a desire for representativity, in combination with an ambition to create a meaningful past for the Europe of the EU, is a great example of the conflation of history and heritage:

> In domesticating the past we enlist it for present causes. Legends of origin and endurance, of victory or calamity, project the present back, the past forward; they align us with forebears whose virtues we share and whose vices we shun. We are apt to call such communion history, but it is actually heritage. The distinction is vital. History explores and explains pasts grown ever more opaque over time; heritage clarifies pasts so as to infuse them with present purposes.[34]

The line David Lowenthal draws here between history and heritage is rarely so sharp, but it helps make the point that all historical sites are vertical. They are linked to different purposes, peoples, and events in different periods, all of which figure into their history. In the process of becoming heritage, some of these pasts are tilted horizontally, chosen as particularly meaningful against the backdrop of present concerns. The EHL attempts to perform such a tilt through the exercise of listing, an act which also draws up borders in time. To explore when Europe was in this scheme, I return to Krapina and Sagres.

During my visit to the Krapina Neanderthal Museum in 2017, the manager told me be about a recent EHL networking meeting he had attended. Introducing the Krapina site to the other site representatives, he had been asked by some of them why it carried the label, insinuating that the period and topic made Krapina an oddball in the context. I admitted that, confronted with the EHL criteria, I too had been surprised that it included ancient archaeological sites and a Neanderthal site. When first reading about it I remember thinking: surely, they cannot mean that the Europe of the EU has its roots in the Pleistocene? As it turns out, this was not the case. Among the themes outlined by the European Commission and the EHL panel, the site sorts under "quest for knowledge" and "the Europe of science and progress".[35] The panel recommended it for inscription as "a monument to Europe's contribution to the research on the genesis of humankind".[36]

33 EHL 2016, p. 41.
34 Lowenthal 1998, p. xv.
35 EU 2017; EHL 2016, p. 40.
36 EHL 2015, p. 6.

Fig. 2. The beginning of the walk through time at Krapina Neanderthal Museum. Photograph courtesy of Damir Fabijanić.

Thus, it is not the Neanderthals but the *academic* importance of the find – including over 900 bone fragments from about 80 individuals – that takes centre stage at Krapina. Its European significance is linked to the discovery in 1899 by geologist and palaeontologist Dragutin Gorjanović-Kramberger (1856–1936), and the subsequent formation of scientific networks and theories around the finds. Out of a 125,000-year history, it was the events of 1899 and their outcomes that were tilted horizontally, chosen as a European past, populated by the great men of Western science. This aligns with the focus of the application, which only drew on the prehistory of the site under the category "common values that underpin European integration". There it is suggested that the human development theme itself could send a bioenvironmental message of tolerance and peaceful cohabitation rooted in European prehistory. A Croatian heritage professional involved in writing the text told me that this storyline, about the life and culture of the "first Europeans", had been more pronounced in the initial pitch, but that emphasis had shifted in response to feedback during the EHL application process. In a way, even if anachronistic, connecting the question of what it means to be European to the life of the Neanderthals, and from there to what it

means to be human (*Fig. 2*), represents a wider approach to Europe than the idea of progress, which is so deeply ingrained in the trope of European civilization.

At Sagres Fortress in Portugal, the heritage professionals in charge had much confidence in the site's suitability for the EHL. Its European significance is so manifest, they explained, that the real challenge is how to ensure that the story of Prince Henry the Navigator (Infante D. Henrique of Portugal, 1394–1460) does not overshadow the longue durée of the area, which include prehistoric megalithic menhirs, influences from Christian Mozarabs (8th–11th century), and traces of 16–18th-century military history. Indeed, Sagres plays a strong mythical role in the Portuguese historical imagination, both as Henry's last residence, and the place for his alleged school of navigation (an idea which endures despite being refuted).[37] Together with the neighbouring town of Lagos, Sagres also figures as a starting point for grand narratives of European exploration. As the EHL panels' recommendation shows, everything that came before the 15th century is therefore easily baked into the chosen European past:

> Sagres Promontory is a rich cultural landscape testifying to the remote origins of European civilisation and its universal expansion in the Age of Discoveries through science, commerce, and exploration.[38]

While nothing in the application discouraged a focus on Prince Henry, portrayed as a pioneer of globalization and one of the founding fathers of Europe,[39] it mentions one important aspect which is missing from the EU promotional texts. Henry was also a founding father of the European slave trade.[40] His "exploration" campaigns were fuelled by greed and religious fanaticism rather than curiosity. Highest on the list of desirable commodities were gold and spices, but in 1444 Henry authorized a fleet which brought back 235 persons from sub-Saharan Africa to be sold as slaves in the city of Lagos, near Sagres. The public auction, which Henry turned into a display of Portugal's new power as a slave-trading nation, marked the start of two centuries of Portuguese domination in the Atlantic slave trade.[41] Part of what made these actions seem justifiable at the time was the holy war against Islam. Henry was the grand master of the military Order of Christ, an association funded by the Knights Templar, and when the slave trade began it was Muslim Berber tribes living north

37 Russell 2001.
38 EHL 2015, p. 8.
39 See also Gonçalves *et al*. 2016.
40 Russell 2001, pp. 260–261.
41 Rawley & Behrendt 2005, pp. 18–21; Russell 2001, p. 241.

Fig. 3. Sign at the entrance of Sagres Fortress. Photograph by the author, 2017.

of the Senegal River that were the first targets.[42] Thus, the terms "commerce" and "exploration" on the EU sign (*Fig. 3*) could easily be exchanged for "exploitation" and "subjugation". In fact, there are historical sources that point to the profits from the slave trade being the reason why Henry could continue his expeditions in the name of science, profit, and the Christian god.[43]

Grouped under European Commission themes like "quest for knowledge" and "networks and exchanges",[44] which are both positively charged components of EU rhetoric, the darker side of the chosen European past at Sagres – the oppression

42 Russell 2001, pp. 67–69, 240; Thomas 1997, pp. 53–58.
43 Rawley & Behrendt 2005, p. 2; Russell 2001.
44 EU 2017; EHL 2016, p. 40.

Fig. 4. Hero or perpetrator? Honorific statue of Prince Henry the Navigator in front of the old slave market (building with arches) in Lagos. Photograph by the author, 2017.

caused by "the expansion of European culture" (*Fig. 3*) – becomes defused. If celebrated chiefly as a cross-cultural meeting point and place of globalization, the violence of this period comes off as an achievement. Acts which clearly violated the human rights we now consider to be a core European value, become footnotes in a grand narrative of European civilization. Should this past be cherished? Should it be a base for reconciliation? Should it be used as a means to highlight and criticize power imbalances still in existence? None of these are mutually exclusive, but as it stands, if stories such as that of "Henry the Slave Trader" (*Fig. 4*) is not processed as part of what it means to be European, the EHL risks sanctioning the crimes of European colonization, trafficking, and religious war.

Looking at the borders in time drawn up at Krapina and Sagres, as well as in the EHL initiative as a whole, there is little to indicate that the scheme – in its mission to create a sense of belonging to the EU – seeks to challenge already established notions of Europe. Even if done with a critical twist, it tends toward reciting a canon where European civilization has its cradle in the Greco-Roman world, youth in the ages of

Discovery, Enlightenment and Empire, adulthood in the Industrial Revolution and World Wars, and maturity in the unification of Europe. This narrative is also circumscribed by the fact that the EHL scheme is only open to EU member states, excluding nations that have played a major part in the history of the region, such as Switzerland, Norway and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides, if really aiming for a cultural historical (not geographical) idea of Europe, sites of "European significance" could be found in all parts of the world. Used as an answer to the question of what it means to be European, this limited approach may reinforce a notion of belonging dependent on the past – on *where you come from*. It could also work to dissociate negative sides of European history from the Europe of the EU. In reality, to be European is of course not the same as being a force of good. Contemporary history, more so than heritage, teaches us that.

Extending outwards: Heritage at the fault lines of Europe

Walking along the Sagres promontory I encountered a building with very little signage (*Fig. 5*). In the maps of the site it is only marked as "naval radio station". Searching for more information, I found that the first lighthouse at Sagres was inaugurated in 1894, as part of the 5th centenary of the birth of Prince Henry. It was replaced with a new building in 1923, which in turn was to be demolished some 35 years later, because it was considered damaging to the authenticity of what was on the way to becoming a "proper" heritage site. Due to its strategic vantage point a lighthouse was nevertheless needed and on 1 April 1960 a new, architectonically unobtrusive tower was inaugurated as part of the 5th centenary of the death of Prince Henry.[45]

It was this anonymous building I had seen. Today it forms part of the heritage protection zone of Sagres Fortress, while still in full operation.[46] No longer just a navigation aid, it is used for remote-controlled radio-goniometric positioning of un/authorized vessels. Discussing the site's contemporary meaning with the site co-ordinator, it became clear that it is linked to European and global border surveillance systems, which have recently been tightened in response to boat migration. Just as in the 15th–18th century, the site now has a military function. And just as then, it represents the frontier between Europe and Africa – between the Christian and the Muslim world. Exclusionary political groups in Portugal and Spain reinforce this divide, the co-ordinator said. The sad irony of the situation – that people from the same sub-

45 Direcção de Faróis 2006, p. 35.
46 DGPC 2018.

Fig. 5. The naval radio station at Sagres Promontory. Photograph by the author, 2017.

Saharan regions from where people were once forcibly taken and brought to Europe by ship and often perished on the way, now risked their lives at sea to get to Europe, often only to be detained or sent back – was not lost on either of us.

Sagres Fortress illustrates how heritage can be tied to both border-transcending and border-confirming practices, at the same time.[47] As part of the EHL scheme, the site participates in the symbolic and networked debordering of the EU, an act of political consolidation and transcension which, due to the conditions created by EU cultural policy, also confirms a meaningful difference between that European and that non-European. This development began in earnest after the Schengen Agreement came into effect in 1995, followed by the launch of the Euro currency in 1999 and the eastward enlargement of 2004. As border-transcending measures in communication, commerce, and education multiplied, researchers began to understand the new Europe as a network of deterritorialized relationships between peoples, places,

47 Scott 2012.

and goods: as nodes tied to an EU cluster in an increasingly globalized, technology-driven world.[48] Still, borders did not vanish as much as they shifted in nature.

This is where the naval radio station becomes important. As part of supranational surveillance networks, it is linked to the (re)bordering of Europe, a complex architecture of control designed to maintain a division between the Europe of the EU and non-Europe.[49] Fuelled by the War on Terror and illegal immigration, nowadays dangerously conflated, the gaze of EU's external border regime has increasingly been directed outwards.[50] Through tools such as Frontex (The European Border and Coast Guard Agency) and its Rapid border intervention teams (RABIT), much of EU's border-work now takes place at sea or in adjacent countries. Southern and Eastern European states have come to act as buffer zones, enforcing EU borders without membership status in exchange for greater access to EU privileges.[51] Bilateral agreements have also been struck with Morocco and Turkey (among others) to deter unwanteds from reaching EU borders, and if they do, to return them to the transit country.[52] For those deported or blocked before reaching the EU, and those waiting in holding centres on Lesbos (Greece) or in Melilla (Spain), "Fortress Europe" is very real. Such in-between places, Étienne Balibar argues, where "foreigners again become noncitizens and pariahs", exposes the border as a "nondemocratic condition of democracy".[53] Furthermore, even if people successfully enter the EU, they soon learn that without the benefit of religious and bodily invisibility, the border travels with them. Because just as borders have extended outwards, they have – "sometimes noisily and sometimes sneakily" – moved from the edges to "the middle of political space".[54]

A group deeply invested in upholding such borders is the populist radical right. Taking advantage of the political indecisiveness that has plagued the EU refugee reception crisis, they have managed to build a strong platform for their core issue: to halt non-western (specifically Muslim) immigration. More effective than their policies are their ability to instil fear into public discourse, prompting establishment parties to focus the political conversation on national security.[55] The fights over refugee quotas in the European Parliament speaks to this influence, exposing Europe as "a

48 Castells 2000; Sassen 2006.
49 van Houtum 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2015.
50 Follis 2017; Vaughan-Williams 2008; Zaiotti 2016.
51 Liikanen *et al*. 2016.
52 Yıldız 2016.
53 Balibar 2004, p. 111.
54 Balibar 2004, p. 109.
55 Niklasson & Hølleland 2018; Wodak 2015.

coalition of selfishness rivalling for the trophy of xenophobia".[56] One oft-neglected aspect of radical right ideology is that, while anti-EU, they rarely take issue with "Europe" or with co-operation between independent European states.[57] In fact, over the last decade they have established a shared foreign-political message: "Europe for the Europeans".[58] At its base rests a canonized idea of European civilization which does not differ significantly from the one often cited in EU rhetoric. For them, Cas Mudde argues, Europe is a "meta-culture", an extended club of distinct nations with roots in Greco-Roman and Christian traditions.[59] Similarly, Rogers Brubaker suggests that the synchronized turn against "Muslims" as a collective enemy has produced a "civilizational overlay of nationalist rhetoric".[60] That among populist right parties in Western Europe, Christianity, paradoxically, is becoming the new "matrix of liberalism, secularity, and gender equality".[61] And so...

> ... even as the European project falters – with the eurozone, Schengen, and the EU itself in deep crisis – a European identity, defined in religio-civilizational terms, has come to figure more centrally in political rhetoric.[62]

Here, the border-transcending and border-confirming practices of the EU traverses the agenda of the radical right. Trying to proactively manage, rather than block Middle Eastern and North African immigration, the externalization of EU's border regime still aligns with and legitimizes a "politics of fear".[63] Meanwhile, the radical right's appeals to protect European civilization makes them rival claimants of a common European heritage. From France to Austria, identitarian youth movements claim to fight for a "genuine Europe", justifying the harassment of immigrants by alluding to the diverse yet interconnected heritage of "native Europeans".[64] In Greece, the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn rallies against immigrants beneath the Athenian Acropolis (an EHL site since 2014), and holds annual commemorations of the Spartans' mythologized battle for Western civilization against the Persians at Thermopylae.[65] The

56 Balibar 2015.
57 Mudde 2007, pp. 165–171.
58 Liang 2007, p. 29.
59 Mudde 2007, p. 170.
60 Brubaker 2017, p. 1211.
61 Brubaker 2017, p. 1211.
62 Brubaker 2017, p. 1212.
63 Wodak 2015.
64 Neyrat 2014, p. 26; York & Anselmi 2017.
65 Fielitz 2016; Tharoor 2016.

burning question for the future of EU cultural policy becomes: how can it ensure that the image of European civilization summoned through heritage initiatives like the EHL is fundamentally different from that of the radical right?

Europe ends here? Re-imagining the nexus of heritage and borders

This chapter set off from the premise that heritage forms one of the conditions that makes borders possible. The act of "doing" European heritage can therefore influence, not just people's sense of belonging to the EU – as is the explicit goal of the EHL – but outline what it "takes" to belong in Europe. The text has raised the simple but critical point, that if the European Heritage Label manages to break borders and expand historical consciousness in the EU, it will also, inevitably, create borders elsewhere. It is vital to be aware of what those borders are and who they serve, lest EU heritage actions risk inadvertently underpinning civilizational agendas that promote ethno-cultural origins as a condition for citizenship and equal treatment. Of course, this is not just a task for EU policy makers. Borders are collaborative projects, and it is up to heritage practitioners, researchers, civil servants, and politicians alike, to be observant of the borders they make and break through their actions.

So how can the points and pitfalls identified in relation to the EHL scheme help us reimagine the traditional nexus of heritage and borders? And how can this nexus be put to work analytically, as something used to "think with" rather than something that preconditions our thoughts about who belongs where? By temporarily reversing the EHL slogan "Europe begins here!" to "Europe ends here", I will highlight three potential dimensions of a more deliberate approach to heritage and borders.

The first is to locate the political borders within heritage. This means to identify the mechanisms by which the unruly mass of history is tidied up and turned into heritage, whereby particular pasts are singled out for their ability to explain and sanction political status quo. In relation to the EHL, I argued that the conflation of cultural Europe and political Europe, of European history and the heritage of the EU, work as such a mechanism. It allows the EU to tie previous "Europes" to their history as an institution and to their reason for being, with the consequence that the borders which defined what it meant to belong in Europe back then will have bearing on what it means to be European today. To locate such political borders in heritage is the first step if we are to think with them. In the case of the EU this could facilitate a shift from European heritage to heritage in Europe, or better yet, the removal of "Europe" from the set phrase altogether. Recently there are signs of such a trend, as the European Commission has begun to recognize the cultural contributions of everyone liv-

ing in the EU as part of European culture – not just EU citizens.[66] The EU ministers of culture have also flagged for an understanding of cultural heritage as something "constantly evolving" and begun to pay less attention to Europe as signifier.[67] For the EHL this would mean supporting heritage for its knowledge potential first, not as part of an identity-political mission.

The second is to adopt a view from the border. By figuratively climbing borders we locate – between nations and continents, between past and present, between us and them – we can better understand the power asymmetry rooted in the question: Where do you belong? My linking of the border-transcending and border-confirming practices of the EHL to the externalization of EU's border regime, and to its unintentional alignment with the rhetoric of the European radical right, was an attempt to begin such a climb. To show that just as with the nation state, the rhetoric of European values – of democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law – becomes most challenging, even contradictory, along its edges. For EU cultural policy, to adopt such a view would mean to challenge the borders between Europe and non-Europe, as they manifest in big cities, by the sea, or in zones at the EU margins. The EHL could then highlight the ironies and inconsistencies of the grand narratives of Europe, thereby complicating, not harmonizing, current understandings of what it means to be European.

The third is to stop treating heritage as a goodwill project. This means to not, at the outset, draw a border between positive and negative pasts based on how well they match the contemporary values of a given political power, but to recognize the two-faced nature of heritage: that perpetrators and heroes, failures and achievements, are often one and the same.[68] It would signal a more confident and brave stance on heritage, open to embarrassing and self-exposing narratives that challenge the status quo. Discussing the EHL sites assigned European value, I argued that the EU's implicit belief in both "Europe" and "heritage" as good causes has led to a situation where sites that align with the self-image of the EU are celebrated as part of its own legacy, while sites dealing with uncomfortable pasts are linked to a previous, different Europe, in need of remembrance. The question then, is what would a non-goodwill EHL site look like?

Addressing the aftermath of the Balkan War (1994–1996), Étienne Balibar argued that only if the European Community recognized what transpired as a product of their own history and making – not a mere by-product of communism or an

66 Calligaro 2013.
67 Niklasson 2017, p. 152.
68 Niklasson 2016, p. 66.

"exterior obstacle to be overcome through exterior means" – would Europe "become possible again".[69] A future, self-exposing EHL site, situated in one of the external buffer zones of the EU, would therefore be Srebrenica Genocide Memorial. The EHL plaque would then acknowledge the damage caused by the inaction of the EU member states in that conflict. Another suggested future candidate, standing as a monument to EU border politics, is Moria refugee camp and holding centre on the Greek island of Lesbos. In neither case would their European significance be about reconciliation or overcoming obstacles on the way to peace and progress, but about working with pasts that fester on the road to social justice.

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69 Balibar 2004, pp. 3–6.

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Cecilia Parsberg

We are losers and you have to learn from us

1. The words in the title are Kefah Fanni's, from a conversation we had in 2005. He is a Palestinian poet living in the Israeli-occupied territories on the West Bank. He's a poet under occupation. His view of the Israeli wall is that it prevents possibilities to relate and thus build communities. Kefah means that the wall is a break in a movement, that this demarcation is a law that fractures the development of community.

The Israeli West Bank barrier winds across Palestinian farmland, which has been excavated as the wall was built. Construction started in 2003. On 9 July 2004, it was declared by the International Court of Justice to be a violation of international law, but that did not prevent construction continuing. The wall separates Palestinian farmland from Palestinian residences, causing confrontations in many places. In 2003 when I started to document the building of the wall, I interviewed Kefah Fanni and he expressed his relation to the wall "[...] the Israelis can limit our sight, but they can't limit our imagination. [...] On the other side, they see the wall as constructive. [...] it's their will to build this wall; it's against our will. From our side it's inappropriate: we want to demolish this wall. [...] Here in Ramallah we have daily contact with the wall, we are touching it. On the other side of the wall there is nothing built, because it was recently, before the wall, our land. Now they are constructing roads. Most of the Israelis don't know what the wall looks like, only those people living in distant settlements, like near Jenin. In the Israeli cities they have only heard about the wall in the media. If you drew something on the wall on the Israeli side, there wouldn't be anyone to see it."[1]

When Kefah says "We are losers, and you have to learn from us", he is suggesting an alternative way of looking at the relating and teaching of them or that which can't be excluded and controlled.

1 Parsberg 2016, ch. 6.1.

The community of wall builders provides the basis for a production of knowledge that is disseminated, as is the community of the occupied. Kefah calls himself and his occupied community – which is surrounded by the wall – *losers*. Because they have been defeated by a victorious power. But the winners do not possess all of the knowledge. He is saying that the knowledge of the *losers* is unavoidable. He is saying: We lost, but if your strength, your victory, your success is built on us losing, then we're in your lives, in your actions, in your knowledge production to the same, or perhaps a greater, extent. The sentence: "We are losers and you have to learn from us" demarcates a border, but the meaning opens up a space – a space for possible action. Kefah gives me an example, the wall built by Israel on occupied Palestinian territories is opposed by different kinds of resistance, political and religious, but is not just a political barrier: many artworks are made about it, of which the most interesting is the art made *on* it. The wall has become an attractive place for Palestinian artists and for international and collective artworks – a surface where networking happens by itself, without the networkers knowing each other, or even knowing about each others' works until their artworks connect at the site. They seem to share the same idea: the Israeli wall as a space for action, through fiction, instead of a hindrance for action. In 2005 the graffiti artist Banksy described the wall as "the ultimate activity holiday destination for graffiti writers".[2]

Kefah has taught me that "To only relate *against*, means obliterating one's own agency in a dependency, to let oneself be occupied. It's about autonomy and stance". In my opinion, this is about dignity, to give worth, to receive worth, and the fact that worth cannot be taken. Just as when women in my home country Sweden demanded the right to vote, they demanded to be seen, heard, and spoken to, to receive a response from society, an acknowledgement that they existed, to receive worth. They demanded that images of women change. Women were the occupied territory of prevailing knowledge. To demand that women's knowledge count as knowledge was a struggle against subordination that was fought by attending to one's worth. Through practice lies the possibility of stamping knowledge or stamping it out through oblivion. That struggle was just as much about attending to the knowledge that was considered worth promoting.

Five years later, in 2010, an invisible wall, a border between people in the streets in Sweden will cause intense national discussion. It will insist on my attention, and it will take me another four years to find out how to present this border as a space of potentiality.

2 BBC News 2005.

2. It is late 2010, in Gothenburg, Sweden. For some months now, I've passed a number of people during my daily rounds, they're kneeling or walking jerkily holding plastic cups. They ask for money and speak languages I don't understand. Something new is happening in the city streets.

One day I see a man who is standing, shaking, he's leaning on a cane and holding out a cup with his other hand. For a while I stand at a distance, watching him. The situation is complex and confusing, I become emotional. When I approach him to speak to him, my body language doesn't project friendliness and mutuality – reasonable conditions for a dialogue – and I know all this in that very moment, it is my job to know it. I also realize that I am about to take leave of several of my founding ethical principles, the stance that I have worked toward during my 20 years of artistic practice, but right now I am ruled by adrenaline, my heart is pounding. I step up to the man, iPhone in hand, and film him, while I ask in Swedish if he needs help. He doesn't understand. I then ask again in English, then in Spanish. No, he needs money, he tells me in Italian. He extends a large cross that he is wearing on a chain around his neck. This doesn't compute for me; what does the cross have to do with his situation, why is he begging, can't he go to the social services? I ask why he isn't working, if he is sick, if he needs care. "Do you want me to take you to a hospital?", I insist, but he doesn't understand and says that he has several children that need food. He says he came by bus from Romania. "You came by bus, oh, so you're a tourist?", I say. He looks at me uncomprehendingly and the conversation is over. "Please, no television," he says. No, I won't show this, I tell him, and mean it, trembling and ashamed.

My first encounter – or rather non-encounter – with a person who was begging, prompted me to embark on a five-year exploration of what happens between the begging and the giving in the streets of Sweden. The distance between me and the person begging, is a distance demarcated by a number of ethical quandaries. I pose questions about the images at play in the social choreography of begging and giving – how can images be activated in this context and new ones generated?[3] I use images as my starting point; images of action and images that implicate, images that are set in motion, images that generate motion (moving images) and the reverse: new movements generate new images. Images, because borders don't just manifest on the ground; on places where some people are included in the social structure and others are shut out for various reasons and continue to live just outside. But borders manifest also in the mind; in the collective imagination. We share an existence in the streets but we're separated by an imagined border, a chasm – we don't share it. During three years

3 Parsberg 2016, ch.1.4.

I interview both begging and giving people and make interactive workshops with them, but I don't succeed in doing much more than write and stage works *about* the phenomenon.

3. In the spring 2014 I begin to plan for a film shoot of a chorus dialogue, *The Chorus of Begging and The Chorus of Giving*. Two choirs are involved: The Chorus of Begging consists of people who beg in the streets and The Chorus of Giving consists of people who give to people begging in the streets.[4] On the street the obstacles seem both emotional, aesthetic, and language-bound. Often both parties seem to want to communicate more but can't. And of course, there are cultural codes at play between those who beg and those who give or don't give. To give and receive money is often a non-verbal transaction, which is why I decide that The Chorus of Begging and The Chorus of Giving shall sing without words. Using their own individual voices as well as their collective voice of the chorus, they are going to attempt to sing the feelings between these begging and giving people.

The choruses will stand facing each other – about five metres apart – while they sing, and the setup will be the same when the films are screened as an installation. The viewer will stand between the images and the sound from The Chorus of Begging and the images and the sound from The Chorus of Giving. With this setup, it is a work that aims to reveal and activate a social border as a space for political action.

Phenomenologist Sara Ahmed has studied the meaning of emotion in the space between people.[5] She describes how emotions are created between people, how they bind, and connect bodies, not as something that is, that exists inside people, but rather as something that's done and becomes action, in interaction with and dependent on other people. The purpose of our chorus training was to activate that crossing of the imagined border. The idea was that border-crossing movements must be per-

4 The recruiting is described in Parsberg 2016, ch.7.1. The film was made in 2014 when the attention and engagement around newly arrived beggars, mostly from Romania and Bulgaria, in Sweden was high, for example the number of articles in Swedish newspapers about begging and giving increased 17 times from 2011 to 2016.

5 In *The cultural politics of emotion* (2014) Sara Ahmed joins the sociologists and anthropologists who claim that emotions – rather than being seen as psychological states – can be seen as social and cultural practices. She describes Durkheim's reasoning on how individual ideas and tendencies come to us "from without". Durkheim argues that sociology is about "recognizing constraint". "Most of our ideas and our tendencies are not developed by ourselves but come to us from without." (Durkheim 1966, p. 4). He presents a theory on emotion as a social form with the example of large gatherings of people generating emotions that do not tie in to individual "self-expression" (compare to swarm theories).

formed contrary to accustomed patterns of identification, new patterns of movement must be generated: a new choreography. If a mutual action is staged – something which none of those begging or giving have previously done in this manner – can new images be conveyed between the participants? Can they be conveyed to the viewer who gets to inhabit the in-between – the space between the two choirs?[6]

4. For three days in June 2014, the 24 members of the choirs were put through a specific form of choral training to learn how to improvise song without words or music. All participants had signed contracts. The schedule was on the contract as was a release form stating that each participant consents to being filmed. The chorus participants were filmed the entire time – using five cameras – except during breaks. In the more social contexts, when we ate, took breaks, drank coffee, and danced, there was a desire to make contact, a search for communication, a curiosity and a sort of attraction – a curious interest. Three interpreters translating between Romanian and Swedish were at the lunch so that everyone would be able to understand what we said to each other. A sense of community emerged between the participants in the chorus. The recordings of the training were later edited into a production film.[7] In art historian Claire Bishop's words it can be termed a "delegated performance", which is a work "[...] where the artist devises the entire situation being filmed, and where the participants are asked to perform themselves."[8] A director is expected to know when the actor reaches the boundary where contact is made with the viewer. A documentary filmmaker is expected to know when the person being filmed penetrates the lens. Improvising singing, in dialogue with another chorus, in a situation where everyone is an amateur and no one has met before and everyone is being filmed, means that those in front of the camera need to feel safe with those behind the camera. Otherwise nothing will be created, nothing will happen, no one will sing so that the song reaches and carries.

During these three days of training, conditions were more or less equal for everyone in terms of logistics. Nobody had previous experiences of singing in a chorus opposite another chorus consisting of people that they had never met before. Different life circumstances can create fear and distance but also curiosity: part of the drama that plays out in the streets. Sometimes I call this "curiosity attraction", described as a condition in which I want to know more, but it worries me. I am prepared to give

6 The film can be viewed in Parsberg 2016, ch. 7.1.

7 Parsberg 2016, ch. 7.1.

8 Bishop 2012, p. 226.

Fig. 1. Both choruses were arranged in the same formation. The Chorus of Begging *is placed to the left and* The Chorus of Giving *to the right. The participants did not wear any kind of costume, only the clothing they wore when they arrived at the set. Jacobsson Theatre, Artisten, Gothenburg, 13–15 June 2014.*

up something of my own understanding of the state of things and am also interested in the unknown, in what isn't understood.

All chorus participants were thus prepared for the task to voice – to sing – feelings in their own chorus, which in turn sings in dialogue with the other chorus. If the members of the choirs had sung in their own languages – Swedish or Romanian – the language would have become a barrier. Instead they were expected to explore sounds. They had understood that training would be needed, but not how it would work. One of the voice exercises used concrete situations as a prompt: stories of longing for one's children in Romania; a story of being spat on; a story of a loved one dying. The choir directors Jenny and Pär guided the participants in finding a sound, a tone, and a short melody, a call or another way of expressing their emotion and repeating this word mechanically. When each person one-by-one – led by a rhythm – repeated his or her sounds mechanically it became a choir: a choir of individual sounds that originated in a personal association to the same feeling, expressing a mood.[9]

9 For further reading about the dramaturgic approach and setup, see Parsberg 2016, ch.7.

Fig. 2. Varbergs Konsthall 2015.

> "[…] right there, in the warmth of the human voice, in the living echo of the past, some primal happiness lies hidden and the inescapable tragedy, the chaos and pathos of life is bared, the singular and the unattainable, there, in the primary sources, they have yet to be reworked." (Svetlana Aleksijevitj)[10]

5. The two choirs stood about five metres apart when we shot the film, and they are shown the same way – as projections opposite one another approximately five metres apart. The scale is calibrated so that a viewer and a member of the choir are about the same size when full body shots of the choir are shown on the screen.

Begging is a call to social interaction. Regardless of whether or not the giver interacts socially with the (visitor) begging in the street, the giver is implicated in the asymmetrical value system of the EU.[11] These transactions and interactions take place

10 Aleksijevitj 2013, audiobook, at 26:46 mins.

11 See the Council of Europe commissioner Thomas Hammarberg's report: "The commissioner has repeatedly highlighted that anti-Gypsyism is a crucial factor preventing the inclusion of Roma in society and that resolute action against it must therefore be central to any efforts to promote their integration.", Strasbourg: Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012, p. 40. For further reading, see Parsberg 2016, chs. 5, 3 'Giving in Free Movement Europe'.

between, and in opposition to, one another, which is why I arranged The Chorus of Begging and The Chorus of Giving identically – in a symmetrical structure.

This configuration does not become three-dimensional until the viewer steps into the space in-between. I quote Jacques Derrida: "The Third is the one who questions me in the face-to-face, who suddenly makes me feel that there's a risk of injustice in the ethical if I do not take into account the other of the other".[12] In this installation the viewer could be said to be The Third, who is invited to the installation, and who is watching the work in their own life experience. The viewer is also a participant when asked to give feedback after the chorus work – experiences without reflection are just events without meaning.[13] But also, the viewer is always present for the director who guides the choices and decisions. The notes for the installation as a whole were:

> The political happens every day, between people in our surroundings who share our existence. That is the premise for my artistic practice. I perceive, with all of my senses, a physical and mental distance between those who kneel on the street and passers-by, between begging and giving people. Here I invite the spectator into that "border-zone". A dialogue, or a lack of dialogue is going on between the two choruses, between voices, between facial expressions, and between bodies. The installation "The Chorus of Begging and The Chorus of Giving" is an embodiment of this experiential space. A reflection of a situation that many experience every day on our streets. It is my hope that art can make it possible to see such borders – which seem to be difficult to talk about – as spaces for action; and thus contribute to the possibility of political acts in and about these spaces.

6. Does the symmetrical arrangement – by directing and presenting symmetry – present a false image, a benevolent representation that indicates a sort of equity? Could my arrangement be giving a sense of two troops, soldiers of society, framed into op-

12 Derrida continues: "As for Lévinas, he defined the relationship to the ethical as a face-to-face with the other and then he eventually had to admit that in the dual relation of the ethical face-to-face with the other, the Third is present too. And the Third is not a person, not a *terstis*, a witness who comes in addition to the two. The Third is always already there in the dual relation, in the face-to-face. Lévinas says that this Third, the coming of this Third that has always already come to pass, is the origin or rather the birth of the question. It is with the Third that the call to justice appears as a question. The Third is the one who questions me in the face-to-face, who suddenly makes me feel that there's a risk of injustice in the ethical if I do not take into account the other of the other." Derrida 2007, p. 444.

13 One example of this are Maja's and Frej's comments in Parsberg 2016, ch. 7.1, the last part of 8. 'Debrief'.

position on each side of the viewer? Is it a utopia of collaboration, or a dystopia of separation?

Within the matrix of the prevailing system humans are counted and measured according to symmetric meters, however those in The Chorus of Begging aren't quite part of the system and thus haven't been counted by the same meter as those in The Chorus of Giving – that is why I wanted both choirs to be able to stand in the same way.[14]

The first reason for the symmetrical choral arrangement is the intention that the chorus of song would be created through interaction. "Co-presence" is a key word here. On the streets, in our cities, we move in co-presence, people's movements are an essential part of how cities function. But co-presence doesn't necessarily mean that we interact: "Co-presence is not social in itself. In contrast, it makes up the foundation of social interaction (in physical space). And it is with social interaction that the social 'begins'", writes human geographer Sara Westin.[15] Choral singing is a creative endeavour between people, which demands presence and togetherness from all participants, and we moved on to "co-presence" in the interaction between the two choruses, which could be said to demand exactly that from its participants which the prevailing political structure does not.

The second reason for the symmetrical arrangement is that I don't want to depict what is happening, I don't want to replicate the physical gestures that play out on the street. The participants, whose bodies and gestures were shaped by the situation on the street, were guarded at the beginning, not so much when it came to singing as when it came to relating to each other. They needed training to unlearn instrumental roles and representations: to unlearn the images they had of each other. This process of unlearning also necessitated de-representation of clothes as well as positions.[16] I wanted to try to make a new image emerge. My question was and remains: Is there a way for me to wriggle past the rhetoric that so easily traps me in the framework of

14 In August 2013 the Swedish government co-ordinator for the homeless, Michael Anefur, estimated that the number of poor EU citizens coming to Sweden for work is somewhere between 1000 and 2000 people, and that the number is expected to rise significantly. On 20 March 2014, Hammarberg made a statement on Sweden's treatment of Roma EU migrants. "The municipalities are unwilling to do anything to indicate that they understand the situation, they won't even install a toilet. Nor do they want to create more beds in homeless shelters. Nothing is done to improve daily life." (Vergara 2013); Commissioner for Human Rights 2012. Read more about the situation in Parsberg 2016, ch. 5, 3 'Giving in Free Movement Europe'.

15 Westin 2014, p. 187.

16 For more on this training see Parsberg 2016, ch. 7.1, under 4. 'Dramaturgic approach and setup'.

expectation, to a place in which we do a third thing together? Is this a way for new images to be generated? The participants are not asked for their ethnicity, citizenship and the like, they are only asked about this particular activity and this action. The viewers have only been told that one chorus is made up of people who usually beg on the streets and the other of people who usually give to those who beg, and are not told which one is which.

The third reason for the symmetry is based on what the anthropologist Camilla Ravnbøl writes after a ten-month field study of those who beg on the streets of Copenhagen: "They see themselves as being EU-citizens [...] as part of the system".[17] In the same vein Mujo Halilovic, a Ph.D. candidate at Malmö University writes that beggers themselves want to be seen as citizens like any other and no longer as "the others".[18] The symmetry of the choral arrangement attempts to highlight the deficiency that is experienced on the street. The viewers are given the opportunity to confront this deficiency when they stand between the two choruses. The seemingly empty space is transformed – in front of the viewer – from glances exchanged in silence, to singing together with the other chorus. Sensuality is mediated here.[19] Social points of contact are sensual, that is where the political is founded: in people's affectivities and reactions. Judith Butler claims that "a critical practice of thinking [...] refuses to take for granted that framework of identitarian struggle which assumes that subjects already exist, that they occupy a common public space, and that their differences might be reconciled if only we had the right tools for bringing them together."[20] The sensual (sound and vision) space is created for the viewer, the witness, to step in and partake in the exchange. This action challenges normative understandings of identity, ethnicity, nationality, and subject. It's an immaterial space. A potentially sensual space lies between giving and begging.

The fourth reason for the symmetrical formation of the choral arrangement is to depict a form of border that appears unbridgeable in the urban space between those begging and those giving. It is a border manifested through these actions. It is a structural and ethical border that is inherent to the situation, position, and action. I wanted to examine what might happen if the border remains but those begging and those giving perform *situation*, *position*, and *action* in a different way. I changed the conditions as follows:

17 Ravnbøl 2015, p. 328.
18 Halilovic 2015, p. 361.
19 Watch the film, f.e. at 3:35 mins, Parsberg 2016, ch. 7.1.
20 Butler 2009, p. 163.

Fig. 3. Konsthall Väven, Umeå, 2015.

situation – they have been subject to the same conditions for three days.[21]
position – they are standing up.
action – they are singing with each other.

About, for and through: situation, position, and action, at once ties together and separates the begging and the giving.

The fifth reason is that symmetry contributes to staging a *framing*. Culturally and socio-politically conditioned views, ways of seeing that create norms through systematic use – framing – become restrictions for what can be heard, read, seen, perceived, and known. I emphasize that begging and giving are social actions rather than focusing on who performs them; the focus is on the activities, rather than on identities in a system.[22] To some degree giving and begging designate their respective recognition

21 Except for payment, Parsberg 2016, ch. 7.1.

22 Since the designation *the Roma who beg* and *the begging Roma* are at play in the public discourse and I have personally experienced viewers using these to speak of The Chorus of Begging, I want to further emphasize that the division is not about ethnicity. For instance, there are Roma participants in both The Chorus of Begging and The Chorus of Giving. However, I do not disregard the racist attitudes inherent to the situation, they matter hugely, as they are the

Fig. 4. Konsthall Väven, Umeå, 2015.

and representation in the streets. The installation with the two videos opposite each other, with the viewer in the middle, exemplifies this performative act.

According to the social framework in which the choral arrangement was developed, the question arose if and how I – who in this case inhabit a knowledge-producing position of power – can learn something new from the people I engage. Butler writes further:" "If certain lives are deemed worth living, protecting, and grieving and others not, then this way of differentiating lives cannot be understood as a problem of identity or even of the subject. It is rather a question of how power forms the field in which subjects become possible at all or, rather, how they become impossible".[23] One way of putting it would be that both the members of the choruses as well as the viewers are invited to negotiate exchange and possible synergy with me as director. Another way of seeing it would be that a film director has simply hired them as chorus singers. Opening up that discussion is one reason why I present a screening of the production film in a room nearby. The production film shows the work process.[24] The

consequences of framing, among other things. See further discussion in Parsberg 2016, chs. 1.3 and 5.2.

23 Butler 2009, p. 163.

24 Parsberg 2016, ch. 7.1.

Fig. 5. Konsthall Väven, Umeå, 2015.

idea is that the installation explores the social space around the mutually related gestures of begging and giving, while it also explores the physical space of its own agency as an installation: a social space, as a way of doing things that affects *the way* of doing things: an ethical space.[25]

7. The symmetry in the choral arrangement leaves space for the asymmetrical. The videos of the choruses cut between showing the entire chorus and close-ups of the faces of chorus participants. During the choral singing they sometimes look at each other, sometimes not. Emmanuel Lévinas points out that "every individual shall be able to remain individual, an irreplaceable being, as 'faces', but without individuals isolating themselves and letting conditionality reign."[26] "But how then can commonality even exist?" asks the Danish philosopher Peter Kemp in an attempt to grasp Lévinas' thinking. Kemp continues: "According to Lévinas commonality emerges only through one human giving the world to the other, that is by sacrificing it so that

25 From a mail dialogue between Tobias Hering and Cecilia Parsberg in response to a doctoral seminar.

26 Quoted in Kemp 1992, p. 73.

it is open to both, and through the freedom to sacrifice conditionality, through which it subordinates itself to the judgment of the other."[27]

The choral arrangement takes place in a temporary space, albeit a directed and aestheticized one. Certain directives have been given that pertain to using voice and gaze to interact with one another and with the conductors who are conducting the drama of the choral arrangement. Still the recording space could be described as a liminal space where a mutuality, a commonality, arises during the recording, one that can be hard to create outside of this temporary space.

Creation implies that something is coming into being (as opposed to something being done). In the choir training the participants recalled their feelings from incidents on the streets and were trained in voicing them through a certain choral technique. They were creating sounds with their own voice in front of the others, and these likely came into being such as they were because the others were there and were also creating sounds. Peter Kemp again: "That is exactly why the ethical subjectivity does not express itself in what is said, in that which is already known. It expresses itself in 'an utterance that – in relation to that which is – constitutes an exception.'"[28] That which first seemed like an impediment – that the song was wordless – also became a liberation from what would have become a language barrier.

There is a dialogue between The Chorus of Begging and The Chorus of Giving, at the same time as there is a lack of dialogue between voices, facial expressions, and bodies. The viewer stands in a liminal space between different EU citizens, with different conditions but similar needs, with different experiences and interests but similar feelings, with different clothes but in a similar position, with different educations but similar voice resources.

The symmetry makes visible the gap between the choruses and the asymmetry shows links between them: hence the symmetrical and the asymmetrical make space for agency.

8. "We are the losers and you have to learn from us", says Kefah. The border between Israel and Palestinian occupied territories was built in the mind and then manifested on the ground. The Israeli wall is concrete, which doesn't hinder the poetry and the art made on the wall partly dissolving it. When the artists: grafitti writers, painters, poets, and others use the construction of the wall, they use the idea of it. When changing the wall's appearance the new generated images on and about the wall ac-

27 Kemp 1992, p. 73.
28 Kemp 1992, p. 49.

tivate the (collective) images of the wall; its intention, purpose, and function. This activity raises the question of knowledge production – if a physical wall is manifested as an aesthetic of loss – and experienced as an abyss – then where and how can the knowledge be detected?

My thinking in the chorus work was on the same path as Kefah's when he is arguing that the knowledge of the *losers* is unavoidable. Begging is a call to social interaction, and regardless of whether the giver interacts socially with the begging person on the street, the giver is implicated in the asymmetrical value systems of the European Union. The arrangement of the choirs in the staged work *The Chorus of Begging and The Chorus of Giving*, indicates a space for social interaction and thus demonstrates a different order that demands different actions in terms of language, movement, and attitude toward each other. It's a social choreography: when the choirs rehearsed and sung together a political form emerged.

In both examples the participants experience a struggle against subordination that is fought by attending to one's worth. They must relate to the boundaries in their daily lives and it is for an involuntary reason. In both examples the artistic practice is not just an activity *against* but a creation; letting something come into being, to set (collective) images in mind in play, for the purpose to widen and open perception. The practice as a way to attend to a knowledge worth promoting. The artistic activity interacts with the images that contributed to build the boundary, and aims to generate new images in order to make the border visible as a zone for negotiation between life and right, and as a space for action.

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Conversation

Péter Balogh: – I don't know how many people visit the Thai–Cambodian [Preah Vihear] Temple now, but sites like this, maybe they become even more famous because of the conflict. I mean, a lot of people have heard about this temple now [...]. Yesterday I mentioned this notion of the third actor, or the third heritage. I mentioned briefly the case of Jerusalem, where this Mongol heritage did create some project, a conservation project, that did bring Jews and Arabs together. Maybe this is something to look at more intensely as some theoretical contribution. This isn't heritage in a narrow sense, but in my Ph.D. project on the Poles and Germans [I found that] the Poles were actually very keen on involving Swedes in a formalized cross-border co-operation region. That's why the region of Skåne today is formally part of the German-Polish cross-border region. The Germans dominated the co-operation too much, so the Poles involved a third part. Again, there is a parallel to involving someone else to have a more equal balance of power.

Conflict

Strategy

Catharina Nolin: – I would just like to comment [on that], because from a Danish perspective, the loss of Skåne is much less complicated than the loss of the southern parts of Denmark that now belong to Germany. That is still a wound. That is also a very interesting border, which you don't see, and people are crossing it all the time. The other border is also very important today, because there is this passport-free union between the Scandinavian countries, but now, between Denmark and Sweden you again have to show your passport because of the immigrants coming. I was brought up in that part of Sweden, and I never had to show a passport in my whole life crossing that border, but now I have to do it, sometimes at least. But that border between Denmark and Germany is of course very interesting, as Germany occupied Denmark during the war.

Conflict

Essentialization

Anna Källén: –Perhaps that can go back to what Dacia said yesterday, about the conflict involving heritage ... that it sort of erases the possibility for being something in-between. You have to be either/or, and it therefore brings out the essential categories and perhaps that's also ... because the conflict brings out those essential qualities of a heritage object, which otherwise can be very confused and can be several things at once – that essential quality also attracts attention, I think ... this is not very well formulated, but, because the conflict creates the idea of essential qualities, it can also attract attention to a heritage object, because it can appear to be much more clear than it actually is in reality, so to speak, or in ordinary practice. For that reason a conflict can be beneficial to a heritage object, because it can create the essence that is needed to get public attention. Does that make sense at all?

Conflict

Law

Practice

Siri Schwabe: –Going back to your Jerusalem example. I'm not familiar with the particular case, but I think, as I'm sure you are all well aware, especially archaeology and heritage is a field that in Palestine is very much contentious. Of course that is because there is no set border. Legally speaking there is no set border to that country, so it is something which is continuously being negotiated. In that particular case you really see how heritage is very much a political project, and there is very much a political agenda, in many cases, that comes before any scholarly practice in that area. All archaeological practice in that particular geographical area is very much informed by the political context, right? So it is very difficult, I think, to find any kind of "pure" heritage or "pure" archaeological findings in that context. I think it's a very interesting example, especially because it is something that is ongoing. It is still unclear if there even is a national border, where it goes ... and that is something archaeologists and others play into by their practice and what they do, saying, "Well, we found this thing here, so that means our people were here first . . ." It's of course [to do with] the whole story of that conflict and that area.

Conflict

Creation

Cecilia Parsberg: – I think it's interesting what you said, that the conflict also brings attention, yes? Like the wall ... I was [in Jerusalem] speaking to people, and they said: "But suddenly I can't see the horizon because there is a wall". So it's actually a border also in my visual [field] ... And then Banksy comes, you know, the graffiti artist, and he paints all these paintings of landscapes [on the wall]. He paints away the wall, he opens the wall. [...] This third party, the artist, comes and says: "What is this? It is a good place to paint graffiti!". He comes with this other

perspective on it, and he creates a discussion that is not just "Oh it's my history, and my . . .", these fundamental, hardcore ... It opens up, asking "What is this space?" There is something happening there, which is ...

SIRI SCHWABE: – There are lots of non-spatial boundaries in that setting as well, right? Lots of boundaries being set up between "us" and "them", which is of course a very basic thing, but some people are trying to challenge that by saying "Actually, no, that's not the full story. Look, here are all these photos, for instance, that show the Muslim and the Jewish neighbours back in whatever hundred years ago, getting along fine . . ." All these things become part of a kind of heritage-making, digging out certain sources to tell a different story. That is something that is always ongoing in that context where certain forces might try to hide those stories away, to say "No, actually these are our enemies, we shouldn't actually get along, we are different nations, we should have separate . . ." CREATION DIFFERENCE

CECILIA PARSBERG: – But what can one learn from that, now in Syria? All these places in Syria that are threatened and destroyed ... It is so ... What do you think? DESTRUCTION

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – It is a difficult question, and I don't know what the rest of you say, but [in my view] the destruction of heritage is also ... it is deliberate, whatever you want to say about the ISIS ideas and their methods, there is reason behind the destruction. They want to build a new heritage, based on the Islamic world and want to destroy [what they see as Western] things. In that way the destruction is productive – for them, I mean, for their purposes. I think we need to understand that, even though we think it is disgusting, we need to understand there is reason behind it. Not lack of [proper] education. There is reason behind it, although we think it is horrible. DESTRUCTION CREATION

IAN LILLEY: – Also, from a historical and archaeological point of view it is entirely normal. People have been doing this for a bazillion years.

DACIA VIEJO-ROSE: – That is the layering of the dynamics [of heritage], and the destruction also, in a sense that it sends messages locally, and, [in the case of] the Bamyan Buddhas, internationally. It is a symbol of ... "Hello, we're dying, people are dying, and all you're carrying on about are the Buddhas". But then, NEGOTIATION SCALE

locally, it also sent a message because there, the local enemy were the Hazaras, and those Buddhas locally meant especially something to the Hazara way of thinking, ideology, and mythology. So the local target were the Hazaras, and the international target were ... yeah, well, the internationals, and Philippe de Montebello and all of those who were going in there through back channels suggesting [whispering:] "We'll buy them off you". [...] There are all these different uses of heritage, violence, and destruction ... even the destruction itself, there is not one motivation, one use, one victim ... there is a whole spread.

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – That is a very good point to be made – that, well, all uses of heritage are made on different levels. Also the destructive uses, or the consumption of heritage ... Can we bring that realization in some form back to the issue on heritage and borders?

SIRI SCHWABE: – When you look at scales within Europe [...], I find it really interesting how far-right groups answer to their individual nationalisms but still claim a pan-Europeanness in the face of "the threat from the outside" in a sense. So I suppose, [...] in some ways heritage is always multi-vocal in that sense, that it always works at different scales. And I think that very much speaks to the situation right now in Europe, where we are seeing a fortification of the outer borders, and at the same time an attempt at fortification of national borders by these right-wing groups that are growing bigger by the day. I think maybe that can help us to think about the complexities of what is actually going on within heritage politics and border-making within Europe or the EU.

SCALE

DACIA VIEJO-ROSE: – Yes, what Elisabeth was saying yesterday about these borders that are homogenizing, or attempting to homogenize, what is inside the European border and then homogenizing what is outside of it. [...] There is this cleansing using essentialization. There is a cleansing of history that goes on during conflicts when that essentialization mode kicks in. You saw that clearly in Yugoslavia, where it wasn't just about killing people, but about erasing their presence in cemeteries. So cleansing the cemetery, cleansing the history of the place, so there is proof ... creating proof or destroying evidence that they lived here. And that sense of destroying that history, cleansing that history so that there are only two groups: "These are the two groups and you live here, and you live there", reinforcing that boundary by creating this myth of homogeneity on either side of the boundary, where everyone else falls through the holes. There is

CLEANSING

ESSENTIAL-IZATION

DESTRUC-TION

[for instance] the Maronite community in Cyprus, that falls within the cracks of the conflict and ends up being forgotten.

Siri Schwabe: – That can be said, in part at least, about Christians in Palestine and Israel as well. It is often said to be a religious conflict, but what about the Christians? Or, like you are saying about the Mongols too … — Conflict

Cecilia Parsberg: – But if a conflict and an attack constitutes a border, or makes one aware, "Oh, there is a border here that we didn't think of before . . .", so the border is constructed by the attack. Then also, the response – like for example in Syria there are many multi-ethnic … women … protecting this World Heritage – the defence has to reorganize. Like in Palestine also, in the infrastructure. Reorganizing to defend against this attack … here is a border … If this is happening, and this is just becoming harder and harder, then the border must be seen, I insist, as a space for negotiation. Because otherwise it's total destruction […] How can [the border] be respected as a space? — Conflict — Negotiation

Anna Källén: – I think what we see here in the discussion is a … we talk about a multi-layered response, or attitude to heritage, or active engagement with heritage, where political conflict creates essentialization which [in turn] creates a kind of unproductive vacuum in-between. At the same time we see a practical movement, which Cecilia is talking about, that goes in with art or mundane practices, often with local communities, to work with the border, the border site, as a creative place for unification or moving forward in other ways. So we have this separating tendency, and we have the unifying or creative [one], and they move in tandem. Is that a correct way [to summarize the discussion?] — Essentialization — Practice — Creation

Elisabeth Niklasson: – What we are talking about [here] is heritage as border, and borders as heritage. If we see borders as a heritage or if we see heritage as a more creative and evolving and open thing than we have done in the past, then yes, that would be a useful way to see it. But for me the border … well, heritage wouldn't exist if it wasn't politically useful, the way we have defined heritage over time. Especially if you look at archaeology and how it comes up in these conflicts. Like in Palestine too, Israeli settlers have drawn on archaeological remains in relation to wine plantations, as a proof for … as a way to create a border in time, to prove that there couldn't possibly have been Palestinian people in this area — Creation — Nationalism

because we can prove that there has been wine grown here ... So when it comes to heritage used as borders, this is a good way to approach the fact that heritage has always been considered good for something. An archaeological site, however you define it, it is politically useful for something ... So, where to go from that? I mean, there are so many examples, I'm getting all dizzy by all these examples of borders, and I think they are really good. But one thing I thought about was this European aspect too, like the borders that you talked about [Siri], how they come back between Europe and the Other. That's one thing that comes out in the European Heritage Label too. I got some insights from an interview recently, about two sites that were nominated, but which will not get the heritage label for this year. They have now, inspired by the present times (these are two sites in Eastern Europe with castles that were part of the defence against the Ottomans) and they have now said "Wouldn't this be a perfect European heritage?" Perfect for this label, because it symbolizes the constant fight and how we protected Europe against Ottoman forces ... So, they are in fact using heritage, turning heritage into a border, reinforcing the border in the present, by drawing it into a European narrative in their applications [for the European Heritage Label].

ESSENTIAL-IZATION

PÉTER BALOGH: – What you all emphasize is the form of discourse, right, the form of narrative. I mean, that is always politicized, ok, everything is politics. But for instance the example of painting away of the wall – that might not have been financed, or might not have that [relation to] politicians, but it was a bottom-up initiative, right? And there are a number of [such examples]. So I mean ... I'm just saying that we need to be aware of the counter-discourses and the bottom-up approaches that may not be as ... may not get the same attention as the big projects with the big money.

CREATION

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IAN LILLEY: – One of the boundaries that I'm interested in crossing [...] is differences between legal systems [...]. Particularly the difference which a few people have commented on, [...] which is the difference between British and British descendent common law, and the civil law, which everybody else in the universe has. If you look at how heritage is done in common law countries – North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain of course – when you look at it, there are actually some quite profound differences between how it plays out in civil law countries. And that adds a dimension to this idea of the West

LAW

DIFFER-ENCE

imposing on the Rest, because it's which bit of the West and what are they imposing. What's imposed by common law is quite different in details from what is imposed by civil law, and how it plays out on the ground.

ANNA KARLSTRÖM: – I'm also thinking in connection to that about the separation between the West and the Rest ... and that there is a border between us and them. But we should not forget that they could replace each other. I'm thinking of West and East for example, and I'm thinking of the story of the Ise Shrine in Nara prefecture in Japan, which was the reason for the Nara document in the 1990s that added the concept of authenticity to the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, and added also other aspects of defining things not only as material but also [with reference to] aspects of authenticity. And that authenticity could also be different things, not only material authenticity ... But, the reason why the conference was in Nara was because of the Ise Shrine, which is a temple area that has been there for at least 1,200 years. This temple site has been renovated, restored every 20 or 25 years during these 1,200 years. So the temples, which are there today [...] are new. When the discussion on the Nara document was ongoing, there were also discussions about Ise as a [potential] World Heritage Site. But Ise Shrine is not a World Heritage Site, because it is used and continually changed, and they who use it don't want it to be a World Heritage Site. So, there is also a We in the East, reacting against us, the Other in the West [who have been] setting the standards for what is heritage and what should be protected and how it should be protected. So we really have to think about reverse directions as well, when we talk about borders between Us and Them, including and excluding.

ESSENTIALIZATION

INSIDE/OUTSIDE

IAN LILLEY: – One thing we need to be mindful of – it was your comment, Anna that made me think of it – is that our own history of ideas and rationale for talking about these sorts of things, [...] in this case about borders, can create things that aren't necessarily true, or as stark and clear as we think. The West versus the Rest is a great [example of this] and is used in all sorts of [arguments]. But in fact when you look at the history of [heritage management] in stark empirical terms, in real documents [...] the East, for example, or "the Rest" has been intimately involved in the creation of all of these sorts of international instruments, from the very beginning! It has been this negotiation backwards and forwards, often quite subtle – and there is no question of power differentials and so on – but in our discussions as scholars, we quite often go off in a particular direction

NEGOTIATION

for a very particular reason, and all of that subtlety and nuance in empirical reality gets varnished over.

Creation

Elisabeth Niklasson: – That was a good point. We do recreate the barriers when we talk about them, that's for sure. [I was also thinking of the way] borders stretch far beyond Europe, [through] time as well. Like Classical Antiquity and the heritage from Alexander the Great outside Europe. Those places, those temples and architectural heritage sites are often happily incorporated into a European Heritage [based on] style and characteristics, whilst the people who live there and incorporate them into their everyday lives are not included. They are often Muslim populations, so they are not included in the European heritage. But the [physical] structures are included, although they are "displaced".

Essentialization

Creation

Fredrik Krohn Andersson: – In more general terms, [I think] that heritage, when I look upon it, really, on a fundamental level is about borders and boundaries, about constructing borders and boundaries. It is, as Dacia pointed out yesterday, political. Top-down, bottom-up, regardless, it is a highly political thing or object. We often ... we like to regard heritage as a good thing, as a benign thing. And borders tend to be regarded as something that is not good, that should be transcended and passed. This is inscribed from the beginning, I would like to say. On so many levels – geographically, knowledge-disciplinary, and also in ... you have to create a border between now and then in order to see something as heritage. So it is very much . . .

Scale

Anna Källén: – It is a matter of separation between spaces, temporal and . . .

Fredrik Krohn Andersson: – Yes, it is about that, in a number of ways. Sometimes very rich and complex, and sometimes in certain instances very singularized. [...] The Berlin Wall, for example, that was painted with graffiti. Because one of the walls was on the East German side, so when you painted graffiti you could not be arrested by the West Berlin Police. That sounds great, of course – it is an act of resistance and all of these things. In both directions, both East and West. But this was of course used, immediately, by Ronald Reagan in his speech, you know "Tear down this wall . . .", so even if the idea in one way was very good, it is always also used, or has the potential to be used [in other ways].

Scale

* * *

TRINH T. MINH-HA: – I guess I came up with this [concept of] material and immaterial boundary event in my book and lecture (the dividing wall or this period of the day called twilight), not so much to say that everything in-between would lead us to a kind of free space where we can just experience a lot of possibilities. On the contrary, it is very difficult to assume that space of in-betweeness. [...] For me it is a question of profoundly and extensively breaking with binary thinking. In a way, there is a lot of constraints in freedom. For example, in order to forget, one has to remember exactly what one wants to forget. This is a line from a Vietnamese poet who wrote on the war, which I quoted in my latest film Forgetting Vietnam. In order to go on, people have to forget. But how can one forget when one does not really know exactly what in the war one wants to forget? Memory and forgetfulness. To forget and to remember can never be separated, they come together as a pair. In this non-binary thinking, what is important is to hold both. And this is something very difficult to do. [...] Forces come in pair and there are many twos affecting our everyday reality. If we talk about sexuality and gender, for example, people who cannot be confined to one category or defined as one single gender could actually be in that position of holding both. The pronoun "they" in US queer contexts stands for neither man nor woman and refers to both the singular and the plural. This lead us to the question of limits and openness. So, when we talk about heritage and border – how and where do we put the limit of heritage? What kind of heritage? Whether it is material or immaterial, visible, not yet visible or invisible, we very often function in terms of territory. The territorial mind is always at work; although the local, versus the global, for example, could be important as a strategy – since in "world heritage" the question "Whose world? What world?" always arises. So when putting to use notions of borders and heritage as in our conversation here, it seems important to think in non-binary pairs, and more in terms of strategy than in terms of finality.

THE IN-BETWEEN

MEMORY

IDA HUGHES-TIDLUND: – I think it's important to see what the border looks like when it lands, in everyday life. The limitations of people's everyday life when dealing with the border ... Because there are certain things about borders that you can't get around, and it is that is has that institutional look of law.

PRACTICE

LAW

Law

Elisabeth Niklasson: – [In terms of] law I was also thinking about the continuity that is confirmed through heritage [protected by law], and then the more evolving type, or idea of heritage that we often talk about. And how the laws that we operate under will mostly not permit that [evolving] type or vision of heritage. How to work within those confines and ... how to deal with the laws that confine our concepts of heritage. It also relates to the idea of the buffer zone around heritage, both conceptually and at actual sites – what space of negotiation [can be claimed there]? What can we actually do with them? [As in the example of] Thermopylae, where the Golden Dawn [extreme-right party] gathers every year. There has been a discussion now in archaeology about "What can we do about this?", in this very practical situation where [extreme-right groups use] an archaeological site. But actually, as the law says, the buffer zone doesn't stretch to the place where they are at. Where they are [gathering] is considered public space. It is part of the archaeological site, but it is just outside [of the protected area]. They are a few metres away from the area that is protected, and so there is nothing we can actually do to legally intervene.

Buffer zones

Whose law?

Cecilia Parsberg: – Whose law put this border up? Those who are not agreeing with this law – it's not their law – these people feel powerless and the reaction is ... You can be a poet or an artist, talk about visions and open the wall as for example Banksy. Or you can write your poems and think above, around, through the wall, under the wall ... You can also become spiritual, "Oh, there is paradise" or God or something, and they go away, "I blow myself up" ... And then you have political activists, or someone banging, headbanging through the wall, headbanging the wall ... There are so many different ways of reacting to this wall. But it is someone else's law if ... for example the Israeli wall that the [court] in the Hague has declared illegal, then, hmm ... whose law is it? And how are we dealing with the law? The law is a border.

Strategy

Anna Källén: – Can we tie this in with the idea of heritage and borders as a strategy [...], and the counter-border – that the law establishes the border but there are counter actions, and they are equally strategic. The law is strategic and the counter action is also strategic, right?

Ian Lilley: – I come from a common-law country, [where] laws are contestable, always. And that may be very much influencing how I think about these sorts of things. That it is something that's there and it's there and it's there ...

that is not the case in our system. Everything is contestable. Law moves on with custom and practice, as we call it. So even if the law has been established at point X under custom and practice Y, when something is contested it is looked at in the current social and political setting. [...] It's much more ... things are much more negotiable, generally speaking. And while politicians very often say "It's the law, it's the law . . .", there is always a lawyer there somewhere that you can find to contest it. And this comes up all the time in the stuff that I do ... in a civil law country I say, well, "Why don't you just take them to court?", and they look at me as if I was a Martian and say " . . .that doesn't happen". There is a very famous case in New Guinea where a group of people from this extraordinarily remote part of New Guinea successfully sued the biggest mining company in the world. Because that is the way our system works. But in lots of jurisdictions I suspect that isn't even conceivable. So I guess my idea of counter-borders and counter things is because I come from that background where you can always contest laws, not always successfully, but you can contest them. [...] And it is this thing with borders, it is very ... Australians like to think that we have a barrier [around the country], and in the news at the moment we are infamous for keeping [migrant] people out, sending them back and all that stuff ... But in fact our northern borders are under constant negotiation. The border we have with New Guinea has about twelve different versions depending on what it is for. So there is the border that is half-way between New Guinea and Australia, there is the sea floor border which is somewhere else ... there is some other border where you can almost throw a stone across to New Guinea from Australia. They are all the border! And it really depends on the context. And because it is so flexible you can actually argue in these spaces in-between them to get what you want, and people do it every day.

Law

Negotiation

The in-between

Trinh T. Minh-ha: – Perhaps I can continue on that? I think when Cecilia was saying "Whose law is it?", the other question we can come up with is whom does that law serve? Because we can see cases like in China right now where the lawyers are the ones that are most persecuted by the system, because, precisely, the law is made a pawn to the powerful – serving to discipline the dominated, while benefiting the dominant. So whenever lawyers, for example, defend a case of human rights, it was said very clearly that they necessarily become themselves human-rights cases. They become victims of what they are trying to defend. Whose law is it then? And whom does it serve? As you said, it can always be contested, and that's why ... one of the things that I find most constraining – or

Whose law?

even in a much stronger term: strangulating – in a system like in the US, is the dominance of lawyers and the judicial system in our everyday reality. In Africa, in West Africa, for example, ... whenever a conflict, a brawl or an angry dispute arises that leads to serious accusations and complaints, you don't immediately resort to a lawyer. There is always a third person in the community, or someone who could be a total outsider ... Two people could quarrel endlessly and they would just resort to someone passing by, like a third party who could step in and fairly fill the role of the mediator. And so, rather than constantly resorting to lawyers to defend your rights, the solution can come just with someone's intervention in the everyday. The role of the lawyer in the States is mainly to interpret the law, so in that sense we are hiring them in order to do the interpretation and the reading for us, because they know the language – a language so full of traps that by using it, ordinary folks are always running the risk of putting themselves at disadvantage, if not of criminalizing themselves.

Anna Karlström: – I was just thinking of an example of a border where there are different laws in action at the same time and they both work at the same time. In Laos there is a formal law, a national law, [relating to] an antique object that is, according to the national laws, supposed to be reported to the authorities and then placed eventually in a museum or exhibited somehow. But there are also lots of people using this ancient, very ancient, several thousand years old object. And the local authorities in the province know about the national laws, of course, where the officer is obliged to report [his knowledge of the object] to the national authorities. But the officer doesn't do that, because he knows that on the local level there are other laws at play, local laws [that are] letting people use this object in a different way than it is supposed to be used, according to the national law. And the officer doesn't report it to the national authorities. So he let the villagers have their ancient object, using it ... consuming it and using it in a totally wrong way, if you listen to what the national laws say. So there are the national, formal laws, and the local, informal laws, and they can work simultaneously in this border space where binaries are broken.

Law

Trinh T. Minh-ha: – What about this situation of aboriginal people, where you have the law with small l, and the Law with capital L?

Anna Karlström: – Exactly . . .

TRINH T. MINH-HA: – But that law cannot be said to be only local, you see. The pair of local and national laws can be taken further here, because at first, the local seems to be the law with lower case l and the national, the Law with the capital L. But what modern society calls "customary" or "traditional" law (or more pejoratively, the "lore") as differentiated from white, colonial or so-called contemporary law is not merely specific to a tradition. What is being put forth in the capital L is something very different from the law that man comes up with. Its truth is a truth not confined to the man-made regimes of truth and power; not only here, there, but rather, "elsewhere within here". So this law with upper-case L that cuts across time(s) is really heritage in the very large sense of the term.

LAW

TIME

* * *

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – Anna, you were talking about the outside–inside … That we try to go outside to put forward our knowledge, but that is also someone's inside. We need to connect . . .

INSIDE/ OUTSIDE

ANNA KARLSTRÖM: – I think that is the only way to reach to that point that [Trinh] was talking about, when the binary thinking is broken. We have to start by swapping places and deconstructing the borders between places to finally end up with not thinking in binary oppositions. If that is the main goal in the end, I don't know. But to be able to break that binary thinking I think we need to put ourselves in the opposite position.

CECILIA PARSBERG: – Is it possible?

ANNA KARLSTRÖM: – Yes, is it possible? That is the question … But I think … to put ourselves in the other position … [I mean] when it comes to power relations, because I don't think we cannot, shouldn't go native and try to understand how it is to be the Other. But we can also be the Other, not by being the Other, but a meta-Other, so to say … […]

INSIDE/ OUTSIDE

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – But isn't this counter to what Fredrik was saying […] that heritage both needs and creates borders? So if we are talking about heritage, not just generally, but borders when we talk about heritage – is it necessary that when

CREATION

we talk about heritage, we create boundaries and borders? Is that a necessity? And what happens … can that be a possible creative space?

TIME

FREDRIK KROHN ANDERSSON: – Of course it could be negotiated, and [borders can be] redrawn, et cetera, et cetera … But, maybe I'm a very square-thinking person, but … even if you don't want to formulate it like [David] Lowenthal did with the foreign country, there is a line drawn between a now and then, in time – that is the function of [heritage], yes. So to overcome that, in itself … maybe that is possible, but would that be something that we want from heritage? Is it productive to talk about heritage then? Well, so … it was not opposite to what I said I guess, but . . .

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – But it was challenging it, I thought.

MEMORY

FREDRIK KROHN ANDERSSON: – Also, I think, what you said in one way reverberates what Trinh was talking about – that you have to remember in order to forget. In order to see that other position you have to border it. So, as heritage researchers we may be stuck with borders in one way.

DIFFERENCE

MATTIAS FRIHAMMAR: – It is important to remember that border is a neutral concept – it is not a bad concept. It is just a way of saying that this is one thing and this another thing. It is not necessarily binary. It's a way of organizing modernity, in a way. And it is a way of getting away from chaos, to be able to navigate in your life and in society. So I think it's just … it sounds sometimes as if a border is something evil … but it's just a border. If we want to explain what we mean with heritage on any level, we have to use the border, or limit, or demarcation, because otherwise the concept is impossible to use.

PÉTER BALOGH: – Very briefly … the whole idea of diversity, and even that of multiculturalism, is of course based on borders. Because there wouldn't be any diversity if there weren't any borders. Then the real question is how we relate to them, not whether there are differences.

DIFFERENCE

ELISABETH NIKLASSON: – As I said yesterday in my talk, diversity and difference are actually different concepts in the way they are used. There's a lot of talk about diversity, but less about difference. […] And that's something that plays

into what I wanted to say when it comes to heritage and borders in relation to this inside–outside and the binaries. A lot of the time, especially when we try to renegotiate what heritage might be and what it could be … it's a strategy … we want to use heritage for healing … Maybe it's a guilt, because we know that heritage has had many dark sides, but then heritage has to become something positive, a positive force in society. It's like with the Mostar Bridge – trying to use heritage as healing, we forget that it's not symmetrical. And sometimes, with the border especially, working around borders … if it is a scar we might just have to let it be a scar. And this is something . . .Chip Colwell said this in a talk a while ago about Native American tribes, [that] we do not need to reach consensus. Consensus is a bad thing. We don't need to solve something, by overbridging a border. The border needs to be entertained … [as] a space for negotiation, yes, but also a space for contention. So that's like a really challenging thing, to not try to solve, and try to climb borders all the time, but to manage them somehow.

NEGOTIATION

CECILIA PARSBERG: – I think we have a border here between us … [Édouard] Glissant talks about this, and Sara Ahmed too. If I'm in here, this skin is my protection. I had it since I was born, of course I need it. You can never be inside me, and I can never be … I mean, we have to listen to each other. And communicate, and hear and give voice and … sort of engage, I think. It is not enough to be trying to understand, or tolerate, or accept. It's not enough. We have to really want to engage in diversity [and] be interested and curious [about] what is on the other side of the . . .

SECURITY

IAN LILLEY: – This is really important, and it is one of those things … Just in terms of translation, Umberto Eco said – well, there are two schools in translation, one says that you should just make it seamless so there is no … but in fact, the whole point of translation is that it is from something else – and he said why don't leave people feel "das Fremde", as the Germans say – feeling a bit of the foreignness. Because it is something different, and if you make it the same, what's the point? We get this with Aboriginal people all the time … the idea is for them, to trivialize it slightly, it is boring if everybody agrees. So people would just sometimes disagree just to keep the conversation going. But quite often, I think, in heritage particularly, we try to please everybody. And that goes to your point [Elisabeth], but … why? Because what makes heritage different, why is this place, this Roman site or this Aboriginal thing [important]? Why bother even talking about it if we are not going to put some kind of boundary around it for a

DIFFERENCE

Time

Negotiation

particular reason and a particular time? And I think the critical thing is that we understand that borders are contestable and that they are also permeable, and are there for contingent reasons. In fact, I deal with this regularly, dealing with the nature and the culture [aspect] on mixed [World Heritage] sites, where what I'm doing [as a cultural heritage expert] and what the nature guys are doing is completely different. [...] There was one case, we were in the middle of nowhere, in Palau, and I did my thing and they did their biological thing. Mine was done, I'm off to the pub or whatever, and they were reading this thing and came after me, shouting: "Ian, Ian, you haven't put a boundary to the western side of the site!". I looked at them and I said: " . . .Well, from a cultural point of view there is not actually any need for a boundary there". But they were obsessed about that they had to have a boundary. So I just invented one. "Let's put it ... there" ... [...] So in that particular World Heritage thing, for my purpose we didn't need a boundary and in fact in local terms, in Palauan cosmology actually it shouldn't have a boundary there. But the nature guys ... it was going to destroy the whole thing if we didn't put a boundary in, so ... And it literally is just for that purpose that there is a boundary there. And that is one thing we need to think of into the future, when we are doing our boundaries around heritage sites for temporal reasons or ... for whatever reason, it is for that reason. And it may be a completely different reason to not have it there for local people, or for the nature guys, or for something else.

Difference

Anna Källén: – [Trinh's suggestion of "holding both"] is perhaps a way forward, of recognizing difference, engaging in difference and still have some kind of willingness to "hold both", rather than to separate into binaries. Is that a way forward do you think?

Inside/outside

Trinh T. Minh-ha: – Well ... you know, we talk about outside and inside, and another variation I came up with, in terms of positioning for example, is outside–in, inside–out. The in-and-out that is added is very important. It doesn't mean that the outside and inside can be collapsed, but ... I guess one example would be ... some Black friends of mine said in a group discussion: "You can never speak from the place of the victims, unless you have had the experience", for example, of broken glass cutting you throughout, when during the night in your sleep, your house is raided and the windows are smashed into pieces. I think these friends are right. But to go a bit further, if one just feels what a cut is, if we feel it very intensely and intimately, then there is a possibility of feeling what the

person who receives all the glasses on themselves would feel. It is this simultaneous reaching out and reaching in that allows us to break with the binary of self and other or of Us and Them. And this is the outside–in and inside–out movement that we can assume when we are in a situation where we speak either inside the border, outside the border, or right at the border. Of course, the difficulty, the challenge is to speak right at the border. And hence, to speak from the border, rather than merely inside or outside. When placed in the context of our discussion on heritage, this place, from the border, is both space and time. To speak from the border is therefore very challenging, and it allows us further to address Cecilia's question of how – how can one speak from that very place? It means that whenever one speaks there is always room for the outside, and there is always room for the inside. And to be able to manage, to negotiate that time-space, it requires a lot of vigilance, and it requires that one listens with many ears and sees with many eyes at the same time. Oppressed people usually talk about a double consciousness, or as I would have it, a multiplicity of consciousness. Because it is not only hearing what the dominant say versus what the dominated say, and being able to speak to both the dominant and to one's people. But also to be able, every time one goes to a different location, to speak from that different location. There are many kinds of twos and of non-binaries.

DIFFERENCE

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – It is difficult. I also took note of something you said before, which also ties into this, and also what Cecilia says, that it is difficult, and it must be difficult to be in the in-between space that is the border. It should be difficult, it should be challenging, otherwise it is not the border.

THE IN-BETWEEN

CECILIA PARSBERG: – But we don't need to do everything ourselves. I mean, one can have chorus conductors and do [chorus] training, or you can have ... it is just an example. [...] It is fantastic that we can be so many . . .

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – Technically we can have both. But at the same time, if we really want to challenge that idea of inside and outside, or to try to "hold both", then it must be challenging, inside yourself ... I guess ... if you want to embrace something that is entirely different, as Anna was talking about as well, earlier. That is my experience at least, that it is very ... well it should be difficult. And that is also what makes it interesting and makes it worthwhile doing.

INSIDE/OUTSIDE

DIFFERENCE

Security

Dacia Viejo-Rose: – Also maybe the difficulty is that ... you know, borders often do an either or. You're either here or there, and that's kind of safe. There is a security in that. You're either here, or there. And I think often we ... certainly the conservative trend in heritage is for certainty, safety, and security. This is who we are and this is where we are, this is what represents us. It feels safe. And the thing with all of us who feel like we are multiple in our origins – we are both, this and that, both Spanish and American, both whatever ... a lot of us have that. And all of us who have that know that also means we are neither. And that can feel very unsafe. Because ... it can feel like a privileged position – "Oh, you're both" – but you are also neither of those two, because "when you are here you are Other, and when you are there you are the other Other", so you are never fully one thing, either this or that. That can be both scary and liberating.

The in-between

Ian Lilley: – I think you're right, people just can't ... you fall between two stools, you are not one or the other, and ... it's quite easy to imagine you can move seamlessly through these things, but in fact you get caught up all the time, if you're not in America anymore or whatever it is.

Nationalism

Dacia Viejo-Rose: – So in a sense, to me, there is a golden age of heritage in the kind of nation-building moment. And I think that the second golden age of heritage that we are living through now, perhaps – and this is just a proposition – is a response to the globalization of the '80s and '90s ... The celebration of globalization that led to this kind of fragmentation. Because the more the globalization was toted as this kind of success story, the more you had fragmentation into smaller and smaller units – where it's not just about Spain but about Catalonia or the Basque country. Fragmentation into ever smaller and smaller units of certainty ... of "this is who we are", "this is what defines us", which confronts a vision of homogenizing Americanization, Disneyfication, Starbucksification, McDonaldsification, whatever ... [ ] Like [Benjamin] Barber's Jihad vs McWorld, where the jihadi fundamentalist essentialization dynamic is a a response to the McWorld of globalization.

Nationalism

Péter Balogh: – But the difference is exactly that in the 19th century nationalism was progressive, right? It was meant to be something new. Whereas today, it is a reaction. It is a very reactionary movement, against globalization.

SIRI SCHWABE: – I suppose this opens up as well for – and I don't know how people that work on material heritage do – but [...] all the different routes in which things, ideas, and narratives travel, is something that I have looked into in terms of memory and more in a sort of narrative sense in my own work. But that's something where you definitely see a negotiation along the way, it's kind of like ... if you started telling a story down there and we all had to whisper – you know, you have all played that game – it turns into something completely different at the end, right? So the way things also transform along the way, the way stories are put to use ... the same stories, but put to use in various ways along various routes. How those stories and narratives travel, but also, I suppose, even materials travel ... and images, and so on. [...] And I think that's something by which borders can even be challenged in a sense as well, because it's not so ... it's something that goes beyond the [bell] jar. You actually open up for things to be put to use, or be talked about, faded, or challenged in various ways around the world, right?

ROOTS/ ROUTES

NEGOTIATION

ELISABETH NIKLASSON: – As long as everyone can walk it ... yes, well, I like the route idea. But the way I've seen it used often, in projects and stuff when it has been about missionary routes, and ... one project called The Route of the Iron [Curtain], where ... It's like what you said, sometimes when you emphasize borders, you rebuild them in a sense as well. And you create them as heritage through the routes. [...] I like the idea of routes a lot, but I've just seen a lot of projects where it is still re-essentializing [through] the "set path to progress", or the "set path to the new Europe", through this route ...

ROOTS/ ROUTES

ESSENTIALIZATION

IAN LILLEY: – Well, one thing that you say is that people always retreat to something safe. So [emphasizing routes instead of roots] was a very progressive thing, but I think it disappears because it is a very threatening idea to a lot of people, that things are in motion. Whether it's identities or objects or whatever ... and identities and objects go together ... people want everything in quite certain little boxes. So even if it's technically supposed to be some fluid thing across time and space, it's not. It's actually a succession of secure little boxes for people.

SECURITY

ROOTS/ ROUTES

FLOW

SIRI SCHWABE: – Also it takes something out of its original context as well. You know, there is a tendency to essentialize ... it becomes a very limited perspective being taken out of its surroundings.

ELISABETH NIKLASSON: – That's fine in a way. You can't do everything with heritage and I think the route is a better idea than the glass case in a museum when it comes to learning about history and the environment, and challenging concepts, and for people to meet ... But I think [it is interesting] what Trinh suggested [in her talk yesterday] about walking – how can we focus on the walking rather than the goals and the stops on those routes . . .

WALKING

ROOTS/ ROUTES

PÉTER BALOGH: – Aren't pilgrim routes very much hot nowadays? I don't know if anyone of them are recognized as official heritage?

DACIA VIEJO-ROSE: – Santiago ... Santiago de Compostela . . .

PÉTER BALOGH: – I think the routes are interesting because they have such flows ... I'm thinking now you might have come across the news that the Silk Road is now a very hot topic as well, not only for tourists, but also for economic and ... there is also an interest for it as heritage.

FLOW

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – Yes exactly, and to nominate the whole thing as one [World Heritage] site or connected heritage area. That would perhaps be my input also, because I have been very much inspired by James Clifford's ideas about the movement rather than ... getting roots down into the earth. But it doesn't really do it for me with the Silk Road. There is no movement in it. It is a way of trying to connect larger land areas and to make new statements and strategies, which has to do with economics and [is an attempt] to have a position in this, sort of heritage game. And it has very little to do with the actual flow and movement ... and flexibility that [the route] concept is supposed to accommodate. So for me it is almost worse, because ... when you try to kidnap [the route] idea and make it into just a mega ... massive demonstration of [stable] power, it has the opposite effect for me. Rather than loosening up, it gets even more stabilized ... even the route is stabilized.

ROOTS/ ROUTES

STRATEGY

PÉTER BALOGH: – But hasn't it all the time been about power and commerce?

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – Yes, heritage has, for sure. But it's often also presented like [a new thing] ... it is cross-boundary, it's not national anymore, it crosses the whole earth ... So [it seems] like we don't need to think about these boundaries any-

ROOTS/ ROUTES

more, but in fact it might just reconfirm the boundaries, or make them even more important as geopolitical demarcations. And it is hidden behind that concept of the road, which is supposed to be a flow. So [in that sense, to me] it becomes worse. But I know that there are other opinions about that . . . FLOW

SIRI SCHWABE: – I think we're talking about two different things in a way. That's the actual ... land, that's a heritage site in a way, even though it's a very long stretched-out one. Whereas what I'm getting at is more referring, again, to memory studies and work that has been done on multi-directional memory and these things ... how certain signifiers can work in different ways ... so I'm thinking more along the lines of how things travel, not only in the material sense, but also ideas and narratives and things like that. So I'm not talking about actual routes ... just to clarify what I was saying. And I think there is some potential there, but there are also a lot of pitfalls and there is also the danger of essentializing. But I think that by looking at those things, I think that we can potentially get at something, and that is something that is very timely as well, with the internet, with the kind of media that we have available for these things nowadays. MEMORY FLOW

DACIA VIEJO-ROSE: – I'm thinking about everything that you're all saying, and I'm trying to think of incursions across the boundaries ... And I was just thinking about what you were saying about the roads, and how roads become walls and walls become roads. Like the Great Wall of China. It was also a route, as well as a wall, walking along it ... The poem I mentioned yesterday by Robert Frost about mending a wall, walking along, him and his neighbour walking along either side of the wall, mending it and then ending with a question that he puts us: could walls make good neighbours? But in fact every year you walk along it and together you redo ... you figure out where you each stand. When I told my colleague [Professor Marie Louise Stig Sørensen] that I was coming here and the topic of this symposium, she told me that her sister is part of this Danish committee where every so many years they go around physically inspecting the borders of Denmark, to see where they might have changed. Because rivers meander. So usually its quite clear-cut, but where there is a river creating the border and the rivers meander, they have to check where the border is now. So in that sense, walking the border together with those on the other side of the border to negotiate the borders. Because we need borders. As soon as we remove borders we get anxious and build new ones. I often joke with my students that the only time when the idea of a "world heritage" is really going to make sense is when there is ROOTS/ ROUTES PRACTICE CREATION WALKING

an alien invasion, only then we will understand what heritage of humanity really means . . .

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – . . .because the stratosphere will be the border . . .

DACIA VIEJO-ROSE: – Yes, but I think you're right, the Silk Road has been used for largely economic reasons, like that will be our connection to China. We are all kind of linking the dots as opposed to focusing on the exchange of ideas. There is ... Sebastian Becker did an archaeology Ph.D. which is really fascinating a few years ago, about how this motif of a bird first appears. He traced where it appears in the Bronze Age objects and ornamentation in Germany, and then how it spreads. And so with the material culture the idea and the design of birds and flight on ornaments moves around Europe. So that's a way of tracing an idea in the same way as you can trace seeds or spices . . .

FLOW

IAN LILLEY: – The interesting thing is that, as that goes, the ideas around it move as well. So it's not the actual idea [that is transported]. Where I used to work in Papua New Guinea is a classic example of what we call subsistence middlemen. They live on an island as big as this room, and they are the richest people in the area because they just move stuff around. And they tell lies, basically, about what things are and where they come from. So, a [big] piece of obsidian at the obsidian source would cost a fish, because it is so abundant. By the time it gets to the far other end of the trading system, a piece of obsidian smaller than my finger nail is worth three pigs. [That is] because the whole idea of what obsidian is, where it comes from, and what it does, changes radically from one end – and in modern terms it's not very far – from one end to the other. Clay pots are made in one village on the mainland and they are transported all over the region by these people. When they take them from the village in which they are made they transform from a humanly made thing, to this object from deep under the sea, which many men died to dive down and pull up ... so a pot becomes an entirely different thing a long way away from where it was made. It is still a pot in our eyes, but the idea of it is utterly different. I find that fascinating.

FLOW

PÉTER BALOGH: – Can we really separate the flows of ideas from economic interests? Because you mentioned that the Silk Road is mostly about new economic interests, which is quite true, but for instance with this connection with Asia the

FLOW

East European periphery is now more and more infiltrated with new ideas and models about hybrid regimes, Asian-type democracies, and what not. So, I mean, it's not just about money.

SIRI SCHWABE: – Do you think that you can separate economic interests or are you saying that you can't?

PÉTER BALOGH: – I think you can't. Because Dacia was saying that the Silk Road, the reinvention of the Silk Road, was only more or less about economic interests, and not so much about political ideas. That's what I meant. ROOTS/ ROUTES

DACIA VIEJO-ROSE: – Well, yes, but there are the strategic borders and then the strategic routes, obviously … Creating, emphasizing the Silk Road is a way of connecting East and West strategically in terms of heritage. Opening that dialogue, it's political and economic and about an exchange of ideas. STRATEGY ROOTS/ ROUTES

SIRI SCHWABE: – But I think if you look at the everyday practices of these things, among regular people, you would get a different perspective. In the Chilean context where I have worked, where you have descendants of Palestinian immigrants hanging on to old possessions from … that's material things beyond [economic interests] … the key to the old house symbolizing the return that is supposed to happen at some stage, right? But that's of course something that takes on a different meaning in that context, something that links people to their Palestinian community, and creates a sense of distance perhaps to the wider Chilean society in this case. So that's not about financial interests or anything like that. That's about a diasporic context of belonging to a community and about engaging with the reality that is playing out at a massive geographical distance from where people actually are. So in the context of my research, that's one of the things I find interesting, because how can you be living a Palestinian reality in Chile? Through these things, through these narratives? That was what I was trying to get at. PRACTICE

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – If you take that idea that things have a meaning across distance, then the flow is interesting and can perhaps say something important about borders and border-crossing. Then if you apply the World Heritage concept to this space where things are supposed to flow, and ideas are supposed to FLOW

change ... what happens then, with the Silk Road as World Heritage? As compared to the Silk Road as a function rather than a space? Will that actually help the things we find fascinating [to stand out], or will it have the exact opposite effect? I believe it will have the opposite effect, but I may be wrong.

IAN LILLEY: – It will depend on how you define the heritage. Cause if you define the heritage as the function, whatever the function is . . .

ANNA KÄLLÉN: – Can you freeze the function?

IAN LILLEY: – But you are not freezing it if you say that it is a function that exists across a space. The function is the thing ... whatever the function is, is the heritage.

MATTIAS FRIHAMMAR: – I was just thinking, because you can say in that a way heritage erases memory and establishes history. It is a way to say that this happened at this place. I think that in your example, people who have travelled and lived along this road – although it was long ago now – but they have their memories of [one place along the road], and they don't remember [the entire road]. But when it becomes a heritage, a long heritage place, or site, then the story will be that this [place] is part of this long [road] ... So I think you are right. When you get the memory dimension into thinking about heritage, it changes the way you can think about a place and remember a place, when it becomes a heritage site. Because it becomes history in the official way, and that will dominate the narrative about it in such a way that you can't think about it in another way, even if you live there. Because your old reference points will be changed to science, or they will rebuild [the place] in another way . . .

MEMORY

IAN LILLEY: – It's true to a point. I guess again it comes back to the setting from which I come ... what we are negotiating in Australia at the moment is how the indigenous law integrates with British common law. We have situations like this all the time, where people are about to hunt endangered species, for example. We had one case that went all the way to the highest court, because the person who killed an endangered crocodile did so with modern weapons from a boat with an engine, and all that sort of thing. And the challenge was: this is not a traditional activity as specified by the indigenous law. But the high court said

LAW

NEGOTIATION

no, it's the action and the intention, not how they do it [that matter]. So, yes to some extent, what's happening is defined by definitions and so on. But because of the context in which we operate [they could in this case say that] "Jason shot this crocodile from a motorized boat, but the whole intention was a perfectly traditional ceremonial intention", and so he won the case. [...] What you see in these kinds of negotiations is that the definition is incredibly important. If you define stuff in terms of things rather than ideas, or if you define ideas and try to ... but you have to allow for flexibility and change. We try to not lock ourselves in for precisely that reason.

* * *

TRINH T. MINH-HA: – Coming back to the question of breaking with binary thinking, I think it can be very unpredictable in much wider ways. In other parts of the world, in Asia and West Africa for example, education is carried out in such a way that the more you go inside, the wider it gets. Rather than focusing on individuality versus commonality, or on the personal as opposed to the societal, here the world and the self is never in opposition. Working with this question of outside–in and inside–out, and how its simultaneous movement could impact the way one think of heritage, of a culture – it is at once humbling and exalting to note that as soon as one goes deeper inside, it gets wider and wider. This has always been my experience working with what I think is "my country". Even with the name of the country, it gets wider and wider (as treated in the film *Surname Viet Given Name Nam*). And boundaries that may be strategic ... [like the] one between Vietnam and China are often presented as absolute, even though what we have actually inherited from China is so enormous and deep-seated as to make it almost impossible to raise that kind of barriers. But we do have to raise them at times – politically, strategically – in order to work more specifically on certain areas of culture, and to work out the differences between the two. I would also like to offer another figure in relation to context and history. The spiral is a movement at the same time very old and very challenging for linear thinking. So the focus here for heritage and border would be how to move not according to linear, but to spiral thinking, spiral time – or history as a spiral. Every time you return to what you think is the old, or the ancient, you are actually going somewhere else, constantly in a spiral. In this way you can say that the most ancient and the avant-garde are never opposed to one another. That's how I work for

INSIDE/OUTSIDE

STRATEGY

DIFFERENCE

SPIRAL

example with digital technology in my books, *The digital film event* (2005) and *D-passage: The digital way* (2013). I actually bring together the notions of form and formlessness, I and not-I in ancient spiritual East Asian thinking, and today's digital technology whose process of digitalization and underlying foundation is a translation into a series of zeros and ones: 01010101.

Walking

Siri Schwabe: – I like the idea of the edge zone and the interstitial space, walking on the wall, exploring the border zone ... I still think there is a lot to be gained from acknowledging that borders do exist, that boundaries do exist, and that a lot of people think and work in these binaries. I think there is little point trying to go beyond those binaries. Rather, I envision my own work at least, focusing on the ways in which people work to challenge certain forms of knowledge [...] within those binaries. So not only what is the border zone, but also, what are the exchanges that play out between the inside and the outside, within that border zone and beyond? And again, that brings me back to this idea of routes and the movement. I think this all comes back, for me anyway, to that kind of process thinking. There is always movement, be it spatial or temporal, and most of the time it's both. There is always something happening. And that for me ties into a larger focus on the ethnography of everyday practices of heritage, not among the practitioners and professionals and authorities, but among regular people who just live it and practise it on an everyday level. [...] This process thinking, movement thinking, holds something very interesting.

Border zone

Practice

Elisabeth Niklasson: – Thinking practically, I think it would be interesting if there were more ethnographic hands-on approaches to how borders are created before they become manifested. Whether it's like manifested in print, as a law, or as a physical monument. Instead of objectifying walls, it would be great to see and look at the prerequisites for wall-making. How borders come to be. In general, borrowing from concepts that have been thrown around here, [I think that questions such as] "whose law?", and "who does the law serve?" are important. Taking that to the concept of border, I think it would be productive to think in terms of – without losing the political part of borders – to think about who does the border serve. So if heritage is a border, and we acknowledge that borders is an integral part of what heritage is, [we should ask] who does the border serve. And often it serves us, who works within heritage and the heritage sector in different ways, as well as it serves ... well, it serves a lot of different people, but in what ways?

Whose law?

Anna Källén: – Can we, in heritage studies, find examples or ways ahead where we can actually at the border work with it?

Siri Schwabe: – I was thinking as the discussion went on, after I put forth the idea of following movements and looking at the sometimes tense or paradoxical exchanges at a border and across a border. And … I'm very interested in not only national borders, but also … how mental or social or political borders play out in practice. And one of the venues where we might go and look at that, is the urban centres, right? Because we're not only looking at migration across [national] borders, but also to world cities, which is why a lot of churches [in the countryside] are empty now. So, I think doing studies within urban settings in practice [among] people, but also in the material sense … I'm coming into a new project where I look at architecture, and essentially what is happening is also that "the heritage of the future" is being built … But, like, how are borders negotiated in the ways that cities are developed? Obviously now we are looking at much more diverse cities in a lot of terms. So how do cities accommodate a different population to what city populations were in a lot of places a hundred years ago? What are the physical, material manifestations of that change? But also, how does it play out socially or culturally? This was something that was in the Danish news, I think last week or the week before, the Minister of Integration who had been to London and came home and tweeted something like "Well, we see how diverse London is and that is no fun, is it?", trying to use that as an example of how horribly wrong it can go if you let too many foreigners in – without taking imperialism into account or anything … But of course, a lot of people responded and said "Actually, we think London is a great place, we think there is a lot of interesting stuff happening in London, because of how massive and also massively diverse it is". So, I think that might be somewhere, if we're talking about visions for the future and places to go with heritage studies, I think it would be interesting to look at how heritage and future heritage is built under very different circumstances in the cities, than what was the case before.

Practice

Difference

Mattias Frihammar: – I think time is the thing here. […] Now we have climate change, the last climate period lasted 65 million years. And now in the 1950s it changed. Now we are always connected with the future. Everything we do, will make something in the future. When I grew up there was a campaign in Sweden that was called *Håll Sverige Rent* – keep Sweden clean – and it was about not throwing [waste] on the ground. And now, people say don't use plastic bags,

because it will destroy the earth. I think that has to do with our experience of
Time time, and space. So I think there is a connection [to heritage] [...] They say that when the polar ices are melting it is deep time melting. And that is quite interesting. There are connections between heritage studies and the way scientists talk about climate, because ... it was not a different climate yesterday, although it was raining yesterday and is sunny today. It is something that is about time.

Inside/ outside
TRINH T. MINH-HA: – [I was thinking of] the movement outside–in, inside–out, the more we go inside the wider it gets, and then linking it with what Mattias was talking about – time. Little by little I could relate so much more with what you were saying about time [...]. And also with what Elisabeth was
Time raising in relation to how discourse is often considered to be less serious than ... let's say material reality, or physical reality. Similarly, the notion of time is like ... whenever someone says discourse and language are not important because there is another reality that is more real, the person is really not functioning in our time. For, in everything we do, we are driven by the symbolic order – that essential part of social reality. Language in its symbolic dimension is a strongly affective kind of reality whose impact remains very powerful. In relation to time ... there is an example that often comes to my mind. It's a common story in West Africa, as told by the scholar and diviner Malidoma Somé. In his village a number of people were gathering, and drinking around a calabash of millet beer. Somé who had travelled told them how such sitting around would be negatively looked upon in the West whose life pace is faster. One of the elders asked where these white people run to every morning, and when he was told that they were heading
Time to their workplaces, he asked again: "Why do they have to run to something that is not running away from them?" To which, Somé replied: "They do not have time," using French to express a word that didn't even exist in his language. Of course then, the elder asked: "What is time?" And their conversation came to a halt. Here we come back to where I started ... if one sees something material or physical, not as an object but as time – like when you say the ice melting is time ... water is time. We can go further and say indeed we don't have time because we are time. Constantly, we are time. So no wonder that in ancient "times", all these painters from China ... I remember how people looking at their paintings tend to refer to them either as an "expert" in horses, or an expert in persimmons, or else an expert in mountains. It is not at all a question of expertise as we understand it today. They have spent all that time drawing only horses or only mountains. It is a question of time. Every single moment they draw the mountain is a dif-

ferent instant of mountain. Through their works, we can see the identity of an object in constant motion, or rather, we can see the object in its course. There is also a tendency to see film as movement-image – at least with analogue film. But analogue film is not at all moving. It's founded in stillness. It is a series of still images. So to bring about a more constructive way of looking at film one should inquire into the time-image (as Deleuze did). Time really determines the image event as well as the experience of sitting through a film, looking at and living time through images.

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The Contributors

Mikael Baaz is an Associate Professor in International Law and an Associate Professor in Peace and Conflict Studies. He currently works as a Senior Lecturer in International Law at the Department of Law, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg. His research focuses on aspects of "international society" including the "politics of governance" and "the politics of resistance". Baaz is the author of a number of books, including: *Law & politics in the international society* (Jure, 2019), and coauthor of *Researching resistance and social change: A critical approach to theory and practice*, (Rowman and Littlefield, 2018), and *Resistance and emotions: Interrogating crossroads and social change* (Routledge, 2018).

Péter Balogh holds a Ph.D. in Human Geography from Stockholm University (2014) and is currently a postdoctoral research fellow at the Institute for Regional Studies, CERS HAS (MTA) in Budapest. His main fields of interest are Border Studies, Political Geography, and Critical Geopolitics. Through studying borders, spatial images, and geographical narratives, his research revolves around the questions what kind of ideologies and narratives are (meant to be) binding various groups of people together, which actors produce such discourses, and with what goals and consequences.

Mattias Frihammar, Ph.D. is a Senior Lecturer in Ethnology at the Department of Ethnology, History of Religions and Gender Studies at Stockholm University and co-ordinator of the Stockholm University Bachelor programme in Museums and Heritage. He is interested in heritages in a broad sense, among other thing the heritagization of the material and immaterial remnants of the Cold War period in Sweden, social and cultural constructions of death, and how flora and fauna are framed

within a broad notion of heritage with special focus on attitudes and practices that concerns invasive species.

Ida Hughes Tidlund is a Ph.D. student in Ethnology at Stockholm University, within CEMAS (Centre for Maritime Studies). Her dissertation project concerns the maritime borders of the province of Åland in Finland, and how the floating borders have been adjusted, anchored, and lived since their establishment. Her main fields of interest are vernacular border effects, heritage issues, and ethics in ethnographical methods.

Anna Källén, Ph.D. is Associate Professor in Archaeology and Researcher in Critical Heritage Studies at Stockholm University, Department of Culture and Aesthetics. Her research has taken the form of critical enquiries into the making, use, and maintenance of archaeological heritage in contemporary and colonial society, in Europe and South-East Asia. Her latest book is *Stones standing: Archaeology, colonialism and ecotourism in Northern Laos* (Left Coast Press & Routledge, 2015), and she is Lead Investigator of the current project *Code–Narrative–History: Making sense of ancient DNA in contemporary culture.*

Anna Karlström holds a Ph.D. in archaeology from Uppsala University, and is a researcher in Heritage Studies at the Department of Art History/Conservation, Uppsala University Campus Gotland, where she also teaches. Her Ph.D. dissertation – *Preserving impermanence: The creation of heritage in Vientiane, Laos* (2009) – challenges taken for granted material preservationism in contemporary heritage discourse, which is a theme she develops further in present research.

Fredrik Krohn Andersson is a Senior Lecturer in Art History and Heritage Studies at the Department of Culture and Aesthetics, Stockholm University. His research interests include heritagizations of nuclear power and of the Cold War, as well as critical architectural historiography. Recent publications are the articles 'The advantage and disadvantage of architectural history in the age of history of built environment' (*Journal of Art History,* 2016), and 'Mediating public cultural policy: Buildings, bills, and films as governmentality' (*The Power of the In-Between,* 2018).

Mona Lilja currently serves as Professor in Peace and Development Research at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Lilja's area of interest

is the linkages between resistance and social change as well as the particularities – the character and emergence – of various forms of resistance. In regard to this, she is currently working on how different articulations of resistance fuel other forms of resistance. Some of her papers have appeared in *Signs, Global Public Health, Nora, Feminist Review*, and the *Journal of Political Power*.

Ian Lilley has worked in Australasian and Indo-Pacific archaeology and cultural heritage for over 40 years. He holds a chair in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies Unit at the University of Queensland in Australia and is the Willem Willems Chair of Contemporary Issues in Archaeological Heritage Management at Leiden University in the Netherlands. He is an ICOMOS World Heritage Assessor, serves on two IUCN Commissions, and has held a variety of other national and international leadership roles. His most recent books are a heritage-management volume on *Early human expansion and innovation in the Pacific* (ICOMOS 2010) and the university textbook *Archaeology of Oceania: Australia and the Pacific Islands* (Blackwell, 2006).

Elisabeth Niklasson holds a Ph.D. in archaeology from Stockholm University (2016) and is currently a postdoctoral scholar at Stanford University. Her research explores the fabric of heritage politics: how the everyday paper shuffling and power struggles in political institutions influence what we come to know as "our common heritage". In *Funding matters* (dissertation), she used participant observation in the European Commission, document analysis, and interviews to examine if and how EU grant systems have fostered specific approaches to Europeanness in archaeology. At Stanford she pursues two new lines of research. One scrutinizes the identity politics of the European Heritage Label, an emblematic heritage scheme adopted by the EU in 2011. The other studies the role of heritage within far-right political movements in Europe.

Catharina Nolin is a Professor of Art History and Director of Heritage Studies at the Department of Culture and Aesthetics, Stockholm University, Sweden. Her core field of research interest is the history and historiography of urban public parks, landscape architecture as a female practice and performance, as well as gardens in heritage perspectives. She has contributed to a number of international edited volumes, including: *Women, modernity and landscape architecture* (Routledge, 2015), *Green landscapes in the European city, 1750–2000* (Routledge, 2017), and *Heritage of death* (Routledge, 2017).

Cecilia Parsberg holds a Ph.D. in Fine Arts in Visual Arts, Lund University and Umeå University. She is a Senior Lecturer in Visual Arts at the Department of Artistic Studies, Karlstad University. "My work is contextually situated, relational, performative, politically informed, and articulates an artistic view on challenges that are also existential, political, and aesthetic. A form of participatory performance is involved in the production process one way or another – and aims to generate images to be presented to an audience. My projects are for the most part clearly situated in time and space and developed in relation to the public debate; my investigations have also demanded a public space for the presentations."

Siri Schwabe holds a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from Stockholm University, and is an Assistant Professor at the Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University. Her research focuses on processes related to memory and place-making. Currently, she is investigating the relationships between urban development, atmospheres, heritage, and the use of lighting design in public space. Her doctoral research centered on transnational politics of memory and its spatial contestations as explored through an ethnography of the Palestinian diaspora in Santiago de Chile.

Trinh T. Minh-ha is a filmmaker, writer, composer, and Professor of Gender and Women's Studies and of Rhetoric at the University of California, Berkeley. Her work includes numerous books, such as: *Lovecidal: Walking with The Disappeared*; *D-passage: The digital way*; *Elsewhere, within here: Immigration, refugeeism and the boundary event*; *Framer framed; and Woman, native, other: Writing postcoloniality and feminism*; as well as eight feature-length films (including most recently, *Forgetting Vietnam*), which have been featured in numerous retrospectives around the world.

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